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HISTORY OF GREECE

FINLAY

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A
HISTORY OF GREECE

FROM ITS
CONQUEST BY THE ROMANS TO THE PRESENT TIME

B.C. 146 TO A.D. 1864

BY
GEORGE FINLAY, LL.D.

A NEW EDITION, REVISED THROUGHOUT, AND IN PART RE-WRITTEN,
WITH CONSIDERABLE ADDITIONS, BY THE AUTHOR,

AND EDITED BY THE
REV. H. F. TOZER, M.A.
TUTOR AND LATE FELLOW OF EXETER COLLEGE, OXFORD

IN SEVEN VOLUMES

VOL. IV
MEDIAEVAL GREECE AND THE EMPIRE OF TREBIZOND

A.D. 1204 — 1461

The logo features a stylized 'O' with a crown on top, followed by the word 'xford' in a serif font.

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TO

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ETC. ETC. ETC.

WHOSE LONG AND LABORIOUS EXERTIONS

IN CLEARING THE ANCIENT HISTORY OF GREECE FROM OBSCURITY,

AND THE MODERN FROM MISREPRESENTATION,

HAVE MERITED THE APPLAUSE OF BRITAIN AND THE

GRATITUDE OF GREECE,

THE FOLLOWING PAGES ARE INSCRIBED

AS A TESTIMONIAL OF PERSONAL RESPECT AND LITERARY HOMAGE,

BY

THE AUTHOR.

MEDIAEVAL GREECE.

CHAPTER I.

CHANGES OF THE POPULATION AFTER THE DECLINE OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE.

SECT. I.—*Observations on the Early Changes.*

TWO facts form the basis of Greek history at the commencement of the Byzantine empire: the diminution in the numbers of the Hellenic race, and the occupation of a considerable part of Greece by Slavonians who settled in the depopulated country¹. The Byzantine writers inform us, that for several centuries the Slavonians formed the bulk of the population in ancient Hellas, but the precise extent to which this Slavonian colonization was carried has been the subject of warm discussion. One party maintains that the present inhabitants of Greece are Byzantinized Slavonians; another upholds them to be the lineal descendants of the men who were conquered by the Romans. This latter party generally selects an earlier genealogical era, and talks only of a descent from the subjects of Leonidas and the fellow-citizens of Pericles. Both seem equally far from the truth. But nations affect antiquity of blood and nobility of race as much as individuals; and surely the Greeks, who have been so long deprived of glory in their immediate progenitors, may be

¹ The Byzantine empire is a conventional term which historians have applied to the Eastern Roman empire. In this work it is used as applicable to the period commencing with the accession of the iconoclast Leo III. in 715, and ending with the establishment of the Latin empire in 1204. See vol. ii. p. 3.

pardoned for displaying an eager zeal to participate in the fame of a past world, with which they alone can claim any national connection. It is not, therefore, surprising that the attempt, to prove the extermination of the Hellenic race in Europe by the Slavonians, deeply wounded both Greek patriotism and Philhellenic enthusiasm¹.

Before reviewing the various immigrations into Greece during the middle ages, it is necessary to notice two questions connected with the population in earlier times which still admit of doubt and discussion. Their importance in determining the extent to which the bulk of the population may have been of mixed race during the classic ages is great. The one relates to the numbers of the slave population employed in agriculture when Greece was in its most flourishing condition; and the other, to the proportions in which the free population and the slaves were diminished in the general depopulation of the country that preceded the Slavonian immigration. A large proportion of the slaves employed in agriculture were of foreign origin, as we know from the enormous extent of the slave trade, and from the circumstance that the Greeks looked on the rearing of slaves as unprofitable². We know also that under the domination of the Romans, the higher classes of Greece either died out or

¹ Professor Fallmerayer made this attempt with great ability. His principal work is entitled *Geschichte der halbinsel Morea während des Mittelalters*. A subsequent tract forms a necessary appendix. It is entitled *Welchen Einfluss hatte die Besetzung Griechenlands durch die Slaven auf das Schicksal der Stadt Athen? oder die Entstehung der heutigen Griechen*. In both these works, which contain much original matter, there is too much latitude in the use of authorities. The ablest opponent of Fallmerayer is Zinkeisen, but his *Geschichte Griechenlands* is far from a triumphant refutation. It has the merit of exact references to the original authorities. Two Greeks at Athens have also attempted to reply to Fallmerayer, viz. A. G. Leukias, *Refutatio illorum qui putaverunt, scripserunt, et typis divulgaverunt, quod nemo eorum qui nunc Græciam incolant a veteribus Græcis oriundus est*; Gr. et Lat. Athenis, 1843; and K. Paparrhegopoulos, *Περὶ τῆς ἐποικίσεως Σλαβικῶν φύλων εἰς τὴν Πελοπόννησον, ἐν Ἀθήναις*, 1843. [By far the most exhaustive discussion of this subject is to be found in Professor Carl Hopf's *Geschichte Griechenlands* in Brockhaus' *Griechenland*, vol. vi. pp. 100 foll. (vol. lxxxv. of Ersch and Gruber's *Encyclopædie*, published in 1867). Here Fallmerayer's authorities are subjected to a searching examination, and the historical aspect of the question is fully discussed. This treatise may be fairly said to have set the matter at rest; so that Fallmerayer's theses may be considered as disproved, except so far as they imply that a large admixture of Slavonic blood flows in the veins of the modern Greeks, which is admitted on all hands. An interesting sketch of the controversy is given in Hertzberg's *Geschichte Griechenlands seit dem Absterben des antiken Lebens*, i pp. 120-130. Ed.]

² Aristot. *Pol.* iv. (vii.) 9; Reitemeier, *Geschichte und Zustand der Sklaverey und Leibeigenschaft in Griechenland*, pp. 73-79.

Ch. I. § 1.]

lost their nationality by adopting the names and assuming the manners of Roman citizens. Indeed it seems probable that pure Hellenic blood began to be greatly adulterated about the time the ancient Greek dialects fell into disuse. Still there can be no doubt that the Greek population retired before the Slavonian immigration, and did not mingle with the intruders, but on the other hand there is no evidence to determine whether the agricultural slaves were exterminated by the barbarian invaders of the Hellenic soil, or were absorbed into the mass of the Slavonian or Byzantine population. These questions prove how uncertain all inquiries into the direct affiliation of the modern Greeks must be. Of what value is the oldest genealogic tree, if a single generation be omitted in the middle?

The extent to which the purity of the Hellenic race was corrupted by admixture with the slave population hardly admits of a satisfactory answer. Liberated slaves certainly engrafted themselves into the native blood of Greece, to some extent, in Roman times; but it is difficult to ascertain what proportion of the freedmen that filled Greece were of foreign origin. Slavery was for many ages the principal agent of productive industry in Greece; the soil was cultivated by slaves, and many manufactured articles were produced by their labour. Throughout the whole country, they formed at least one-half of the population¹. Now, although the freedmen and descendants of liberated foreign slaves never formed as important an element in the higher classes of the population of Greece as they did of Rome, still they must have exerted a considerable influence on society. And here a question forces itself on the attention,—Whether the singular corruption which the Greek language has undergone, according to one unvarying type, in every land where it was spoken, from Syracuse to Trebizond, must not be, in great part, attributed to the infusion of foreign elements, which slavery introduced into Hellenic society in numberless streams, all flowing from a similar source? The Thracians and Slavonians were for centuries to the slave-trade of the

¹ For the best information on the numbers of the slave population, see Clinton, *Fasti Hellenici*, vol. ii. 381. In comparing the numbers of the slaves in Greece with those in the slave states of North America, we must recollect that the proportion of adults would be greater in Greece, as the importation was free, and the Greeks did not rear slaves in any quantity.

Greeks what the Georgians and Circassians have been for ages to the Mohammedan nations, and the Negroes of the African coast to the European colonies in America¹.

Whatever may have been the operation of these causes in adulterating the purity of the Hellenic race and the Greek language, we know that a great revolution occurred about the middle of the sixth century of our era. Until that time, the population of Greece presented the external signs of a homogeneous people. In the third century, the Greek language was spoken by the rural population with as much purity as by the inhabitants of the towns, and even the ancient peculiarities of dialect were often preserved². Nor did the condition of the mass of the population, greatly as it was diminished, undergo any material change until after the time of Justinian; for the invasions of the Goths in the third and fourth centuries were temporary evils, that only caused a permanent decrease in the population in so far as they destroyed the productive powers of the country.

The Greek language indicates that a great change had taken place in the Greek people before the extinction of the Western Empire. The rhythmical beauty of the ancient language had been destroyed by allowing accent to absorb quantity long before foreign colonies invaded the Hellenic soil. But it was not until the great Slavonian invasion had overspread the land that the native population was com-

¹ [It rarely happens that the language of a highly developed people is influenced in any considerable degree by those of other races in a lower state of civilization and possessing no literature. The change which has passed over the syntax of the Greek language in the transition from its ancient to its modern form, is sufficiently accounted for by the tendency of all languages to lose inflexions and become more analytic, and by the necessity of adapting expressions to the modes of thought of conquering tribes. These are the same influences which have operated in the formation of the Romance languages. In the modern Greek vocabulary the principal intrusive elements are derived from Latin, Italian, and Turkish. This of course does not apply to the Neo-hellenic idiom of the Athens press, which has eliminated the intrusive words, but to the Romaic of the people, which was used by all classes up to the War of Independence. At one time it was maintained that the language had been considerably modified by the Slavonic dialects; as, for instance, by Heilmair, in his otherwise excellent treatise *Ueber die Entstehung der romaischen Sprache unter dem Einflusse fremder Zungen* (pp. 23-34); but this view has been disproved by Miklosich, who has shown in his essay entitled *Die slawischen Elemente im Neugriechischen*, how extremely slight that influence has been. Ed.]

² Philostratus, though speaking of an earlier period, may be received as an authority for his own time, which may extend considerably into the third century. See the dialogue with Sostratus in the *Life of Herodes Atticus* (*Vit. Soph.* ii. 1, p. 238), and the *Life of Apollonius of Tyana*, viii. 12.

pletely transformed into that modern race of Greeks, which inhabited the towns and had recovered possession of a considerable part of the country at the time of the conquest of Greece by the Crusaders and Venetians. Among an illiterate people like the Greeks of the sixth, seventh, and eighth centuries, each successive generation alters the language of oral communication, by neglecting inflexions and disregarding grammatical rules. A corrupted pronunciation confounds orthography, and obscures the comprehension of the grammatical changes which words undergo. The process of transforming the Hellenic language into the Romaic, or modern Greek dialect, evidently arose from a long neglect of the rules of grammar and orthography; and the pronunciation, though corrupted by the confusion it makes of vowels and diphthongs, proves by the very tenacity with which it has preserved the Hellenic accentuation, that modern Greek is a lineal descendant of the classic language; for with its inflexions correctly written, it might easily be mistaken for a colloquial dialect of some ancient Greek colony, were it possible for a scholar unacquainted with the existence of the nation in modern times to meet with a Romaic translation of Thucydides¹. There is hardly more difference between the language of Homer and the New Testament, than between that of the New Testament and a modern Greek review. Greek and Arabic seem to be the two spoken languages that have suffered the smallest change in the lapse of ages. The inference is plain; either these are the nations which have admitted the smallest infusion of extraneous social elements, and been the least under foreign compulsion in modifying their habits and ideas; or else, the ties of blood

¹ Ducange traces the progress of corruption in the Latin language, in the preface to his *Glossarium mediae et infimae Latinitatis*. Hallam (*Introduction to the Literature of Europe in Fifteenth, Sixteenth, and Seventeenth Centuries*, vol. i. p. 69, Paris edit.) notices a MS. in the British Museum (Cotton. Galba, i. 18) containing the Lord's Prayer in Greek, written in Anglo-Saxon characters, which proves the pronunciation to have been the same in the eighth century as at present. Compare *Turner's History of the Anglo-Saxons*, iii. 396. See also the German translation of Henrichsen's Tracts in Danish—*Ueber die Neugriechische Aussprache der Hellenischen Sprache*, p. 38; and *Ueber die sogenannten politischen Verse bei den Griechen*, 27. [The standard work on the development of the modern Greek language is Prof. Mullach's *Grammatik der Griechischen Vulgarsprache in historischer Entwicklung*: in English it is treated in the Introduction to Sophocles' *Glossary of later and Byzantine Greek*; and in a lucid essay by Professor Blackie, *On the philological genius and character of the Neo-hellenic dialect of the Greek language*, in his *Horae Hellenicae*, pp. 111–166. Ed.]

and race have been weaker than those of civilization and religion, and literature and religion have created Arabs out of Syrians and Egyptians, and Greeks out of Slavonians and Albanians.

The gospel and the laws of Justinian blended all classes of citizens into one mass, and facilitated the acquisition of the boon of freedom by every Christian slave. The pride of the Hellenic race was stifled, and the Greeks became proud of the name of Romans, and eager to be ranked with the freedmen and manumitted slaves of the masters of the world. But a Christian church which was neither Greek nor Roman, arose and created to itself a separate power under the name of Orthodox, and forming a partnership with the imperial authority, acquired a power greater than any nationality could have conferred. A social organization at variance with all the prejudices of ancient, private, and political life was framed, and the consequence was that this change created a new people. Such seems to be the origin of the modern Greeks, a people which displays homogeneity in character, though dispersed over an immense extent of country, and living in various insulated districts, from Corfu to Trebizond, and from Philippopolis to Cyprus.

SECT. II.—*Depopulation of Greece under the Roman Government.—Causes of the Introduction of Slavonian Settlers.*

The depopulation of Greece under the Roman government is the leading fact of Greek history for several centuries. This depopulation was increased and perpetuated by the accumulation of immense landed estates in the hands of individual proprietors. The expense of maintaining good roads and other adjuncts of civilization, necessary for bringing agricultural produce to market, is greater in Greece than in most other countries; and it would be considered by proprietors of whole provinces as an unprofitable sacrifice. Their neglect consequently produced the abandonment of the cultivation of the soil in a great part of the country, and its conversion into pasture land. From provinces in this condition the government often derived very little revenue, for the large proprietors found facilities of gaining exemption

Ch. I. § 2.]

from taxation, and the diminished numbers and impoverished condition of the colons rendered the tribute insignificant. The defence of a province so situated became a matter of no interest to the central power at Rome or Constantinople, and it was abandoned to the invaders without a struggle. Greece was often left to defend itself against Gothic and Sclavonian invaders, whose progress must have been facilitated by the numbers of the discontented colons and agricultural slaves, for the Sclavonian lands were the great slave marts of the age. Such was the internal state of Greece when the Sclavonians attacked the Byzantine empire as a warlike and conquering race.

The earliest steps by which the Sclavonians colonized the Hellenic soil are unnoticed in history. Like the subsequent increase in the number of the Greeks who expelled or absorbed them, its very causes pass unrecorded, and the greater part of what we know is learned by inferences drawn from incidental notices connected with other facts. Strange to say, this remarkable revolution in the population of Greece excited very little attention among either ancient or modern historians until recently; and the great vicissitudes that took place in the numbers of the Greek population of the Byzantine empire in Europe, during different periods of the middle ages, is a subject which has not yet been carefully investigated¹.

The fabric of the ancient world was broken in pieces during the reign of Justinian, and Greece presented the spectacle of ruined cities and desolate fields. Procopius, in recording one of the great irruptions of the Hunnish armies, whose course was followed by Sclavonian auxiliaries and subjects, mentions that the barbarians passed the fortifications at Thermopylae, and spread their ravages over all the continent as far as the isthmus of Corinth. This notice places the commencement of the hostile incursions of the Sclavonians into Greece as

¹ Colonel Leake, in his *Researches in Greece*, published in 1814, first pointed out proofs of the long residence of the Sclavonians in every part of Greece, and cited the principal Byzantine authorities which certify the political importance of their settlements (p. 379). Professor Fallmerayer became the champion of Sclavonianism, in his *History of the Morea*, in 1830; and he has ever since defended the cause with great eloquence, learning, and wit, but with some exaggeration. It was Colonel Leake who first observed that the Sclavonian names of places in Greece are often the same as those of places in the most distant parts of Russia. By means of this discovery, Fallmerayer endeavours to exterminate the ancient Greeks.

early as the year 540¹. But the colonization of the Hellenic soil by Slavonians is not noticed until long after its occurrence, and its extent is proved more convincingly by its consequences than by the testimony of historians. In the adulatory work of Procopius on the buildings of Justinian, the conversion of a large part of Greece into pasture lands, by the repeated ravages of the barbarians, is incidentally revealed; and the necessity of constructing forts, for the protection of the population engaged in the regular agricultural operations of husbandry, is distinctly stated. The fourth book is filled with an enumeration of forts and castles constructed and repaired for no other object. The care, too, which the emperor devoted to fortifying the isthmus of Corinth, when he found that the greater part of the Peloponnesian cities were not in a state of defence, affords strong proof of the danger of an irruption of barbarous tribes, even into that distant citadel of the Hellenic race². The particular mention of the fortifications necessary to protect the fertile land on the river Rhechios, in Macedonia, and the construction of the city of Kastoria, to replace the ruined Diocletianopolis, while they prove the desertion of great part of Chalcidice and Upper Macedonia by the ancient inhabitants, prepare us for finding these districts occupied by a new race of immigrants³. Now, it is precisely in these districts that we find the Slavonians first forming the mass of the inhabitants within limits once occupied by the Hellenic race⁴. In these cases of colonization, as in many others afterwards, it seems that the Slavonians occupied their new settlements without any opposition on the part of the Roman government; and though their countrymen continued to ravage and depopulate the provinces of the empire as enemies, these peaceable settlers may have been allowed to retain their establishments as subjects and tributaries. The Goths, and other Teutonic

¹ Procopius, *De Bello Persico*, ii. c. 4, p. 95, edit. Paris. He mentions frequent incursions of the Slavonians into Illyria and Thrace; and in alluding to this very expedition in the Secret History, he connects the Huns, Slavonians, and Antes, together as allies (c. 18, p. 54). Several Byzantine historians speak of irruptions of the Huns and Slavonians, in a united body, into Thrace in 559. Malalas, 235; Theophanes, 197; Cedrenus, 386; Clinton, *Fasti Romani*, i. 810.

² Procopius, *De Aedificiis*, iv. c. 2, p. 71.

³ Ibid. lib. iv. c. 3, 4. The Rhechios is supposed to be the river that flows from the lake Bolbe to the Gulf of Strymon.

⁴ Tafel, *De Thessalonica ejusque Agro*. Proleg. lvii.

peoples who invaded the Eastern Empire, were nothing more than tribes of warriors, who, like the Dorians, the Romans, and the Othoman Turks, became great nations from the extent of their conquests, not from their original numerical strength. But the Sclavonians, on the contrary, had for ages formed the bulk of the population in wide-extended territories from the shores of the Adriatic to the sources of the Dnieper and the Volga. In a considerable portion of the countries in which they subsequently appear as conquerors, a kindred race seems to have cultivated the soil even under the Roman government; but at what period the Sclavonians began to force themselves southward into the territories once occupied by the Illyrians and the Thracians, is a question of much obscurity.

The successive decline of the Roman, Gothic, and Hunnish empires, in the provinces along the Danube, allowed the hitherto subject Sclavonians to assume independence, and form themselves into warlike bands, in imitation of their masters. The warlike and agricultural Sclavonians from that time became as distinct as if they belonged to two different nations. A contrast soon arose in their state of civilization; and this, added to the immense extent and disconnected and diversified form of the territory over which the Sclavonian race was scattered, prevented it from ever uniting, so as to form one empire. The Sclavonians always make their appearance in the history of Greece as small independent hordes, or as the subjects of the Huns, Avars, or Bulgarians, and never, except in the Illyrian provinces, form independent states, with a permanent political existence. Their ravages as enemies are recorded, their peaceful immigrations as friends and clients pass unnoticed. No inconsiderable part of those provinces of the Eastern Empire that were desolated by the repeated inroads of the northern nations were nevertheless re peopled by Sclavonian colonists, who, often fearing to devote themselves to husbandry, lest they should invite fresh incursions, adopted a nomadic life as the only method of securing their property. In this way they became, according to the vicissitudes of the times, the serfs or the enemies of their Greek neighbours in the walled towns. It was a characteristic of the Sclavonian colonists, in the Byzantine empire, for a long period, that they had an aversion to

agriculture, and followed it only on a small scale, deriving their principal support from cattle¹.

The progress of depopulation in the Roman empire is attested by numerous laws, which prove that the rapid diminution in the members of the municipalities forced the government to adopt regulations for the purpose of retaining every class of society in its own sphere and place². The steady diminution of the Greek race, from the time of Justinian I. to that of Leo III., is testified by the whole history of the period; and it is evident that this diminution was more immediately dependent on political causes, connected with a vicious administration of the government, and on moral ones arising out of a corrupt state of society, than on the desolation produced by foreign invaders. The extermination of the Illyrian and Thracian nations may have been completed by the ravages of the northern barbarians; but it could not have been effected unless these people had been weakened and decimated by bad administration and social degradation. The same causes which operated in exterminating the Thracian and Illyrian races were at work on the Greek population, though operating with less violence. The maritime cities and principal towns, both in Thrace and Illyria, were in great part inhabited by Greeks; and from these the rural population was repulsed, as a hostile band, when it appeared before their walls in a state of poverty, in order to seek refuge and food. The citizens, in such cases, had always so many drains on their resources, to which interest compelled them to attend, that humanity only extended to the circle of their immediate

¹ *Institutions Militaires de l'Empereur Leon le Philosophe, traduites par Joly de Maizroy*, tome ii. p. 117. *Leonis Tactica*, c. xviii. § 99; Imp. Mauricii *Ars Militaris*, p. 272 (edit. Scheffer). The spirit of the warlike Sclavonians, at the period they poured their conquering armies into the Eastern Empire, is described in Menander (*Excerpta e Menandri Historia*, p. 406, edit. Bonn, in the *Corpus Historiæ Byzantinæ*). The extent of the Sclavonian colonization in Macedonia in the seventh century is proved by the Emperor Justinian II. transporting at one time more than 150,000 souls into Asia and settling them on the shores of the Hellespont. Theophanes, pp. 304. 305. 364. Thirty thousand troops were raised in this colony shortly after its establishment.

² *Cod. Justin.* x. tit. 32; and tit. 31, laws 18, 19, 20, 21, 50. Even he who quitted his civil position as tax-payer to the fisc, to serve in the army, was ordered to be brought back to his estate (law 17)—'Qui derelicta curia militaverit, revocetur ad curiam.' No words could declare more strongly the decrease in the numbers of the tax-payers, nor mark more clearly that the treasury, not the army, gave its character and laws to the Eastern Roman empire. Modern nations, having reached the same crisis in their government, might study Byzantine history for lessons in politics.

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neighbours. But when the Sclavonians colonized the wasted lands, this new population proved better able to protect itself, both from its previous rude habits of life, and from the artless method in which it pursued its agricultural occupations. The Sclavonians, therefore, soon became the sole possessors of the greater part of the territories once inhabited by the Illyrians and Thracians. For some centuries, they seem to have advanced into the Hellenic territory in the same manner in which they had possessed themselves of the country to the north; but the circumstances were somewhat changed by the greater number of towns they met with, and by the comparatively flourishing condition maintained by that large portion of the Greek population engaged in commerce and manufactures. Though they occupied extensive territories in Greece without encountering serious opposition, their progress was arrested at many points by a dense population, living under the protection of walled towns. It is, however, impossible to trace the progress of the Sclavonians on the Hellenic soil in any detail; and we learn only from a casual notice in the ecclesiastical historian Evagrius, that their first great hostile irruptions into the Peloponnesus were made under the shelter of the Avar power, towards the end of the sixth century¹. Whether any colonies had previously settled in the peninsula as agriculturists, or whether they at that time formed populous settlements in northern Greece, is a mere matter of conjecture.

SECT. III.—*The Sclavonians in the Peloponnesus.*

It will assist our means of estimating the extent of the Sclavonian colonization of Greece, and the influence it exercised in the country, if we pass in review the principal historical notices that have been preserved relating to these settlements, particularly in the Peloponnesus, the citadel of the Hellenic population. The ravages by which the barbarians opened the way for the Sclavonians as early as the reign of Justinian have been noticed. The contemporary Byzantine historian, Menander, records that about the year 581 the Sclavonians ravaged Thrace with an army of their own amounting to

¹ See next section.

a hundred thousand men, and extended their devastations into Greece¹. About this time they were carrying on war with the Chagan of the Avars, to whom they had formerly paid tribute. Many Sclavonian tribes, however, continued to be subject to the Avar power, and to furnish auxiliaries to their armies². A few years later another contemporary historian, Evagrius, in a passage already alluded to, notices an invasion of the Avars into Greece in the following words: 'The Avars penetrated twice as far as the long wall of Thrace. Singidon, Anchialos, all Greece, and many cities and fortresses, were taken and plundered; everything was laid waste with fire and sword, for the greater part of the imperial army was stationed at the time in Asia³.' These words, unsupported by other evidence, would certainly not lead us to infer that any part of Greece had been then settled by either Avars or Sclavonians, even were we assured that the Sclavonians composed the bulk of the Avar army. But this careless mention of Greece, by Evagrius, in connection with the plundering incursions of the Avars, receives some historical value, when connected with the Sclavonian colonies in the Peloponnesus by a passage in a synodal letter of the Patriarch Nikolaos to the Emperor Alexius I. The Patriarch mentions that the Emperor Nicephorus I., about the year 807, raised Patrae to the rank of a metropolitan see, on

¹ *Excerptae Menandri Historia*, pp. 327 and 404, edit. Bonn.

² *Ibid.* p. 334. The conquest of the Antae, a numerous Sclavonian race, is mentioned in p. 285. See Schafarik's *Slawische Alterthümer*, i. 68. The importance of the Sclavonian colonies in Macedonia, and their wars with the Greeks and the Byzantine government during the interval between A.D. 589 and 746, are noticed by Tafel (*De Thessalonica*, proleg. pp. lviii. xci.) and the authorities he quotes. Theoph. pp. 288, 304, 305. The Patriarch Nicephorus mentions the Sclavonians as united in great numbers with the Avar armies (*Breviarium*, pp. 13, 24). Ephraemius. 69, edit. Bonn.

³ Evagrius, *Hist. Eccles.* vi. 10. (This passage has been the subject of much discussion; see Zinkeisen, *Geschichte Griechenlands*, p. 697.) This took place before the year 591, as the Emperor Maurice concluded peace with Persia in that year. Those who witnessed the complete desolation of Greece after the war of independence against the Turks, and the civil wars that followed the assassination of Capodistrias, can alone understand to what extent it is possible for barbarians to desolate a country. The Avars probably understood the art as well as the Turks and Greek Palikari. I have myself ridden through the streets of Tripolitza, Corinth, Megara, Athens, Thebes, and Livadea, when hardly a single house had escaped being levelled with the ground. No living soul was to be seen in the streets, through which the fallen walls of the houses rendered it difficult to penetrate, and no cattle could be found in the surrounding country. I have visited villages in which bread had not been made for a fortnight, the whole of the inhabitants living on herbs; and I have seen cargoes of the copper cooking-vessels of the peasantry exported to Trieste, to obtain food for a few days. The consequence was, that two-thirds of the population perished.

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account of the miraculous interposition of the apostle St. Andrew in destroying the Avars who then besieged it. 'These Avars,' says the Patriarch, 'had held possession of the Peloponnesus for two hundred and eighteen years, and had so completely separated it from the Byzantine empire that no Byzantine official dared to put his foot in the country¹.' The Patriarch thus dates the establishment of the Avars in the Peloponnesus from the year 589; and the exact conformity of his statement with the testimony of Evagrius, indicates that he had some official record of the same invasion before his eyes, which recorded that the Avar invasion of Greece, mentioned by the ecclesiastical historian, extended into the Peloponnesus, and described its consequences in some detail. The circumstance that the Patriarch speaks of Avars, instead of Sclavonians, who, at the time he wrote, formed a considerable portion of the population of Greece, points to the inference that his facts were drawn from Byzantine official documents, and not from any local records concerning the Sclavonian settlements in the Peloponnesus. The Emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitus, who is an earlier authority, differs from the Patriarch Nikolaos, and places the Sclavonian

¹ Nikolaos III., called the Grammarian, occupied the Patriarchal chair from A.D. 1084 to 1111. Leunclavius, *Jus Graeco-Romanum*, tom. i. 278; Le Quien, *Oriens Christianus*, tom. ii. 179. A Greek MS. in the library of Turin, quoted by Fallmerayer (*Fragmente aus dem Orient*, ii. 413), perhaps confirms the testimony of the Patriarch; but the coincidence in the mode of expressing the chronology leads to the conclusion that the writer of the chronicle in this passage copied the synodal letter of the Patriarch. He, however, takes particular notice of the ravages of the Avars in Attica and Euboea, which he must have derived from another source, so that he may have seen the same original authority as the Patriarch. [The Chronicle of Monemvasia, which is here referred to, is examined by Hopf (*op. cit.* pp. 106-108), and declared by him to be a confused compilation of the sixteenth century, almost worthless as a historical authority. The vagueness of the passage in Evagrius, which tacks on 'all Hellas' to the names of two places in Moesia and Thrace, deprives it of all weight. The quotation from the Patriarch Nikolaos is of far greater importance. The statement, however, that Byzantine officials could not enter the Peloponnese during that period of 218 years is historically untrue. Finlay himself has remarked (vol. i. p. 378) with reference to the visit of Constans II. to Athens in A.D. 662, and his assembling troops there, when on his way from Constantinople to Rome—'The Sclavonian colonies in Greece must, at this time, have owed perfect allegiance to the imperial power, or Constans would certainly have employed his army in reducing them to subjection.' This may suggest the doubt, whether the Patriarch has not put a colouring of his own on a genuine record. There may have been a great inroad of the Avars accompanied by Slavonians at the end of the sixth century, and it is possible that some of them may have settled in a part of the Peloponnese until reinforced by other settlers at a later period. But this is the utmost that can be deduced from it. See Hertzberg, *Geschichte Griechenlands seit dem Absterben des antiken Lebens*, pp. 139, 140. Ed.]

colonization in the year 746¹. But whether these foreigners colonized the Peloponnesus in the year 589 or in the year 746, it appears that they were sufficiently numerous to attempt the conquest of Patrae, and to form the project of expelling the Greeks from the peninsula in the year 807. Indeed, they came so near success that it was deemed necessary for St. Andrew to take the field in person in order to maintain the Hellenic race in possession of a city dear to the apostle by the memory of the martyrdom which he had suffered in it at the hands of the Hellenes. The Sclavonians must undoubtedly have become dangerous enemies, both to the Greek population and the Byzantine government, before it became the general opinion that they could only be defeated by miraculous interpositions².

Other circumstances prove that a great change took place in the state of the Peloponnesus about the end of the sixth century. During the reign of the Emperor Maurice, A.D. 582-602, the bishopric of Monemvasia was separated from the diocese of Corinth, and raised to the rank of a metropolitan see. Now, as the metropolitan bishops were at this period important agents of the central government, this change indicates a necessity for furnishing the Greek population of the south-western part of the Peloponnesus with a resident chief of the highest administrative authority; and this necessity seems to have originated in the communication with Corinth which was the capital of the province having been rendered more difficult than in preceding times³.

In the period between the reigns of Justinian I. and Heraclius, a considerable portion of Macedonia was entirely colonized by Sclavonians, who aspired at rendering themselves masters of the whole country, and repeatedly attacked the city of Thessalonica⁴. In the reign of Heraclius other warlike tribes of Sclavonian race, from the Carpathian Mountains, were invited by the Emperor to settle in the countries between the Save and the Adriatic, on condition of defending these

¹ Constant. Porphy. *De Them.* ii. p. 25.

² Compare Fallmerayer, *Geschichte der halbinsel Morea*, i. 138, and Zinkeisen, *Geschichte Griechenlands*, 702.

³ Compare Phrantzes, p. 398, edit. Bonn, and Le Quien, *Oriens Christianus*, ii. 216.

⁴ See all that relates to the Sclavonians in Macedonia in Tafel's work, *De Thessalonica usque Agro*, Proleg. civ.

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provinces against the Avars, and acknowledging the supremacy of the Byzantine government. By this treaty the last remains of the Illyrian race were either reduced to the condition of serfs, or forced southward into Epirus¹. This emigration of the free and warlike Sclavonians, as allies of the government, is of importance in elucidating the history of the Greeks. Though it is impossible to trace any direct communication between these Sclavonians, and those settled in Greece and the Peloponnesus, it is evident, that the new political position which a kindred people had thus acquired must have exerted a considerable influence on the character of the Sclavonian colonists in the Byzantine empire.

The country between the Haemus and the Danube was conquered by the Bulgarians, under their chief Asparuch, about the year 678. The greater part of the territory subdued by the Bulgarians had already been occupied by Sclavonian emigrants, who exterminated the old Thracian race. These Sclavonians were called the Seven Tribes; and the Bulgarians, who conquered the country and became the dominant race, were so few in number that they were gradually absorbed into the mass of the Sclavonian population. Though they gave their name to the country and language, the present Bulgarians are of Sclavonian origin, and the language they speak is a dialect of the Sclavonian tongue². A few years after the loss of Moesia, the Emperor Justinian II. established numerous colonies of subject Sclavonians in the valley of the Strymon, for the purpose of defending the possessions of the Greeks against the incursions of their independent countrymen³.

In the early part of the eighth century the Peloponnesus was regarded by European navigators as Sclavonian land. In the account of St. Willibald's pilgrimage to Jerusalem in 723, it is said that, after quitting Sicily and crossing the Adriatic Sea, he touched at the city of Manafasia (Monemvasia) in the Sclavonian land⁴. The name of Sclavinia at times obtained

¹ Constant. Porphy. *De Administ. Imp.* cap. 30-32.

² Theoph. 298; Schafarik's *Slawische Alterthümer*, ii. 170.

³ Constant. Porphy. *De Thematibus*, ii. p. 23.

⁴ Fallmerayer quotes this passage (*Geschichte der hal'insel Morea*, ii. 444) from *Acta Sanctorum* apud Bolland. ad 8 Jul. p. 504—'Et inde (e Sicilia) navigantes venerunt ultra mare Adriaticum ad urbem Manafasiam in Slavinica terra.' [Hopf remarks (*op. cit.* p. 106) that the nun who composed the Life or Pilgrimage of St. Willibald was so ignorant of geography that she places Tyre and Sidon on

a widely extended, and at times a very confined, geographical application. We find it used in reference to particular districts and cantons in Macedonia and Thrace, but it does not appear to have been permanently applied to any considerable province within the territories of ancient Greece.

It is thus proved that the Slavonians had rendered themselves masters of great part of the Peloponnesus in numbers at the very commencement of the eighth century. The completion of the colonization of the whole country of Greece and the Peloponnesus—for such is the phrase of the Emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitus—is dated by the imperial writer from the time of the great pestilence that depopulated the East in the year 746¹. The events, if really synchronous, could not have been immediately connected as cause and effect. The city population must have suffered with more severity from this calamity than the rural districts; and it is mentioned by the chronicles of the time, that Constantinople, Monemvasia, and the islands of the Archipelago, were principal sufferers; and, moreover, that Constantinople itself was repopled by drafts from the population of Greece and the islands². Even in ordinary circumstances, it is well known that an uninterrupted stream of external population is always flowing into large cities, to replace the rapid consumption of human life caused by increased activity, forced celibacy, luxury, and vice, in dense masses of mankind. According to the usual and regular operation of the laws of population, the effects of the plague ought to have been to stimulate an increase of the Greek population in the rural districts which it still occupied; unless we are to conclude, from the words of Constantine, that after the time of the plague all the Greeks were in the habit of dwelling within the walls of fortified towns, and the country was thus entirely abandoned to the Slavonians, whose colonies, already established in Greece, found by this means an opportunity of extending their settlements. The fact seems to be so stated by the imperial writer, who declares that at this time ‘all the country became Sla-

the Adriatic Sea; and that therefore there is no sufficient ground for supposing that by the Slavonian land she meant the Peloponnesus as distinguished from the Greek peninsula at large. Ed.]

¹ Constant. Porphy. *De Thematibus*, lib. ii. p. 25; Theoph. 354; Cedrenus, ii. 462.

² Nicephorus Cyprianus, p. 40; Theoph. pp. 354, 360.

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vonian, and was occupied by foreigners¹. And in confirmation of the predominance of the Sclavonian population in the Peloponnesus, he mentions an anecdote which does not redound to the honour of his own family. A Peloponnesian noble named Niketas, the husband of a daughter of his own wife's brother, was extremely proud of his nobility, not to call it, as the emperor sarcastically observes, his ignoble blood. As he was evidently a Sclavonian in face and figure, he was ridiculed by a celebrated Byzantine grammarian in a popular verse which celebrated his asinine Sclavonian visage².

The Emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitus dates the completion of the Sclavonian colonization of Greece in the reign of Constantine V. (Copronymus); yet it is evident from history that a mighty social revolution commenced in the Byzantine empire during the reign of his father Leo III. (the Isaurian), and that the people then began to awake reinvigorated from a long lethargy. From this period all the Sclavonians within the bounds of the empire, who attempted to display any signs of political independence, were repeatedly attacked in the districts they had occupied. Still, it required all the energy of the Iconoclast emperors, men in general of heroic mould and iron vigour, to break the power of the Sclavonian colonists who had rendered themselves independent in several provinces. But this was at last effected. The Sclavonian emigrants who completed the occupation of Greece and the Peloponnesus, after the great plague, were not long allowed to enjoy tranquil possession of the country. In the year 783, the Empress Irene, who was an Athenian by birth, and consequently more deeply interested in the condition of the Greek population than her immediate predecessors, sent an army into Greece, to reduce all the Sclavonians who had assumed independence to immediate dependence on the imperial administration. This force

¹ Constant. Porphy. *De Them.* ii. 25. This passage is so important, from its official authority, that it must be transcribed in order that neither more nor less than it contains be attributed to it. Πᾶσα ἡ Ἑλλάς τε καὶ ἡ Πελοπόννησος ὑπὸ τὴν τῶν Ῥωμαίων σαγήνην ἐγένετο, ὥστε δούλους αὐτ' ἐλευθέρων γενέσθαι. Ἐσθλαβῶθι δὲ πᾶσα ἡ χώρα καὶ γέγονε βάρβαρος ὅτε ὁ λοιμικὸς θάνατος πᾶσαν ἐβύσκετο τὴν οἰκουμένην, ὁπνίκα Κωνσταντῖνος ὁ τῆς κοπρίας ἐπ' αὐτοῦ τὰ σκῆπτρα τῆς τῶν Ῥωμαίων διεῖπεν ἀρχῆς.

² See above, vol. ii. p. 305.

marched into the Peloponnesus, ravaged the lands of the Sclavonians, carried off an immense booty and many prisoners, and compelled all the independent tribes to acknowledge themselves tributary to the Byzantine empire¹. In spite of this check, the Sclavonians continued numerous and powerful; and fifteen years later, one of their princes in northern Greece, who ruled a province called Veletzia, engaged in a dangerous conspiracy against the imperial government, which had for its object to raise the sons of Constantine V. to the throne of Constantinople².

The conviction that their affairs were beginning to decline induced the Sclavonians of the Peloponnesus to make a desperate effort to render themselves masters of the whole peninsula. In the year 807, they made the attack on Patrae which has been already alluded to. The siege of that city was to be the first step towards political independence. They counted on deriving some assistance in their undertaking from a Saracen fleet, which was to co-operate in the attack on Patrae by cutting off all connection between the peninsula and the western coast of continental Greece. The military power of the Sclavonians does not appear to have been very formidable, for the Greeks of Patrae were able to defeat the attack on their city, before any aid reached them from the Byzantine troops stationed at Corinth³. The policy of the Byzantine government, which viewed with great jealousy every indication of martial spirit among the native Greek population, and carefully obliterated every trace of local institutions, willingly attributed all the honour of the victory to St. Andrew, rather than allow the people to perceive that they were able to defend their own rights and liberties, by means of their own courage and municipal authorities⁴.

The condition of the Greek race began to change again soon after this event. The privileged position of the citizen in Hellenic society had disappeared; and now citizen, alien, freedman and serf were melting into the mass that composed

¹ Theoph. 385.

² Ibid. 400.

³ The chronicle of Monemvasia, quoted by Fallmerayer, says that, previously to this period, the inhabitants of Patrae had emigrated to Reggio in Calabria; so that for a time only the citadel remained in the hands of the Greeks. [On the value of this chronicle as evidence, see note on p. 13. Ed.]

⁴ Constant. Porphy. *De Administ. Imp.* cap. 49. p. 131; Leunclavius, *Jus Graeco-Romanum*, p. 278.

the Romaioi, or Greeks of the Byzantine empire, called contemptuously by the abbot confessor Theophanes, Helladikoi. Society suffered a deterioration in purity of race and in intellectual culture, but the mass of the population rose considerably in the scale of humanity. The first great wave of that irresistible river of democracy, which has ever since floated society onward with its stream, then rolled over the Eastern Empire, and it flowed majestically and slowly forward, unnoticed by philosophers, unheeded by the people, and undreaded by statesmen and sovereigns. Unfortunately on this occasion, as on too many others, the waters were allowed to wash away the productive soil of local institutions, and to leave only a few rocks insufficient to afford any shelter in the wide expanse of despotism. The barbarism of the Sclavonians placed them beyond the sphere of this social revolution, and they were ultimately swept from the Hellenic soil by its progress. The Greek race having enlarged its social sphere and included within itself that portion of the agricultural population which had replaced the purchased slaves, felt the invigorating influence of the change. As soon as the Greek population began to increase sensibly under the new impulse given to society, the necessity was felt of recovering possession of the districts which had been occupied by the Sclavonians for six generations. The progress of society made the Greeks the encroaching party, and their encroachments produced hostilities.

In the ninth century the Greek population began to make rapid advances. During the reign of the Emperor Theophilus, the Sclavonians of the Peloponnesus broke out in a general rebellion, and remained masters of the open country for some years, committing fearful devastation on the property of the Greeks. But when his widow, Theodora, governed the empire during the minority of her son, Michael III. (A.D. 842-852), she sent an army to reduce them to obedience. This Byzantine force, commanded by Theoktistos the Protospatharios, does not appear to have encountered any very obstinate resistance on the part of the rebels. Two tribes—the Melings, who occupied the slopes of Taygetus, which had already received its modern name Pentedaktylon, and the Ezerits, who dwelt in the lower part of the valley of the Eurotas, about Helos, which the Sclavonians translated Ezero

—had long enjoyed complete independence¹. They were rendered tributary by this expedition, and their chiefs were selected by the Byzantine government. The Melings in the mountain were ordered to pay an annual tribute of sixty gold byzants, and the Ezerits in the rich plain three hundred. The insignificancy of these sums must be considered as a proof that they were imposed merely as a sign of vassalage, and not as a tax. But under an administration so essentially fiscal as that of the court of Constantinople, the Sclavonian tribes must have been exposed to various modes of oppression. Rebellion was a natural consequence; and accordingly, in the reign of Romanos I., we find them again in arms (A.D. 920–944). Krinites Arotas, the Byzantine governor of the Peloponnesus, received orders to exterminate the Melings and Ezerits, who had distinguished themselves by their activity. After a campaign of nine months, in which he laid waste their territory, carried off their cattle, and enslaved their children, he granted them peace on their engaging to pay an increased tribute. The subjection of the mountaineers of Taygetus was on this occasion so complete that they were compelled to pay annually the sum of six hundred gold byzants, and the tribute of the Ezerits, whose possessions in the plain were probably laid waste, was fixed at the same amount. The successor of Krinites embroiled the affairs of his province; and a Sclavonian tribe, called the Slavesians, invading the Peloponnesus, threatened the whole peninsula with ruin. The Melings and Ezerits, taking advantage of the troubles, sent a deputation to the Emperor Romanos to petition for a reduction of their tribute; and the Byzantine government, fearing lest they should join the new band of invaders, consented to reduce the tribute to its first amount, and to concede to the tributaries the right of electing their own chiefs². From this period the Melings and the Ezerits were governed by self-elected chiefs, who administered the affairs of these Sclavonian tribes according to their native laws and usages. In this condition they were found by the Crusaders, who invaded the Peloponnesus at the commencement of the thirteenth century³.

¹ Constantine Porphyrogenitus calls them *Μιληγγοὶ καὶ Ἐζερίται*; the *Chronicle of the Conquest of the Morea*, *Μελίγγοι*.

² Constant. Porphy. *De Adm. Imp.* c. 50. p. 133.

³ *Chronicle of the Conquest of the Morea*, Greek text of Copenhagen MS. pub-

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In the time of Constantine Porphyrogenitus, the only part of Mount Taygetus that remained in the possession of the Greeks was the fortress of Maina and the rocky promontory in its vicinity. In that corner of Laconia, a small remnant of the Greek race survived, living in a state of isolation, poverty, and barbarism. So completely had they been separated from all connection with the rest of the nation, and secluded from the influence of the Greek church, that the rural population around the fortress remained pagans until the reign of Basil I., the Macedonian, A.D. 867–886. In Constantine's own reign these Mainates, who had been converted in the time of his grandfather, paid to the imperial treasury an annual tribute of four hundred gold byzants¹.

The epitomizer of Strabo, who lived not long before the commencement of the eleventh century, speaks of the Sclavonians as forming almost the entire population of Macedonia, Epirus, continental Greece, and the Peloponnesus. He mentions the coast of Elis in particular, as a district where all memory of the ancient Hellenic names, and consequently of the Greek language, was then forgotten; the population consisting entirely of Sclavonians, or as he calls them Scythians².

The Sclavonian tribes in Elis and Laconia were found by the Franks in a state of partial independence, A.D. 1205. They still preserved their own laws and language; and though they acknowledged the supremacy of the Byzantine government, they collected their tribute and regulated their local administration by their own national usages. The Melings had become the dominant tribe in Laconia, and were masters of all Mount Taygetus; but the Greeks had expelled the Sclavonians from the greater part of the plain of Elis, and driven them back into the mountainous districts of Elis and Arcadia. The country they occupied was called Skorta, and extended from the ruins of Olympia to the

lished by Buchon, Paris, 1845. p. 111. v. 166². The Sclavonians in the Morea are described—*Ἀνθρώπους ἀλαζονικούς, κ' οὐ σέβονται αὐθίτην*.

¹ Constant. Porphy. *De Adm. Imp.* c. 50. p. 134. It is difficult to fix the position of the Kastron of Maina mentioned by Constantine Porphyrogenitus, in consequence of an error in the text. It is said to have been situated at Cape Malea, on the sea-coast, beyond the territory of the Ezerits. Malea is here evidently an inadvertency of the writer or an error of a copyist.

² For the age of the epitomizer, see Dodwell, *De Geograph. Aetate*, Diss. vi. The passage referred to will be found in *Geograph. Vet. Script. Gr. Minores*, edit Hudson, tom. ii. 98; and in Coray's edition of Strabo, tom. iii. pp. 373, 386.

sources of the Ladon, and to the great Arcadian plain. The importance of the Slavonian population was still so great that the Franks, in order to facilitate their conquest of the Peloponnesus, induced the Melings and the Skortans to separate their cause from that of the Greek nation, by granting them separate terms of capitulation, and guaranteeing to them the full enjoyment of every privilege they had possessed under the Byzantine government¹. Though the numbers of the Slavonians diminished, after the reconquest of the eastern part of the Frank principality by the Greek emperors, still several districts of the Peloponnesus, and especially the tribes of Mount Taygetus, are stated by Laonicus Chalcocondylas, an Athenian personally acquainted with the state of the country, to have preserved their manners and language until the time of the Turkish conquest in 1460².

We have thus undoubted proof, from Greek writers, that a considerable part of the Peloponnesus was inhabited by Slavonians, and that the Slavonian language was spoken in great part of Greece for a period of seven hundred years³.

¹ *Chronicle of the Conquest of the Morea*—French text, pp. 39, 335; Greek text, pp. 113, 170.

² Chalcocondylas, pp. 16, 71. Mazaris (in Boissonade, *Anecdota Græca*, iii. 174) also proves that Slavonian was spoken in the Peloponnesus during the fourteenth century.

³ [The present position of the question may be briefly summed up as follows. The great period of Slavonian immigration into Greece was shortly after the great pestilence of A.D. 747, which greatly depopulated the country (see vol. ii. p. 68). From this time till the middle of the ninth century the Slavonians formed a large part, though by no means the whole, of the population. In the latter part of the ninth century the Greeks began to recover a numerical superiority (vol. ii. p. 255), and from this period dates the process of the absorption and Hellenizing of the Slavonians, so as to form the mixed race, of which the greater part of the population of Greece is now composed. Hertzberg (*op. cit.* p. 338) rightly remarks on the important part which the Greek church played in effecting this change. The tendency of the Greek race rapidly to assimilate the Slavonic is illustrated by the fact that that excellent explorer M. Albert Dumont (quoted by Rambaud, *L'Empire Grec*, p. 225) has only discovered two Slavonic inscriptions in a country so overrun by Slavonians as Thrace. The affinity between the ancient and modern Greeks has been traced by several lines of argument. It has been pointed out how great is the resemblance of character between them, and that too in points presenting the sharpest contrast to the character of the Slavonic races. The survival of old beliefs and classical superstitions at the present day has been carefully traced, as, for instance, by N. G. Polites in his *Νεοελληνική Μυθολογία*, and by Bernhard Schmidt in *Das Volksleben der Neugriechen und das hellenische Alterthum*. The language is a lineal descendant of the ancient speech, and has been shown by Miklosich to contain next to no Slavonic element (see above, p. 4). Finally, lest it should be thought that this language had been imported into the provinces from one or more great centres, and had not survived in the districts themselves, it is proved that numerous classical words and forms, which have been lost to the language at large, still survive in the local dialects (Bernhard Schmidt, pp.

SECT. IV.—*Sclavonian names in the geographical nomenclature of Greece.*

The only durable monument of the Sclavonian colonization of Greece, that has survived to the present time, is to be found in the geographical names which they imposed, and which were adopted by the Greeks when they recovered possession of the country. It is natural that every year should diminish the number of these names, were it only by the corruption of Sclavonian into Greek words of similar sound or import; and it is at present a subject of fierce contention, to decide what proportion of the modern geographical nomenclature of Greece is of Sclavonian origin. There is no doubt that for some centuries this proportion has been daily lessened; for we now find many Turkish and Albanian names in those districts which were the peculiar seats of the Sclavonian population. Many names, too, are triumphantly claimed by both parties, one party asserting that a word is unquestionably Sclavonian, and the other that it is undoubtedly Greek. None, however, can contest that there was a period when Sclavonian influence succeeded in changing the name of the peninsular citadel of the Hellenic race from Peloponnesus to Morea, and in effacing all memory of the ancient Hellenic names over the greater part of the country. Indeed, ancient Hellenic names are the exception, and have only been retained in a few districts, in the immediate vicinity of the cities that preserved a Greek population.

It may not be uninteresting to notice the historical facts relating to the name Morea; leaving the whole of the philological questions concerning the modern Greek geographical nomenclature, and the surnames of many of the inhabitants, to the sagacity of the learned, when party zeal and national prejudice shall have cooled sufficiently to admit of the subject being investigated with calmness and impartiality. It would seem from the pilgrimage of St. Willibald, which has been

5-11). Thus, though the physical connection between the modern Greeks and the ancient Hellenes, in certain districts at all events, may be slight, as seems to be implied by the difference of physiognomy, yet in all that really constitutes a people, their character, feelings, and ideas, they are their lineal descendants. Mr. Finlay has expressed himself unhesitatingly to this effect in vol. iii. p. 225. Ed.]

already quoted, that in the eighth century the Morea was not the name generally applied to the Peloponnesus, or the writer would probably have used it, instead of calling it the country of the Sclavonians. Among the Greeks certainly it could never have come into use until the country fell under a foreign domination, for the Peloponnesus continued to be the official designation of the province down to the time of the Turkish conquest. The name Morea was at first applied only to the western coast of the Peloponnesus, or perhaps more particularly to Elis, which the epitome of Strabo points out as a district exclusively Sclavonian, and which, to this day, preserves a number of Sclavonian names. When the Crusaders first landed, the term Morea was the denomination used to indicate the whole western coast; for Villehardouin, in his *Chronicle*, makes his nephew speak of coming to Nauplia from the Morea, when he came from Modon: and the *Chronicles of the French Conquest* repeatedly give the name a circumscribed sense, referring it to the plain of Elis, though at other times applying it to the whole peninsula¹. Originally the word appears to be the same geographical denomination which the Sclavonians of the north had given to a mountain district of Thrace in the chain of Mount Rhodope. In the fourteenth century the name of this province is written by the Emperor Cantacuzenos, who must have been well acquainted with it personally, *Morrha*². Even as late as the fourteenth century, the Morea is mentioned in official documents relating to the Frank principality as a province of the Peloponnesus, though the name was then commonly applied to the whole peninsula³.

¹ Villehardouin, *Conquête de l'Empire de Constantinople par les Francs*, p. 121, edit. Buchon, in *Recherches et Matériaux*, pt. 2.—'Sire, je viens d'une terre ki moult est riche que on apele la Mourée;' and at p. 122, 'et entrèrent en la terre de la Mourée.' See the word *Morée* in the index of the French text of the *Chronicle of the Conquest of the Morea*, and the following passages in the Greek, p. 171, v. 3370; p. 207, v. 4377; p. 243, v. 5394; p. 291, v. 6729; and p. 296, v. 6861.

² Cantacuzeni *Hist.* 588, where Hyperpyrakion, a town in this district, is mentioned; also pp. 592, 650, and 846. Ameilhon, in the continuation of *Le Beau (Histoire du Bas-Empire, tom. xx. 135)*, makes Hyperpyrakion a considerable city in the Peloponnesus, and (p. 137) he mentions Asan, the brother-in-law of Cantacuzenos, as made governor of the Morea instead of *Morrha*.

³ The will of Angelo Acciaiuoli, dated 1391, enumerates lands in the Morea, in Sairita, and Calamata; and a letter of Robert, prince of Achaia, in 1358, contains the expression—'In dicta provincia Calamatae et provincia Amorreae.' Buchon, *Nouvelles Recherches sur la Principauté Française de Morée; Diplomes*, pp. 160, 213.

[Of several derivations that have been given of the name Morea, three deserve

With regard to the proportion between the Greek and Slavonian names scattered over the whole surface of the Peloponnesus at the present day, the authority of Colonel Leake may be quoted with some confidence, as one of the most competent judges on account of his philological and personal knowledge, and as by far the most impartial witness who has given an opinion on the subject. He thinks there are now ten names of Greek origin in the Morea for every one of Slavonian¹. Still, the fact that a mighty revolution was effected in the population of Greece, during the period between the seventh and the tenth centuries, is unquestionable; and that the revolution swept away almost every trace of preceding ages from Greek society, and nearly every memory of Hellenic names from the geography of the country, is indubitable. The Jews of the present day hardly differ more from the Jews of the time of Solomon, and the Arabs of to-day certainly differ less from the contemporaries of Mahomet, than the modern Greeks from the fellow-citizens of Perikles. When the Greek race began to increase in the

especial notice. The first of these would derive it from the Greek *μυρτιά*, 'the mulberry-tree,' from the resemblance of the outline of the peninsula to the leaf of that tree. This is wholly untenable. According to the second it comes from the Slavonic *more*, 'sea,' so that it meant 'sea-land' or 'coast-land.' If Finlay is right in thinking that the name was *originally* applied to part of the west coast of the Peloponnese (Hopf disputes this), it would seem, supposing this derivation to be the right one, that the name was first used in contradistinction to the other Slavonic districts, which lay inland. Kopitar, however, maintains that Morea cannot be formed from this root according to the principles of derivation of Slavonic words. Hopf, in his *Geschichte Griechenlands* (pp. 265-267), inclines to the view that Morea arose by metathesis from Romea (*Ρωμαία*, i.e. the country of the *Ρωμαῖοι*), and was first used by the Frankish occupants; and that it was sometimes used in a restricted sense of the north-western province, because that was the Frankish headquarters. The arguments in favour of this last etymology are—(1) that the name does not occur before the Frank period; (2) that in contemporary documents the words Morea and Romania are used interchangeably; (3) that an Italian writer of the fifteenth century calls the Rumanians (Wallachs) Morias, in which form the same metathesis appears. Ed.]

¹ Leake's *Peloponnesiaca*, p. 326. Servia, which is the name of a town of Macedonia founded by the Slavonians, is mentioned in the Greek Chronicle as a place in the plain of Elis, v. 3532, 3877. The observations of Fallmerayer on the Slavonian names in Greece deserve perusal, though they contain much that is fanciful. *Geschichte der halbinsel Morea*, i. 240; *Entstehung der heutigen Griechen*, 64. Modern Greek names, indicative of Slavonian and other foreign influences, and proving the extinction of all Hellenic reminiscences, are not uncommon, like Sklavokhorion, Phrangokastron, Arnaoutli, and Turkovrysi. There is an amusing though ridiculous reply to Fallmerayer, entitled *Die Abstammung der Griechen und die Irrthümer und Täuschungen des Dr. Ph. Fallmerayer*, von J. Bar Ow. Mr. Ow tries to persuade his readers that Miliosi, Kalendgi, Suli, Vrana, Varibobi, Hassani, and Spata are Greek names. In short, the only Slavonian name he finds in Greece is Divri.

ninth century, and to recover possession of the country occupied by the Sclavonians, they gave Greek names to many of the places they regained; but these names were modern, and not the old Hellenic denominations, for the people were too ignorant to make any attempt to revive the ancient geographical nomenclature of the country¹. Where the Albanians settled, a considerable number of Albanian names are found—a circumstance which would hardly have been the case had the Albanian colonists entered a country possessing fixed Greek names; for the Albanians certainly entered Greece gradually, and in comparatively small numbers at a time, and, moreover, their geographical nomenclature is so circumscribed that the same names recur wherever they settled. Even within the single province of Attica, we find the same name repeated in the case of several villages². So complete was the dislocation of the ancient inhabitants of the Peloponnesus that traces of the Sclavonian language are found among the Tzakones, a race which is supposed to have preserved more of the ancient Greek dialect spoken in their country than the other inhabitants of the peninsula³.

SECT. V.—*Colonies of Asiatic Race settled by the Byzantine Emperors in Thrace and Macedonia.*

The emperors of Constantinople attempted to remedy the depopulation of their empire, which was forced on their attention by the spectacle of desolate provinces and uninhabited cities, by forming colonies on a scale that excites our

¹ [The plague of 747. was the period from which dates the oblivion of ancient Hellenic names. It would be of the utmost importance to know what the state of things was, when the Greek element began to reassert itself against the Slavonian settlers. Unfortunately, Constantine Porphyrogenitus in the tenth century, who is our only authority on the subject, is very untrustworthy in his use of names. A fair number of ancient names of seaport towns have been preserved to the present day, such as Corinth, Patrae, Epidaurus, Methone, and others, either exactly in their old form or slightly changed in the course of ages. Even in Arcadia, one of the districts most completely occupied by Slavonians, the name of Pheneus is preserved in Phonia, and that of Cleitor in Clituras. Some places which have been long deserted, still have the classical name attached to them; as the Hieron of Aesculapius near Epidaurus, which is still called Hiero, and the site of Cenchrea which bears the name of Cechries, and Leuctra that of Leftra. This point is well treated by Hertzberg, *op. cit.* pp. 329-338. Ed.]

² There are two villages of the names of Liopesi, Spata, Liosia, and Buyati.

³ Leake's *Peloponnesiaca*, 326. [See below, p. 34.]

Ch. I. § 6.]

wonder even in this age of colonization. The Emperor Justinian II. transported nearly two hundred thousand Sclavonians to Asia on one occasion. His removal of the Mardaite population of Mount Lebanon was on the same extensive scale. Future emperors encouraged emigration to as great an extent. A colony of Persians was established on the banks of the Vardar (Axios) as early as the reign of Theophilus (A.D. 829–842), and it long continued to flourish and supply recruits for a cohort of the imperial guard, which bore the name of the Vardariots¹. Various colonies of the different Asiatic nations who penetrated into Europe from the north of the Black Sea in the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth centuries, were also established in Macedonia and Thrace. In the year 1065 a colony of Uzes was settled in Macedonia; and this settlement acquired so much importance that some of its chiefs rose to the rank of senators, and filled high official situations at Constantinople². Anna Comnena mentions colonies of Turks established in the neighbourhood of Achrida before the reign of her father³ (A.D. 1081). A colony of Patzinaks was settled in the western part of Macedonia by John II. in the year 1123⁴; and colonies of Komans were also established both in Macedonia and Thrace, after the empire had been depopulated by the Crusaders and Bulgarians, in the year 1243⁵. All these different nations were often included under the general name of Turks; and, indeed, most of them were descended from Turkish tribes.

SECT. VI.—*Bulgarians and Vallachians in Greece.*

The wars of the Byzantine emperors with the Bulgarian kings, from the latter half of the seventh century to the destruction of their kingdom by the Emperor Basil II. in the early part of the eleventh, form an important and bloody portion of the annals of the Byzantine empire. The wars of the Bulgarians with the Carlovingian monarchs give them

¹ Codinus, *De Officiis Aulae Constantinopolitanae*, 66, 75, note; Tafel, *De Thessalonica*, 70. [On these so-called Persians and their relation to the Turks in the neighbourhood of Achrida, see the editor's note in vol. iii. p. 77. Ed.]

² Skylitzes, *ad calcem Cedreni*, 816; Zonaras, ii. 273; Anna Comn. 195.

³ Anna Comn. 109, 315.

⁴ Nicetas, 11.

⁵ Niceph. Greg. 21.

also some degree of importance in Frank history. After they had adopted the language of their Slavonian subjects¹, and embraced Christianity, they extended their dominion southward over the Slavonian tribes settled in Mount Pindus, and encroached far within the limits of the Byzantine empire. In the year 933, the Bulgarians first formed permanent settlements to the south of Macedonia, and intruded into the territories occupied by those Slavonians who had settled in Greece. In that year they rendered themselves masters of Nicopolis, and colonized the fertile plains on the Ambracian Gulf. After this they more than once ravaged Greece, and penetrated into the Peloponnesus². Their colonies, scattered about in southern Epirus, continued to exist after the conquest of the Bulgarian kingdom by Basil II., and the defeat of a body of Byzantine troops sent against them in the year 1040 by Petros Deleanos, enabled them to assume a temporary independence. They were soon reconquered by the Byzantine armies; but the Bulgarians long continued to form a distinct class of the population of southern Epirus, though the similarity of their language to that of the Slavonians led ultimately to their becoming confounded with the mass of the Slavonian colonists³.

The second Bulgarian kingdom, formed by the rebellion of the Bulgarians and Vallachians south of the Danube against the Emperor Isaac II., in 1116, took place after the complete extinction of the old Bulgarian language, and this kingdom seems to have been quite as much a Vallachian as a Bulgarian state. The court language, at least, appears to have been Vallachian, and the monarchs to have affected to regard themselves as descendants of the Romans⁴.

¹ [The fusion of the Bulgarians and Slavonians took place so insensibly, that it may be well to notice the traces of the process that have been collected by M. Rambaud (*L'Empire Grec au dixième Siècle*, p. 320). In A. D. 811 the Slavonic chieftains are invited to a banquet of King Crum, and join the Bulgarians in drinking from the skull of the Emperor Nicephorus. In 812, a Bulgarian ambassador is called Dargamir, an evidently Slavonic name. Their ruler for a long period is called in the Byzantine historians the prince of the Bulgarians and Slavonians. In the eighth century a distinction is drawn between the Bulgarian and Slavonian language. See the authorities there given. *Ev.*]

² Cedrenus, 702.

³ *Ibid.* 745.

⁴ *Epist. Innocent. III.* No. 266, tom. i. p. 513, edit. Baluze. Colonel Leake mentions that the Bulgarian language—that is, the Slavonian dialect now spoken in Bulgaria—is still the language of some villages in the mountains to the south of Achrida. *Travels in Northern Greece*, i. 341, 347. [All the Christians in Ochrida (Achrida) itself, and in its neighbourhood, as far west as Struga, where the Black

Ch. I. § 6.]

Amidst the innumerable emigrations of different races, which characterize the history of Eastern Europe from the decline of the Roman empire to the conquest of Constantinople by the Othoman Turks, the Vallachians formed to themselves a national existence and a peculiar language, in the seats they still occupy, by amalgamating the Dacian and Thracian inhabitants with the Roman colonists into one people. That they grew out of the Roman colonies, which spread the language and civilization of Italy in these regions, is generally admitted. They make their appearance in Byzantine history as inhabiting an immense tract of country, stretching in an irregular form from the banks of the Theiss, in Hungary, to those of the Dneister, and from the Carpathian Mountains to the southern counterforts of the chain of Pindus, bordering the Thessalian plain¹. But in this great extent of country, they were mingled with other races in a manner that makes it extremely difficult for us to know which was the most numerous portion of the population at different epochs².

In the eleventh century, the Vallachian race occupied a great part of the plains of Thessaly, and dwelt in several towns³. In the twelfth, the country had acquired the name of Great Vallachia⁴. The close affinity of their language to Latin is observed by the Byzantine historian, John Kinnamos⁵. Benjamin of Tudela, the famous Jew traveller, who visited Greece about the year 1161, informs us that the Vallachians of Thessaly had completely expelled the Greek inhabitants within the limits of their dominions, of which he places the southern boundary near Zeitouni. 'Here are the confines of Vallachia, a country the inhabitants of which are called Vlachi. They are as nimble as deer, and descend from the mountains into the plains of Greece, committing robberies and making booty. Nobody ventures to make war upon

Drin issues from the lake of Ochrida, are Bulgarians and speak Bulgarian. The population of the city, which amounts to about 15,000 persons, is nearly equally divided between Bulgarian Christians and Mahometan Albanians. See my *Highlands of Turkey*, vol. i. pp. 186, 199. Ep.]

¹ Chalcocondylas, 16, 40. Nicetas (236) speaks of the Vlachoï as inhabitants of Mount Haemus; but the Greeks of his time, as now, probably used the word, indiscriminately of race, to indicate nomade shepherds.

² [On the origin of the Wallachians, see above, vol. iii. p. 228. Ep.]

³ Anna Comn. 138.

⁵ Cinnami *Hist.* 152; and Ducange's note, 483.

⁴ Nicetas, 410.

them, nor can any king bring them to submission ; and they do not profess the Christian faith. Their names are of Jewish origin¹, and some even say they have been Jews, which nation they call brethren. Whenever they meet an Israelite, they rob, but never kill him as they do the Greeks. They profess no religious creed². This account is evidently not to be relied on as authentic information, for the Vallachians were undoubtedly Christians ; and Benjamin felt naturally very little desire to form a personal acquaintance with people who were in the habit of robbing Jews, even though they bore the sacred names of Moses, Samuel, and Daniel. He only reports the information he had picked up in the neighbouring Greek towns from Jews, who may have suffered from the plundering propensities of these nimble-footed brethren of Israel. This district long continued to bear the name of Vallachia or Vlakia, both among the Greeks and the Frank conquerors of Greece³.

A Vallachian population still exists in the mountains of southern Epirus and Thessaly, in the upper valley of the Aspropotamos (Achelous) about Malakasa, Metzovo, and Zagora, in the districts of Neopatras and Karpenisi, and in the country about Moskopolis, twelve hours' journey to the east of Berat. Their whole number, however, in all these districts, does not appear to exceed 50,000 souls⁴.

SECT. VII.—*Albanian Colonies in Greece.*

The Albanian or Skipetar race, which at present occupies more than one quarter of the surface of the recently constituted kingdom of Greece, first makes its appearance in Byzantine history, as forming part of the army of the rebel Nicephorus Vasilakes, who assumed the imperial title in 1079⁵. The Albanians were then, as now, the inhabitants of the mountains near Dyrrachium. The existence of the

¹ The frequency of the names of Samuel, Simeon, Daniel, Gabriel, and Moses, in Vallachian history, is marked on every page.

² *The Itinerary of Benjamin of Tudela*, translated by A. Asher, i. 48.

³ Acropolita, 23, 33; Pachymeres, i. 49; *Chronicle of the Conquest* (French), 414.

⁴ Pouqueville in his *Voyage de la Grèce* (ii. 394) estimates their numbers at 74,470. He affects exactitude in his exaggerations.

⁵ Skylitzæ *Hist. ad calcem Cedreni*, 865.

Ch. I. § 7.]

Albanian name in these regions dates from a far earlier period. Albanopolis, which is the principal town of the northern district, bore that name in the time of Ptolemy, and continued to retain it under the Byzantine government¹. The Turks have corrupted the word into Elbassan. Reasonable doubts may nevertheless be entertained, whether the ancestors of the present Albanians were the inhabitants of these mountains in ancient times. But the history of no European race is more obscure. They have been supposed by some learned men to represent the ancient Pelasgians, and by others to belong to the original race of which the Epirots and Macedonians were cognate branches. Modern philologists have decided that the Albanian language is an offset of Sanscrit which separated from the parent root at a period quite as remote as the earliest dialect of Greek².

Anna Comnena mentions the Albanians more than once, calling them *Arvanitai*, which is the name still in use among the modern Greeks. She indicates that they had acquired some political importance, though in her time they do not appear to have occupied a very extensive territory³. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, they are mentioned by more than one Byzantine writer. Pachymeres and Nicephorus Gregoras called them Illyrians, but Chalcocondylas objects to that name, and thinks they were rather of Macedonian descent⁴. In the fourteenth century, they had rendered themselves masters of a considerable extent of territory in Acarnania, Epirus, Thessaly, and Macedonia, in which they appear never to have formed the majority of the inhabitants, and from which they have long disappeared. They first made their appearance in the Peloponnesus as mercenary troops

¹ Ptolemaei *Geog.* lib. iii. cap. 13. § 23.

² [On the origin and tribes of the Albanian race see below, *History of the Greek Revolution*, book i. ch. 2, where the principal authorities on the subject are mentioned. According to Bopp's view, which is referred to in the text, Albanian is derived, not from Sanscrit, but from the original Aryan language. Ed.]

³ Anna Comn. 122, 165, 390.

⁴ Pachymeres, i. 243, 347, edit. Rom.; Niceph. Greg. 69, 334; Chalcocondylas, 283. There seems to be a question whether Cantacuzenos (289) in mentioning the Malakassians, Bouians, and Mesarites as Albanian tribes, has not confounded them with the Vallachians. A Vallachian population now occupies these districts with the same names. But the names of Malakasa and Bouia are found both in Attica and the Morea as favourite Albanian names of villages, and they appear in other districts where the Vallachians are not known to have penetrated.

in the service of the Greek despots of Misithra, and shortly after they were settled in great numbers as colonists on the waste lands in the province¹. During the half century immediately preceding the conquest of the Morea by the Turks, the Albanian population more than once assumed a prominent part in public affairs, and at one time they conceived the project of expelling the Greeks themselves from the Morea.

The Albanian population of the Greek kingdom amounts to about 200,000 souls, and the whole race in Europe is not supposed to number more than a million and a quarter². In continental Greece they occupy the whole of Attica and Megaris, with the exception of the capitals, the greater part of Boeotia, and a portion of Locris. In the islands they possess the southern part of the island of Euboea, and about one-third of Andros; while the whole of the islands of Salamis, Poros, Hydra, and Spetzas are exclusively peopled by a pure Albanian race, as well as a part of Aegina and the small island of Anghistri in its vicinity. In the Peloponnesus, they compose the bulk of the population in Argolis, Corinthia, and Sicyonia, and they occupy considerable districts in Arcadia, Laconia, Messenia, and Elis. In all this great extent of territory the prevailing language is Albanian; and in many parts Greek is only spoken by the men, and very imperfectly, if at all, understood by the women. The soldiers of Suli and the sailors of Hydra, the bravest warriors and most skilful mariners in the late struggle of Greece to regain her independence, were of the purest Albanian race, unaltered by any mixture of Hellenic blood.

SECT. VIII.—*Tzakones or Lacones.*

Of all the inhabitants who now dwell on the Hellenic soil, the Tzakones, or Laconians—for the two words are identical—seem to possess the best title to connect their genealogy with their geographical locality, though they must be regarded as the descendants of serfs rather than of free Laconians. Part

¹ Chalcocondylas, 112, 127; Ducange, *Histoire de Constantinople*, 283; Phrantzes, 38, edit. Bonn; *Chronicon Breve, ad calcem Ducas Hist.*; Fallmerayer, *Geschichte der halbinsel Morea*, ii. 255.

² Schafarik's *Slawische Alterthümer*, i. 32; Lejean, *Ethnographie de la Turquie d'Europe*, p. 17.

Ch. I. § 8.]

of the country conquered by the Spartans was always peopled by a race that differed from the Dorian¹. When the Crusaders invaded Greece, they found the Tzakones occupying a much wider extent of country than they do at present. They are first mentioned by Constantine Porphyrogenitus as troops employed in garrison duty². Nicephorus Gregoras mentions them as furnishing a body of mariners to the imperial fleets in the time of the Emperor Michael VIII. Pachymeres notices that they visited Constantinople in such numbers as to form a Tzakonian colony in the city with their families, while the men served on board the fleet³. The *Chronicle of the Conquest of the Morea* by the Franks, which appears to have been written towards the latter part of the fourteenth century, repeatedly mentions Tzakonia and its inhabitants as distinct from the rest of the Peloponnesus⁴. In the fifteenth century Mazaris, in enumerating the various races then inhabiting the peninsula, places the Lakones or Tzakones first in his list. He then passes to the Italians, for, at the time he wrote, they were masters of the principality of Achaia. The Peloponnesians, or modern Greeks, appear only as third in his list⁵. Crusius informs us that in the year 1573 the Tzakones inhabited fourteen villages between Monemvasia and Nauplia, and spoke a dialect different from the other Greeks⁶. They now occupy only seven villages, and the whole population does not exceed fifteen hundred families, of whom nearly one thousand are collected in the town of Lenidhi.

The language of the Tzakones is marked by many peculiarities; but whether it be a relic of the dialect of the Kynourians, who, Herodotus informs us, were, like the Arcadians, original inhabitants of the Peloponnesus, and consequently of the Pelasgic race, or of the Laconians called

¹ Grote (*Hist. of Greece*, ii. 601) observes that the readiness with which Karyae and the Maleates revolted against Sparta after the battle of Leuktra, exhibits them apparently as conquered foreign dependencies without any kindred of race. Karyae must fall within the Tzakonian territory in the middle ages. The Maleates, when expatriated by the Slavonians, would retire to Mount Parion (Malevo). The Dorians of Messenia seem not to have degraded the subject race so completely as the Spartans.

² *De Caerem. Aul. Byz.* tom. i. p. 402, edit. Lips.; p. 696, edit. Bonn.

³ Niceph. Greg. § 8; Pachymeres, i. 209, edit. Rom.

⁴ See *Chacoignie* in the index to the *Livre de la Conquête*, and Τζακωνία under the head of the letter Γ in the *Index Géographique* of the Greek text, edit. 1845.

⁵ Boissonade, *Anecdota Græca*, tom. iii. p. 174.

⁶ *Turcogræcia*, 489.

Oreatae—whose traditions, according to Pausanias, were different from those of the other Greeks—seems to be a question with the learned¹. While the rest of the modern Greeks, from Corfu to Trebizond, speak a language marked by the same grammatical corruptions in the most distant lands, the Tzakones alone retain grammatical forms of a distinct nature, and which prove that their dialect has been framed on a different type². It cannot, therefore, be doubted that they have a strong claim to be regarded as the most direct descendants of the ancient inhabitants of the Peloponnesus that now exist; and whatever may be the doubts of the learned concerning their ancestors, these very doubts establish a better claim to direct descent from the ancient inhabitants of the province they occupy, than can be pleaded by the rest of the modern Greeks, whose constant intercommunications have assimilated their dialects, and melted them into one language³.

The district of Maina has frequently been supposed to have served as an inviolable retreat to the remains of the Laconian race; but the inhabitants of Maina have lost all memory of the very names of Laconia and of Sparta: they have adopted a foreign designation for their country and their tribe. Part of the district they now inhabit abounds in Sclavonian names of localities, and their language does not vary more than several other dialects from the ordinary standard of modern Greek. On the other hand, the people of the eastern mountain range of Laconia have only corrupted the pronunciation of the name of their country by the modification in the sound of a single letter, Zakonia for Lakonia, and their language bears the impression of a more ancient type than any modern Greek dialect⁴.

¹ Herodotus, viii. 73; Pausanias, *Lacon.* 24.

² Kodrika, in his *Observations sur les Opinions de quelques Hellenistes touchant le Grec moderne*, reckons thirteen spoken dialects of modern Greek, including Tzakonian, which, however, can no more be considered a dialect of modern Greek than Dutch can be considered a dialect of English.

³ The most important works on the Tzakonian language are Leake's *Researches in Greece*, 196; *Peloponnesiaca*, 304; Thiersch, *Ueber die Sprache der Zakonen*, in the *Transactions of the Royal Academy of Munich*. [The account given in Leake's *Peloponnesiaca* is professedly derived from Thiersch's essay. The chief peculiarities of the Tzakonian dialect are noticed in Mullach, *Grammatik der griechischen Vulgarsprache*, pp. 94 foll. Bernhard Schmidt (p. 6) refers to the work of Th. M. Oikonomos, a Tzakonian by birth, *Γραμματική της Τσακωνικής διαλέκτου*, Athens, 1870, and that of G. Deville, *Étude du dialecte Tzaconien*, Paris, 1866. Ed.]

⁴ [There seems to be little doubt that the Tzakonian dialect and tribe are

SECTION IX.—*Summary.*

At the time Greece was conquered by the Othoman Turks, it was inhabited by six different nations as cultivators of the soil. All these people, consequently, formed permanent elements of the population, for the true test of national colonization is the cultivation of the soil by the settlers. It is the only way in which the nursery of a nation can be created. These national races were—the Greeks, who had then become the most numerous portion of the population both in the Peloponnesus and the continent; the Tzakones, who, though they are the representatives of a Greek race, must still be considered a distinct people, since they speak a language unintelligible to the modern Greeks; the Sclavonians, the Bulgarians, the Vallachians, and the Albanians. The whole civilization and literature of the country were in the hands of the Greeks, and whatever the others learned, it was from them the knowledge was acquired. Greek priests were the teachers of religion to all, and the rulers of the church that guided every inhabitant of the land. The Frank races and the Latin church, though enjoying great power and wealth for two centuries and a half, were unable to destroy this influence, and were always strangers on the Hellenic soil. Nevertheless, we have seen that the traditions of ancient Hellas were so completely forgotten by the modern population, that the ancient geographical nomenclature of the country had disappeared. The mountain-peaks visible to

Hellenic, and have survived from an early period. Hopf (in Brockhaus' *Griechenland*, vol. vii. p. 184) maintains on historic grounds that they are purely Sclavonic, because the Venetians spoke of them as such. Bernhard Schmidt however (p. 12) replies with good reason that the philological evidence on the other side is stronger, and shows clear traces of the early Doric, and in particular of the Laconian, dialect. It appears that the Tzakonian race at one time occupied a more extensive area than their present narrow boundaries; and when, as is probable, they were displaced by Slavonians, a confusion might easily arise between the earlier and later occupants. There is no satisfactory explanation of the name. Though the change from Lakonia to Zaconia involves only 'the modification in the sound of a single letter,' yet everything depends on the question, whether this change is in accordance with the laws of letter-change in the language; and this is not the case. Lord Strangford, in his Appendix to vol. i. of Spratt's *Travels in Crete*, 'On Cretan and modern Greek' (p. 356), would derive it from the name of the Kaukones, and speaks of the language as 'not a dialect of modern Greek at all, but the representative of the ancient speech of the Kaukones, being a sub-dialect of the ancient Doric come down to us in a state of extreme corruption, yet not without traces of even pre-Hellenic antiquity.' Ed.]

cultivators from valleys that rarely communicated with one another, and the rivers that fertilized distant plains, though their names must have been in daily use by thousands of tongues, lost their ancient names and received strange designations, which became as universally known as those which they supplanted. Yet in some continental districts, and in most of the islands, we find Hellenic names still preserved, so that this very circumstance of their partial preservation becomes an argument for the complete extinction of the Hellenic race in those districts where Hellenic names have been utterly effaced. Numerous names are scattered over the surface of the country, and many Greek names in use are derived from circumstances that attest the establishment of foreign colonists in the country¹. It must, however, be observed, that this change from Hellenic to modern Greek appears almost as complete in some portions of Greece into which we have no evidence that the Slavonians ever penetrated, as in the heart of the Peloponnesus, where for ages they lived in a state of semi-independence. In Euboea, the change is almost as great as in the Morra of Elis. By what process, therefore, the ancient Hellenic population was transformed into Byzantine Greeks—or, as they long called themselves, Romans—must be explained by the internal life of the people rather than by the introduction of foreign blood.

The vicissitudes which the population of the earth has undergone in past ages have hitherto received little attention from historians, who have adorned their pages with the records of kings and the exploits of heroes, or attached their narrative to the fortunes of the dominant classes, without noticing the fate of the people. History, however, continually repeats the lesson that the power, the numbers, and the highest civilization of an aristocracy, are insufficient to insure national prosperity, and to guarantee the dominant class from annihilation. On the other hand, it teaches us that conquered tribes, destitute of all these advantages, may perpetuate their existence for ages in misery and contempt. It is that portion only of mankind which eats bread raised

¹ Sklavokhorion, Phrangokastron, Arnaoutli, and Turkovrysi have been mentioned. Hebraiokastron (Jew being put as a term of contempt for stranger), Phrangolimiona, Phrangovrysi, Venetiko, Vlakhiko, Turkokhorion, and many Albanian and Turkish proper names, might be added.

Ch. I. § 9.]

from the soil by the sweat of its brow, that can form the basis of a permanent national existence. The history of the Romans and the Spartans illustrates these facts. Yet even the cultivation of the soil cannot always insure a race from destruction, 'for mutability is nature's bane.' The Thracian race has disappeared. The great Celtic race has dwindled away, and seems hastening to complete absorption in the Anglo-Saxon. The Hellenic race, whose colonies extended from Marseille to Bactria, and from the Cimmerian Bosphorus to the coast of Cyrenaica, has become extinct in many countries where it once formed the bulk of the population, as in Magna Graecia and Sicily. On the other hand, mixed races have arisen, and, like the Albanians and Vallachians, have intruded themselves into the ancient seats of the Hellenes. But these revolutions and changes in the population of the globe imply no degradation of mankind, as some writers appear to think, for the Romans and the English afford examples that mixed races may attain as high a degree of physical power and mental superiority as has ever been reached by races of the purest blood in ancient or modern times.

CHAPTER II.

CAUSES OF HOSTILE FEELINGS BETWEEN THE BYZANTINE GREEKS AND THE WESTERN EUROPEAN NATIONS.

SECT. I.—*Political Condition of the Byzantine Empire.*

THE Byzantine empire was brought into direct collision with the western Europeans towards the end of the eleventh century. As the representative of the Roman empire, it counted a longer political existence, free from radical revolution, than had ever been attained by any preceding government. Alexius V., whom the Crusaders hurled from the summit of the Theodosian column, was the lineal political representative of Constantine and Augustus.

The wide extent of territory over which the Greek race was dispersed, joined to its national tenacity of character and the organization of the Eastern Church, enabled the Roman administration in the Eastern Empire to quell the military anarchy that rendered the western provinces a prey to rebellious mercenaries and foreign invaders. The Goths, Huns, Avars, Persians, Saracens, and Bulgarians, in spite of their repeated victories, were all ultimately defeated. When Constantinople was apparently on the point of yielding to the united assaults of the Avars and Persians in the reign of Heraclius, the empire rose suddenly as if from inevitable ruin, and the imperial arms reaped a rich harvest of glory. Again, when assailed by the invincible Saracens in the first fervour of their religious enthusiasm, the administrative organization of imperial Rome arrested the progress of their armies under the walls of Constantinople, and under the Iconoclast Emperors, Leo III. and his son Constantine V.,

arrested the progress of Saracen conquest, drove back the armies of the caliphs, and rendered Mount Taurus the frontier of the empire. The Byzantine Leo had defeated the grand army of the Mohammedans before Charles Martel overthrew a division of the caliph's forces. At a later period the Bulgarian kingdom was destroyed, and in the eleventh century the Danube became again the frontier of the Eastern Empire. Age succeeded age without witnessing any sensible decline in the fabric of this mighty empire; and while the successors of Haroun Al Rashid and Charlemagne were humbled in the dust, and their power became as completely a vision of the past as the power of Alaric and Attila, the Byzantine government still displayed the vigour of mature age.

The warriors, the statesmen, and the legists of the Byzantine empire deserve a higher place in the history of mankind than they have received, for their merits have been obscured, and their individuality lost, in the monotonous movements of a mighty administrative machine, which shows its own power sufficient to command results that even valour and wisdom are sometimes incompetent to secure. Yet even at the time the Byzantine empire exhibited the most striking evidence of its power, we perceive many marks of internal weakness. There was no popular energy in the inhabitants directed to their own improvement. The antagonistic principles at work in Byzantine society were for ages so exactly balanced as to prevent any rapid change, and the slow changes which occurred, though they tended to prolong the existence of the government, did little to reinvigorate the people.

In judging the Byzantine government according to modern ideas, it is often necessary to regard the change of emperors and dynasties as something equivalent to a change of ministers and parties. The imperial power was generally not more endangered by the murder of an emperor, than the monarchical principle by a change of ministers. Revolutions at Constantinople assumed the authority of supreme criminal tribunals to punish national crimes. Society had not then learned to frame measures for guarding against abuses of the executive power, and it had sense enough to perceive that the power to punish emperors on earth could not always be left solely to heaven. The theory that the emperor

concentrated in his person the whole legislative, as well as the executive power, was universally admitted; yet the people regarded his authority as a legal and constitutional sovereignty, and not an arbitrary sway, for he presented himself to their minds as a pledge for the impartial administration of that admirable system of law which regulated their civil rights. The emperors, however, claimed to be the selected agents of divine power, and to be placed above those laws which they could make and annul¹. Yet many enlightened men repeated the truth that they were restrained in the exercise of their power by the promulgated laws of the empire, by the fixed order of the administration, by the immemorial privileges of the clergy, and by the established usages of local communities; and each successive emperor, at his coronation, was compelled to subscribe his submission to the decrees of the general councils and the canons of the Orthodox Church². Thus the regular administration of justice by fixed tribunals according to immutable rules of law, the order of the civil government based on well-defined arrangements, the limits on financial oppression by established usages, the restraint of military violence by systematic discipline, and the immunities secured by ecclesiastical privileges and local rights, became parts of the Byzantine constitution, and were guaranteed by the murder of emperors, and by those revolutions and rebellions which the absence of hereditary right to the throne made so frequent. Strictly speaking, it is true that the state consisted only of the imperial administration, of which the emperor was the absolute master. The rights of the people were comprised in the duty of supporting the state; of political franchises, as members of the state, they were in theory utterly destitute. The power of rebellion was the guarantee against oppression.

No state ever possessed such a long succession of able rulers, competent to direct all branches of the administration, as the Byzantine empire. The talents of the emperors, as well as the systematic order of the administration, held together their extensive dominions long after the tendencies

¹ Ἐξέστι γὰρ τοῖς ἐκ Θεοῦ τὴν οἰκονομίαν τῶν κοσμικῶν ἐγκρατευσμένοις πραγμάτων, ὑπερτίρας ἢ κατὰ νόμους οἰκονομεῖν. *Novell.* iv. of Alexius I. Comnenus. Bonifidius, *Juris Orientalis libri tres*, p. 54.

² Codinus, *De Officiis Const.* c. xvii. *De Coron. Imp.*

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of mediæval society urged the provinces to separate. It was a constant object of the imperial attention to prevent too great an accumulation of power in the hands of any single official, and yet it was absolutely necessary to intrust the provincial governors with great authority, for they were called upon incessantly to resist foreign invaders and to quell internal insurrections. Never did sovereigns perform their complicated duties with such profound ability as the Byzantine emperors. No mayors of the palace ever circumscribed their power; nor were they reduced to be the slaves of their mercenaries, like the caliphs of Bagdad.

When the Byzantine empire first came in contact with the western nations, its military forces were numerous and well disciplined, and though its navy had been neglected for some time, its artillery and mechanical engines of war were superior to those of the Crusaders. But a great change took place before the commencement of the thirteenth century. In the interval between the first and fourth crusades, the navy of the Italian republics grew to be more powerful than that of the Byzantine emperors, and the whole energies of feudal Europe were devoted to the study of the military art, as well as to its practice; while, after the death of Manuel I., the resources of the Byzantine empire were allowed to fall to decay, or were wasted by the incapacity and infatuation of the two brothers Isaac II. and Alexius III.

The Byzantine army was organized to prevent its being able to dispose of the throne, as well as to make it efficient in defending the empire. The troops raised from the native provinces were formed into themes, or legions, of a thousand men. These themes were placed in permanent garrisons throughout the provinces, like the ancient legions. The most celebrated of the European themes were the Thracian, Macedonian, and Illyrian, whose ranks were filled with Vallachians, Sclavonians, and Albanians. But the most esteemed portion of the Byzantine army consisted of foreign mercenaries and federate soldiers. These last were recruited among the rude population of some districts, whose poverty was so great that they were unable to bear the burden of direct taxation; but they willingly supplied the emperor with a fixed contingent of recruits annually. The mercenaries consisted of Russian, Frank, Norwegian, Danish, and Anglo-Saxon volunteers.

The Varangians, who about this time began to rank as the leading corps of the imperial guards, consisted of Anglo-Saxons and Danes¹.

The financial administration was the most complex and important branch of the public service. The emperors always reserved to themselves the immediate direction of this department. In civilized states, the finances are the life of the government; and the emperors, feeling this, acted generally as their own first lords of the treasury, to borrow modern phraseology. One fact may be cited, which will give a better idea of the financial wisdom of the Byzantine emperors than any detail of the administrative forms they employed. From the extinction of the western Roman empire in 476, to the conquest of Constantinople by the Crusaders in 1204, the gold coinage of the empire was maintained constantly of the same weight and standard. The concave gold byzants of Isaac II. are precisely of the same weight and value as the solidus of Constantine the Great. Gold was the circulating medium of the empire, and the purity of the Byzantine coinage rendered it for many centuries the only gold currency that circulated in Europe. The few emperors who ventured to adulterate the coinage have been stigmatized by history, and their successors immediately restored the ancient standard. But the Byzantine financial system, though constructed with great scientific skill, was so rapacious that it appropriated to government almost the whole annual surplus of the people's industry, and thus deprived the population of the power of increasing their stock of wealth. It retained agriculture in a stationary condition, and imposed such heavy burdens on commerce, that the Greeks were unable to compete with the citizens of the Italian republics who were subject to lighter duties².

¹ Penzel, *De Barangis in aula Byz. militantibus*, 9.

² Michael Akominatos, Archbishop of Athens, in his monody on Eustathios, Archbishop of Thessalonica, says, Πάντας φορολόγοις ἐκκείσσομαι, πάντας δασμολόγοις βρωθήσομαι, ὡς ἑταίμῃ καὶ ἀγαθῇ θήρᾳ, καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρωποφάγοις τοῦτοις θηροῖν ἐκδοτος. Tafel, *Thessalonica*, Appendix, 387. Things must have been bad when an archbishop spoke of the imperial tax-gatherers as wild beasts with cannibal propensities.

SECT. II.—*Social Condition of the Greeks in the Twelfth Century.*

The destruction of municipal institutions by the emperors extinguished all patriotic feeling, and made selfishness the prominent social result of family education and local prejudices¹. But the greatest injury inflicted on the Greeks by the abolition of their municipalities was that the aqueducts, public buildings, schools, sewers, and sanatory police were neglected by the central government, in order to appropriate the money to purposes more gratifying to the pride of the emperor and the views of the ministers at the capital. The people lost all control over the business which related to their own immediate interests. The local magistrates, no longer selected by the will of the people, lost their former importance as conservators of the existing order of society, and became, according to circumstances, the servile agents of superior authority, or the tumultuous organs of a rebellious populace.

In the twelfth century the population of Greece was composed of many discordant elements, besides the difference of races who peopled the country. The city population was naturally liable to the ordinary vicissitudes of commercial and manufacturing industry; its prosperity and its numbers rose and fell with the accidents of trade and the events of war. But the agricultural population was always in a stationary condition: generation followed generation, treading in the same footsteps as their forefathers; family replaced family, cultivating the same fields, paying the same burdens, and consuming the same proportion of the earth's fruits, without adding to the annual amount of the earth's produce. The distinction of rich and poor was the only recognized division of the people, and this division made its way into the administration as a legislative classification. The emperor was compelled to pass laws to protect the poorer class of landed proprietors from the encroachments of their wealthier neighbours². The middle class had always a tendency to diminish,

¹ *Corpus Juris Civilis*, Leonis Nov. Const. 46, 47.

² The laws of the emperors after Basil I. frequently mention the rich, of *δυνατοί*, and the poor, of *πτωχοί*. To prevent the complete absorption of the property of

from being more exposed than the others to fiscal oppression. Its members had not the influence necessary to make their complaints heard, or to get their interests considered, by the central authorities, while their property prevented all attempts at emigration. The decay of roads, bridges, aqueducts, ports, and quays caused a difficulty in the sale of agricultural produce, and made labour lose its value too rapidly, in the distant provinces, for any laws promulgated by the central government to arrest the accumulation of landed property in the hands of the rich. One of the social evils of old Roman society again demoralized the civilized world: 'Verumque confitentibus latifundia perdidere Italiam; jam vero et provincias'¹.

A considerable portion of the empire was cultivated by colons, who formed the bulk of the agricultural population on the extensive possessions of the rich. Like the serfs of the west, these colons were attached to the estates on which they were born; they belonged to the land, not to the proprietor, and only paid to him a fixed portion of the fruits of the soil as rent. As long as this was regularly paid, they enjoyed very nearly the same position as the poor freemen. The colons formed a very important part of the population of the Byzantine empire in the eyes of the treasury. The imperial revenues were so largely drawn from agriculture that the Byzantine legislation is filled with provisions for their protection against their landlords, and with restrictions for fixing them irrevocably as tillers of the soil, in order to prevent any diminution in the production of those articles from which the state revenues were principally derived. They were protected against the avarice of the proprietor, who might wish to render them more profitable to himself, by employing their labour in manufactures. But the colons were prevented from acquiring the rights of freemen, lest they should abandon the cultivation of the land, and seek refuge in the cities, where labour was better paid.

A considerable number of free labourers existed in Greece,

the poor, Romanus I. created in their favour the preference of pre-emption, by which the members of the same community could alone purchase their neighbour's property; and the rich, as well as civil and ecclesiastical officials, were prohibited from making such purchases. This right, called *ἡγορία*, is the subject of many Byzantine laws. Mortreuil, *Histoire du Droit Byzantin*, ii. 321, 336, 354, 358; iii. 139.

¹ Plinius, *Hist. Nat.* lib. xviii. 35.

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who were employed at a high rate of wages during short periods of the year by the citizens, to cultivate the olive grounds, vineyards, and orchards in the immediate vicinity of the towns. As the number of towns throughout the continent and islands of Greece was still comparatively great, the existence of this class of poor freemen had a considerable influence on the social condition of the people, and must not be overlooked when we compare the Byzantine empire with Western Europe at the time of its conquest by the Crusaders.

There is one social feature in the Byzantine empire which gives it a noble pre-eminence in European history, and contrasts it in a favourable light with the other governments in the middle ages, not excepting that of the Popes. The Emperors of Constantinople were the first sovereigns who regarded slavery as a disgrace to mankind and a misfortune to the state in which it existed. A knowledge of the writings of the New Testament, and an acquaintance with the principles of Christianity, were far more generally diffused among the Greeks in what are called the dark ages than they have been in many western nations in what are supposed to be more civilized times. Justinian I., in the sixth century, proclaimed it to be the glory of the Emperor to accelerate the emancipation of slaves; and Alexius I., in the eleventh, gave the most favourable interpretation to the claims of those who sought to establish their personal liberty. The clergy were ordered to celebrate the marriage of slaves, and if their masters attempted to deprive them of the nuptial benediction and of the rights of Christianity, then the slaves were to be proclaimed free. Alexius I. declares that human society and laws have divided mankind into freemen and slaves; but, though the existing state of things must of necessity continue, it ought to be remembered that in the eye of God all men are equal, and that there is one Lord of all, and one faith in baptism for the slave as for the master¹.

The law had long prohibited freemen from selling themselves as slaves, and punished both the buyer and the seller. Slaves were allowed to enter the army, and by so doing, if they obtained the consent of their masters, they acquired their freedom. They were allowed to become ecclesiastics

¹ Compare *Corpus Juris Civilis*; *Nov. Justin.* 22. c. 8, with *Nov. Alex.* i. 9; Mortreuil, iii. 158; Bonefidius, 70.

with the consent of their masters¹. Agricultural slavery was evidently verging towards extinction. The facilities afforded to rural slaves for escaping into the Sclavonian and Bulgarian settlements, rendered it impossible to compel the slave to submit to as great privations as the colons, and his labour consequently became too expensive to be advantageously devoted to raising agricultural produce. Agricultural slavery could only be perpetuated with profit on those small and productive properties in the immediate vicinity of towns where free labour was dear, and where there was a great saving in the expense of transport.

Domestic slavery continued; but as domestic slavery can only be maintained under circumstances which would call for the employment of an equal number of hired menials, its general influence on the condition of the empire was not very great. Indeed, when slaves are habitually purchased young, they occupy a position superior to that of hired servants, for they are bred up in some degree as members of the family into which they enter.

The progress of society among the Greek population, in the twelfth century, was thus evidently tending to enlarge the sphere of civil liberty, and to embody the principles of Christianity in the legislation of the empire. The progress of mankind seemed to require that such a political government should meet with a career of prosperity, the more so as it was surrounded on all sides by rude barbarians. It was not so. Political liberty is indispensable to man's progress. Human civilization demanded that new ties, connecting social and political life, should be developed: elements of liberty, alien to the condition of the Greek race, were to become the agents employed by Providence in the improvement of man's condition; and the people of western Europe were now to take a prominent part in the world's history, to destroy the Byzantine empire, to enslave the Greek race, and in return to receive lessons of improvement from the Eastern nations.

¹ *Nov. Leonis*, 9, 10, 11. Leo in these laws declares that fugitive slaves who have become priests, monks, or even bishops, are to be delivered up to their masters without the benefit of prescription, on the ground that a slave cannot possess the feelings suitable to the clerical functions.

SECT. III.—*Stationary Condition of Agricultural Industry throughout Europe during the Middle Ages.*

In the west the leading feature of civil society, from the fall of the western Roman empire to the time of the Crusades, is the abject condition of the agricultural classes. No Cincinnatus appears as a hero in mediaeval history. The labourers who became warriors returned no more to their ploughs. Century after century, the ruling classes, kings, priests, nobles, and soldiers, seized the whole surplus wealth which the hand of nature annually bestows on agricultural labour. The cultivator of the soil was only left in possession of the scanty portion necessary to enable him to prolong his existence of hopeless toil, and to rear a progeny of labourers, to replace him in producing wealth with the smallest possible consumption of the earth's fruits. Such was the condition of the greater part of Europe, from the commencement of the sixth to the end of the thirteenth century.

The general insecurity of property, and the decrease of commercial intercourse, consequent on the neglect of the old Roman roads, reduced the numbers of the middle classes of society, who lived insulated in distant towns. They belonged to the conquered race, and were deprived of all political rights. They were despised by their conquerors as a dastard people, and envied by the poor, because they were the possessors of more wealth than the rest of their countrymen. This state of society produced a perpetual though covert conflict between the lower and higher classes. The ruling class, whether nobles, gentlemen, or soldiers, viewed the mass of the people with contempt and treated them with cruelty. The people indulged in vague hopes of being able, by some dispensation of heaven, to exterminate their tyrants and reform society. There hardly exists any European history that is not filled with rebellions and civil wars, which can be traced to this source. But the people, where they have not been trained to order by local institutions, can never form any practical scheme of administration; and, consequently, their rebellions, when unsuccessful, generally end in establishing anarchy as a remedy for oppression. Still we must not forget, that the pictures we possess of popular struggles

against governmental oppression have received their colouring from the aristocratic class; and, consequently, that we seek in vain in such records for any notice of the wiser aspirations and better feelings of the patient and thinking individuals among the people.

SECT. IV.—*Condition of the Normans when they conquered the Byzantine Possessions in Italy.*

The vigour of the Scandinavian race is one of the marvels in the history of European nations. The Normans rivalled the exploits of the Goths. In Gaul, Britain, Italy, and Russia they left permanent traces of their power. Driven by the same desire to secure to themselves a better position in the world by their own swords, which had impelled the Goths to destroy the Roman empire, they became the founders of new states and kingdoms. Unable to assemble large armies, they found the sea more favourable to their plundering excursions than the land. For nearly two centuries, the Scandinavian nations carried on a series of piratical attacks on the Franks in Gaul, and on the Saxons in Britain. They wasted the open country, and circumscribed every trace of civilization within the walls of fortified towns, or of secluded monasteries in inaccessible situations. The records of French and English history commence with details of cruelties committed by these pirates, so frightful that the poetry of their sagas cannot efface the conviction that plunder was dearer to them than glory, and that their favourite exploits were the robbery of industrious villages, or the burning of peaceful monasteries. The daring of these ruthless plunderers was rarely exposed to very severe trials, for the mass of the agricultural population was prevented from bearing arms, lest they should employ them against the ruling classes, and begin their military career by attacking their permanent oppressors. The descendants of Charlemagne preferred paying thousands of pounds' weight of silver to the Normans, in order to purchase immunity from ravage for their own domains, to employing the money in arming a subject population whose feelings they knew to be hostile. This cause of

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the facility the Normans found in effecting their conquests, is hardly noticed by historians¹.

Tales of the inexhaustible wealth and unbounded luxury of the Byzantine empire were current in Scandinavia. Many warriors returned to their country enriched by the wealth they had amassed in the Byzantine service. These men repeated wondrous tales concerning the palaces and the gold of Constantinople, and the luxury and helplessness of the Greeks, to delighted crowds of listeners in their rude dwellings. Harald Hardrada, the gigantic warrior who lost his life at the battle of Stamford Bridge, acting as herald of the Norman conquest, had gained at Constantinople the treasures that enabled him to mount the throne of Norway. Traditions, constantly revived by the sight of gold byzants, nourished a longing to reach the Byzantine empire in the breast of every Norman. The wish to see Constantinople, and obtain some small share of its immeasurable wealth, mingled with religious ideas in urging them to perform the pilgrimage to Jerusalem.

About the commencement of the eleventh century, the Normans established in France began to appear frequently in Italy as pilgrims and military adventurers; and, before the end of the century, they created a new political power at the expense of the Byzantine emperors. In their career from mercenary soldiers to independent chiefs, they advanced much in the same way, and nearly by the same steps, as the Goths and Lombards had done, when they founded kingdoms in the western Roman empire. Though some distinguished Normans visited Italy as pilgrims, the greater number wandered thither, impelled by the desire to better their condition, by entering into the military service of the Byzantine viceroys of southern Italy and Sicily. The changes that had occurred in northern Europe had put an end to piracy and degraded the occupation of the brigand, so that adventurous young men were now driven to seek their fortunes in distant lands. The Normans, like the Goths of older times, considered no

¹ Depping (*Histoire des Expéditions Maritimes des Normands*, p. 213, edit. Didier) cites the following passage, to show the fear entertained by the Franks of any assembly of the agricultural population:—'Vulgus promiscuum inter Sequanam et Ligerim adversos Danos fortiter resistit; sed quia incaute suscepta est eorum conjuratio, a potentioribus nostris facile interficitur.' *Annales Bertin.* ad ann. 859.

undertaking too arduous for their ambition ; and they feared to tread no path, however dangerous, that promised to conduct them to wealth and fame.

The romantic narratives which connect the first appearance of the Normans in Italy with the formation of the Norman principalities, must not be received as true according to the letter. The sudden arrival of a ship of Amalfi, with forty Norman pilgrims, on their return from a pilgrimage to the Holy Land, may certainly have saved Salerno from the Saracens ; for these forty Normans, in complete panoply, may have rallied round them an army of pilgrims and mercenaries, on the great line of communication between the West and East. The meeting of Mel, the Byzantine rebel chief of Bari, with a few Norman gentlemen who were visiting the shrine of St. Michael on Mount Gargano, may also have led to these Normans collecting an army to attack the imperial authorities. But the success of the Norman arms arose from the circumstance that numerous bodies of Norman mercenaries were already serving in the South of Italy¹. We may reasonably conclude that few men wandered from Normandy to Italy to gain their fortune by the sword, who were not possessed of something more than ordinary daring and skill in the use of arms. The Norman mercenaries must therefore have possessed some superiority over ordinary troops ; and the physical superiority of the individual soldier, when the lance, the sword, and the mace determined the fate of a battle, was of more importance than it is in our day, when the fire of distant artillery and the evolutions of unseen regiments often decide the victory. The personal superiority of the Normans in moral character must also be taken into consideration, in estimating the causes of their surprising fortune in Italy and Sicily. In their own country they belonged to a higher class of society than that from which mercenary soldiers were generally drawn, and their education had taught them to aspire even above their birth. This nurture gave them a feeling of self-respect, and a high estimation of their individual responsibilities—qualities which form a firmer basis of national greatness than literary culture

¹ Compare Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, chap. lvi. vol. vii. p. 103 ; Sismondi, *Histoire des Républiques Italiennes*, vol. i. p. 277 ; Gally Knight, *Normans in Sicily*, p. 3, and their authorities.

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or refinement of taste. To this moral education, and to the manner in which it tempered their ambition, we must ascribe the facility displayed by the Norman soldiers in assuming the duties of captains and generals, and their prudence as leaders and princes. Brave, skilful, disciplined, rapacious, wary, unfeeling, and ambitious, they possessed every quality necessary for becoming conquerors, and all the talents required to rivet the bonds of their tyranny. Never, indeed, did any race of men fulfil their mission as conquerors and tyrants with a firmer hand or more energetic will, whether we regard them in their earlier state, as the devastators of France, and the colonists of Russia; or in their more mature fortunes, as the lords of Normandy, the conquerors of England, Naples, and Sicily, and the plunderers of Greece¹. Southern Italy, divided between the Lombard principalities of Benevento, Capua, and Salerno, and the Byzantine province, was saved from anarchy, and delivered from the ravages of the Saracens, by the Norman conquest.

SECT. V.—*Normans invade Byzantine Empire—Their ravages in Greece.*

The wars of the Normans with the Byzantine emperors, and the facility with which they conquered the Greeks in Italy, induced them to aspire at the conquest of Greece itself. Their successes, and the fame that attached to the Norman name from the recent conquest of England, raised their military reputation and their self-confidence to the highest elevation. No enterprise was regarded either by themselves or others as too difficult for their arms; and Robert Guiscard, when he found himself master of dominions in Italy which exceeded Normandy in wealth and population, aspired at eclipsing the achievements of William the Conqueror by subduing the Byzantine empire.

In the month of June 1081 he sailed from the port of Brindisi, with an army of thirty thousand men and with one hundred and fifty ships. Corfu, which then yielded an annual

¹ Galfredus Malaterra (i. c. 3) has an admirable sketch of the Norman character, of which the original is more expressive than Gibbon's amplified version (vii. 106); and the next chapter contains a correct portraiture of a Norman family. Carusius, *Bibliotheca Historica Regni Siciliae*, tom. i. p. 161.

revenue of fifteen hundred pounds of gold to the Byzantine treasury, surrendered to his arms, and he landed in Epirus without opposition. The glorious victories of the Normans, the prudent perseverance of the Emperor Alexius I., the valour of Bohemund, the failure of the expedition, and the death of Robert Guiscard as he was about to renew his attack, are recorded with such details in the pompous pages of Anna Comnena, and with so much art in the gorgeous descriptions of Gibbon, that they are familiar to every reader of history¹.

Bohemund again invaded the Byzantine empire in the year 1107 with a powerful army. He was then Duke of Antioch, and had recently married the daughter of the King of France. The army of Bohemund, like that of William the Conqueror, whose glory he expected to eclipse, was composed of warlike adventurers from Normandy, France, and Germany. The winter was consumed besieging Dyrrachium, whose ancient Hellenic walls still existed, and were so broad that four horsemen could ride abreast on their summit, while they were flanked at proper intervals by towers raised eleven feet above their battlements². The cities of Greece then preserved many classic monuments of art, and Bohemund encamped to the east of Dyrrachium, opposite a gate adorned with an equestrian statue of bronze³. The Emperor Alexius had acquired more experience in the tactics of western warfare than he possessed when he encountered Robert Guiscard in the earlier invasion. Bohemund could neither take Dyrrachium nor force the emperor to fight; so that in order to escape utter ruin he was compelled to sign a treaty, in September 1108, by which he acknowledged himself the liegeman of the Byzantine emperor. Such was the fate of an expedition under the haughty Bohemund, no way inferior to that which conquered England⁴.

The third invasion of the Byzantine empire took place in consequence of the Emperor Manuel rudely disavowing the conduct of his envoy, who had concluded a treaty with Roger, King of Sicily. But its real origin must be sought

¹ Robert Guiscard died at Cephalaria in 1085.

² Anna Comn. 384.

³ Ibid. 380. Other monuments of ancient sculpture also remained in Dyrrachium; *ibid.* p. 99.

⁴ Anna Comn. 406.

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in the ambitious projects of the Sicilian king and the warlike and haughty spirit of the young emperor. Roger, by the union of the Norman possessions in Sicily and southern Italy, was one of the wealthiest and most powerful princes of his time. The large fleet and well-disciplined army at his disposal authorized him to aspire at new conquests; and he hoped to accomplish what his uncle, Robert Guiscard, and his cousin, Bohemund, had vainly attempted. But the Byzantine power in the interval had improved as rapidly as the Norman had increased. Manuel I., proud of the excellent army and trusting to the well-filled treasury left by his father, John II., and expecting to recover all his predecessors had lost in Italy, and even to reconquer Sicily, was as eager for war as the Norman king. Indeed, had the emperor been able to direct all his forces against the Normans, such might possibly have been the result of a war; but the attention of Manuel was diverted by many enemies, and his forces were required to defend extensive frontiers; while Roger was enabled to direct his whole force against the point where least preparation had been made to encounter an enemy. The Normans invaded Greece, and their expedition inflicted a mortal wound on the prosperity of the country.

When the second crusade was on the eve of marching through the Byzantine empire, Roger, who had collected a powerful fleet at Brindisi, either for attacking Manuel's dominions or for transporting the Crusaders to Palestine, as might turn out most advantageous to his interests, was put in possession of Corfu by an insurrection of the inhabitants. This occurred in the year 1146. From Corfu the Sicilian admiral sailed round the Peloponnesus to Monemvasia, at that time one of the principal commercial cities in the Mediterranean; but the population of this impregnable rock boldly encountered the Sicilians, and repulsed their attacks. The Norman fleet then proceeded to plunder the island of Euboea, after which it suddenly returned to the western coast, and laid waste the coasts of Acarnania and Aetolia.

The whole of Greece was thrown into such a state of alarm, by these sudden and far distant attacks, that it was impossible to concentrate the troops in the province at any particular point. The Norman admiral now darted on his prey, directing his whole force against Thebes, whose situation

appeared to secure it from any sudden assault, but whose wealth, from this very circumstance, promised a larger amount of plunder than any city on the coast. Thebes was then a rich manufacturing town, without any walls capable of defence. George Antiochenus, the Sicilian admiral, entered the Straits of Lepanto without encountering any opposition, and debarked his troops at the Scala of Salona. From thence the Norman troops marched past Delphi and Livadea to Thebes.

Thebes was taken and plundered in the most barbarous manner. The inhabitants carried on an immense trade in cultivating, manufacturing, and dyeing silk, and their industry had rendered them extremely rich. Everything they possessed was carried away by their avaricious conquerors, who conveyed their gold, silver, jewels, bales of silk and household furniture of value, to the ships which had anchored at the port of Livadostro. The unfortunate Thebans were compelled to take an oath on the Holy Scriptures, that they had not concealed from their plunderers any portion of their property; nor was the city evacuated by the Normans until they had removed everything they considered worth transporting to the fleet. They dragged the principal inhabitants into captivity to profit by their ransom or sell them as slaves, while the most skilful workmen in the silk manufactories were carried to Sicily to exercise their industry for their new masters.

From Livadostro the fleet transported the troops to Corinth. Nicephorus Kalouphe, the governor, retired with the chief men of the city into the Acrocorinth. That fortress was impregnable, but the cowardly governor basely surrendered the place on the first summons. The Sicilian admiral, on examining the magnificent fortress of which he had so unexpectedly become master, could not refrain from exclaiming, that the Normans certainly fought under the protection of heaven, for, if Nicephorus Kalouphe had not been more timid than a woman, all their attacks might have been repulsed with ease¹. Corinth was sacked with the same

¹ George Antiochenus was high-admiral, and one of the nobles of the highest rank in Sicily. The Greek deed by which Roger, King of Sicily, confers the title of *protobilissimus* on Christodoulos the father of George, is preserved in the archives of the Royal Chapel at Palermo. Montfaucon has engraved it in his *Palaeographia Graeca* (p. 408). There is a stone bridge of five arches near Palermo, called Ponte

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rapacious avidity as Thebes: all the men of rank, the most beautiful women, and the most skilful artizans, with their wives and families, were carried away, either to obtain a ransom or to keep them as slaves. Even the shrines of the saints were plundered, and the relics of St. Theodore were torn from his church; and it was only when the fleet was fully laden with the spoils of Greece that it sailed for Sicily.

The inhabitants of Greece attained the highest point of material improvement, which they reached during the middle ages, at this period; and perhaps their decline may be more directly attributed to the loss of the silk trade than to any other single event connected with the Normans and Crusaders. The establishment of the silk manufacturers of Thebes and Corinth at Palermo transferred the highest skilled labour from Greece to Sicily. Roger took the greatest care of the captured artizans; he collected together their wives and children, furnished them with dwellings, and the means of resuming their former industry under the most favourable circumstances. He perceived that their skill was the most valuable part of the plunder of the expedition, and he succeeded by his kindness in attaching them to their new home and in naturalizing their industry in Sicily. On the other hand the Byzantine emperors ruined the trade of Greece by oppressive monopolies and ill-judged restrictions, and thus prepared the way for the conquests of the Franks and Venetians¹. And even when the Emperor Manuel concluded a treaty of peace with William I. of Sicily in 1159, he did not endeavour to restore the workmen of Thebes and Corinth to their homes, but abandoned them to their fate. Yet Thebes continued for some time to retain some importance by its silk manufactures. Benjamin of Tudela, who visited

del Ammiraglio, which was built by George, probably from the plunder of Greece. The church at Palermo, called La Martorana, was also built by George, and contains two curious mosaics with Greek inscriptions. Greek, indeed, seems to have been the habitual language of the admiral, and of many Sicilian nobles at the court of Roger. Gally Knight, *Normans in Sicily*, 263, 301. [See above, vol. iii. p. 162 note. Ed.]

¹ Nicetas, 65. Roger seems to have paid more attention to improving the condition of his subjects than any contemporary sovereign. In his reign the cultivation of the sugar-cane was introduced into Sicily. For the Norman expedition to Greece, see Ducange's note to Cinnamus, 446; Otho of Frisingen, *De Gestis Frederici I.*, i. c. 33, in Muratori, *Script. Rer. Ital.* vi. 668. The passage is extracted in Carusius, *Bibliotheca Hist. Regni Siciliae*, tom. ii. 934.

it about the year 1161, speaks of it as a large city with two thousand Jewish inhabitants, who were the most eminent silk-merchants and dyers of purple in Greece¹. The silks of Thebes continued to be celebrated throughout the East even at a later period. In 1195, Moieddin, Sultan of Iconium, required from the Emperor Alexius III. forty pieces of the Theban silk that was woven expressly for the imperial family, among other presents, as the price of his alliance².

The last attempt of the Sicilian Normans to subdue the Byzantine empire was made in the year 1185. William II., hoping that the cruelty of the Emperor Andronicus I. would prove a powerful ally to the Sicilian arms, invaded the empire under the pretext of aiding Alexius Comnenus, one of the nephews of Manuel I., to dethrone the tyrant, and of avenging the losses sustained by the Latins during the troubles which preceded the usurpation of Andronicus, when their establishments were plundered, when thousands were massacred, and thousands sold as slaves³. But whatever might be his pretexts, his real object was to secure for himself some permanent possession in Greece. A powerful fleet under the command of Tancred, the king's cousin and successor, was sent to attack Dyrrachium, which was taken by assault after a siege of thirteen days. The army then marched by the Via Egnatia to Thessalonica, while the fleet with Tancred sailed round the Morea. The rich and populous city of Thessalonica fell into the hands of the Sicilians after a feeble defence. In the fury of conquest, neither age nor sex had been spared when Thessalonica was sacked, and the barbarity of the conquerors is described in frightful detail by Nicetas.

¹ *Itinerary*, vol. i. 47, Asher's edit.

² Nicetas, 297. It was not until the reign of John III. at Nicaea, 1222-1255, when Thebes was in the hands of the Latins, that the Greeks of Asia Minor were forced to import silk from Persia and Sicily. A law was then promulgated to prohibit the use of foreign silk. Niceph. Greg. 25; Bonifidius, *Jus Orientale*, 124. Interesting proof of the great extent and long continuance of the manufacture of purple dye at Athens was found in clearing out the earth and rubbish which had accumulated in the Odeion of Herodes Atticus. The interior of the building and the roof had been destroyed by fire probably as early as the fourth century. Above the pulverized marble and the charcoal of the beams, layers of earth were intermingled at different levels with fragments of shells several feet thick, beside immense jars of earthenware in which a Diogenes could have resided. Layers of these shells were found at three different levels, indicating that the dyeing manufactory had been abandoned for long periods and again resumed on a very large scale.

³ Nicetas, 162; Eustathius, *Funeral oration on Manuel*; Tafel, *Comnenen und Normannen*, p. 117.

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Neither rich nor poor were safe from the most barbarous treatment. Similar horrors are the ordinary events of every war in which religious bigotry excites the passions of rival nations, and the Greeks and Latins now hated each other as heretics, commercial rivals, and political enemies. The cruelties which the Greeks had committed when they drove the Latins from Constantinople three years before were fresh in the memory of the Sicilian troops. On that occasion women, children, and even the sick in the hospital of St. John, had been mercilessly slain, churches filled with helpless fugitives had been burned, and upwards of 4000 Latins had been sold as slaves to the Mohammedans¹. Many of the wealthiest inhabitants of Thessalonica were driven from their splendid palaces without clothes; many were tortured, to compel them to reveal the place where they had concealed their treasures; and some, who had nothing to reveal, were hung up by the feet and suffocated with burning straw. Insult was added to cruelty. The altars of the churches were defiled, the religious ceremonies of the Greeks were ridiculed; while the priests were chanting divine service in the nasal harmony admired by the Orientals, the Sicilian soldiers howled in chorus in imitation of beaten hounds. The celebrated Archbishop Eustathius, however, fortunately succeeded, by his prudence and dignified conduct, in conciliating the Sicilian generals, and in persuading them to make some exertions to bridle the license of their troops, which they had tolerated too long. By his exhortations, Thessalonica was saved from utter ruin².

The Sicilian army at last put itself in march towards Constantinople. But the cruelty with which the inhabitants of Thessalonica had been treated, roused the indignation of the whole population of Macedonia and Thrace, and the Sicilians encountered a determined resistance. In the meantime the tyrant Andronicus had been dethroned and murdered, and Isaac II. reigned in his stead. The Sicilian

¹ William of Tyre (*Hist. xx. 12*, in Bongars, *Gesta Dei per Francos*, i. p. 1024) says that the Greeks beheaded the Sub-deacon of Rome, whom the Pope had sent to the East, and tied his head to the tail of a mangy dog to mark their contempt for the Latin church.

² Nicetas, 192. Eustathius has left us a declamatory but valuable account of the capture of Thessalonica, which was first published by Tafel, *Eustathii Opuscula*, Tübingen, 1832, 4to. p. 267. It is reprinted in the collection of the Byzantine historians, published at Bonn, in the same volume with Leo Grammaticus.

fleet under Tancred entered the Propontis, and advanced within sight of Constantinople, without being able to effect anything. The army continued to advance in two divisions in spite of all opposition; one of these divisions reached Mosynopolis, while the other was engaged plundering the valley of the Strymon and the country round Serres. Alexius Vranas, an experienced general, assumed the command of the Byzantine army. The new emperor, Isaac II., secured the good-will of the troops by distributing among them four thousand pounds of gold, in payment of their arrears and to furnish a donative. The courage of the imperial forces was revived, and their success was insured by the carelessness and presumption of the Sicilian generals, whose contempt for the Greek army prevented them from concentrating their strength. Vranas, taking advantage of this confidence, suddenly drove in the advanced guard and defeated the division at Mosynopolis with considerable loss. The Sicilians retreated to the site of Amphipolis, where they had collected their scattered detachments, and fought another battle at a place called Demerize, on the 7th November 1185. In this they were utterly defeated, and the victory of the Byzantine army decided the fate of the expedition. Count Aldoin and Richard Acerra, the generals, with about four thousand soldiers, were taken prisoners. The fugitives who could gain Thessalonica immediately embarked on board the vessels in the port, and put to sea. Tancred abandoned his station in the Propontis, and, collecting the shattered remnants of the army, returned to Sicily. Even Dyrrachium was soon after abandoned, for William found the expense of retaining the place far greater than its political importance to Sicily warranted. The prisoners sent by Vranas to the Emperor Isaac II. were treated with great inhumanity. They were thrown into dungeons, and neglected to such a degree by the government, that they owed the preservation of their lives to private charity¹.

¹ Nicetas, 231.

SECT. VI.—*Separation of the Greek and Latin Churches.*

The Normans of Italy were the vassals of the Pope. Robert Guiscard, the first Norman invader of Greece, adopted the style of 'Duke by the grace of God and St. Peter;' and the animosity and cruelty of the Sicilian troops against the Greeks were increased by the ecclesiastical quarrels of the Popes of Rome and the Patriarchs of Constantinople. The influence of the Latin and Greek clergy rapidly disseminated the hatred caused by these dissensions throughout the people. The ambition of the Patriarch Photius laid the foundation of the separation of the two churches in the ninth century. He objected to the addition of the words 'and the Son,' which the Latins had inserted in the original creed of the Christian church, and to some variations in the discipline and usages of the church which they had adopted; and he made these a pretext for attacking the supremacy and orthodoxy of the Pope. The Christian world was astonished by the disgraceful spectacle of the Bishops of Rome and Constantinople mutually excommunicating one another, and each pointing out his rival as one who merited the reprobation of man and the wrath of God. These disputes were allayed by the prudence of a Slavonian groom, who mounted the throne of the Byzantine empire as Basil I.; but Christian charity never again took up her abode with the heads either of the Papal or the Greek church.

The arrogance of the Patriarch, Michael Keroularios, induced him to revive the dormant quarrel in 1053. His character as a man condemns him as a Patriarch. When a layman, he plotted against his sovereign; when a priest, he rebelled against his superior. Whatever may have been his religious zeal, there is no doubt that the revival of the quarrel between the Eastern and Western churches was an unnecessary and impolitic act. A joint letter, in the name of the Patriarch Michael and Leo Archbishop of Achrida, was addressed to the Archbishop of Trani, then a Byzantine possession, in which all the accusations formerly brought forward by Photius against the Latins were repeated. The Emperor Constantine IX. (Monomachos) attempted to appease the ardour of Michael; and, in the hope of averting a quarrel, prevailed

on Pope Leo IX. to send legates to Constantinople. Unfortunately the Papal legates were quite as arrogant as the Patriarch himself; and thus the slumbering animosity of the Greek clergy was roused by their imprudent conduct. The legates, finding their exorbitant pretensions treated with contempt, completed the separation of the two churches, by excommunicating the Patriarch and all his adherents; and they inflicted a sensible wound on the feelings of the Greeks by their success in depositing a copy of the act of excommunication on the high altar of the church of St. Sophia. The Patriarch immediately convoked a council of the Eastern clergy, and replied by excommunicating the Pope and all the Latins. The Papal act was ordered to be taken from the altar and publicly burned. From the time of these mutual anathemas, the separation of the Greek and Latin churches has been attended with antichristian animosity; and the members of the Eastern and Western hierarchies have viewed one another as condemned heretics. From this period, therefore, we must always bear in mind that the conduct of the Byzantine government and the actions of the Greeks are judged by the Western nations under the influence of religious prejudices of great virulence, as well as of political and commercial jealousy.

The crimes of which the Patriarch accused the Pope, and on account of which the Greeks deemed the Latins worthy of eternal damnation, were these: the addition of the words 'and the Son' to the clause of the primitive creed of the Christians, declaring the belief in the Holy Ghost, who proceedeth from the Father; the use of unleavened bread in the holy communion; the use in the kitchens of the Latins of things strangled, and of blood, in violation of the apostles' express commands¹; the indulgence granted to monks to make use of lard in cooking, and to eat meat when sick; the use of rings by Latin bishops as a symbol of their marriage with the church, while, as the Greeks sagaciously observed, the marriage of bishops is altogether unlawful; and, to complete the folly of this disastrous quarrel, the Greek clergy even made it a crime that the Latin priests shaved their beards and baptized by a single immersion.

¹ Acts of the Apostles, xv. 20.

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Whatever may be the importance of these errors in a moral or religious point of view, it is certain that the violence displayed by the clergy in stimulating the religious hatred between the Greeks and Latins contributed to hasten the ruin of the Greek nation.

SECT. VII.—*Increase of the Papal Power during the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries.*

Unfortunately for the Greeks, the period during which the animosity of the orthodox and Catholic clergy was transfused into the Eastern and Western nations witnessed a wide extension both of the spiritual jurisdiction and the temporal power of the Popes. Numerous conversions effected by the zeal of the Catholic clergy augmented the authority of the Papal throne, for though the Normans, Danes, Norwegians, Hungarians, and Poles, embraced Christianity in the tenth century, it was not until the eleventh that their conversion added sensibly to the numbers and wealth of the Latin clergy, and augmented the power and dignity of the Popes of Rome.

The events which particularly influenced the political relations of the Popes with the Byzantine empire were, the conquest of Transylvania by the kings of Hungary, the establishment of the Normans in Italy as vassals of the papal see, and the expulsion of the Greeks and Saracens from Sicily. The first of these conquests carried forward the banner of the Popes into the east, and raised a strong bulwark against the progress of the Greek church to the westward, whether it attempted to advance from Constantinople or Russia; by the second, a number of rich benefices, which had been previously held by Greek ecclesiastics, were transferred to Latins; and by the Norman conquest of Sicily the clergy of that island, who, under the Saracens, had remained dependent on the Patriarch of Constantinople, became united to the Latin church. The commencement of the schism was thus marked by three important victories gained by the papal see. The Pope was also furnished with a numerous body of clergy from southern Italy and Sicily, who were familiar with the Greek language, then generally

spoken in those countries. It was consequently in his power to carry the ecclesiastical contest into the heart of the Byzantine empire; while the Greek Patriarch, deprived by the emperor of all political authority, dependent on a synod, and subordinate to the civil power, offered but a faint representation of what was in that age conceived to be the true position of the head of the church.

The territorial acquisitions of the Western Church, great as they really were, bore no comparison to the augmentation of the power of the Pope within the church itself. The authority of the Popes, in Western Europe, was based on the firmest foundation on which power can rest: it was supported by public opinion, for both the laity and the clergy regarded them as the only impartial dispensers of justice on earth, as the antagonists of feudal oppression, and the champions of the people against royal tyranny¹. It is true that the general anarchy towards the end of the tenth century, and the social disorganization incident to the early consolidation of the feudal system, produced a great revolution of discipline among the Latin clergy; and a series of disorders prevailed in the Western Church to which there is no parallel, until far later times, in the Eastern. But the exertions of the well-disposed—who are generally the most numerous, though the least active portion of society—effected a reformation. A spirit of reform conferred on Gregory VII. the extensive temporal power which he assumed for the good of society, but which was too great for an imperfect mortal to possess without abusing it. Thus, at the time when a variety of events invested the Popes with the rank of temporal princes of the highest order, numerous causes conspired to constitute them supreme judges of right and wrong, both in the eyes of kings and people; while their real power was also increased by a widespread belief that the end of the world was approaching, and that the possession of the keys of St. Peter conferred a power to open the portals of heaven. Such was the position of one of the enemies which the vanity and bigotry of the Greek clergy arrayed in hostility against their nation.

¹ Gregory VII (the great Hildebrand), dying at Salerno, under the protection of the Normans, in 1085, exclaimed, 'I have loved justice and hated iniquity, and therefore I die an exile.'

SECT. VIII.—*Predominant position of the French Language in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries.*

The progress of events, rather than any fault on the part of the Byzantine government, ranged many of the nations of western Europe as enemies of the Greeks. All the nations who spoke the French language were regarded by the Greeks as one people, and all were treated as enemies in consequence of the wars with the Normans of Italy and Sicily. The name of Franks was given, in the Byzantine empire, to all who spoke French; and, consequently, under this hated designation the Greeks included not only Normans and French, but also Flemings, English, and Scots¹. The Norman conquests on the shores of the Mediterranean, and their commercial relations with the Italian republics, began to place their interests in rivalry with those of the Byzantine Greeks. And when the East was invaded by the Crusaders, the prevalence of the French language, and the number of Normans in their ranks, tended to make the Greeks view the intruders as old enemies.

It is singular that the most numerous body of those who appeared in the East, making use of the French language, were neither French by race nor political allegiance. Normandy, Flanders, southern Italy, Sicily, England, and we may add Scotland, were then more French in language and manners, in the higher and military classes, than the southern provinces of what is now France. The foundation of the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem, and the smaller principalities of Syria, gave the French language and Norman manners a predominant influence in the East. Though the king of France really exercised no direct authority over the greater part of the states in which French was spoken, still the dependence of several of the most powerful princes on the French crown as feudatories, and the great influence which Louis IX. deservedly possessed throughout the Christian world at

¹ 'At this period (A.D. 1290) Norman-French was, alike in England and Scotland, the language in which state affairs were generally conducted.' Tytler's *History of Scotland*, i. 75; Hume's *History of England*, chap. xiii. note U.

a later period, rendered the king of France, in the eyes of the Greeks, the real sovereign of all the French or Frank nations¹.

¹ [The influence of the French mediaeval romances on the Greek literature from the twelfth century onwards is carefully traced by M. Gidel in his *Études sur la littérature grecque moderne; imitations en Grec de nos romans de chevalerie*. See especially pp. 358 foll. Ed.]

CHAPTER III.

OVERTHROW OF THE BYZANTINE EMPIRE BY THE CRUSADERS.

SECT. I.—*The Crusades.*

IN the West, the Crusades were productive of much good ; but to the native Christian population in the East they were the cause of unmixed evil. During the early period, while the force of the Crusaders was greatest, and religious enthusiasm directed their conduct, they respected the Byzantine empire as a Christian state, and treated the Greeks as a Christian people. The earlier armies passed through the empire like hurricanes, producing widespread but only temporary desolation. At a later period, when ambition, fashion, and the hope of gain made men Crusaders, avarice and intolerance exerted more influence over their conduct than religion and a sense of justice. The Crusades must, consequently, be examined under two different aspects in order to be correctly appreciated. In the East, they offer little beyond the records of military incursions of undisciplined invaders, seeking to conquer foreign lands by the sword, and to maintain possession of them by the combinations of the feudal system. To the Christians of Greece and Syria, the Latins appeared closely to resemble the Goths, Vandals, and Lombards. Viewed, therefore, as the actions of the Crusaders must have been by the Eastern nations, the results of their expeditions were so inadequate to the forces brought into the field, that the character of the Western nations suffered, and the Franks were long regarded with contempt as well as hatred both by Christians and Mussulmans.

With armies far exceeding in number those of the early Saracens who subdued Asia, Africa, and Spain, and much

greater than those of the Seljouk Turks, who had recently made themselves masters of great part of Asia, the conquests of the Crusaders were comparatively insignificant. One striking difference between the Asiatic and European warriors deserves to be noticed, for it formed the main cause of the inefficiency of the latter as conquerors. The Asiatics left untouched the organization of society among the Christians throughout their wide-extended empires. The changes effected by their conquests in the relations of rich and poor, master and slave, resulted from altered habits gradually arising out of new social exigencies, and were rarely interposed by the direct agency of legislation. But the Crusaders immediately destroyed all the existing order of society, and revolutionized every institution connected with property and the cultivation of the soil. Mankind was forced back into a state of barbarism, which made predial servitude an element of feudal tenures. In the East, the progress of society had already introduced the cultivation of the soil by free agricultural labour before the arrival of the Crusaders in Palestine; the Franks brought back slavery and serfage in their train. The Saracens had considered agricultural labour as honourable; the Franks regarded every useful occupation as a degradation. The Saracens became agriculturists in all their conquests, and were, consequently, colonists who increased in number under certain social conditions. The Franks, on the contrary, were nothing but a feudal garrison in their Eastern possessions; so that, as soon as they had reduced the cultivators of the soil to the condition of serfs, they were themselves subjected to the operation of that law of population which, like an avenging Nemesis, is perpetually exterminating every class that dares to draw a line of separation between itself and the rest of mankind. Thus the system of government introduced by the Crusaders, in their Asiatic conquests, contained within itself the causes of its own destruction.

The Crusades are the last example of the effects of that mighty spirit of emigration and adventure that impelled the Goths, Franks, Saxons, and Normans to seek new possessions and conquer distant kingdoms. The old spirit of emigration in its military form, engrafted on the passion for pilgrimages in the Western church, was roused into religious enthusiasm by many coincident circumstances. The passion for pilgrim-

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ages, though of ancient date, received great extension in the eleventh century; but as early as the fourth, the conduct of the numerous pilgrims who, in the abundance of the ancient world, went on their way to Palestine feasting and revelling, had scandalized St. Gregory of Nyssa. The great increase of pilgrimages in the eleventh century was connected with the idea then prevalent, that the thousand years of the imprisonment of Satan mentioned in the Apocalypse had expired; and, as the tempter was supposed to be raging over the face of the earth, no place was considered so safe from his intrusion as the holy city of Jerusalem.

The inhabitants of the Byzantine empire were from early times familiarized with the passage of immense caravans of pilgrims, and due arrangements were made for this intercourse, which was a regular source of profit. Even the Saracens had generally treated the pilgrims with consideration, as men who were engaged in the performance of a sacred duty. The chronicles of the time relate that a band of pilgrims amounting to seven thousand, led by the archbishop of Mentz and four bishops, passed through Constantinople in the reign of Constantine X. (Ducas)¹. Near Jerusalem they were attacked by wandering tribes, but were relieved by the Saracen emir of Ramla, who hastened to their assistance. The conquests of the Seljouk Turks had already thrown all Syria into a state of disorder, and the Bedouin Arabs began to push their plundering excursions far into the cultivated districts. This army of pilgrims was prevented from visiting the Jordan and the Dead Sea by the robbers of the desert, and it is reported that the caravan lost three thousand of its number before returning home. The misfortunes of so numerous a body of men resounded throughout the Christian world; and year after year bringing tidings of new disasters, the fermentation of the public mind continually increased. No distinct project was formed for delivering the holy sepulchre, but a general desire was awakened to remedy the insecurity attending the pilgrimage to Jerusalem. The conquest of Palestine by the Seljouk Turks, in 1076, increased the disorders. These nomades neglected to guard the roads, and augmented the exactions on the pilgrims. In the West,

¹ A.D. 1064 or 1065. Michaud, *Histoire des Croisades*, i. 67, who refers to *Annalium Baronii epitome*, p. 11, cap. 5, p. 432.

the passion for pilgrimages was increasing, while in the East, the dangers to which the pilgrims were exposed were augmenting still more rapidly. A cry for vengeance was the consequence. The Franks and Normans were men of action, more prompt to war than to complaint. The mine was already prepared; when Peter the Hermit applied the match to the inflammable materials.

Commercial interests were not unconnected with the origin of the Crusades, though the commercial enterprise of the age was perhaps too confined for us to attribute to commerce a prominent part in producing these great expeditions; but if all notice of the facts that connect them with the progress of trade were to be overlooked, a very inaccurate idea would be formed of the various causes of their origin. Commerce exercised almost as much influence in producing the Crusades, as the Crusades did in improving and extending the relations of commerce¹. The roads which the early Crusaders followed in marching to Palestine were the routes used by the commercial caravans which carried on the trade between Germany, Constantinople, and Syria. This had been very considerable in earlier times, and had enriched the Avars and the Bulgarians². From Constantinople to Antioch, the great road had always been much frequented, until the commercial communications in Asia Minor were deranged by the incursions of the Seljouk Turks. In the year 1035, before their arrival, Robert, Duke of Normandy, called Robert the Devil, the father of William the Conqueror, when on the pilgrimage to Jerusalem with a numerous suite, joined a caravan of merchants travelling to Antioch, in order to traverse Asia Minor under their guidance³. The great losses of the

¹ Thirty-five years before the Crusades, Ingulph, the Secretary of William the Conqueror, mentions that in returning from the pilgrimage to Jerusalem, he found a fleet of Genoese merchantmen at Jaffa, in one of which he took his passage to Europe. Vincens, *Histoire de la République de Gènes*, i. 40.

² *Capitularies of Charlemagne*, ed. Baluze, i. 755. The Bulgarian trade is mentioned by Suidas, v. Βουλγαροι.

³ The pilgrimage of Robert the Devil was much talked of, and gives a good idea of the pilgrimages then in fashion with princes and nobles. He reached Constantinople with a numerous and splendid suite of Norman gentlemen. The emperor, Michael IV., received him at a public audience; but either from personal vanity, or the pride of Byzantine etiquette, the Paphlagonian moneychanger, whom a turn of fortune had seated on the throne of Constantine, left the Duke standing. Robert made a sign to his companions to imitate his proceedings. All dropped their rich velvet cloaks and sat down on them. On quitting the audience chamber they left their cloaks on the ground. A chamberlain followed to remind

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Crusaders in their expeditions by land, are not therefore to be attributed so much to absolute ignorance of the nature of the country, as to utter inattention to the arrangements required by their numbers, and to incapacity for exercising habitual forethought and restraint. As early as the first Crusade, the fleets of the Italian republics would have sufficed to transport large armies direct to Palestine. The Venetians and Byzantines are said by Anna Comnena to have lost thirteen thousand men in a naval defeat they sustained from Robert Guiscard, near Corfu, in 1084; and the Byzantine princess can hardly be suspected of making the losses of her father's subjects and allies exceed the numbers of those actually serving on board their fleets¹. Amalfi, Pisa, and Genoa were all able to send large fleets to Palestine as soon as they heard that the Crusaders had got possession of Jerusalem².

During the age immediately preceding the Crusades, society had received a great development, and commerce had both aided and profited by the movement. There is no greater anachronism than to suppose that the commercial greatness of the Italian republics arose out of these expeditions. Their commerce was already so extensive, that the commercial alarm caused by the conduct of the Seljouk Turks was really one of the causes of the Crusades. The caravans of pilgrims which repaired annually to the East, supplied Europe with many necessary commodities, whose augmented price was felt as a universal grievance. The fair held at Jerusalem during Easter was at that time of great commercial importance to all the nations of Europe, and this market was in danger of being closed. The commerce of the East, if it were allowed to exist at all by the Mohammedans, seemed to be in danger of becoming a monopoly in the hands of the Greeks.

them, but Robert replied, 'It is not the habit of Norman gentlemen to carry away their chairs.' As he was travelling through Asia Minor, he was met by a Norman pilgrim, who asked him if he had any message to send home. The Duke was in a litter, carried by four negroes. 'Tell them in Normandy that you saw me carried to heaven by four devils,' was all he had to say. He was poisoned at Nicaea, on his return, by one of his attendants. Wace, *Roman de Rou*, quoted by Ducange, *Gloss. Med. et Inf. Latinitatis*, v. 'Bancus.'

¹ Anna Comnena, 161. A ship at this time generally carried one hundred and forty men. The Norman fleet consisted of one hundred and twenty ships. Guilielmus Apuliensis, *Res in Italia Normannicae*.

² Anna Comnena (336) mentions a Pisan fleet.

Thus we see that the Scandinavian spirit of adventure, the ancient superstitions of the people, the interests of the Latin church, the cruelties of the Mohammedans, and the commercial necessities of the times, all conspired to awaken enthusiastic aspirations after something greater than the commonplace existence of ordinary life in the eleventh century; and every class of society found its peculiar passions gratified by the great cry for the deliverance of Christ's tomb from the hands of the infidels. The historians of the Crusades often endeavour to give a miraculous character to the effects of the preaching of Peter the Hermit; but we have seen in our own day Father Mathew in morals, and Daniel O'Connell in politics, produce almost as wonderful effects on the people.

SECT. II.—*Quarrels with the Byzantine Emperors during the First and Second Crusades. Conquest of Cyprus by Richard I., King of England.*

The subjection of the Greeks to Latin domination was commenced by one of those accidents which no human foresight could have predicted. The third Crusade seemed to threaten the Greeks with little danger after the prudence of Frederic Barbarossa had prevented the folly of Isaac II. from causing a war in Thrace. The kings of France and England, in order to avoid visiting the Greek territory, transported their armies to Palestine by sea. But 'who can avoid his fate?' On this occasion, as on so many others, fortune amused herself by making the condition of nations depend on the caprice of a worthless tyrant. Isaac Komnenos, who had assumed the title of emperor of the Romans in the island of Cyprus, wantonly engaged in hostilities with Richard Cœur-de-Lion, and caused that king to conquer the island, and lay the foundations of the most durable state which the Latins established in the East. This accidental conquest of Cyprus was the first serious blow that the Crusaders struck at the independence of the Hellenic race.

The island of Cyprus was well cultivated; its population was numerous, and its trade flourishing. The extreme fertility of the soil secured to the inhabitants abundant harvests

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of corn, fruit, oil, and wine; the solid buildings erected in former ages afforded them extensive magazines for storing their produce; and the situation of their island supplied them with ready and profitable markets in the Frank possessions in Syria, in the Armenian kingdom of Cilicia, in Egypt, and on the African coast. Neutrality in the wars of the Christians and Mohammedans was the true basis of the wealth of Cyprus. Its pecuniary interests suffered seriously by the policy of the court of Constantinople, which was frequently engaged in disputes with the best customers for the produce of Cyprus; and to this circumstance we must in some degree attribute the ease with which Isaac Komnenos established himself in the island as an independent sovereign. He had gained possession of the island during the oppressive administration of Andronicus I., and had already reigned seven years. His marriage with the sister of William II. of Sicily was both a popular and a politic alliance, because it secured to his subjects a flourishing trade; but his bad government, and the commercial selfishness of his subjects, had destroyed every sentiment of patriotism in the breasts of the Cypriots, and prepared them to receive a foreign yoke.

In the year 1191, the English fleet, under Richard Cœur-de-Lion, on its voyage from Messina to Acre (Ptolemais), put into Crete and Rhodes to renew its stock of provisions and water. After leaving Rhodes it encountered a tempest in the Gulf of Satalia, and two ships were wrecked near Limisso on the coast of Cyprus. Isaac, who possessed all the feelings of personal rancour against the Franks generally felt by the Greeks, and who had recently formed an alliance with Saladin, fancied that he might gratify his spleen against the English with impunity. He was ignorant of the power and energy of the English monarch, whom he considered only as the chief of a barbarous island. The Cypriots were allowed to plunder the shipwrecked vessels, though even the tyrant Andronicus had made a law which punished severely such acts of plunder, and the unfortunate crews escaping on shore were thrown into prison. The ship that carried Berengaria of Navarre, the betrothed of Richard, and Joanna, queen of Sicily, his sister, sought shelter from the storm in the same port. Isaac invited the queens to land, and though they suspected treachery they would have been unable to avoid

accepting his invitation, had Richard not arrived during the night¹.

The emperor of Cyprus had sadly miscalculated his own power, as well as the disposition of the English king. Richard demanded the release of the prisoners, and indemnification for the property plundered. Isaac refused to deliver up the shipwrecked subjects of the crown of England without ransom, and disclaimed all responsibility for the pillage of the shipwrecked mariners. Richard immediately took measures to deliver the prisoners by force and to levy an ample contribution. The English army was landed, the city of Limisso taken by assault, and the Greek troops defeated in battle. The nobles, proprietors, and citizens submitted to the conqueror, and took an oath of fidelity and allegiance to the English king on the first summons. The emperor Isaac, who fled to Nicosia, alarmed at this defection, sued for peace. Guy of Lusignan, king of Jerusalem, Bohemund, prince of Antioch, Raymond, count of Tripolis, and Leo, king of Cilician Armenia, arrived at this time in Cyprus to welcome Richard. His marriage with Berengaria of Navarre was celebrated on Sunday, May 12th, at Limisso, and by the mediation of the Knights Hospitallers a meeting took place between the king of England and the emperor of Cyprus, and a treaty of peace was concluded. By the terms of this treaty Isaac received back the island of Cyprus as a fief to be held of the crown of England; and he engaged to deliver up all the prisoners still in his power; to pay twenty thousand marks of gold as an indemnity for his injustice, and for the expense of the expedition; to receive English garrisons into his fortresses; and to join the Crusaders in person with five hundred cavalry and five hundred infantry, serving as a vassal of Richard. Isaac had expected to obtain more favourable terms, and at the instigation of a knight of Palestine in his service he fled during the following night to Famagusta. Richard pursued him with his usual promptitude, and made himself master of the whole island in a fortnight. The English fleet was sent to cruise round the island in order

¹ Richard's fleet left Rhodes on the 1st May 1191, and his ship reached Limisso on the 6th. *Itinerarium peregrinorum et gesta Regis Ricardi*, auctore ut videtur Ricardo, Canonico Sanctae Trinitatis Londoniensis, p. 188; in vol. ii. of the *Chronicles and Memorials of the Reign of Richard I.* edit. Stubbs.

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to occupy every point from which it seemed probable that Isaac might endeavour to escape to the mainland. The king proceeded first to Keronia (Cerines), which contained the emperor's treasury, and where his young daughter resided. The place made no resistance, and the princess threw herself at Richard's feet and implored pardon for her father; while Isaac, seeing the insufficiency of any military force he could assemble to carry on the war, surrendered himself a prisoner, asking only that he might not be confined in irons. Richard, who could not trust his promises, granted his request only so far as to order him to be secured by silver fetters, and committed him to the custody of Guy of Lusignan¹.

The conquest of Cyprus detained Richard a month, and on quitting the island he intrusted the government to Richard Camville and Robert Turnham². The dethroned emperor Isaac was transported to Tripolis, to be kept imprisoned in the castle of Margat, under the wardship of the Knights Hospitallers³. The Greeks soon considered the domination of foreign heretics a severer lot than the tyranny of an orthodox usurper, and they took up arms to expel the English. Richard, who wished to withdraw all his troops for the war in Palestine, sold the island to the Templars; but these knights found the internal affairs of Cyprus in so disturbed a state, that they surrendered back their purchase to Richard in a short time. The king of England then transferred the sovereignty to Guy of Lusignan, who had lost the kingdom

¹ The account of the first battle, given by the author of the *Itinerarium*, is curious. He describes the Greek army as making a gallant show on the beach, and the emperor as riding to and fro splendidly equipped, and attended by a crowd of courtiers in rich armour and many coloured scarfs, mounted on spirited horses or beautiful mules. As soon as the English effected their landing, the whole Greek army fled. Richard hastening to pursue the fugitives on foot, fell in with a pack-horse, and with the aid of his lance mounted on the pack-saddle. Fixing his feet in the ropes which served as stirrups he galloped after Isaac shouting, 'My lord emperor, I challenge you to single combat.' But Isaac fled away swiftly as if he was deaf. *Chronicles and Memorials of the Reign of Richard I.* vol. i. p. 191.

² He sailed to Palestine on June 5th, 1191.

³ Isaac escaped from Margat, and attempted to invade the Byzantine empire, but was poisoned by one of his own household, Nicetas, 298. His daughter was placed under the protection of Berengaria, and Richard is said to have been a great admirer of her beauty. When the queen quitted Palestine the Cypriot princess accompanied her to Poitiers. One of the articles in the treaty for the ransom of Richard, extorted by the German emperor, was, that Isaac and his daughter should be set at liberty. The article is supposed to have been suggested by the Duke of Austria, who was connected with the family of Komnenos by marriage. The daughter of Isaac was married to a Flemish noble, who vainly claimed the crown of Cyprus. Roger of Hoveden, 414, Saville's edit.; Ducange, *Fam. Byz. Aug.* 184.

of Jerusalem by the election of Henry Count of Champagne as successor to Conrad of Montferrat.

Guy of Lusignan introduced the feudal system as it existed in the kingdom of Jerusalem. He made the French language that of the government, the Latin became that of the church, and the Greek language was confined to the chapel and the family. Territorial rank and military power were reserved to the Catholics, but toleration was practised with more equity than in most Christian states. The Greek clergy were allowed to retain their ecclesiastical authority over the orthodox, though they were deprived of the greater part of the church property; and Armenians, Nestorians, and Copts were allowed to build churches. Latin bishops and priests were endowed with rich benefices, and Byzantine officials and wealthy Greeks were driven from the island. Numbers of Greek families emigrated, and their place was occupied by Latin families from the kingdom of Jerusalem, who had lost their property by the conquests of Saladin. Three hundred knights were invested with landed estates by Guy of Lusignan, and many Latin soldiers received dotations as sergeants at arms or as burgesses in the fortresses.

From this period the history of Cyprus ceases to be connected with the records of the Greek nation. After flourishing for several centuries as a feudal kingdom it became at last nothing more than a dependency of the republic of Venice. In the year 1571 it was conquered by the Turks, after having been possessed by the Latins for 380 years. During that period, and especially since its conquest by the Turks, the Greek population has sunk from age to age, into an inferior state of society, in consequence of the destruction of capital and property; and the island is probably at the present hour incapable of maintaining in wretchedness one-tenth of the population which it nourished in abundance at the time of its conquest by Richard King of England¹.

¹ From 1191 to 1486 Cyprus was a feudal kingdom under the sway of sovereigns who often assumed a triple crown, and styled themselves kings of Cyprus, Jerusalem, and Armenia. From 1486 to 1571 it was a Venetian possession, and since 1571 it has been a Turkish province. Loredano, *Istoria de' Re Lusignani dall' anno 1180 sin' al 1475*, and the French translation by Giblet, Paris, 1732; Jauna, *Histoire Générale des Royaumes de Chypre, de Jerusalem, d'Arménie, et d'Égypte*, Leyde, 1747, 2 vols. 4to.; Reinhard's *Geschichte des Königreichs Cypern* (Erlangen, 1766) is a much better work, but the new work by Maslatrie, *Histoire de l'île de Chypre sous le règne des princes de la maison de Lusignan*, will be still more complete. Vols. ii. and iii. contain a valuable collection of documents.

SECT. III.—*Commercial relations of the Venetians with the Byzantine Empire.*

The commercial greatness of Venice arose from its trade with the Greeks of the Byzantine empire. The flourishing trade in Christian slaves with the Mohammedans, which early roused the anger of the Popes, was a secondary though lucrative branch of Venetian commerce¹. During several ages the Byzantine emperors considered Venice as a vassal municipality, not as an independent city; and even under the Iconoclast and Basilian dynasties the Venetians recognized the suzerainty over the Mediterranean as an attribute of the imperial crown. Indeed for nearly two centuries the *thalassocracy* or dominion of the sea of the Byzantine empire was only temporarily disturbed by a few isolated catastrophes, whose terrible effects are prominently exhibited in history².

After the extinction of the Basilian family, the emperors of the East ceased to govern by the systematic agency of a well-trained official aristocracy acting on ancient traditions and by fixed rules of procedure, and the government assumed the form of an administrative despotism conducted for the aggrandizement of an oligarchy consisting of a few families. The commercial and industrial corporations of the Greeks, which had been allowed to replace or to survive their municipal rights under the Roman empire, were now destroyed by the fiscal rapacity of the Comneni. Greek commerce declined, and the dominion of the sea passed into the hands of the free cities of Italy. Amalfi, Pisa, Venice, and Genoa became sharers in that eastern commerce, which had been long monopolized by the subjects of the Byzantine emperors.

Towards the latter part of the eleventh century the naval power of Venice was so great, that when Robert Guiscard invaded the Byzantine empire, Alexius I. purchased the assistance of a Venetian fleet by granting important immunities to Venetian commerce at Constantinople. The concessions he made were confirmed in a charter dated in 1082, which secures to the republic the exclusive possession of a street or quarter as a factory, in which the merchants constructed

¹ See above, vol. ii. *History of the Byzantine Empire*, p. 64 note.

² *Ibid.* p. 10, and the taking of Thessalonica, p. 270.

dwelling-houses, warehouses, churches, and monasteries, and in which justice was administered by Venetian judges according to the laws of Venice. A landing-place in the Golden Horn was set apart for Venetians, and their goods, imported in Venetian ships, were exempt from import duties. There can be no doubt that a colony of Venetian traders was established at Constantinople before this concession, but the privileges it conferred soon rendered the Venetian merchants a rich and powerful community. Their quarter and landing were situated near the entrance of the great port in the vicinity of the walls of the ancient Byzantium, which now enclose the old palace of the sultans.

The privileges conceded by this charter of Alexius in 1082 were perpetuated in the Byzantine and Greek empires. When foreigners were assured of legal protection against the fiscal exactions of a rapacious government, strangers were enriched and the Greeks were impoverished. The system of which this charter was the progenitor, was a heritage which the Othoman sultans received from the Greek emperors¹.

A generation of Venetian colonists grew up at Constantinople, neither under the control of Byzantine laws nor subject to the wholesome restraint of native usages at home. Complaints were made by the unprivileged Greeks of the license of the privileged strangers. Frequent quarrels and tumults arose in the streets of the capital, which were attributed to the insolence of the Venetians. At last John II., called Kalojoannes, and one of the best of the Byzantine emperors, expelled the Venetian colony from Constantinople, as the only mode of restoring order and doing justice to his own subjects. This was regarded by the Venetian republic as a violation of his father's treaty. A loud outcry was raised against the faithlessness of the Greeks, and prompt measures were taken to revenge the injury.

In 1122 a body of Venetian crusaders on their way to Palestine turned aside to attack Corfu and collect some wealth by plundering Rhodes. The same body on its return in 1124 seized the island of Chios, where it established its winter quarters, and from whence it plundered Lesbos, Samos, and

¹ This charter of Alexius I. is recited in a charter of Manuel I. published by Tafel and Thomas, *Urkunden zur ältern Handels- und Staatsgeschichte der Republik Venedig mit besonderer Beziehung auf Byzanz und die Levante*, Theil i. pp. 43 and 113.

Andros. On its return to Venice it surprised the city of Modon and plundered the coast of the Morea. In 1126 another body of Venetians conquered Cephalonia, and the emperor John II. finding that he was unable to contest the dominion of the sea with the single city of Venice, or even to defend his territories against the attacks of the bold republicans, concluded a treaty of peace and re-established the Venetian merchants in all their former privileges and possessions at Constantinople¹.

In the year 1148 the emperor Manuel, in order to obtain active assistance from Venice in his war with King Roger of Sicily, confirmed the charters of his father and grandfather, though the immunities of the Venetians were hourly becoming a greater burden to the Greek traders in his empire². The insolence of the Italians on the one hand and the envy of the Greeks on the other engendered a violent hatred between the two nations, which occasioned several bloody quarrels during the siege of Corfu in 1149. On one occasion the young emperor was grossly caricatured by a party of Venetian sailors, but unmoved by personal insults he appeased the most dangerous tumults, and re-established order in the allied force by his patience, courage, and prudence³. For many years the value of the political alliance both to the Byzantine empire and the Venetian republic was so great, that Manuel bore the insolence of the colonists at Constantinople, and the senate despised the occasional outbreaks of Greek hatred. Manuel did not entirely neglect to form some counterpoise to the overweening power of the Venetians. He granted commercial privileges, and conceded quarters for the formation of colonies, both to the Pisans and the Genoese. By this means he diminished the exorbitant gains of the Venetians without infringing the treaties he had concluded with Venice, for while they were entirely exempt from import duties, the Pisans were obliged to pay four per cent., and the Genoese were subjected to the same duty as the native Greek merchants and paid ten per cent.⁴ And the treaty (A.D. 1155), which conferred on the Genoese the right of

¹ Tafel and Thomas, *Urkunden Venedigs*, i. 95.

² See above, vol. iii. p. 169.

³ Tafel and Thomas, i. 109, 113.

⁴ See an able memoir on the commercial colonies of the Italians in the Byzantine empire by Heyd, published in the *Tübingen Zeitschrift für die gesammte Staatswissenschaft*, vol. xiv. p. 674.

establishing a colony at Constantinople, bound the colonists to military service in defence of the empire¹. The citizens of Amalfi had been long established as traders in the Byzantine empire, but at this time they were subjected to Venetian control.

While looking round for allies, Manuel concluded a treaty with the free city of Ancona². And to place some restraint on the tumultuous behaviour of the Venetian seamen who visited the port of Constantinople, he demanded an oath of fealty from every Venetian who resided in his dominions as a permanent settler³. In virtue of this oath he proposed to render them responsible for the good conduct of their fellow-citizens who were only temporary sojourners in the ports of the empire. These prudent measures awakened the jealousy of the Venetian government, and when Manuel was involved in war with William II. of Sicily (A.D. 1167), the republic refused to afford him any aid. Bloody feuds between the citizens of the different Italian states occurred frequently in the streets of Constantinople. The colonists arrogated to themselves the right of waging private war in the dominions and even in the capital of the Byzantine emperor, and burned down one another's shops in their respective quarters. It was necessary for Manuel to adopt strong measures to maintain order. Instead of establishing a strong police, he seized the opportunity for avenging himself on Venice, and pretending that the Venetians were more disorderly than the other Italians, he ordered all who could be seized in the Byzantine empire to be imprisoned. At the same time he abrogated all their privileges and confiscated their goods. This act of imperial despotism⁴ was perpetrated in 1171, and if we believe a contemporary writer, 10,000 Venetians were arrested in Constantinople alone⁵. The Greeks, who hated the privileged strangers, were pleased with the tyrannical proceedings

¹ Sauli, *Della colonia dei Genovesi in Galata*, ii. 181.

² Cinnamus, 98.

³ Ibid. 164.

⁴ Cinnamus, 165; Nicetas, 111. The iniquity of seizing the goods of foreign merchants without provocation was often practised by mediaeval sovereigns. Modern princes have found it more profitable to cheat their own subjects by borrowing their gold and paying them in paper, while western republics have preferred the dishonesty of repudiating their lawful debts.

⁵ At the end of Manuel's reign (A.D. 1180) Eustathius the archbishop of Thessalonica says there were 60,000 Latins in Constantinople; *De Thessalonica urbe a Latinis capta narratio*, c. 28.

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of Manuel. Indeed the Venetians seem to have done everything in their power to render themselves intolerable both to the sovereign and the people. Byzantine writers complain of the rudeness and insolence of the purse-proud mariners and burghers of the colony, who treated even the titled officials of the empire as if they were merely slaves. It is certain, however, that the independent spirit of the free citizens of Venice rendered their persons and their manners less displeasing to the Byzantine ladies, for the colonists excited the envy of the Greeks by marrying young, rich, and beautiful orthodox damsels, and living like Byzantine nobles in splendid houses beyond the precincts of the quarter assigned to them for residence as well as trade¹. The haughty republicans also ridiculed the pretension of the sovereign of the Greeks, who styled himself emperor of the Romans, and their bitter irony drew tears from the eyes of a courtly Byzantine historian².

The Venetians lost no time in wreaking their vengeance on the Greeks in the islands and coasts of the empire for the injuries they had received from Manuel. They attacked Negrepont, and plundered its suburbs when they found they were unable to take the city. They gained possession of Chios, which, as before in the year 1124, they made their winter-quarters. A contagious disease broke out among their forces in that island, and they accused the Emperor Manuel of having suborned emissaries to poison the wells and the wine-casks of the Chiotes. The malady broke the strength of the expedition, which returned to Venice without having effected any lasting conquest.

In 1174 the Venetians and the troops of the emperor Frederic Barbarossa besieged Ancona, which had admitted a Greek garrison, and the republic having concluded an alliance with the King of Sicily, Manuel found himself unable to defend his dominions. Like his father, he was compelled to patch up a peace by agreeing to all the demands of the Venetians. A treaty was concluded, by which Manuel engaged to release all his prisoners, and pay fifteen hundred

¹ Cinnamus, 164. Nicetas (129) calls the Venetians disorderly, bloody-minded, greedy mariners, breathing irreconcilable hatred of the Greek race. Will. Tyr. xxii. 12.

² Cinnamus, 127.

pounds' weight of gold as an indemnity for the property he had confiscated¹.

After the death of Manuel, the Latins at Constantinople became involved in the political contests and intrigues that were terminated by the usurpation of Andronicus². The national and religious antipathies of the Greeks facilitated that usurpation, and in the tumults which attended it, the Latins were overpowered and ruthlessly massacred. Not combatants only, but also the peaceful colonists and traders with their wives and children were murdered in cold blood, or if their lives were saved, they were frequently sold as slaves to the Mohammedans in Asia Minor. Venetian children were exposed for sale in the slave markets of Nicaea and Iconium. The cruelties committed at this time by both parties added greatly to the violence of the hatred already existing between the Greeks and Latins³.

The accession of Isaac Angelos re-established the commercial relations of the Venetians with the Byzantine empire on the old footing. The colonists were put in possession of their quarter and landing-place in the port (*scala*), and the merchants were indemnified for their losses. Isaac also concluded an offensive and defensive alliance with the republic in the year 1187, by which the Venetians bound themselves to assist in defending the empire when attacked by any foreign power, even should it be their close ally the King of Sicily⁴.

Even this alliance with Venice was insufficient to prevent continual outbreaks of the hatred which the Latins felt for the Greeks. During the weak government of Isaac the populace of Constantinople attacked the Latin colonists, and Latin cruisers plundered the ships of the Greeks. When ambassadors passed between Isaac and Saladin, they were arrested on the pretext that the Byzantine emperor was forming an alliance with the infidels against the Crusaders⁵. Piracy was also carried on by the Italian merchant-nobles in the Aegean Sea on a scale resembling the private wars of the great feudal barons in the western states of Europe.

¹ A.D. 1175. Nicetas, 112; Tafel and Thomas, *Urkunden Venedigs*, i. 150; see above, vol. iii. p. 183.

² See vol. iii. p. 200.

³ Will. Tyr. xxii. 13.

⁴ This interesting document is published by Tafel and Thomas, *Urkunden Venedigs*, i. 195; see also Marin, *Storia del Commercio de' Veneziani*, iii. 265.

⁵ Nicetas, 250. Le Beau, *Histoire du Bas-Empire*, xvi. 416.

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Alexius III., though he regarded the Venetians with a less friendly feeling than his brother whom he had dethroned, nevertheless renewed all their privileges, and even extended their exemption from import duties to sales of goods made in the interior of the empire. In 1199 he also concluded an offensive and defensive alliance with the republic on the same conditions as his brother Isaac in 1187. At this time the Venetians were in possession of an extensive trade over the whole empire, and numerous colonies of Venetian merchants were settled in all the great maritime cities, excluding the natives from the most lucrative branches of foreign commerce¹.

The ultimate result of the privileges granted to the Venetians, Genoese, and Pisans was to deprive the Greeks of any share in the eastern trade. That the native subjects of the Byzantine emperors should be always eager to expel strangers who were ruining their commerce was perfectly natural, and it is probable that about this time the Venetians began to feel the necessity of rendering their position more secure by acquiring some possessions in the Archipelago. The fourth crusade afforded them an opportunity, of which they availed themselves without paying the slightest regard to their recent treaty with the Emperor Alexius III. Honesty in politics was then as little a characteristic of the Latins as of the Greeks.

SECT. IV.—*Conquest of the Byzantine Empire.*

Religious enthusiasm had less to do with the fourth Crusade than with the preceding expeditions. Many of the leaders engaged in it to escape the punishment of their feudal delinquencies to the crown of France, and many were needy adventurers eager to better their condition abroad, as the prospect of improving it at home became daily more clouded. The chiefs of this Crusade concluded a treaty with the republic of Venice, which engaged to transport all who took the cross to Palestine by sea; but when the expedition

¹ Tafel published the treaty of 1199 with a valuable geographical commentary under the title *Symbolarum criticarum geographiam Byzantinam spectantium pars prior*; and it is reprinted in Tafel and Thomas, *Urkunden Venedigs*, i. 246.

assembled, the Crusaders were so few that they were unable to pay the stipulated price. Henry Dandolo, the blind old hero who was then doge, took the cross and joined them; but he appears hardly to have contemplated visiting the holy sepulchre, and only to have proposed guiding the Crusade in such a manner as to render it subservient to his country's interests. When the Crusaders declared their inability to pay the whole sum agreed on, Dandolo proposed that the republic should defer its claim for 34,000 marks of silver, and despatch the fleet immediately, on condition that the Crusaders should aid in reducing the rebellious city of Zara. The Crusaders consented. In vain Pope Innocent III., the greatest prince who ever sate on the papal throne, excommunicated both the Crusaders and the republic of Venice, for turning the swords they had consecrated to the service of Christianity against Christians. They paid no attention to the excommunication, and took Zara¹.

It must not be forgotten that the state of Venice did not yet possess any territory in Italy beyond the Dogado. The nobles were still merchants, not feudal chiefs. They went forth to wage war or to collect plunder, as well as to trade in their own galleys or as captains of the galleys of the republic. Verona, Vicenza, Padua, and Treviso confined the Venetians, and seemed to exclude them from any hope of forming a state on the Italian continent. Even in Istria and Dalmatia their authority was not yet firmly established. It was the order and security of property which prevailed at Venice and the energy of her citizens that made the republic powerful, not the number of its inhabitants nor the extent of its territory.

While the expedition remained in Dalmatia, ambassadors from the emperor Philip of Germany solicited their assistance in behalf of his nephew, Alexius Angelos, the son of the

¹ Various accounts are given concerning the age and blindness of Dandolo. The best authorities are: for his age, Marin Sanudo (*Vite de' Duchi di Venetia*, 526), who says he was 85 years when he was elected doge in 1192; and concerning his blindness, Villehardouin, his companion in the crusade, who says that he had fine eyes, but was stone blind, from a wound in the head. This notice by the marshal refutes the tale of his having been blinded by Manuel I. when envoy at Constantinople, as reported by Andrea Dandolo. The two friends would have been delighted to plead so good a reason for punishing the Greeks. See the text of Villehardouin by Buchon (47): 'Ki viex hons estoit. Et si avoit bicaus iex en sa teste et si n'en véoit goutte, car perdue avoit la veue par une plaie qu'il avoit eue el chief.'

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dethroned emperor of Constantinople, Isaac II. In spite of the opposition of many French nobles, who were more pious and more amenable to papal censures than the Venetians and Italians, it was decided to attack the Byzantine empire¹. A treaty was signed at Zara, by which the Crusaders engaged to replace Isaac II. and his son Alexius on the throne of Constantinople; and Alexius, in return, promised to pay them 200,000 marks of silver, and furnish them with provisions for a year. He further engaged to place the Eastern church under papal authority, to accompany the Crusaders in the holy war, or else to furnish them with a contingent of 10,000 men paid for a year, and to maintain constantly a corps of 500 cavalry for the defence of the Christian possessions in Palestine. Thus, as Nicetas says, the young Alexius quitted the ancient doctrines of the orthodox church to follow the novelties of the Popes of Rome².

On the 23rd June 1203, the Venetian fleet, with the army of the Crusaders on board, appeared in sight of Constantinople. The Byzantine troops had been neglected both by Isaac II. and Alexius III., and were now ill-disciplined and ill-officered; the citizens of Constantinople were void of patriotism, and the Greek fleet had been for some time utterly neglected. One of the heaviest of the Venetian transports, armed with an immense pair of shears, in order to bring the whole weight of the ship on the chain drawn across the entrance of the port, was impelled with all sail set against the middle of this chain, which was thus broken in two, and the whole fleet entered the Golden Horn. The Crusaders occupied Galata, and prepared to assault Constantinople. The army was divided into six divisions, and encamped on the hills above the modern suburb of Eyoub, for their numbers did not admit of their extending themselves beyond the gate of Adrianople. An attack directed against the portion of the wall opposite the centre of the camp was perseveringly carried on; and on the 17th July,

¹ Villehardouin (53) says that only twelve French nobles could be persuaded to swear to assist Alexius. The disgrace or the glory of conquering Constantinople belongs, therefore, to the Belgians, Venetians, and Lombards.

² Nicetas, 348. It is not easy to determine what share commercial schemes and what influence projects of conquest exercised over the Venetians in determining them to divert the crusade from Palestine and turn it against the Greeks.

a breach, caused by the fall of one of the towers, appeared practicable. A furious assault was made by the Flemish knights ; but, after a long and bloody combat, they were all hewed down by the battle-axes of the English and Danes of the Varangian guard¹. The Greeks were less successful in defending their ramparts towards the port where they were assailed by the Venetians. High towers had been constructed over the decks of the transport ships, and the tops of the masts of the galleys were converted into little castles filled with bowmen. A number of vessels directed their attack against the same point. Showers of arrows, stones, and darts swept the defenders from the wall ; the bridges were lowered from the floating towers ; the Doge, in complete armour, gave the signal for the grand assault, and, ordering his own ship to press forward and secure its bridge to the ramparts, he walked himself steadily across it, and was among the first who trampled on the pride of the city of Constantine. In an instant a dozen bridges rested on the walls, and the banner of St. Mark waved on the loftiest towers that overlooked the port. Twenty-five towers were captured by the Venetians before they advanced to take possession of the city. But when they began to push onward through the narrow streets, the Greeks made a vigorous defence, and inflicted severe loss on their assailants by attacks on their flanks. The Venetians set fire to the houses before them, and the fire soon extended from the hill of Blachern to the monastery of Euergetes and to the Deuteron. But the victory of the Byzantine forces over the Crusaders, on the land side, enabled the Greek army to follow up their advantage by attacking the Crusaders in their camp. Dandolo no sooner heard of the danger to which his allies were exposed than he nobly abandoned his own conquests, and repaired with all his force to their assistance. Night terminated the various battles of this eventful day, in which both parties had suffered great loss, without securing any decided advantage. The event was ultimately decided by the cowardice of the emperor, Alexius III., who abandoned Constantinople during

¹ Sixteen Crusaders mounted the breach ; two were seized, the rest were slain, as we learn from an eye-witness. ' Et li murs fut mout garnis d'Englois et de Danois.' Villehardouin, 72. Nicetas (35) mentions also the Pisans as having done good service.

the night. His brother Isaac was led from the prison in which he had been confined and placed again on the throne, and negotiations were opened with the Crusaders. The treaty of Zara was ratified with fresh stipulations; and on the 1st of August, Alexius IV. made his public entry into the city, riding between Count Baldwin of Flanders and the old Doge, Henry Dandolo, and was crowned as his father's colleague.

Isaac and Alexius soon became sensible that they had entered into engagements with the Crusaders which it was impossible for them to perform. Quarrels commenced. The disorderly conduct of the Frank soldiers, the rapacity of the feudal chiefs and of the Venetians, who deemed the wealth of the Greeks inexhaustible, and the strong feelings of religious bigotry which inflamed both parties, quickly threatened a renewal of hostilities. While things were in this state, a second conflagration, more destructive than the first, was caused by a wilful act of incendiarism committed by some Flemings. A party of soldiers, after drinking with their countrymen who were settled at Constantinople, proposed in a drunken frolic to burn the Turkish mosque, and plunder the warehouses of the Turkish merchants in the neighbouring quarter. Their pillage was interrupted by the Greek police officers of the capital, who assembled a force to preserve order and compel the drunken Franks to respect the Byzantine laws. The Flemings, beaten back, set fire to some houses in their retreat in order to delay the pursuit; and the fire, aided by a strong wind, spread with frightful rapidity, and devastated the city during two days and nights. This conflagration traversed the whole breadth of Constantinople, from the port to the Propontis, passing close to the church of St. Sophia, and laying everything in ashes for the breadth of about a mile and a half¹. The wealthiest quarter of the city, including the richest warehouses and the most splendid palaces of the Byzantine nobility, filled with works of ancient art,

¹ Gibbon (chap. lx. vol. vii. 308) says the conflagration lasted eight days and nights; and Daru (*Histoire de Venise*) and Michaud (*Histoire des Croisades*) both repeat the error. The mistake seems to have originated in copying Cousin's French translation of Nicetas. Buchon has given additional currency to the blunder, by reprinting the inaccurate translation without correction in his notes to Villehardouin. We possess two contemporary witnesses. Nicetas says the fire continued the first day, all the night, the following day and the evening (p. 356). Villehardouin says it lasted two days and nights, and extended half a league in front (p. 82, Buchon's edit.). The text of Ducange has *une lieue de terre*.

Oriental jewellery and classic manuscripts, were destroyed. Constantinople never recovered from the loss inflicted on it by this calamity. Much that was then lost could never be replaced even by the most favourable change in the circumstances of the Greeks; but the occasion was never again afforded to the inhabitants of the city to attempt the restoration of that small portion of the loss which wealth could have replaced.

The fury of the people after this dreadful misfortune knew no bounds, and all the Latins who had previously dwelt within the walls of Constantinople were compelled to emigrate, and seek safety with their wives and families at Galata, where they enjoyed the protection of the crusading army. Fifteen thousand souls are said to have quitted the capital at this time.

The Emperor Isaac II. soon died. Alexius IV. was dethroned and murdered by Alexius V., called Murtzuphlos. The Crusaders and Venetians, glad of a pretext for conquering the Byzantine empire, laid siege to Constantinople, and it was taken by storm on the 12th April 1204. But before the Crusaders could make themselves masters of the immense circuit of the city, whose ramparts they had conquered, they thought it necessary to clear their way through the heart of the dense buildings by a third conflagration, which, Villehardouin informs us, lasted through the night and all the next day. It destroyed the whole of the quarter extending from the monastery of Euergetes to the Droungarion¹. These three fires which the Franks had lighted in Constantinople destroyed more houses than were then contained in the three largest cities in France.

This conquest of Constantinople effected greater changes in the condition of the Greek race than any event that had occurred since the conquest of Greece by the Romans. It put an end to the reign of Roman law and civil order in the East; and to it we must trace all the subsequent evils and degradations of the Byzantine empire, the Orthodox Church, and the Greek nation. Yet society only avenged its own wrongs. The calamities of the Greeks were caused more by the vices of the Byzantine government and by the corruption

¹ Nicetas, 366.

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of the Greek people, than by the superior valour and military skill of the Crusaders. The lesson is worthy of attentive study by all wealthy and highly civilized nations, who neglect moral education and military discipline as national institutions. No state, even though its civil organization be excellent, its administration of justice impartial, and its political system popular, can escape the danger of a like fate, unless skill, discipline, and experience in military and naval tactics watch constantly over its wealth. Except men use the means which God has placed in their hands with prudence for their own defence, there can be no safety for any state, as long as kings and emperors employ themselves incessantly in drilling troops, and diverting men's minds from honest industry to ambitious projects of war¹.

¹ Universal peacemakers in the present state of society should inquire where lies the savour of truth in the Satanic observation of Voltaire, that the God of justice is always on the side of powerful armies. Divine Providence has ordained that order and science, united with a feeling of moral responsibility, give men additional force by increasing their powers of action and endurance. Military organization has hitherto combined these qualities more completely than education has been able to infuse them into civil society. The self-respect of the individual soldier has prevented his falling so low, with reference to the military masses, as the citizen falls in the mass of mankind. Discipline and tactics have concentrated power in a higher degree than laws and education; consequently, until the political constitution of society educates the feeling of moral responsibility in the citizen as perfectly as in the soldier, and renders him as amenable to moral and political discipline as the soldier is to military, the destructive classes will look down on the productive. But when the maximum of civil education and discipline is obtained in the local communities of free governments, then the God of justice will invariably be found on the side of the citizen armed in defence of political order. (Written in 1850.)

CHAPTER IV.

LATIN EMPIRE OF ROMANIA.

SECT. I.—*Election of the First Latin Emperor of Constantinople*¹.

BEFORE the Crusaders made their last successful attack on Constantinople, they concluded a treaty partitioning the Byzantine empire and dividing the plunder of the capital. This singular treaty is interesting to the general history of Europe, from the proof it affords of the facility with which the people of all the feudally constituted nations amalgamated into one political society, and formed a separate state; while it displays also in a strong point of view the marked difference that prevailed between feudal society, and the people subjected to the free institutions of the republic of Venice².

This treaty was entered into by the Frank Crusaders on the one part, and the citizens of the Venetian republic on the other, for the purpose of preventing disputes and of preserving unity in the expedition.

¹ [For a detailed account of the Frank occupation of the provinces of the Eastern Empire, the reader is referred to the part of Hopf's *Griechische Geschichte* which relates to this period, published in 1867, in Ersch and Gruber's *Encyklopädie*, vol. 85, pp. 200–465, and vol. 86, pp. 1–173. Professor Hopf, besides making use of the original documents illustrating the subject, which had been edited by others, has himself explored the archives of the principal North Italian cities, as well as those of Naples, Palermo, Malta, Corfu, Athens, and other places in Greece. The result is that his work, which is very exhaustive on this period, contains a large amount of material which cannot be found elsewhere. Ep.]

² This treaty is given in the *Gesta Innocentii III.* tom. i. p. 55, edit. Baluze; and in Muratori's notes to Andrea Dandolo's *Chronicle*, in Muratori, *Script. Rer. Ital.* xii. 326. It is translated in Michaud, *Histoire des Croisades, Pièces Justific.* ii. 595, and Buchon's *Villehardouin*, 90. A corrected text is published by Tafel and Thomas, *Urkunden Venedigs*, i. 444.

Both Crusaders and Venetians engaged to obey the chiefs appointed by the council of the army, and to bring all the booty captured to one common stock, to be divided in the following manner. The Venetians were to receive three parts and the Franks one, until the debt originally due to the Venetian republic was discharged. After that, the surplus was to be equally divided. The provisions captured in the city of Constantinople were to form a common stock, and to be deposited in magazines, from which rations were to be issued according to the established practice as long as the expedition continued.

The Venetians were to enjoy all the honours, rights, and privileges, in the new conquests, which they possessed in their own country, and were to be allowed to constitute a community governed by the laws of Venice.

After the capture of Constantinople, twelve electors, six being Crusaders and six Venetians, were to be chosen for the purpose of electing the emperor of Romania; and these electors were to nominate the person whom they considered best able to govern the conquered country for the glory of God and of the holy Roman Church.

The emperor was to be put in possession of one quarter of the Byzantine empire, and of the two palaces Bukoleon and Blachern, as the imperial domain. The remaining three parts of the empire were to be equally divided between the Crusaders and the Venetians.

The Patriarch was to be elected from the different party to the emperor, and the ecclesiastics were to have the same share in the church patronage as their respective parties had in the division of the empire.

All parties bound themselves to remain together for one year from the last day of March 1204; and all who established themselves permanently in any conquest made in the Byzantine empire were bound to take the oath of fealty, and to do homage for their possessions, to the emperor of Romania.

Twelve commissioners were to be chosen by each party to divide the conquered territory into fiefs, and to determine the service due by each feudatory.

No person belonging to nations at war, either with the Crusaders or the Venetians, was to be received in the empire as long as the war lasted.

Both Crusaders and Venetians were to employ all their influence with the Pope to procure his ratification of the treaty, and to induce him to excommunicate any persons who refused to fulfil its stipulations.

The emperor elected was to bind himself by oath to execute these stipulations. In case it should be found necessary to make any addition to, or put any restriction on, any clause of the treaty, the Doge of Venice, and the Marquis of Montferrat, as commander-in-chief of the Crusaders, each assisted by six councillors, were declared competent to make the necessary change. The Doge, Henry Dandolo, as a mark of personal honour and privilege, was dispensed from taking the oath of fealty to the emperor to be elected ¹.

An act of partition of the empire was also prepared, but in the copies which have been preserved the names of many places are greatly disfigured, and neither the Crusaders nor the Venetians ever gained possession of many of the provinces which they had partitioned ².

The conduct of the conquerors, after the capture of Constantinople, fixed an indelible stain on the name of the Franks throughout the East. They sacked the city with infamous barbarity; and the contrast afforded by the conduct of the Christians, who now took Constantinople, and the Mohammedans, who a few years before had conquered Jerusalem, may be received as an explanation of the success of the Mohammedan arms in the East at this period. When Saladin entered Jerusalem, the Church of the Holy Sepulchre was respected, and the conquered Christians remained in possession of their property; no confiscations were made of the wealth of the non-combatants, nor were any driven into exile; the women were not insulted, and the poor were not

¹ This clause indicates that it was understood that Dandolo was not to be elected emperor. He was afterwards invested with the rank and title of Despot. Gibbon gives currency to the error that—

‘Old Dandolo

Refused the diadem of all the Cæsars.’

chap. lxi. vol. vii. 321. By the phrases the great historian makes use of, he allows us to perceive that he had not fully appreciated the immense difference between European feudalism and Italian commercial republicanism.

² Tafel has published a corrected text of the act of partition in Latin and Greek, with valuable geographical notes, in his *Symbolæ criticae geographiam Byzantinam spectantes*; see also Tafel and Thomas, *Urkunden Venedigs*, i. 452, 489.

A.D. 1204.]

enslaved. But the Christians, who had taken the cross to carry on war against the Infidel oppressors of their brethren—who had taken oaths of abstinence and chastity, and sworn to protect the innocent—plundered a Christian city without remorse, and treated its inhabitants in such a way that exile was the least evil its inhabitants had to suffer. The noblest church in Christendom, the cathedral of St. Sophia, was stripped of all its rich ornaments, and then desecrated by the licentious orgies of the northern soldiers and their female companions. Nicetas recounts, with grief and indignation, that 'one of these priestesses of Satan' seated herself on the Patriarchal throne, sang ribald songs through her nose, in imitation of Greek sacred music, and then danced before the high altar. It is unnecessary to detail the sufferings of the wretched Greeks. Villehardouin, the Marshal of Romania, vouches for the extent of the disorder by saying that each soldier lodged himself in the house that pleased him best; and that many who before that day had lived in penury became suddenly wealthy, and passed the remainder of their lives in luxury¹. Pope Innocent III., as soon as he was informed of the disgraceful proceedings of the Crusaders, considered it his duty to express his abhorrence of their conduct in the strongest terms, and he has left us a fearful description of their wickedness². A few of the Catholic clergy endeavoured to moderate the fury which the bigoted prejudices of the papal church had instilled into the minds of the soldiery; but many priests eagerly joined in plundering relics from the altar, and made as little scruple in desecrating Greek churches and monasteries as the most licentious among the troops³.

¹ Compare Nicetas, 371, and Villehardouin, 97. Buchon's edit.

² *Gesta Innocentii III.* i. 57, edit. Baluze. The Pope's words deserve to be cited:—'Illudque longe gravius reputatur quod quidam nec religioni nec aetati nec sexui pepercerunt, sed fornicationes, adulteria, et incestus in oculis omnium exercentes, non solum maritatas et viduas, sed et matronas et virgines Deoque dicatas exposuerunt spurcitiis garcionum. Nec imperiales sufficit divitias exhaurire ac diripere spolia majorum pariter et minorum, nisi ad ecclesiarum thesauros et, quod gravius est, ad ipsarum possessiones extenderetis manus vestras, tabulas argenteas de altaribus rapientes, et violatis sacrariis, cruces, iconas et reliquias exportantes, ut Graecorum ecclesia quantumcunque persecutionibus affligatur.'

³ Michaud, *Histoire des Croisades*, iii. 269. The Rev. C. W. King, in his work on *Antique Gems* (p. 303 note), has the following passage:—'The greatest part of these gems (camei and intagli figured by Caylus) were small intagli on carnelian, and set in a chasse containing a tooth of St. Peter, and the head of St. Philip,

After several days spent in the wildest license, the chiefs of the Crusade at last published a severe proclamation, recalling the army to the salutary restraints of military discipline. But many soldiers were put to death; and a French knight was hung by order of the Count of St. Pol, with his shield round his neck, before the authority of the leaders could be fully restored. The offence, however, which was punished with death, was not cruelty to the Greeks, and abuse of the rights of conquest towards the defenceless; it was the crime of defrauding their comrades, by embezzling part of the plunder, which excited the feelings of justice in a Christian army. Thanks were at length solemnly rendered to God for the conquest of a city containing hundreds of thousands of Christian inhabitants, by an army of twenty thousand soldiers of Christ; and in the midst of their thanksgivings, the cry 'God wills it' was the sincere exclamation of these pious brigands¹. The treasures collected from the sack of the city were deposited in three of the principal churches. Sacred plate, golden images of saints, silver candelabra from the altars, bronze statues of heathen idols and heroes, precious works of Hellenic art, crowns, coronets, and vessels of gold, thrones, and dishes of gold and silver, ornaments of diamonds, pearls, and precious stones from the imperial treasury and the palaces of the nobles; precious metals and jewellery from the shops of the goldsmiths; silks, velvets, and brocaded tissues from the warehouses of the merchants, were all heaped together with piles of coined money that had been yielded up to the exactions of personal robbery.

The whole booty amounted to three hundred thousand marks of silver, besides ten thousand horses and mules. Baldwin, count of Flanders and emperor of Romania, declares that the wealth thus placed at the disposal of the victorious army was equal to the accumulated riches of all western Europe; and no prince then living was more competent to make a just estimate². This sum was divided into

made by order of Bishop Garnier, almoner to the Crusaders at the taking of Constantinople, whence he *stole* the skull of the Apostle.'

¹ Villehardouin, 98.

² The edition of Villehardouin by Ducange, which has been generally copied, says four hundred thousand marks; but the text of Buchon is preferable. See Baldwin's Letter to Pope Innocent III., and to the Cistercian Chapter: D'Oultreman, *Constantinopolis Belgica*, 712.

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two equal parts. The Venetians then received fifty thousand marks out of the share of the Crusaders, in payment of the debt due to the republic; and the one hundred thousand marks which remained as the crusading portion was divided in the following manner:—Each foot-soldier received five marks of silver, each horseman and each priest ten, and each knight twenty¹. This small difference between the shares of the knights and the private soldiers is a proof that the feudal militia of the time consisted of men occupying a higher social position than is generally attributed to this class. Noble or gentle birth was almost an indispensable requisite in a soldier; and when we reflect, moreover, that this required to be united to great physical strength, and long practice in the use of arms, in order to acquire the activity necessary to move with perfect ease under the weight of heavy armour, it becomes evident that the power of recruiting armies was, at this time, restricted within such narrow limits as to make the difference between officers and privates rather one of rank than of class².

Much difficulty was found in coming to a decision on the election of the emperor. Three persons occupied so prominent a position in the Crusade that only one of these three could be appointed sovereign of the state the Crusaders were about to found; but as the new empire was to possess a feudal organization, that very circumstance excluded Henry Dandolo, the brave old Doge of Venice, and the ablest statesman and most sagacious leader in the expedition, from the throne. The choice, therefore, remained between Boniface, marquis of Montferrat, who had hitherto acted as commander-in-chief of the land forces, and Baldwin, count of Flanders, who served with the most numerous and best appointed body of knights and soldiers under his own private banner. The military talents and experience of the marquis of Montferrat, and the wealth, liberality, valour, and virtues of the count of Flanders, made the choice between them difficult. As the co-operation of the unsuccessful candidate was absolutely

¹ MS. entitled *Croisade de Constantinople*, in the Bibliothèque Nationale at Paris, published by Buchon in the appendix to the *Livre de la Conquête de la Principauté de la Morée*, 491. A mark of silver was eight ounces troy.

² In ancient times it was the same. Xenophon mentions that the officers received only double the pay of the hoplites, and the commanders of battalions only four times as much as the privates. *Cyr. Ex.* vii. 3. 19; vii. 6. 1.

necessary to ensure the conquest of the empire, ample territories and high honours were promised to him¹. There can be no doubt that Dandolo would have been the ablest monarch, but Venice had no power to maintain him on the throne without the support of the Crusaders; and the constitution of the Venetian republic rendered it impossible for the Doge to become a feudal sovereign, even if the Crusaders would have submitted to swear fealty to a merchant prince. The nature of the expedition rendered it necessary that the conquered territory should receive a feudal organization. The Venetians were, from their way of life, not likely to be able to render regular service for any fiefs they might acquire. The republic might call on them to perform other duty as citizens, or they might be trading to the Crimea or to Trebizond when their services were required in Thrace or Macedonia.

The election took place on the 9th of May, and Baldwin of Flanders was declared emperor. The character of Baldwin, his youth, power, chivalric accomplishments, and civil virtues, made him the most popular prince among the Crusaders, and pointed him out to the electors as the person most likely to enjoy a long and prosperous reign. His piety and the purity of his personal conduct commanded universal respect, both among the laity and the clergy, and obtained for him the admiration even of the Greeks. He was one of the few Crusaders who paid strict attention to a part of their vows; and so rare was his virtue, and so necessary the influence of his example, that after he mounted the imperial throne he ordered it to be repeated twice every week, by a public proclamation, that all those who had been guilty of incontinency were prohibited from sleeping within the walls of his palace².

SECT. II.—*Establishment of the Feudal system in Greece.*

The empire of Romania illustrates the history of feudal conquests in countries too far advanced in their social or-

¹ Villehardouin (Buchon's text in *Recherches et Matériaux*, 101) says that the unsuccessful candidate was to receive *la terre ki est d'autre part le Brach devers le Turkis et l'ille de Griasse*, that is, the Asiatic portion of the empire beyond the Bosphorus (Nicaea, etc.), and the Peloponnesus.

² Nicetas, 384.

A.D. 1204.]

ganization to receive feudal ideas. The Greeks were far superior to the Franks in material civilization; and the various ranks were united together more closely, and by more numerous ties, under the Byzantine laws than under the feudal system. The Manual of Armenopoulos, which presents us with a sketch of Byzantine jurisprudence in its last state of degradation, offers a picture of society far in advance of that which is depicted in the Assize of Romania, where we are presented with the feudal code of the East in its highest state of perfection. But though the Greeks were considerably in advance of the Franks in their knowledge of law, theology, literature, arts, and manufactures, they were greatly inferior to them in military science and moral discipline. The Greeks were at this period destitute of a system of education that had the power of creating and enforcing self-respect in the individual, and attachment to the principles of order in society; while the Franks, though born in political anarchy and nurtured in warlike strife, were trained in a family discipline that nourished profound respect for a few fixed principles more valuable than learning and science, and prepared them to advance in a career of improvement as soon as circumstances modified their society into a fit scene of action for progressive amelioration. Yet, in spite of this, we find that the empire of Romania presents Frank society in a state of rapid decline and demoralization; while the Greek empire, as soon as its capital was transferred to Asia, offers the aspect of steady improvement. The causes of this departure from the general progress of improvement among the Franks, and of decline among the Greeks, were entirely political, and they are more closely connected with the administrative history of the two governments than with the social condition of the rival nations. In order to trace their effects in connection with the government of the empire of Romania, it is necessary to review the peculiarities of the feudal system as it was now introduced among the Greeks.

The Byzantine empire was a despotism based on the administration of the law, and exercised by an educated class of trained officials. The sovereign was both the legislator and the judge, and was responsible only to heaven, to his own conscience, and to a rebellion of his subjects. His people had

no political rights in opposition to his authority, and their only chance of redress was in a revolution.

On the other hand, the empire of Romania was a free government based on the feudal compact of copartnership in conquest. The sovereign gave lands and protection to the vassal in return for feudal services, and both parties were bound to a faithful execution of their mutual obligations¹. The sovereign was the superior of men who had rights which they were entitled to defend even against the emperor himself; and they were equitable judges of his conduct, for they themselves occupied a position similar to his with regard to their own inferiors. The Greeks were governed by the bonds of power; the Franks by the ties of duty. But it was impossible to transplant the feudal system into Greece exactly as it existed in western Europe, for it became immediately separated from all the associations of ancestral dignity, family influence, personal attachments, and traditional respect, which, by interweaving moral feelings with its warlike propensities, conferred upon it some peculiar merit. In the East, the obligations of hereditary gratitude and affection, the local ties that connected homage and protection with social relations and all the best feelings of humanity and religion, were weakened, if not dissolved. In its native seats the feudal system was a system of moral and religious education, begun by the mother and the priest, and completed by practical discipline. In the Byzantine empire it became little more than a tie of personal interest, and partook of that inherent selfishness which has been the curse of Greece from the time of its autonomous cities until the present day, and which is the prominent feature of all Eastern social relations beyond the immediate ties of family.

The nature of the army that conquered Constantinople was not calculated to replace the relaxation of feudal bonds by a closer union of its members, derived from personal interests, military subordination, or the administration of

¹ 'Nam obligatio feudalís est reciproca, præcipue in fidelitate.' Craig, *Jus Feudale*, ii. dieg. 11, p. 284. The Greek *Chronicle of the Conquest of the Morea* shows how deeply this sense of mutual obligation was impressed on the minds of the people:

καὶ ἐν τῷ πρῶτῳ ἀμφοτέρων ἐπικαινον εἰς τοὺς δύο,
οὕτως χρεωστέϊ ὁ πρίγκιπας πίστιν πρὸς τὸν λήzion
ὡσάν ὁ λήzion πρὸς αὐτόν. v. 6552.

A.D. 1204.]

justice. As Crusaders, as Flemings, Venetians, French, Italians, and Germans, their tendency was towards separation; and even the treaty by which they engaged to effect the conquest of the Byzantine empire only bound them to remain united until the end of March 1205. After that period, no Crusader who had not received a grant of lands in Romania owed any obedience to the emperor of Constantinople; and thus the Frank domination was left to subsist on such support as it could draw from feudal principles, from the spirit of adventure, from the large domain conceded to the emperor, and from the religious zeal of the Popes and the Latin church.

Immediately after the coronation of Baldwin measures were taken to carry into execution the act of partition. But ignorance of geography, and the resistance offered by the Greeks in Asia Minor, and by the Vallachians and Albanians in Europe, threw innumerable difficulties in the way of the proposed distribution of fiefs.

The quarter of the empire that formed the portion of Baldwin consisted of the city of Constantinople, with the country in its immediate vicinity as far as Bizya and Tzurulos in Europe, and Nicomedia in Asia. The Venetians were put in possession of a quarter far more extensive than that which had been conceded to them by the Byzantine emperors, and within its gates they governed by their own magistrates and laws, living apart as if in a separate city. Beyond the territory around Constantinople, Baldwin possessed districts extending as far as the Strymon in Europe, and the Sangarius in Asia; but his possessions were intermingled with those of the Venetians and the vassals of the empire. Prokonnesos, Lesbos, Chios, Lemnos, Tenos, Skyros, and several smaller islands, also fell to his share.

Boniface, marquis of Montferrat, in the first instance received a feudatory kingdom in the Asiatic provinces; but, in order to be nearer support from his hereditary principality in Italy, his share was ultimately transferred to the province of Macedonia, and he received Thessalonica as his capital, with the title of King of Saloniki. But before his share of the conquered empire was determined to his satisfaction, he entered into a private treaty with the Venetians to cede to them all his possessions acquired by the Crusade. Pretending

to have received a promise of the island of Crete from young Alexius IV., and asserting that his father had received a grant of the kingdom of Thessalonica from the Emperor Manuel, he ceded both Crete, Thessalonica, and his other territories in the empire to the Venetians, who bound themselves to pay him the sum of one thousand marks of silver, and to put him in possession of territory in the western part of the empire from their share of the partition, which should yield him an annual revenue of 10,000 gold hyperpers¹.

The Venetian republic obtained three-eighths of the empire. Adrianople, and many inland towns, formed part of the territory assigned to the republic; but the Venetian senate never made any attempt to take possession of a considerable portion of its share. Many of the Greek islands were conceded by the senate to private citizens, as fiefs of the republic, on condition that those to whom they were granted should conquer them at their own expense.

The remainder of the empire was parcelled out among a certain number of great vassals, many of whom never conquered the fiefs assigned to them; while some new adventurers, who arrived after the partition was arranged, succeeded in possessing themselves of larger shares of the spoil than most of the original conquerors. The most important of the Frank possessions in Greece was the principality of Achaia, which, though conferred on William of Champlitte, soon passed into the hands of the younger Geoffrey Villehardouin, who had not been present at the siege of Constantinople².

SECT. III.—*Baldwin I.*

The reign of Baldwin was short and troubled. Though no braver knight, nor more loyal gentleman, ever occupied a throne, he was deficient in the prudence necessary to com-

¹ This *Refutatio* is a curious document, and seems to prove that Boniface was anxious to relieve himself from doing homage to Baldwin. It is dated in August 1204, and is printed in Flaminio Cornelius, *Crete Sacra*, vol. ii. p. 223; and in Buchon, *Recherches et Matériaux*, i. 10; and Tafel and Thomas, *Urkunden Venedigs*, i. 512. Several of the stipulations were annulled by subsequent arrangements.

² In the lists annexed to the partition-treaty, great part of Macedonia, almost all Thessaly, eastern Greece, including Attica, Megaris and the Dodekanesos, are assigned to the Crusaders. Tafel, *Symbolae criticae ad geogr. Byz. spectantes*, and Tafel and Thomas, *Urkunden Venedigs*, i. 485.

A.D. 1204-1205.]

mand success, either as a statesman or a general, and he even wanted the moderation required to secure tranquillity among his great vassals. In his first expedition to extend his territory and establish his immediate vassals in their fiefs, he involved himself in disputes with Boniface the king-marquis. The emperor announced his intention of visiting Thessalonica, in order to establish the imperial suzerainty, and confer the investiture of the kingdom of Saloniki on Boniface, whose oath of fealty he was naturally extremely anxious to receive as soon as possible. The king-marquis opposed this arrangement, as tending to exhaust the resources of his new dominions, by burdening them with the maintenance of Baldwin's army; but his real objection was that he had all along hoped to render his kingdom independent of the empire, and he wished to evade taking the oath. The rivalry of the Flemings and the Lombards led them to espouse the quarrel of their princes with warmth. Baldwin marched with his army to Thessalonica; Boniface led his troops to Adrianople, and besieged the governor placed there by the emperor Baldwin. A civil war threatened to destroy the Frank empire of Romania before the Crusaders had effected the conquest of Greece; but the doge of Venice and the count of Blois succeeded, by their intervention, in re-establishing peace, and persuading Baldwin to agree to a convention, by which all disputes were arranged. Boniface did homage to the emperor for the kingdom of Saloniki, consisting of all the country from the valley of the Strymon to the southern frontier of Thessaly; and he was appointed commander-in-chief of the army of the Crusaders destined to march against Greece, in order to take possession of the fiefs appropriated to those who had been assigned their shares of the conquest in that part of the empire by the act of partition¹.

Next year (1205) one army, under the count of Blois and Henry of Flanders, the emperor's brother, attacked the Greeks in Asia; while another, under the king of Saloniki, invaded Greece. As soon as the Frank forces were thus dispersed, and engaged in distant operations, the Greeks of Adrianople rose in revolt, expelled the Frank garrison, and obtained assistance from Joannes, king of Bulgaria and Vallachia, who

¹ Villehardouin, 113, compared with Henri de Valenciennes, 187, edit. Buchon.

was deeply offended with the emperor Baldwin for having rejected his offers of alliance. Joannes had recently received the royal unction from a cardinal legate, deputed for the purpose by Pope Innocent III.; and he conceived that, in virtue of this dignity as a Latin monarch, he was entitled to share with the Franks in dividing the Greek empire.

The emperor Baldwin, the old doge of Venice, and the count of Blois, no sooner heard of the revolt of Adrianople, than they hastened with all the troops they could collect to besiege the city. The king of Bulgaria soon arrived to relieve it, at the head of a powerful army. Baldwin rashly risked a battle with his small force, and the greater part of his army was cut to pieces. The count of Blois and a host of knights perished on the field; the emperor was taken prisoner, and murdered by his conqueror during the first year of his captivity, though in the west of Europe his death was long doubted. The doge Dandolo, and the historian Villehardouin, marshal of the empire, were the only men of rank and military experience who survived in the camp. They hastily rallied the remains of the army, and by abandoning everything but the arms in their hands, succeeded, with great difficulty, in conducting the surviving soldiers safe to Rhedestos.

SECT. IV.—*Henry of Flanders.—Ecclesiastical Affairs.—Political Difficulties.—Parliament of Ravenika.*

Henry of Flanders immediately took upon himself the direction of the administration, acting as regent until he was assured of his brother's death, when he assumed the title of emperor. But though certain tidings arrived at Constantinople of Baldwin's death, various romantic tales were long current that seemed to throw a doubt over his ultimate fate. On the 20th August, 1206, Henry was crowned; and, during his whole reign, he devoted all his energy and talent to the difficult task of giving a political as well as a military organization to the heterogeneous elements of his empire. The cruel ravages of the Bulgarian troops—who, after the battle of Adrianople, were allowed by Joannes to plunder the whole country, from Serres to Athyras—taught the

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Greeks to regret the more regular and moderate exactions of the Franks, and many voluntarily made their submission to Henry, who treated all his subjects with mildness. He possessed more military as well as civil capacity than his unfortunate brother, and carried on war successfully against the king of the Bulgarians, in Europe, and against Theodore Lascaris, the Greek emperor of Nicaea, in Asia.

The internal organization of the Frank empire presented a series of obstacles to the introduction of order and regular government, that no genius could have removed. Henry effected wonders in his short reign ; but all he did proved nugatory, from the incapacity of his successors. His great success was in part due to the popularity he acquired by his mild and conciliatory conduct, perhaps quite as much as to his political sagacity and brilliant courage. The situation of his empire was every way anomalous. Its foundation by Crusaders acting under papal authority, and serving avowedly as a means of carrying on holy wars, conferred on Innocent III. a just pretext for interfering in its internal affairs. The emperor and barons also, standing constantly in need of new recruits in order to maintain and extend their conquests, could not fail to feel the necessity of conciliating the pontiff, without whose religious influence and liberal grants of indulgences these recruits could not be easily obtained. Though the conquest of the Byzantine empire had been made in express violation of the commands of Innocent III., that Pope showed a determination to profit by the crime as soon as it was perpetrated, and displayed a willingness to promote the views of the Crusaders, on condition that the affairs of the church should be settled in a manner satisfactory to the papal see¹. There were, nevertheless, so many discordant interests and rivalities at work in the ecclesiastical condition of the new empire, that it required all the talents of Innocent III., the greatest of the Popes, and all the moderation and firmness of Henry of Flanders, the most conciliatory of emperors, to avoid open quarrels between the church and state. The Pope was determined to maintain the

¹ See a translation of Innocent's letter to the marquis Boniface and the counts of Flanders, Blois, and St. Pol, in Hurter's *Histoire du Pape Innocent III.* i. 607, French translation. The original is in the portion of Innocent's letters published in the rare collection of Brequigny, lib. vi. ep. 48, 103; see also *Gesta Innoc. III.* cap. 89, in the edition of Baluze.

same control over the church in the East which he had laid claim to in the West. Without this authority, the union of the Greek and Latin churches had little significance at the papal court, where the union could only be regarded as consummated when the patriarch of Constantinople was reduced to the condition of a suffragan of the bishop of Rome. The habits of thought of the Greeks, the nature of the civil administration of the empire, and the power over ecclesiastical affairs which the emperor of Romania had inherited from his Byzantine predecessors, all opposed the papal pretensions. Even the Latin clergy were not united in a disposition to submit implicitly to the papal authority. The Venetian republic was still less so, for it directly attacked some of the prerogatives arrogated by the Popes, and alarmed by the terms of its opposition even the fearless Innocent. It secured the election of a Venetian as patriarch of Constantinople; and though the Pope annulled the election as illegal, still, in order to avoid a direct collision with the Venetians, who would probably not have allowed a patriarch selected by Innocent to put his foot in Constantinople, he appointed Thomas Morosini, who had already been elected to the dignity, to be the lawful patriarch by papal authority. The Venetians were indifferent by what subterfuges Innocent thought fit to account for his ratification of the election of the patriarch whom they had chosen¹.

It is always dangerous for a sovereign whose power rests directly on public opinion, to swerve from the cause of truth and justice. The spirit of temporization displayed by Innocent with regard to the Crusaders, from the time they abandoned the real object for which they had assumed the cross, weakened his moral influence and now diminished his power. When he disapproved of the attack on Constantinople, and reprobated the array of a Christian army, with the cross shining on the breast of every soldier, against the largest city of Christendom, it was expected by the Crusaders that he would overlook their offence with the same facility with which he had pardoned the storming of Zara. Their anticipations were not false, for the Pope readily accepted their success as a proof that the will of

¹ The ratification is dated 21 January 1205. Brequigny, ii. 621.

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Heaven had sanctified their act of injustice, and the Holy Father recommended the conquerors to retain possession of a country which God had delivered into their hands¹. His legate had relieved the army from the papal excommunication by his orders, and he confirmed that act without exacting any proofs of sincere repentance; and he thus gave a warrant even for churchmen to tamper with the papal authority in political matters². Innocent likewise tolerated the legate's absolution of the Crusaders from their vow to visit the Holy Land, on condition that they served an additional year against the Greeks; and he wrote to the archbishops of France, to recommend them to recruit the ranks, both of the clergy and the troops in the Latin empire, by promises of riches and of absolution for their sins to the emigrants³. These concessions of justice to policy, and the open deference shown by the head of the church to worldly success, were not unobserved by the conquerors. The Venetians viewed them as the time-serving policy of priestly ambition, while the more superstitious Franks received them as a guarantee that all their crimes were pardoned by Heaven, on account of their zeal against the Greek heretics.

Under the guidance of such principles, the disorders in the church soon became intolerable. The Venetians endeavoured to bind the Patriarch to appoint only Venetian priests to the vacant sees; the Frank clergy refused to receive the Venetian patriarch as their superior; and Morosini, on his arrival at Constantinople, commenced his functions by excommunicating half the clergy of the empire⁴. Many priests, after receiving grants of fiefs, compelled the Greeks on these estates to purchase the rent or service due from the land, and, when they had collected the money, they abandoned the fief and returned to their native country with these dishonest gains⁵. To these difficulties with the Pope, the Crusaders, the Venetians, and the Frank clergy, were added the embarrassments that arose in regulating the relations between the Latin clergy and the priests of the Greek church, who had united

¹ *Gesta Innocentii III.* c. 98, edit. Baluze.

² Brequigny, lib. vii. ep. 206, 207, from Hurter, ii. 22.

³ Ibid. lib. viii. ep. 69, 71; Hurter, ii. 40.

⁴ *Gesta Innocentii III.* c. 100.

⁵ *Epist. Innocentii III.* lib. xiii. ep. 24, tom. ii. 421, edit. Baluze.

with the papal church, as well as the relations between the papal church and those Greeks who still denied the Pope's supremacy, and adhered to their national usages and to the doctrines of the orthodox church.

At length, in order to settle the ecclesiastical affairs of the empire, a convention was signed between the papal legate and the Latin patriarch on the one hand, and the emperor Henry and the barons, knights, and commons of the Crusaders on the other—for the Venetians took no part in the act—in the month of March 1206¹. By this arrangement, a fifteenth of all the conquered lands and possessions was to be ceded to the Latin church, excepting, however, the property within the walls of Constantinople, and the town-dues of that city. All the Greek monasteries were to be surrendered to the papal power without being regarded as included in the fifteenth. Tithes were to be paid by the Catholics on all their revenues, whether derived from the fruits of the earth, cattle, bees, or wool; and if the Greeks could be induced to pay tithes to the Latin clergy, the civil power was to offer no resistance. The clergy, the religious orders, and all monks and nuns, whether Latins or Greeks, the households of ecclesiastics, the churches, church property, and monasteries, with all their tenants, and all persons who might seek refuge in the sanctuaries, were to be exempted from the civil jurisdiction, as in France; reserving, however, in such cases, the authority of the papal see, and of the patriarchate of Constantinople, and the honour of the emperor and the empire. Thus a nation of ecclesiastics, living under their own peculiar laws and usages, and amenable neither to the imperial legislation nor to feudal organization, was established in the heart of the empire of Romania. The Venetians, who were not included in this convention, obstinately refused to pay tithes to the church; nor did Innocent venture to proceed with vigour either against them or against the refractory Greeks, from the dread of causing a close alliance between the two.

The civil affairs of the empire were in as great confusion as the ecclesiastical, and presented even greater difficulties in the way of their ultimate arrangement. The nature of

¹ *Gesta Innoc.* c. 101; Brequigny, lib. xi. ep. 142.

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the conquest divided the inhabitants into two distinct classes of Greeks and Latins, whose separation was rendered permanent by the feudal system, as well as by national divergences of manners and religious opinions. The Franks formed a small dominant class of foreign warriors, many of whom were constantly returning to the lands of their birth, where they held ancestral estates and honours, while many died without leaving posterity. Their numbers consequently required to be perpetually recruited by new bodies of immigrants. From the hour of the conquest, too, the conquerors began to diminish in number, even from the operation of that law of population which devotes all privileged classes to a gradual decay. The Greeks on the other hand, composed a numerous, wealthy, and organized society, dwelling in their native seats, perpetuating their numbers by the natural social amalgamation of classes, and increasing their strength by being compelled to abandon their previous habits of luxury and idleness, and turn their attention either to profitable industry or to imitating the warlike virtues of their new masters. Other causes of discord existed, equally irremediable except by the slow progress of time, yet which called for immediate palliatives. The Crusaders and the Venetians had each their own political views and interests; while the Crusaders were incapable of complete union or harmonious action, from the variety of nations that brought their respective antipathies to the common stock. The Flemish, Italian, French, and German nobility had all their private grounds of alliance and offence. The position of the Greek landed proprietors, who were willing to become vassals of the empire, and to join the Latin church, and of the Greek citizens, cultivators, artisans, and labourers who adhered to their national church and usages, all required to be regulated by positive laws. The relations between the emperor of Romania, the king of Saloniki, the great feudatories and the lesser barons, though sufficiently defined by the feudal system, required to be strictly determined by express enactment; for the moral force of feudality, which prevented the progress of anarchy in western Europe, was wanting in the Eastern Empire. It was necessary, therefore, to frame a list of all the fiefs in the empire, like the Domesday Book of England; and a code of feudal

usages, like the Assize that had been framed for the kingdom of Jerusalem¹.

The Venetians, who possessed a large share of the empire, could not be subjected to the strict feudal regime nor to the precise rules of the Byzantine civil law. Yet, though living beyond the control of feudal usages, they arrogated to themselves the privileges of the dominant classes even while acting in professional rivalry with the conquered. Other trading communities from every country, both of the East and the West, had companies of merchants established at Constantinople; and, whether they were Pisans, Catalans, Genoese, Flemings, Germans, Syrians, or Armenians, they all claimed to regulate the administration of justice among themselves, according to their respective laws and usages.

The subject Greeks had their own code, and their own judicial establishments organized with a degree of completeness that must have impressed the more enlightened members of the Crusading army with astonishment and admiration. The conquerors immediately felt the necessity of respecting the superior civilization of the conquered. The laws of Justinian, as modified in the Greek compilation, called the *Basilika*, remained in full force, and entailed on the Crusaders the necessity of leaving the administration of justice and of the municipal affairs, with a considerable portion of the fiscal business of government, in the hands of the Greeks, on nearly the same footing as they had been under the last Byzantine emperors. The citizens preserved some local privileges; they elected magistrates to perform some few duties, they took part in framing the regulations and local bye-laws under which they lived, and to a certain extent they controlled the administration of the municipal revenues and communal property. In short, the Frank emperors of Romania, as far as the majority of their Greek subjects were concerned, occupied the position and exercised the authority of the Byzantine emperors they had displaced².

¹ The history of the Assize of Jerusalem, and an examination of the period of its introduction into the empire of Romania, will be found in the preface to the magnificent edition of the *Assises de Jerusalem*, by count Beugnot; but it must be observed that he attributes a degree of historical importance to the *Chronicle of the Conquest of the Morea* to which it has no claim.

² The emperor Henry even admitted Greeks into his service, which Baldwin

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The marriage of the emperor Henry with the daughter of Boniface, king of Saloniki, preserved union between these two sovereigns. But after Boniface was unfortunately killed in the war with the Bulgarians, discussions arose between the emperor and the guardians of the kingdom. Demetrius, the son of Boniface by his second marriage with the dowager-empress Margaret, widow of Isaac II., succeeded to the crown of Saloniki by his father's will¹. The empress Margaret acted as regent for her son, who was only two years old; but count Blandrate, a Lombard noble connected with the family of Montferrat, was elected by the nobles and the army as bailly and guardian, to carry on the feudal administration and lead the vassals of the crown². The policy of the bailly was directed to strengthening as far as possible the connection of the kingdom of Saloniki with Italy, and with the marquisate of Montferrat, and to dissolving the feudal ties that bound it to the empire of Romania. He was accused by the Flemings of endeavouring to transfer the crown of the young Demetrius to the head of the marquis William, his elder brother; but it does not appear that his plan really extended beyond effecting a close union between the power and dominions of the two brothers, and garrisoning all the fortresses of the kingdom of Saloniki with Lombard troops, whom he was compelled to recruit in Italy in great numbers.

The conduct of count Blandrate rendered it necessary for the emperor Henry to subdue the spirit of independence which manifested itself among the Lombards without loss of time, or the empire of Romania would have been soon dissolved. The count was accordingly summoned to do homage at the imperial court for the young king, and to deliver up the fortresses of the kingdom, to be guarded by the Suzerain according to the obligations of the feudal law; and the emperor marched with a body of troops towards Thessalonica, to hold a court for receiving the oath of fealty.

and Boniface had not allowed. Ephraemius, v. 7335 and 7414. Branas, who married Agnes of France, sister of Louis VII. and widow of the tyrant Andronicus, seems to have been the only Greek who held any command during the reign of Baldwin. Nicetas, 332.

¹ The empress Margaret was the daughter of Bela III., king of Hungary.

² Count Blandrate is called Blandras by the old French writers. For the commune and counts of Blandrate see Troja, *Della condizione de' Romani vini da' Longobardi*, p. cccc.

But Blandrate replied to the summons, that the kingdom of Saloniki had been conquered by the arms of the Lombards; and he boldly refused to allow the emperor to enter Thessalonica, except on the condition of recognizing the claim of the king of Saloniki to the immediate superiority over the country actually conquered by the Crusaders, including the great fiefs of Budonitza, Salona, Thebes, Athens, Negrepont, and Achaia, as well as all the unconquered territory south of Thessalonica and Dyrrachium¹.

Henry now found himself sorely embarrassed; for, not contemplating any serious opposition, he had quitted Constantinople with few troops, and was encamped in the open country of Chalkidike, where the winter suddenly set in with intense severity. All his councillors advised him to consent to any terms that might be offered, in order to save the lives of his followers, by gaining immediate shelter within the walls of Thessalonica. The clergy who attended the expedition promised to absolve him from any sin he might commit, by subsequently violating the engagements that necessity compelled him to accept, if they should be contrary to the feudal constitution of the empire. Under these circumstances, the emperor promised everything that the Lombards demanded; but he soon found a pretext for violating his promises, after he had succeeded in establishing his troops in Thessalonica.

In order to determine definitely the feudal relations of his subjects, in the month of May, 1210, Henry held a high court of his vassals, or parliament, at the small town of Ravenika². His principal object was to receive the homage and oath of fealty from all the tenants-in-chief in the country south of the kingdom of Saloniki, and to grant such investitures of fiefs and offices as might be required to put an end to all pretensions of superiority similar in nature to those

¹ Henri de Valenciennes, 191, edit. Buchon; Nicetas, 410; Buchon, *Histoire des conquêtes et de l'établissement des Français dans les états de l'ancienne Grèce*, i. 262.

² Buchon (*Histoire des Conquêtes et de l'Établissement des Français*, p. 124) places Ravenika between the Axios and the Strymon at the village called Reveniko by Leake (*Travels in Northern Greece*, iii. 161), and Ravanikia by Fallmerayer (*Fragmente aus dem Orient*, ii. 63). But the place must be the Rabenica of Benjamin of Tudela (i. 48, Asher's edit.), which lay to the south of the Reveniko of Anna Comnena near Larissa (Anna, 139, edit. Paris). Henry of Valenciennes (p. 207) indicates clearly that the Ravenika where the parliament was held lay between Armyro and Budonitza. Tafel, *Thessalonica*, 488.

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advanced by count Blandrate. The claim of the bailly of the kingdom of Saloniki rendered this step absolutely necessary, for the Lombards had already made considerable encroachments on the possessions of the great feudatories who had received their portion of the spoils of the empire in Greece. Otho de la Roche, the signor of Athens, had been deprived of Thebes. The parliament of Ravenika was consequently viewed with favour by the barons of the south, who were not Lombards, and who naturally preferred to remain direct feudatories of the emperor of Romania, in his distant capital at Constantinople, to being converted into subordinate vassals of a neighbouring Italian king. But though the barons of Boudonitza, Negrepont, Athens, and Naxos, the bailly of Achaia, and other tenants-in-chief of the empire in Greece, made their appearance at the court of Henry and fulfilled their feudal obligations, the Lombards attached to the Montferrat party still opposed the emperor's authority, and compelled him to march southward and dispossess them of Thebes by force. That fortress was then restored to Otho de la Roche, who received the investiture both of it and Athens: Mark Sanudo was invested with his conquest of Naxos, and other islands, under the title of Duke of the Archipelago or the twelve islands¹; and Geoffrey Villehardouin the younger, bailly of Achaia, in the absence of his prince, William de Champlitte, was appointed seneschal of Romania, that he might become a great feudatory in virtue of his office.

A determined effort was also made to restrain the ecclesiastical power. This became necessary, from the facility with which the Crusaders, who were on the point of returning home, lavished their possessions on the church. To such an extent was this liberality carried, that there seemed to be some danger of the ecclesiastics acquiring possession of the greater part of the fiefs throughout the empire, in which case the country would have been left without military defenders. Henry and the great barons now ratified an edict which had been already published, prohibiting all grants of land to the church or to monasteries, either by donation or testament; leaving sinners to purchase their peace with

¹ *Δωδεκάνησος*. This name is used by Theophanes, when speaking of the Byzantine empire, as early as A.D. 810; p. 412, edit. Paris.

Heaven, through the agency of the priesthood, out of the proceeds of their movable property alone. This regulation, as might be expected, was violently opposed by a Pope so ambitious as Innocent III., who immediately declared it null and void. But necessity compelled the emperor and the barons to adhere to their decision; and they enforced the edict, in spite of the Pope's dissatisfaction and threats¹. The ecclesiastical affairs of the kingdom of Saloniki, and of the great fiefs in Greece, as far as the isthmus of Corinth, and the relations which the possessions of the church were to hold, with reference to those of the feudal lords, were also regulated by a convention with the patriarch Morosini, and the metropolitans of Larissa, Neopatras, and Athens. By this convention the signors engaged to put the church in possession of all its lands, and to acknowledge and support the rights of the Latin clergy and their dependants. This convention, being extremely favourable to the views of the papal see, was ratified with much pleasure by Innocent III.²

Count Blandrate and the Lombard army continued nevertheless to resist the emperor and the parliament, and determined to defend their possessions with the sword. Henry, therefore, found himself compelled to take the field against them, in order to establish the imperial power in Greece on a proper feudal basis. He met with no resistance until he arrived at Thebes, in which count Blandrate had assembled the best portion of the Lombard troops. The army of Henry was repulsed in an attempt to take the place by assault; and it was not without great difficulty, and more by negotiation than force, that the imperial army at last entered Thebes. The emperor immediately restored it to Otho de la Roche, its rightful signor. Henry then visited the city of Negrepont, where Ravanno dalle Carceri, one of the three signors among whom the island had been partitioned, induced Blandrate to make his peace with Henry; and the Lombard count soon after retired to Italy, leaving

¹ Ducange, *Histoire de Constantinople*, 56.

² The original text of this act is contained in the *Bullarum Amplissima Collectio*, Rome, 1740, tom. iii. No. xlii.; and in Buchon, *Nouvelles Recherches; avant-propos*, 49. There is also a translation of it in Buchon, *Histoire des Conquêtes des Français*, 150; but this author, as is too frequently the case, omits to mention that the text is to be found in one of his own prior publications. For the confirmation, see *Epist. Innocent. III.* tom. ii. p. 496, edit. Baluze.

A.D. 1206-1216.]

the empress-queen Margaret regent for her son, under the usual restrictions in favour of the suzerain's rights over the fortresses of his vassal while a minor¹.

A treaty was also concluded about this time between Henry and Michael, the Greek sovereign of Epirus, Great Vallachia, Acarnania, and Aetolia, who consented to do homage for his possessions to avoid war. The Greek naturally attached little importance to a ceremony which he regarded only as a public acknowledgment of the superior power of the Latin emperor².

The remainder of Henry's reign was a scene of constant activity. At one time, he was engaged in defending the empire against foreign enemies; at another, he was forced to protect his Greek subjects against the tyranny of Pelagius, the papal legate, who made an attempt to compel all the orthodox Greeks to join the Latin rite, and by his own authority shut up the Greek churches and monasteries, and imprisoned the most active among the Greek clergy. A rebellion was on the point of breaking out, when the emperor ordered all the priests to be released, and the churches and monasteries to be reopened³. The emperor Henry died, universally regretted, in the year 1216.

¹ The island of Euboea was conquered by the Fleming James of Avesnes, acting as general for Boniface the king-marquis in 1205, and divided into three fiefs, which were conferred on Ravanno dalle Carceri, Peccoraro de' Peccorari, and Giberto di Verona.

² There exists a letter of Henry, giving an account of his victories over the four enemies of the Latin empire—Theodore Lascaris, emperor of Nicaea; Boris-las, king of the Bulgarians; Michael, despot of Epirus; and Stratius, a near relation of the terrible Joannes of Bulgaria, who after that king's death governed an independent principality. The letter is dated Pergamus, 1212. Martenne et Durand, *Thesaurus Novus Anecdotorum*, tom. i. 821; and Buchon's *Villehardouin*, 211.

³ Heyd, *Die Colonien der römischen Kirche in den Kreuzfahrerstaaten*, p. 318; in the *Zeitschrift für die historische Theologie* for 1856. It would seem from some accounts that Henry took no step to protect his subjects on this occasion until a tumult arose at Constantinople, and twenty thousand Greeks assembled before the gates of the imperial palace, crying out that the emperor ought to rule the state, and defend his subjects against the frock. *Histoire Nouvelle des Anciens Ducs et autres Souverains de l'Archipel*, 24. Dr. Hopf, however, by his accurate researches has proved that this curious book is of very little value as a historical guide; yet it contains many important facts.

SECT. V.—*Peter of Courtenay.—Robert.—Baldwin II.—
Extinction of the Empire of Romania.*

The eastern empire of Romania, like the western or Germanic Holy Roman empire, was considered elective; but feudal prejudices, and the feudal organization of the thirteenth century, stamped its government with an hereditary form, and the law of succession adopted in practice was that established for the great fiefs in France. Yoland, sister of the emperors Baldwin and Henry, had a prior claim to the heritage; but as her sex excluded her from the imperial crown, her husband, Peter of Courtenay, was elected emperor by the barons of Romania. Peter was detained in France for some time, collecting a military force strong enough to enable him to visit his new empire with becoming dignity. When his army was assembled, he visited Rome, where he received the imperial crown from the hands of Pope Honorius III. He landed in Epirus, to the south of Dyrrachium, with the intention of marching through the territories of Theodore, despot of Epirus, who had succeeded Michael as sovereign of that country; but he had entered into no arrangements with Theodore, hoping to force his way through the mountains by the Via Egnatia without difficulty. He was attacked on his march by the troops of Theodore in the defiles near Albanon (Elbassan¹); his army was routed, and he perished in the prisons of the despot of Epirus.

The empress Yoland reached Constantinople by sea; and as soon as she heard of her husband's captivity and death, she undertook the regency in the absence of her eldest son, Philip count of Namur, who was regarded as heir to the imperial crown. Yoland died in 1219; but before her death, she secured the tranquillity of the empire by renewing the treaty of peace with the Greek emperor at Nicaea, Theodore Lascaris.

Philip of Namur refused to quit his Belgian county for the dignity of emperor of Romania, and his younger brother, Robert, was elected emperor in his stead. Conon of Bethune, who had been the principal councillor of the emperor Henry, and had acted as regent in the period that elapsed between

¹ ἐν ταῖς τοῦ Ἀλβάνου δυσχωρίαις. Acropolita, 14.

A.D. 1216-1261.]

the death of Yoland and the arrival of Robert, unfortunately for the empire died shortly after the coronation of Robert.

The race of warriors who had founded the empire was now nearly extinct, and most of their successors possessed neither the military talents nor the warlike disposition of their fathers. The Crusaders had been soldiers by choice, and great barons by accident ; their successors were only soldiers from necessity, and because their position compelled them to appear in arms to defend their sovereign's throne and their own fiefs. The training they received may have fitted them for a tilt-yard, but it did not furnish them with the military qualifications required for a campaign. There was also another difference still more injurious to their position. Their fathers had commanded enthusiastic and experienced soldiers ; the sons were compelled to lead inexperienced vassals or hired mercenaries. Many of the new barons, too, were younger sons, who possessed no revenues except what they drew from their Eastern fiefs, and no nursery existed in the East for supplying them with the hardy followers who had supported the power of their fathers. Unfortunately for the Latin power, the young barons of Romania were generally persons who thought more of enjoying their position than of improving it for the advantage of their posterity. The wealth, both of the emperor Robert and his barons, was consumed in idle pomp, and in what was called upholding the dignity of the imperial court, instead of being devoted to the administrative and military necessities of their respective positions. The number of experienced soldiers daily decreased in the Frank empire, while the Greeks, observing the change, pressed forward with augmented energy. The Frank army was defeated by the emperor John III. (Vatatzes) at the battle of Poimanenos, in the year 1224, and shortly after Adrianople was captured by Theodore, the despot of Epirus. From these wounds the empire of Romania never recovered.

The emperor Robert possessed neither the valour required to defend his dominions, nor the prudence necessary to regulate his own conduct. A fearful tragedy, enacted in the imperial palace, proclaimed his weakness, and called the attention of the whole world to his vices. The daughter of the knight of Neuville, one of the veteran Crusaders, recently dead, was betrothed to a Burgundian knight, when the young

emperor fell in love with the fair face of the lady. His suit, aided by the favour of the mother, won her heart, and he persuaded mother and daughter to take up their residence in the palace. The rejected Burgundian, as soon as he saw his betrothed bride established as the emperor's mistress, vowed to obtain a deep revenge. The unheard-of boldness and daring of his project secured it the most complete success in all its horrible details. He assembled his relatives, friends, and followers; and, with this small band of adherents in complete armour, walked into the palace, where no suspicion of any outrage was entertained. Guided by a friendly assistant, he forced his way into the women's apartments, where the young lady's mother was seized, carried off by his friends, and drowned in the Bosphorus. The daughter was at the same time mutilated by her rejected lover, who cut off her nose and lips, and then left her in this frightful condition filling the palace with her moans, to receive such consolation as her imperial lover could bring. The spirit of the age excused this inhuman vengeance of the Burgundian knight; but it would equally have excused Robert had he seized the culprit immediately, and hung him in his armour before the palace gates, with his shield round his neck. The emperor was so weak and contemptible that he was unable to punish this barbarous outrage and personal insult even by legal forms. He felt the insult, however, which he could not avenge, so deeply, that shame drove him from Constantinople to seek military assistance from the Pope, by which he hoped to make his power more feared. He died in the Morea on his way back from Rome in 1228¹.

Baldwin, the younger brother of Robert, was not ten years old when the succession opened to him. The situation of the empire required an experienced sovereign, and the barons proceeded to elect John de Brienne, titular king of Jerusalem, who at the time was acting as commander-in-chief of the Papal army, emperor-regent for life². The conditions on which the imperial throne was conferred on John de Brienne

¹ Ducange, *Hist. de Constantinople*, 86.

² John de Brienne married Mary, daughter of Isabella, queen of Jerusalem, and Conrad of Montferrat. His kingdom never extended far beyond the walls of Acre and Tyre; but in 1219, at the head of a band of Crusaders, he took Damietta, which he retained for two years. He quitted the Holy Land in 1223.

A.D. 1216-1261.]

afford an instructive illustration of the political views and necessities of the period. Brienne was a warrior of great renown, and his election was warmly promoted by Pope Gregory IX. He was already eighty years of age, but he had not retained the activity of mind and the vigour of body which rendered the octogenarian doge, Henry Dandolo, the hero of the fourth Crusade. By the terms of the convention between John de Brienne and the barons of Romania, Brienne was declared emperor, and invested with the imperial power during his life. He was bound to furnish Baldwin with an establishment suitable to his rank as heir-apparent to the empire, until he attained the age of twenty, when the young prince was to be invested with the government of the Asiatic provinces. Baldwin was to marry Mary the daughter of John de Brienne; and the heirs of John de Brienne were to receive, as a hereditary fief on the accession of Baldwin, either the possessions of the imperial crown in Asia beyond Nicomedia, or those in Europe beyond Adrianople. This act was concluded in 1229; but the valour and experience of John de Brienne were inadequate to restore the shattered fabric of the Latin power¹. The barons, knights, and soldiers seemed all to be rapidly dying out, and no vigorous and warlike youth arose to replace them. The enormous pay then required by knights and men-at-arms rendered it impossible for the declining revenues of the empire to purchase the services of any considerable number of mercenaries. The position of soldiers in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries was, in one respect, like that of barristers in London at present. There were great prizes to be won, as Robert Guiscard and John de Brienne testify; but, on the whole, the number of amateurs was so great, that the whole pay received by the class was insufficient to cover the annual expenditure of its members. John de Brienne died in 1237, after living to witness his empire confined to a narrow circuit round the walls of Constantinople.

Baldwin II. prolonged the existence of the empire by begging assistance from the Pope and the King of France; and he collected the money necessary for maintaining his household and enjoying his precarious position, by selling the holy

¹ The act is printed by Buchon, *Recherches et Matériaux*, 21.

relics preserved by the Eastern Church. He was fortunate in finding a liberal purchaser in St. Louis¹. The fear of the Mongols, who were then ravaging all Asia, and the rivalry of the Greek empire and the Bulgarian kingdom, also tended to prolong the existence of the empire of Romania after it had lost all power and energy. But at length, in the year 1261, a division of the Greek army surprised Constantinople, expelled Baldwin, and put an end to the Latin power, without the change being an event of much importance beyond the walls of the city. The feudal nobility appeared to be extinct, and the Latin church suddenly to have melted away. The clergy, indeed, had consumed the wealth of their benefices quite as disgracefully as the nobles had wasted their fortunes; for we learn from the correspondence of Pope Innocent III., that they at times alienated their revenues and retired to their native countries, carrying off even the communion plate and the relics from the churches². There is nothing surprising in the pitiful end of a society so demoralized.

SECT. VI.—*Kingdom of Saloniki.*

Boniface, marquis of Montferrat, having held the office of commander-in-chief of the Crusaders before the establishment of the empire of Romania, affected to regard his kingdom as an independent monarchy. His plan for rendering it independent of the empire failed through the prompt energy of Baldwin I., and he was compelled to do homage to the imperial crown; but when he obtained the command of the division of the Crusaders which marched to establish itself in Greece, he endeavoured to indemnify himself for his first failure, by inducing the barons, who received lands to the south of his own frontier in Thessaly, to accept investiture

¹ As it would have been an act of impiety to buy these relics, St. Louis redeemed the crown of thorns which Baldwin had pawned, and received it as a gift. The king also furnished the young emperor with large sums of money to be wasted at the court of Constantinople, and received the following relics as a mark of Baldwin's satisfaction:—A piece of the true cross; the linen cloth in which the body of Jesus was enveloped; the bonds, the sponge, and the cup of the crucifixion: a piece of the skull of St. John the Baptist; and the rod of Moses!!! An engraving of the skull, or of one of the skulls, of St. John the Baptist, is given by Ducange, *Constantinopolis Christiana*, 101.

² Hurter, *Innocent III.* ii. 214.

A.D. 1204-1222.]

from and do homage for their possessions to him¹. The operations of Boniface against Greece were crowned with success. Leo Sguros, the Byzantine governor of Nauplia and Argos, after taking possession of Corinth, Athens, and Thebes, had led a Greek army northward to the Spercheius, for the purpose of defending Greece against the Franks. But the Greek troops were unable to make a stand even at the pass of Thermopylae, where they were disgracefully routed, and fled, with Leo, to shelter themselves within the walls of the Acrocorinth, abandoning all the country north of the isthmus to the army of the Crusaders. Boniface established all those who had been assigned shares of the conquered district in their fiefs, and marched into the Peloponnesus, where he laid siege to Corinth and Argos at the same time, with the reduced army under his command. At this conjuncture, he was suddenly recalled to the north by the news of a rebellion in Thessalonica. This he soon repressed; but not very long after, as has already been mentioned, he was slain in a skirmish with the Bulgarians (A.D. 1207). His death was the commencement of a series of misfortunes, that soon ruined the kingdom of Saloniki, which he had been so eager to extend.

This feudatory kingdom bore within itself the seeds of its own destruction. The Lombards, by whom it was founded, were not so much under the influence of feudal organization as the other Crusaders, nor so commercial and intelligent as the Venetians. Their social position had been modified by their intercourse with the republics and free cities of Italy. Money was, therefore, necessary to a larger amount than in the other conquests of the Crusaders, and yet the Lombards were as incapable of creating wealth for their government as any of the Franks. Though Saloniki was regarded rather in the light of a colonial dependency than as a feudal kingdom, still the Lombards thought only of profiting by the acquisition as military men paid to govern and garrison the fortresses and towns, and took no measures to occupy and cultivate the land.

The personal friendship and family alliance of Boniface and Henry preserved peace until the king's death. But we have

¹ Nicetas, 410.

seen that Count Blandrate, impelled either by his own ambition or by the grasping spirit of the Lombards, adopted a policy that involved the kingdom in hostilities with the empire, which ended in the fortresses of the kingdom being forced to receive Belgian garrisons, and, consequently, in greatly diminishing the number of Lombard troops in the kingdom. Yet an Italian colony at Thessalonica, though surrounded by powerful enemies, might have maintained its ground more easily than the Belgians at Constantinople, had the government been able and prudent. The minority of Demetrius, to whom Boniface had left his crown, completed the ruin of the state. His mother, the queen-empress Margaret, acted as regent; and, after the retreat of Count Blandrate, the military command of the fortresses was vested in officers named by the emperor Henry. Under such a partition of power, the resources of the country were naturally consumed in the most unprofitable manner, and the people became eager for any change, hoping that it could not fail to better their condition. While the emperor Henry lived he protected the kingdom effectually both against the king of Bulgaria and the despot of Epirus, its two most dangerous enemies. But after the defeat and death of Peter of Courtenay, it was left exposed to the attacks of Theodore, despot of Epirus, who invaded it with a powerful army.

In the year 1222, while the young king Demetrius, then only seventeen years old, was still in Italy, completing his military education at the court of his brother, the marquis of Montferrat, the despot Theodore took Thessalonica, and subdued the whole kingdom. In order to efface all memory of the Lombard royalty by the creation of a new and higher title, he was crowned emperor at Thessalonica by the archbishop of Achrida, patriarch of Macedonian Bulgaria.

William, marquis of Montferrat, had been invested with the guardianship of the kingdom of Saloniki by Peter of Courtenay, while that emperor was at Rome, and the marquis no sooner heard of the loss of his brother's dominions, than he undertook an expedition for their recovery. The conquest of Thessalonica by the Greeks had also excited lively indignation on the part of Pope Honorius III., who felt that the stability of the papal power throughout Greece was seriously compromised by this reaction in favour of the Greek church.

A.D. 1204-1222.]

His holiness, therefore, willingly assisted the marquis of Montferrat with funds, to enable him to enrol a large body of troops. The Pope even authorized a crusade against the Greeks to re-establish Demetrius as Catholic king of Saloniki. Great delays occurred before the marquis William was able to assemble an army; but at length, in the year 1225, he quitted Italy, accompanied by his brother Demetrius, at the head of a well-organized force. Their expedition sailed from Brindisi, and the army, landing at the ports of Epirus, marched over the mountains into the plain of Thessaly, without sustaining any loss—so admirably had the young marquis combined the movement of his squadrons, and taken measures for securing them abundant supplies of provisions on the road. But just as the army was commencing its operations in the extensive plains, which offered ground best suited to the movements of the heavy cavalry of which it was composed, the marquis William was attacked by the autumnal fever of the country, and died in the course of a few days. The young Demetrius, finding himself unable to manage the vassals of his brother's marquisate and the fierce mercenaries who formed the most efficient portion of the army, was obliged to abandon this attempt to recover his kingdom, and retire to Italy. He died two years after, while engaged in endeavours to form a new expedition, A.D. 1227.

The death of Demetrius allowed several European princes to assume the empty title of king of Saloniki, though none ever regained possession of any portion of the kingdom they pretended to claim. The family of Montferrat naturally considered the crown as descending to the male heirs of the last king, though Demetrius had appointed the emperor Frederic II. his heir by testament. The emperor Frederic II., however, formally renounced all his right to the succession (A.D. 1239) in favour of Boniface III., marquis of Montferrat, who had already assumed the title of king of Saloniki. William dalle Carceri, baron of Negrepont, who married a niece of Demetrius, appears to have assumed the title after the death of marquis Boniface III.; but it was also assumed at the same time by William V., marquis of Montferrat, called the Great or Long-sword, who ceded it, with all his claims to the territory of Thessalonica, as the dowry of his daughter Irene on her marriage with the Greek emperor, Andronicus II.,

in the year 1284¹. Thus the title of the descendants of the founder of the kingdom became united with the sovereignty of the Byzantine empire.

After Baldwin II. was driven from Constantinople, he affected to consider the fief of the kingdom of Saloniki as having been reunited to the empire on the death of Demetrius; and in order to purchase the aid of the house of Burgundy for recovering his throne, he ceded the title of King of Saloniki, as a fief of his imaginary empire, to Hugh IV., duke of Burgundy, in the year 1266. Hugh transmitted the empty title, for which he never rendered any service, to his brother Robert, from whom it passed to his nephew Hugh V. Hugh V., duke of Burgundy, became party to a series of diplomatic arrangements connected with the lost empire of Romania and the valuable principality of Achaia, that took place at Paris in 1312; and he then ceded his title to the imaginary kingdom to his younger brother Louis, who became Prince of Achaia by his marriage with Maud of Hainault, the possessor of that principality². On the death of Louis, the title returned to Eudes IV., duke of Burgundy, his surviving brother, who sold all his claims to the imaginary possessions of his family in the East, to Philip of Tarentum, the titular emperor of Romania, in the year 1320. After this we find no further mention of a kingdom of Saloniki³.

¹ William V. married Isabella, daughter of Richard earl of Cornwall, brother of our Henry III., on the 28th March 1257; but Irene was the child of his second wife, Beatrice of Castille.

² These arrangements were embodied in a series of treaties and marriage contracts involving the following marriages: 1. Jane, sister of Hugh V., Duke of Burgundy, to Philip son of Charles of Valois, third son of Philip III. of France (le Hardi). Philip succeeded to the throne of France in 1328, as Philip V. (of Valois). 2. Catherine of Valois, daughter of Catherine of Courtenay, titular empress of Romania, who had been betrothed to Hugh V. of Burgundy, was married to Philip of Tarentum. 3. Maud of Hainault, princess of Achaia, was married to Louis, brother of Hugh V. Ducange, *Histoire de Constantinople, Recueil des Chartes*; Duchesne, *Histoire générale des Ducs de Bourgogne, preuves*, 115; Buchon, *Recherches et Matériaux*, 54, 238.

³ Ducange, *Histoire de Constantinople*, 246; Buchon, *Recherches et Matériaux*, 62, 69.

CHAPTER V.

DESPOTAT OF EPIRUS—EMPIRE OF THESSALONICA.

SECT. I.—*Establishment of an independent Greek principality in Epirus.*

THAT portion of the Byzantine empire situated to the west of the range of Pindus was saved from feudal domination by Michael, a natural son of Constantine Angelos, the uncle of the Emperors Isaac II. and Alexius III. After the conquest of Constantinople, he escaped into Epirus, where his marriage with a lady of the country gave him some influence; and assuming the direction of the administration of the whole country from Dyrrachium to Naupactus, he collected a considerable military force, and established the seat of his authority generally at Ioannina or Arta¹. The civil government of his principality was a continuation of the Byzantine forms; and there was no interruption in the territory over which he ruled of the ordinary dispensation of justice by the existing tribunals, nor of the regular payment of the usual taxes. The despotat of Epirus was merely a change in the name of the government, not a revolution in the condition of the people. But the political necessity in which Michael was placed, of preserving his power by the maintenance of a large and permanent military force, gave his administration a barbarous and rude character, more in accordance with the nature of his army, and of the mountaineers he ruled, than with the constitution of his civil government. The absence of all feudal organization, and the employment of a large body of native militia, mingled with

¹ Villehardouin, 114; *Chronicon Alberti monachi Trium Fontium*, in the collection of German historians by Leibnitz, tom. ii. 441; Acropolita, 8.

hired mercenaries, gave the despotat of Epirus a Byzantine type, and kept it perfectly distinct from the Frank principalities by which it was almost entirely surrounded.

The population of the territory of which Michael assumed the sovereignty, consisted of different races in various grades of civilization. The Greeks were generally confined to the towns, and were in a flourishing condition; many were wealthy merchants and prosperous traders, as well as large proprietors of land, particularly in the vicinity of Ioannina and Arta. The Vallachian population inhabited the country called Great Vlachia, which still acknowledged the authority of its own princes; but as it was pressed back on the great range of mountains to the south and west of the Thessalian plains, it readily united its force under the authority of a Byzantine leader like Michael, from whose ambition it had evidently less to fear than from the intrusion of the rapacious Franks¹. The Albanians, broken into tribes and engaged in local quarrels or predatory warfare with their wealthier neighbours, readily acknowledged the supremacy of a chief who offered liberal pay to all the native warriors who joined his standard. The despots of Epirus long ruled their dominions by employing the various resources of the different classes of their subjects for the general good, and restraining their hostile jealousies more mildly, yet more effectually, than it would have been in the power of any one of the classes, if rendered dominant, to have done. The wealth of the Greeks furnished a considerable pecuniary revenue, which enabled the despots to maintain a respectable army of mercenaries; and round this force they could assemble the Albanian mountaineers without fear of seditious conduct on the part of that dangerous militia. The government thus acquired the power, rarely possessed by the masters of this wild country, of arresting the predatory habits of the native mountain tribes. The fear of the Franks rendered the Vallachians obedient subjects whenever a force was required to resist foreign invasion. The mountain brigands, who had wasted the country under the later Byzantine emperors, were now paid to fight the common enemies; and military courage, instead of being denied official employment by rapacious courtiers from Con-

¹ Nicetas (410) mentions the independence of the Toparch of Great Vlachia at this period.

A.D. 1204-1214.]

stantinople, became a means of securing wealth and honour. The public taxes, no longer transmitted to a distant land to be lavished in idle pomp, were expended in the country, and the exigencies of the times insured their being employed in such a way as to produce a greater degree of order, and a more effectual protection for property, than the distant government at Constantinople had been able to afford. These circumstances explain how it happened that Michael succeeded in checking the progress of the warlike Franks, and in creating an independent principality with the discordant elements of the population of Epirus. It must not, moreover, be overlooked, that the geographical configuration of the country, and the rugged nature of the great mountain barriers by which it is intersected in numerous successive ridges, protected Michael from immediate attack, and allowed him time to complete his preparations for defence, and unite his subjects by a feeling of common interest, before the Crusaders were prepared to encounter him.

History has unfortunately preserved very little information concerning the organization and social condition of the different classes and races which inhabited the dominions of the princes of Epirus. Almost the only facts that have been preserved, relate to the wars and alliances of the despots and their families with the Byzantine emperors and the Latin princes. These facts must be noticed as they occur. In this place it is only necessary to give a short chronological sketch of the princes who ruled Epirus. They all assumed the name of Angelos Komnenos Dukas; and the title of despot, by which they are generally distinguished, was a Byzantine honorary distinction, never borne by the earlier members of the family until it had been conferred on them by the Greek emperor.

Michael I., the founder of the despotat, distinguished himself by his talents as a soldier and a negotiator. He extended his authority over all Epirus, Acarnania, and Aetolia, and a part of Macedonia and Thessaly. Though virtually independent, he acknowledged Theodore I. (Lascaris) as the lawful emperor of the East. Michael was assassinated by one of his slaves in the year 1214¹.

¹ Acropolita, p. 13.

SECT. II.—*Empire of Thessalonica.*

Theodore Angelos Komnenos Dukas, the legitimate brother of Michael I., escaped from Constantinople to Nicaea, and resided at the court of Theodore I. (Lascaris), where he received an invitation from his brother to visit Epirus, in order to assist in directing the administration. The emperor Theodore I., distrusting the restless and intriguing spirit of his namesake, would not allow him to depart until he had sworn fidelity to the throne of Nicaea, and to himself as the lawful emperor of the East. After the murder of Michael, Theodore was proclaimed his successor, and soon displayed the greatest ability and activity in his government, joined to an utter want of principle in the measures he adopted for extending his dominions. The suspicions of the emperor Theodore I. were fully warranted by his conduct, for he made no distinction between Greek and Frank whenever he conceived that his interest could be advanced by attacking or assisting either the one or the other.

In the year 1217, as we have already seen, he defeated and captured the Latin emperor, Peter of Courtenay, in the defiles near Albanon. After completing the conquest of Thessaly and Macedonia, and driving the Lombards out of Thessalonica, he assumed the title of emperor in direct violation of his oath to Theodore I., and was crowned in the city of Thessalonica, which he made his capital, by the archbishop of Achrida, patriarch of Bulgaria. Theodore Angelos then pushed his conquests northward with increased vigour, and in the year 1224, having gained possession of Adrianople, his dominions extended from the shores of the Adriatic to those of the Black Sea. The empire of Thessalonica then promised to become the heir of the Byzantine empire in Europe. Theodore was already forming his plans for the attack of Constantinople, when his restless ambition involved him in an unnecessary war with John Asan, king of Bulgaria, by whom he was defeated and taken prisoner in 1230. His treacherous intrigues while in captivity alarmed the Bulgarian monarch, who ordered his eyes to be put out.

Theodore had two brothers, Manuel and Constantine, both holding high commands in his empire. Manuel was present

A.D. 1214-1234.]

at his defeat, but escaped from the field of battle to Thessalonica, where he assumed the direction of the government and the imperial title¹. His reign as emperor was short, for John Asan, the king of Bulgaria, falling in love with the daughter of his blind prisoner, married her and released his father-in-law. Theodore returned to Thessalonica, where he kept himself concealed for some time; but his talents for intrigue enabled him to form a powerful party of secret partizans, and before his brother Manuel was aware of his designs, his friends took up arms and drove the usurper into exile. But as it was impossible for Theodore, on account of his blindness, to reascend the throne, the imperial crown was placed on the head of his son John. The father nevertheless continued to direct the administration, with the title of Despot.² In the mean time Manuel, who had escaped to Asia, obtained military aid from the emperor John III. (Vatatzes), and landing at Demetrias (Volo), made himself master of Pharsala, Larissa, and Platamona. Constantine, his younger brother, who governed a part of Thessaly, joined the invaders, and the country was threatened with a destructive civil war. But the spirit of the politic Theodore averted this catastrophe. He succeeded in inducing his two brothers to hold a conference, in which, acting as prime-minister of his son's empire, he employed so many powerful arguments in favour of family union, and agreed to such liberal concessions, that Manuel and Constantine joined in a family compact for supporting the empire of Thessalonica, and abandoned the cause of the emperor John III. of Nicaea. The three brothers then concluded an alliance with the Franks in Greece, for their mutual defence against the emperor of Nicaea.

John, the young emperor of Thessalonica, was a virtuous prince, by no means destitute of talent, though he submitted with reverence to his father, who governed his empire. But neither his own virtues nor his father's talents were able to save Thessalonica from the attacks of the emperor of Nicaea, who was determined that no Greek should share the honours of the imperial title. The facility with which the rich plains

¹ Acropolita, p. 23. Interesting coins of both Theodore and Manuel exist, representing these emperors and St. Demetrius holding between them the city of Thessalonica, above which are the words ΠΟΛΙΣ ΘΕΣΣΑΛΟΝΙΚΗ. They are concave and of copper. For those of Theodore see Mionnet, *Descript. de Médailles Gr. et Rom.*; Suppl. tome iii. p. 172.

of Macedonia were transferred from one sovereign to another, whether he was a Lombard king or a Belgian or a Greek emperor, must in part be attributed to the want of union among the agricultural population. In great part of Macedonia the Slavonians were more numerous than the Greeks, and in great part of Thessaly the Vallachians formed the whole population. The war between the Greek emperors of Nicaea and Thessalonica was a war of conquest carried on by mercenary soldiers, in which the people had nothing to gain. The emperor of Nicaea was victorious; he took Thessalonica, and compelled John to lay aside the imperial title, but allowed him to retain the direction of the government on his accepting the rank of despot and publicly proclaiming the emperor of Nicaea as the lawful emperor of the East both in Europe and Asia¹. The short-lived empire of Thessalonica ceased to exist in the year 1234.

SECT. III.—*Despotat of Epirus.—Principality of Vallachian Thessaly.—Family of Tocco.*

John continued to govern Thessalonica as despot until his death in 1244. He was succeeded by his brother Demetrius, a weak prince, whose authority never extended far beyond the walls of the city. By his misconduct he drove his politic father from his councils, and involved himself in disputes with the Greek emperor, John III., who removed him from the government, and united Thessalonica directly to the Greek empire in 1246.

In the mean time Michael II., a natural son of Michael I., had acquired great influence in Epirus, where he gradually gained possession of the power and dominions occupied by his father. The fall of Thessalonica, and the weakness of his uncles in their Thessalian principalities, enabled him to gain possession of Pelagonia, Achrida, and Prilapos, while the blind old Theodore maintained himself as an independent prince in Vodena, Ostrovos, and Staridola². The emperor John III.,

¹ The official title of the emperors of Nicaea, as of Constantinople, was always 'the true emperor of the Romans.'

² Acropolita, 46. There is no doubt that Staridola is the present Sarighioli. Leake's *Travels in Northern Greece*, i. 311; Cantacuzenos, p. 776.

A.D. 1234-1318.]

in order to secure the friendship of Michael II., and induce him to acknowledge the supremacy of the throne of Nicaea, conferred on him the title of despot, and proposed Maria, the daughter of his son, the emperor Theodore II., as bride for Michael's son Nicephorus. The restless and intriguing old Theodore succeeded, however, in involving Michael II. in war with the emperor. Michael was unsuccessful, and his reverses compelled him to purchase peace by delivering up his blind uncle Theodore as a prisoner, and by ceding Kastoria, Achrida, Deabolis, Albanon, and Prilapos to the Greek empire. The wars of Michael II., and his treaties with the Greek emperors John III., Theodore II., and Michael VIII., belong to the history of the empires of Nicaea and Constantinople rather than to the history of Epirus. The loss of the battle of Pelagonia compelled Michael to abandon his dominions for some time; but the inhabitants of Epirus appear to have found the Constantinopolitan administration more oppressive than that of Michael, whom they regarded as their native prince, and he was enabled to recover possession of the southern part of his despotat. He died about the year 1267.

His son, Nicephorus, received the title of despot when he celebrated his marriage with Maria the daughter of the emperor Theodore II.¹ He succeeded his father in the sovereignty of Epirus, and extended his authority over Acarnania and part of Aetolia. About the year 1290 he was attacked by a Byzantine army, sent by the emperor Andronicus II. to attempt the conquest of Joannina, while a Genoese fleet assailed Arta. Both expeditions were repulsed with loss by the despot, who received important succours from Florenz of Hainault prince of Achaia, and Richard count of Cephalonia, whom he had subsidized². Nicephorus died in the year 1293, leaving a son named Thomas, who succeeded to his continental possessions. He left also two daughters, one married to John, count of Cephalonia; the other, named Ithamar, was the first wife of Philip of Tarentum³.

Thomas, the last Greek despot of Epirus of the family of

¹ Nicephorus, on the death of Maria Lascaris, married Anna, niece of the emperor Michael VIII., daughter of that emperor's sister Eulogia. Pachymeres, i. 162.

² *Livre de la Conquête*, p. 302.

³ The marriage of Philip of Tarentum, son of Charles II. of Naples, with Ithamar, was celebrated 12th July 1294.

Angelos, was murdered by his nephew, the count of Cephalonia, in 1318, and his dominions were then divided, the greater part falling to the share of the murderer. Thomas, count of Cephalonia, was himself murdered by his own brother John; and John was again murdered by his wife Anne, the daughter of Andronicus Palaeologos, Protovestiaros of the Byzantine empire, who was the guardian of her son, Nicephorus II., a child of seven years of age at the time the emperor Andronicus III. invaded the despotat in the year 1337. The possessions of the young Nicephorus were then conquered, and he himself subsequently received an appanage in Thrace, and married a daughter of John Cantacuzenos, the usurper of the throne of Constantinople. Nicephorus was slain in a battle with the Albanians, on the banks of the Achelous, as he was attempting to recover possession of the despotat in the year 1358¹. As early, however, as the year 1350, the civil wars in the Byzantine empire, produced by the unprincipled ambition of Cantacuzenos, had enabled Stephen Dushan, king of Servia, to conquer all Epirus and the greater part of Thessaly².

A principality distinct from that of Epirus was founded by John Dukas, the natural son of the despot Michael II., who married the heiress of Taron, hereditary chieftain of the Vallachians of Thessaly³. He received the title of Sebastokrator from the emperor Michael VIII., as a reward for deserting his father before the battle of Pelagonia, in 1259. He acted an important part in the history of his time, and displayed all the restless activity and daring spirit of his family, occupying an independent possession in Thessaly at the head of his Vallachians, and carrying on war or forming alliances with the emperor of Constantinople, the despot of Epirus, and the Frank princes of Greece, according to the dictates of his own personal interest. He was generally called by the Franks duke of Neopatras,

¹ Cantacuzenos (304) makes Nicephorus only seven years old at the time of the invasion of Epirus; but Nicephorus Gregoras (335) says he was fourteen in 1339-1340, which must be an error, as Cantacuzenos certainly knew the real age of his son-in-law; see Cant. 453.

² MS. on the state of Epirus, published by Pouqueville, of which an abstract is given in Leake's *Travels in Northern Greece*, iv. 553. The original is reprinted in the Bonn edition of the Byzantine Historians; *Historia Politica et Patriarchica Constantinopoleos; Epirotica*, p. 210.

³ Pachymeres, i. 49, edit. Rom.

A.D. 1259-1308.]

(Hypata), from his having made that town his capital; but his principality was usually called Great Vlachia. He died about the year 1290¹, leaving two sons.

The second prince of Vlachia, the son of John, reigned about ten years. His sister was married to William de la Roche, duke of Athens. The third prince was John Dukas II., who was left by his father under the guardianship of Guy II., duke of Athens, his cousin. The possessions of the young prince were attacked by the troops of Epirus, but the duke of Athens hastened to the assistance of his ward, and quickly carried the war into the territory of the despotat, forcing the government to conclude an advantageous peace². John Dukas II. married Irene, a daughter of the emperor Andronicus II., in the year 1305, and died three years after, without leaving issue³. The line of the princes of Vallachian Thessaly then became extinct, and their territories were divided among the frontier states. The Catalans conquered the valley of the Spercheius, with the city of Neopatras; and they were so proud of this exploit that they styled their Grecian dominions the duchy of Athens and Neopatras. But the greater part of the rich plain of Thessaly was annexed to the Byzantine empire, and was governed by officers sent from Constantinople, who were often honoured with the title of despot⁴. Cantacuzenos conferred the government of Thessalian Vlachia, in the year 1343, on John Angelos for life, by a golden bull⁵.

The history of Epirus after its conquest by Stephen Dushan, king of Servia, in 1350, becomes mixed up with the wars of the Servians, Albanians, Franks, and Greeks in the neighbouring provinces, until the whole country fell under the domination of the Turks. Stephen committed the government of Epirus, Thessaly, Acarnania, and Aetolia to his brother Simeon, who was involved in constant wars to defend those conquests against the Albanians, the Franks, and the Greeks. In the year 1367 he recognized Thomas Prelubos as prince of Joannina and Arta. Prelubos was assassinated, on account of his horrid cruelties, in 1385; and

¹ Pachymeres, ii. 137, edit. Rom.; Niceph. Greg. 66; Ducange, *Histoire de Constantinople*, 214.

² *Livre de la Conquête*, 405.

³ Niceph. Greg. 153, 173.

⁴ Cantacuzenos (288) mentions Stephen Gabrielopolus in 1334.

⁵ Cant. 526.

his widow, who was the sister of Simeon, married Esau Buondelmonte, a Florentine connected with the family of Acciaiuoli. Esau was engaged in incessant wars with the Albanians, by whom he was taken prisoner in the year 1399, and compelled to pay a large ransom¹.

In the mean time, Leonard Tocco of Beneventum had been invested with the county-palatine of Cephalaria by Robert of Tarentum, the titular emperor of Romania, when that county had reverted to the imperial crown by the death of the despot Nicephorus II., in 1357. Leonard Tocco also received the title of duke of Leucadia, to give additional dignity to his fief². Charles Tocco, who was apparently his grandson, invaded Epirus about the year 1390, and by gradual encroachments rendered himself master of the whole country south of Joannina, including Acarnania and part of Aetolia, after which he assumed the title of despot of Romania. His second wife was Francesca, daughter of Nerio I. Acciaiuoli, duke of Athens; and his niece Theodora was the wife of Constantine, the last emperor of Constantinople, to whom Clarentza, and all the possessions of the counts of Cephalaria in the Morea, were ceded as her dowry. Theodora died before Constantine ascended the throne of Constantinople. Charles II. died in 1429³. He was succeeded by his nephew, Charles III., from whom the Turks took Joannina and Aetolia in 1431. Charles III., in order to obtain the protection of the republic of Venice for the towns he still retained in Epirus and Acarnania, became a citizen of the republic in the year 1433, during the reign of the doge Francis Foscari⁴. It would seem, from the letters of Cyriakos of Ancona, that he assumed the title of king of Epirus, in addition to his previous titles of duke

¹ Chalcocondylas, 112. The names of Albanian chieftains in the wars against the despots, Thomas Prelubos and Esau Buondelmonte, are, Ghinos Vaia, who held Angelokastron, Petro Leosa, and afterwards John Spata, who held Arta and Rogous, and Ghino Frati of Malakassi. *Epirotica*, pp. 215, 222, &c., edit. Bonn.

² Remondini, *De Zacynthi Antiquitatibus et Fortuna*, Venet. 1756, p. 243.

³ Phrantzes, 129, 154, edit. Bonn. The name of Karlili, or the country of Charles, was applied by the Turks to Acarnania and a portion of Aetolia, as long as they retained possession of the country.

⁴ The act of the doge, Francis Foscari, authorizing the insertion of the name of Charles Tocco, despot of Arta, duke of Leucadia, and count-palatine of Cephalaria, in the registers of the republic, is published by Buchon; *Nouvelles Recherches; Diplomes*, p. 350.

A.D. 1357-1479.]

of Leucadia and despot of Romania¹. He was succeeded by his son, Leonard II., in 1452, who was driven from Leucadia and Cephalaria by the Turks in 1479.

Historians have related those facts concerning the wars, marriages, murders, and successions of the rulers of Epirus and Great Vallachia, which they considered interesting to their contemporaries. But it would have been more instructive to modern readers had they recorded an equal number of events relating to the condition of the Albanian and Vallachian population. For about this time the Vallachian population appears to have declined, while the Albanian race was beginning to increase and send out agricultural colonies to repeople the Peloponnesus.

¹ Cyriaci Anconitani *Epistolae*, p. 71.

CHAPTER VI.

HISTORY OF THE DUKES OF ATHENS—1205–1456.

SECT. I.—*Athens a Feudal Principality.*

THE portion of Greece lying to the south of the kingdom of Saloniki was divided by the Crusaders among several great feudatories of the empire of Romania. According to the feudal code of the time, each of these great barons possessed the right of constructing fortresses, coining money, establishing supreme courts of justice, and waging war with his neighbours; consequently, their number could not be great in so small an extent of country. The lords of Boudonitza, Salona, Negrepont, and Athens are alone mentioned as existing to the north of the isthmus of Corinth, but the history of the sovereigns of Athens can alone be traced in any detail. The slightest record of a city which has acted so important a part in the history of human civilization must command some attention; and fortunately her feudal annals, though very imperfect, furnish matter for study and instruction. Athens and Thebes—for the fate of these ancient enemies was linked together—were then cities of considerable wealth, with a numerous and flourishing population.

Otho de la Roche, a Burgundian nobleman, who had distinguished himself during the siege of Constantinople, marched southward with the army of Boniface the king-marquis, and gained possession of Athens in 1205, and received the title of Grand-Sire¹. Thebes and Athens had probably fallen to his share in the partition of the empire, but it is possible that the king of Saloniki may have found

¹ Geffrey de Villehardouin, *De la Conquête de Constantinople*; Note of Ducange at p 325 of his edition.

means to increase his portion, in order to induce him to do homage to the crown of Saloniki for this addition. At all events, it appears that Otho de la Roche did homage to Boniface as his immediate superior¹.

We possess some interesting information concerning the events that occurred at Athens immediately previous to its conquest by Otho de la Roche, though unfortunately this information does not give us any minute insight into the condition of the population. Still, it allows us to perceive that the social as well as the political condition of the people was peculiarly favourable to the enterprise of the Crusaders. The people of Athens and Thebes were living in the enjoyment of wealth and tranquillity when the news reached them that Constantinople was besieged by the Franks and Venetians. The greatest grievance then endured in the cities where no regular garrisons were maintained arose out of fiscal extortion and judicial corruption, both of which certainly increased to an alarming degree under the emperors of the house of Angelos. But these abuses were palliated, and prevented from assuming a highly oppressive form, whenever the bishop of the place exerted his influence to restrain injustice within the strict bounds of the established laws. The direct judicial authority of the bishops, and their acknowledged political influence as protectors of the people, gave them virtually a superintending control over the agents of the central administration in the distant provinces of the empire. The authority of the central administration had been greatly weakened by the usurpation and misgovernment of Alexius III., and the power of the local governors and great landed proprietors had been proportionally increased².

¹ This title, *Μέγας Κύριος*, was derived by some from the title of *Μέγας Πριμικήριος*, which Constantine the Great was said to have conferred on the governor of Thebes. The general belief, both of the Byzantines and Latins, was that either this title or that of duke had been the ancient title of the governors of Athens. Compare Niceph. Greg. p. 146, and *Livre de la Conquête*, Greek text of Copenhagen, v. 2132.

² Tafel (*De Thessalonica ejusque Agro*, 462) has published a memorial of the archbishop Michael Akominatos to the emperor Alexius III., which gives a curious picture of the abuses then prevailing in the Byzantine fiscal administration. It represents Athens as a city thinly inhabited, with a declining population, impoverished and in danger of being reduced by the emigration of its inhabitants to a Scythian waste. The good Archbishop here alludes to Aristophanes, *Acharn.* 703. It is always difficult to appreciate the precise value of such declamation. Modern official correspondence concerning Athens shows us that any condition of public affairs can be represented by diplomatic agents, even when they are

The support of many wealthy and influential individuals had been purchased by Alexius at a ruinous price. Some had been intrusted with civil and military commands; and others, particularly in Greece, had been allowed to assume the authority of imperial officers without any legal warrant¹.

Leo Sguros, a Peloponnesian noble, who held the office of imperial governor of Nauplia, took advantage of the general disorder, and assumed the administration over the cities and fortresses of Argos and Corinth. As soon as he heard of the arrival of the Crusaders before Constantinople, he collected a considerable army and fleet, and extended his authority beyond the isthmus, apparently with the intention of forming an independent principality in Greece. His first expedition was directed against Athens, of which he hoped to render himself master without difficulty, as it was defended by no regular garrison. The Athenians, however, were not disposed to submit tamely to the usurpation of the Peloponnesian chief. They perhaps flattered themselves with the hope that, in existing circumstances, they might recover some municipal

poorer rhetoricians than Michael, under totally different aspects, merely because a minister has been changed. Now as the Archbishop informs us that Athens possessed ships, suffered in its commercial affairs from pirates, paid a ship tax, and was considered by the imperial officials as a place from which more money could be extorted than from the fertile regions of Thebes and Euboea, we must conclude that the city possessed considerable wealth, trade, and population. This memorial is printed with a German translation in Dr. Ellissen's *Michael Akominatos von Chonae, Erzbischof von Athen*, p. 118. That Athens had declined greatly from its flourishing condition in the time of Basil II. is, however, evident from the *Panegyricon* or *Oratio in Isaacium II.*, for the city was then unable to make the customary coronation offering. *Tafel, Thessalonica*, 459; Ellissen, *Michael Akominatos*, 58. [Professor Hopf (*Geschichte Griechenlands*, in Brockhaus' *Griechenland*, vol. vi. pp. 176, 177) has brought together evidence to show that Athens was a considerable literary centre at this period. Among other students who resorted thither were several Englishmen, who, as Hopf suggests, may have been attracted to those parts by relationship to members of the Varangian guard. One of these, Master John of Basingstoke, afterwards Archdeacon of Leicester, who died in 1252, is mentioned by Matthew Paris (*Historia Major*, edit. Watts, 1684, pp. 720, 721) as having been instructed by a daughter of the Archbishop of Athens; and this Archbishop is believed by Hopf to be Michael Akominatos, who in this case must have been married before he was consecrated bishop. The passage in Matthew Paris is as follows:—'Quaedam puella, filia Archiepiscopi Atheniensis, nomine Constantina, nondum vicesimum agens annum, virtutibus praedita, omnem trivii et quadrivii noverat difficultatem: unde alteram Catherinam, vel Catherinam consuevit dictus magister Johannes jocose, propter suae scientiae eminentiam, appellare. Haec magistra fuit magistri Johannis, et quicquid boni scivit in scientia, ut saepe asseruit, licet Parisiis diu studisset et legisset, ab ea mendicaverat. Haec puella pestilentias, tonitrua, eclipsin, et quod mirabilius fuit, terrae motum praedicens, omnes suos auditores infallibiliter praemunivit.' Ed.]

¹ Leo Chamaretos, ruler of Lacedaemon, appears to have belonged to this class.

A.D. 1205-1308.]

privileges; and they were fortunate enough to find a prudent, disinterested, and energetic chief in their archbishop, Michael Akominatos, the elder brother of the historian Nicetas. When Sguros made his appearance in the plain of Athens, descending from the monastery of Daphne by the remains of the Sacred Way to Eleusis, the archbishop went out to dissuade him from an attempt which would infallibly lead to a civil war, at a moment when Greece was menaced with a hostile invasion. Sguros treated the solicitations of the archbishop with contempt, and, persisting in his design, forced his way into the city, which was not fortified in such a way as to enable it to offer any opposition. But the archbishop animated his flock to defend their independence. The inhabitants, on the first report that Sguros meditated attacking them, had transported all their most valuable effects into the Acropolis, where they soon showed their enemy that they were both able and willing to make a long defence. Sguros, seeing there was no immediate prospect of taking the citadel, raised the siege and marched northward. On retiring, he barbarously set fire to the city in several places, plundered the surrounding country, and, after collecting a large supply of cattle and provisions, proceeded to invest Thebes, which surrendered without offering any resistance. All eastern Greece, as far as the frontier of Thessaly, then submitted to his authority; and he prepared to meet the Crusaders at Thermopylae. His inexperienced soldiers were, however, ill qualified to encounter the veteran warriors under the banners of Boniface. The memory of Leonidas was insufficient to inspire the Greeks with courage, and their army suffered a disgraceful defeat. Leo Sguros fled to Corinth, where he shut himself up in the Acrocorinth with the relics of his force.

Thebes, Chalcis, and Athens opened their gates, and received the Franks as their deliverers from the tyranny of Sguros and the Peloponnesians. There appears to be no doubt that the Greeks generally obtained very favourable capitulations from their conquerors: the inhabitants were secured in the possession of their private property, local institutions, established laws, and national religion. Under the protection of the Franks, therefore, they hoped to enjoy a degree of personal security to which the anarchical condition of the Byzantine empire, since the death of Manuel I. in

1180, had rendered them strangers¹. The Athenians were not disappointed in their expectations; for, though the Byzantine aristocracy and dignified clergy were severe sufferers by the transference of the government into the hands of the Franks, the middle classes long enjoyed peace and security. The noble archbishop Michael, who for thirty years had ruled the see of Athens as a spiritual father and political protector, was compelled to seek refuge at Keos, where he spent his declining years lamenting the forced apostacy of many of his flock, and the desecration of the glorious temple of the Panaghia in the Acropolis, by the rude priests of the haughty Franks, who compelled the subject Greeks to celebrate divine service according to the rites of the orthodox in the humbler churches of the city below².

The conquest of Athens rendered Otho de la Roche master of all Attica and Boeotia; but immediately after the death of Boniface, the Lombards of the kingdom of Saloniki, under the orders of count Blandrate, deprived him of Thebes. This city was again restored to its rightful master by the emperor Henry, when the Lombard kingdom of Saloniki was reduced to its lawful state of vassalage to the imperial crown of Romania; and Otho de la Roche did homage at the parliament of Ravenika, for both Athens and Thebes, as one of the great feudatories of the empire. Otho, like the emperor Henry and the principal vassals of the empire, forbade all donations of land to the papal church, and appropriated to his own use, or at least to temporal purposes, a greater share of the spoils of the Greek church, than met with the approbation of Innocent III. Even threats of excommunication could not compel him to alter his policy, and the Pope was induced to accept the explanations he offered for his proceedings, founded on the political exigencies of his position,

¹ Nicetas (391) indicates that there was some danger of internal disorders at Athens. He alludes to a young noble who opposed the archbishop and whom any other pastor would gladly have given up to Sguros to be put to death. The *Frank Chronicle of the Conquest of the Morea* affords repeated testimony that the Crusaders systematically respected the established institutions of the Greeks, and gave them written capitulations. For the life of the archbishop Michael, see Ellissen's *Michael Akominatos von Chonae*.

² The Parthenon had then hardly felt the finger of time, and had escaped almost uninjured from the hand of man. The marble walls of the Cella were adorned in the interior with Byzantine church paintings, in which it is not improbable that the emperor Basil II. appeared in his imperial robes, presenting his offerings from the spoils of the Bulgarian war. Cedrenus, 717.

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and the deep contrition he expressed for having offended the head of the church¹. It seems that the wealth of the Greek church, the monastery lands, and the imperial domains of the Byzantine emperors in Attica and Boeotia, were sufficient to satisfy Otho's wants and ambition, for his administration, judging from the tranquillity of his Greek subjects and the importance acquired by his principality, must have been less rapacious than the previous government of the emperors of Constantinople. Otho de la Roche nevertheless, in the decline of life, preferred his modest fief in France to his principality in Greece, and about the year 1225, he resigned the government of Athens and Thebes to his nephew Guy, son of his brother Pons de Ray².

Athens has been supposed to have lost its position as a direct fief of the empire of Romania by the homage which Otho de la Roche paid to Boniface, king of Saloniki; and it was pretended that the king of Saloniki had transferred the immediate superiority over all the country to the south of his own frontier, in Thessaly, to William de Champlitte, prince of Achaia. The pretended vassalage of Athens to Achaia at this early period rests only on the authority of the *Book of the Conquest of the Morea*, a Frank chronicle, of which a metrical translation in Greek was known long before the French text, which appears to be the original, was discovered³. The work contains an inaccurate and far from poetical narrative of the prominent events relating to the affairs of the

¹ *Epist. Innocent. III.* tom. ii. pp. 193, 213, 266, 418, 462, ep. 110. pp. 465, and 624; Raynaldi *Annales Eccles.* an. 1218, tom. i. 438. The Frank Chronicle says the church possessed one-third of Greece. Greek text, v. 1305.

² *Généalogie de la Maison de la Roche; Nouvelles Recherches historiques sur la Principauté française de Morée*, par Buchon, i. p. 84. Guy de Ray, or de la Roche, is always called Guillaume in the *Frank Chronicle of the Conquest of the Morea*, one of the numerous inaccuracies which prove that it cannot be implicitly relied on as a historical authority.

³ [The opinion here expressed as to the relation of the *Livre de la Conquête* and the *Χρονικὸν τοῦ Μωραίου* to one another is shared by Hopf (*Griechische Geschichte*, p. 202) and by Buchon. The last-named writer for some time held that the Greek was the original, when he published the Greek text from the Paris MS. in his *Chroniques étrangères relatives aux Expéditions françaises pendant le treizième Siècle*; but he was led to change his opinion by his discovery of the French text in a MS. at Brussels. This he published as vol. i. of his *Recherches historiques sur la Principauté française de Morée*; while vol. ii. of that work contained another version of the Greek text from the MS. at Copenhagen. On his change of opinion, see vol. i. pref. pp. xv. foll., and vol. ii. pref. p. vi. Dr. Ellissen, however, in his *Analekten der mittel- und neugriechischen Literatur*, vol. ii. pref. p. xxi., opposes the idea that the Greek text was a translation of the French. Professor Hopf also remarks on the frequent untrustworthiness of the work as a historical authority. Ed.]

Peloponnesus, from the time of its conquest by the Franks until the commencement of the fourteenth century. On all occasions it exalts the importance of the house of Villehardouin. This Chronicle asserts that Boniface, on quitting the army of the Crusaders in the Morea, to return to Thessalonica, placed all the great feudatories of the empire, including the duke of the Archipelago or Naxos, under the immediate superiority of William de Champlitte, prince of Achaia. The earliest claim of the princes of Achaia to any superiority over the princes of Athens appears to have arisen in the time of Guy de la Roche, about the year 1246. The Grand-sire of Athens and Thebes had assisted William Villehardouin to conquer Corinth and Nauplia ¹ as an ally, and not as a vassal, and received as a reward for this assistance the free possession of Argos and Nauplia, for which the prince of Achaia did not even claim personal homage, as long as his wars with the Greeks in Laconia rendered the alliance of the prince of Athens a matter of importance. This, as far as can be ascertained from authentic evidence, is the only feudal connection that existed between Athens and Achaia previous to the conquest of the empire of Romania by the Greeks, and the transference of the feudal superiority over Achaia to the house of Anjou of Naples ².

When William, prince of Achaia, had completed the conquest of the Peloponnesus, his ambition led him to form projects for extending his power to the north of the isthmus at the expense of the Latin allies, who had aided him against the Greeks. In the year 1254 he called on Guy, Grand-sire of Athens, to do personal homage for his possessions in the Morea. To this demand the prince of Athens replied, that he was ready to pay the feudal service that was due for his fiefs of Argos and Nauplia, but he asserted that he owed no

¹ [On the Author's mistake with regard to this point, see below, p. 194, *note*. Ed.]

² The Frank Chronicle makes Guy de la Roche admit that he owed homage for Argos and Nauplia, but makes him assert that he was no vassal of Achaia. *Livre de la Conquête*, p. 106. King Louis IX. of France, to whom the dispute was referred, decided that Guy had never actually done homage to William; and as he could not therefore be considered a liege-man of the prince of Achaia, he had committed no feudal delinquency in bearing arms against him; p. 114. Muntaner, an earlier and much better authority than the Chronicles, whether French or Greek, who had visited the court of Guy II., duke of Athens, in 1308, had never heard of any vassalage of Athens to Achaia. He declares that the dukes of Athens and the princes of Achaia held their principalities equally free of homage and service. Muntaner, chap. ccxxxvii. and ccxlv.

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personal homage to William. Both parties prepared to decide the question by arms, for it seemed emphatically one of those that authorized a private war according to the feudal system. The Grand-sire of Athens was supported by the count of Soula (Salona), the lords of Euboea, and even by the baron of Karitena, a relation and vassal of the prince of Achaia. But the army of the confederates was defeated by Villehardouin at the pass of Karidi, on the road from Megara to Thebes. The vanquished were besieged in Thebes, and compelled to enter into a capitulation, by which Guy de la Roche engaged to present himself at the court of William Villehardouin, at Nikli, in order that the question concerning the homage due to the prince of Achaia might be decided in a parliament of the principality¹. Guy made his appearance, and William was unable to persuade his own vassals that the Grand-sire of Athens was deserving of any punishment according to the letter of the feudal law. The case was referred to king Louis IX. of France, whose reputation as an able and impartial judge was already so great in the whole Christian world that all parties willingly consented to abide by his decision. Guy de la Roche hastened to the court of France, confident in the justice of his cause; and Villehardouin was satisfied with the temporary absence of a powerful opponent at a critical moment. The king of France considered the delinquency of the Grand-sire of Athens to be of so trifling a nature, that it was more than adequately punished by the trouble and expense of a journey to Paris; and in order to indemnify Guy in some measure for the inconvenience which he had suffered in presenting himself at the court of France, Louis authorized him to adopt the title of Duke of Athens, instead of that of Grand-sire, by which he had been hitherto distinguished². From subsequent events it seems that William Villehardouin really made a claim at this time to the direct homage of the duke of Athens; but whether he based his claim on a pretended grant of the king

¹ Nikli was the town that in Byzantine times occupied the site of Tegea. Mouchli rose into importance when it declined; and when Mouchli fell into ruins, the modern town of Tripolitza was founded. A similar succession of towns occurred also in the lower Arcadian plain. Veligosti arose not very far from the ruins of Megalopolis, and Leondari near the remains of Veligosti.

² Guy de la Roche appears to have made ample use of his power to coin money as a great feudatory of the empire of Romania before visiting France, for his coins with Dominus are more common than those with Dux.

of Saloniki to Champlitte, or on some charter of the emperors Robert, or Baldwin II., to his elder brother Geffrey II., prince of Achaia, who had married the sister of these emperors, cannot be determined. The claim, whether well or ill founded, was made a pretext by the kings of Naples for assuming that the cession of the suzerainty of Achaia, by the emperor Baldwin II., at the treaty of Viterbo in 1267, conveyed also to the crown of Naples a paramount superiority over the duchy of Athens¹.

When Guy de la Roche returned to Greece, he found the emperor Baldwin II. a fugitive from Constantinople, and his own conqueror, William, prince of Achaia, a prisoner in the hands of the Greek emperor, Michael VIII., the conqueror of Constantinople. In order to regain his freedom, the prince of Achaia was compelled to cede to the Greek emperor the fortresses of Monemvasia, Misithra, and Maina, as the price of his deliverance. This cession was warmly opposed by the duke of Athens, as highly injurious to the stability of the Frank possessions in Greece; but it was ratified by a parliament of the vassals of the principality, and carried into effect². Guy de la Roche died about the year 1264, and was succeeded by his eldest son, John.

John de la Roche maintained with honour the high position his duchy had acquired in the East. John Dukas, while besieged in Neopatras, his capital, by a Byzantine army under the brother of the emperor Michael, succeeded in escaping through the hostile camp in the disguise of a groom³. He hastened to Athens, and solicited aid from the duke to save his capital. The duke of Athens immediately supplied him with a body of Latin cavalry, with which the adventurous prince surprised the imperial army, and compelled the emperor's brother to save the remnants of the besiegers on board the Byzantine fleet⁴. About a year after this victory, the duke of Athens, who had formed a close alliance with the prince of Vallachian Thessaly, placed himself at the

¹ This seems to result from two rescripts of Charles II. of Naples, published by Buchon, *Nouvelles Recherches*, ii. p. 336, Naples, xxx. and xxxi.

² *Livre de la Conqueste*, p. 152, Greek text, v. 3082.

³ The Russian chronicle of Nestor gives an anecdote concerning the escape of a young man from Kief when it was besieged by the Patzinaks, which is very similar to the escape of John Dukas from Neopatras. *Chronique de Nestor*, i. 91.

⁴ A.D. 1271.

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head of a body of troops, to defend the north of Euboea against a Byzantine force under the command of Jaqueria, or Zacharia, the Genoese signor of the island of Thasos. A battle was fought in the plain of Oreos, in which the Franks were completely defeated; and the duke of Athens, who, though suffering severely from the gout, had rushed into the midst of the combat in order to rally his knights, was dashed from his horse and made prisoner. The emperor Michael VIII., whose position was at this time extremely critical, gave the captive duke an honourable reception, and did everything in his power to detach him from the interests of Charles of Anjou, king of Naples, who then threatened to invade the Greek empire. A treaty was concluded between the emperor and the duke, which allowed John to return to Athens without paying any ransom. John died unmarried in the year 1275¹.

William, the second son of Guy I., succeeded his brother John. He had married Helena, daughter of John Dukas, prince of Vallachian Thessaly, shortly after the victory of Neopatras, and obtained Zeituni and Gardhiki as his wife's dowry². When the people of Thebes heard that his brother had been taken prisoner at Oreos, they proclaimed William lord of Thebes, evidently more with the intention of defending their own rights and privileges, and of securing the power of the house of de la Roche against any encroachments of the powerful and wealthy family of Saint-Omer, than from dissatisfaction with the government of duke John³. William was a man highly esteemed both for his valour and prudence. He was selected by Charles of Anjou to administer the government of Achaia during the minority of Isabella Villehardouin; and he held his charge from 1280 to the time of his death, in 1290⁴.

His son, Guy II., was only eighteen years of age when he succeeded to the dukedom. The despot of Vlachia died shortly after Guy attained his majority, and left him guardian of an infant prince. The nobles of Vlachia ratified the provisions of their sovereign's testament, and invited the duke of Athens to assume the direct administration of his nephew's

¹ Pachymeres, i. 280, edit. Rom.² *Livre de la Conquête*, 408.³ Pachymeres, i. 280.⁴ The *Greek Chronicle* calls him bailly and vicar-general, v. 6657.

dominions. The moment appeared favourable for the enemies of Vallachian Thessaly to attack the country. An infant prince and a young foreign regent did not seem likely to offer any serious resistance to a well-combined attack. Anna, the widow of Nicephorus, despot of Epirus, acted at the time as regent for her son Thomas, the last Greek despot of Epirus. She commenced hostilities by ordering the Epirot troops to seize the castle of Phanari. Guy was at Thebes, his favourite residence, when he heard that his nephew's territories were invaded. Eager to prove himself worthy of the high trust confided to his care, the young prince summoned all his friends and vassals to join his banner, and marched to avenge the injury offered to his helpless pupil. Boniface of Verona, lord of Karystos, Francis della Carcere, lord of Negrepont, the count of Soula, and Nicholas of Saint-Omer, marshal of Achaia, and a feudatory of the duchy of Athens for one half of the lordship of Thebes, all joined the duke's camp, each at the head of more than one hundred knights and esquires. The whole army, when drawn up in the plain of Vlachia at Domokos, amounted to nine hundred Latin knights and horsemen in complete armour, six thousand Vallachian and Greek cavalry, and thirty thousand infantry, if we can rely on the Chronicles. The chief command was intrusted to Saint-Omer, and the army advanced to Trikala, Stagous and Sirako, from which it could have reached Joanina in three easy marches. But the rapidity of the young duke's movements alarmed Anna and her counsellors, and she was glad to purchase peace by delivering up the castle of Phanari, and paying ten thousand perpers or gold byzants for the expenses of the expedition¹.

In 1304, Guy II. married Maud of Hainault, daughter of Isabella Villehardouin, princess of Achaia. Maud was then only eleven years old². Guy received Kalamata, the hereditary fief of the Villehardouins in the Morea, as his wife's dowry; but he soon advanced a claim to the government of the whole principality, of which he pretended that Philip

¹ The *Livre de la Conquête* becomes a historical authority of value as it approaches the times of the author. Thalassinus, which it mentions as a village one day's march from Domokos and two from Trikala, is erroneously confounded by the editor with the town of Elassona, the ancient Oloosson: pp. 406-418.

² Maud or Matilda, daughter of Isabella Villehardouin and Florenz of Hainault, was born 30th November 1293. *Livre de la Conquête*, 388, note.

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of Savoy, the third husband of Isabella, held possession illegally¹. In order to make good his claim by force of arms, Guy enrolled in his service Fernand Ximenes and a part of the Catalans who had quitted the Grand Company at Cyzikos. The projects of Guy were frustrated by his early death in 1308. As he left no children, the male line of de la Roche became extinct, and his cousin, Walter de Brienne, succeeded to the duchy of Athens and Thebes.

SECT. II.—*State of Athens under the House of De la Roche.*

Athens is usually represented as a miserable and decayed town during the whole period of the middle ages, and Attica is supposed to have then offered the same barren, treeless, and unimprovable aspect which it now does as a European kingdom. Such, however, was not the case. The social civilization of the inhabitants, and their command of the necessities and luxuries of life, were in those days as much superior to the condition of the citizens of Paris and London as they are now inferior. When Walter de Brienne succeeded to the duchy, it occupied a much higher position in the scale of European states than is at present occupied by the kingdom of Greece. The Spaniard Muntaner, who was well acquainted with all the rich countries around the Mediterranean, then the most flourishing portion of the globe, and who was familiar with the most magnificent courts of Europe, says that the dukes of Athens were among the greatest princes who did not wear a kingly crown. He has left us a description of the court of Athens, which gives us a high idea of its splendour²; and he declares that the nobles of the duchy were so entirely French, that they spoke their language with as much purity as the Parisians themselves³. The city was large and wealthy, the country thickly covered with villages, of which the ruins may still be traced in spots affording no indications of Hellenic sites. Aqueducts and cisterns then gave fertility to land now unproductive; olive, almond,

¹ Isabella was thrice married—1st. When a child, to Louis-Philippe, second son of Charles of Anjou; 2d. To Florenz of Hainault; 3d. To Philip of Savoy.

² Muntaner, chap. ccxlv. p. 481 of Buchon's translation, edit. of 1840.

³ Ibid. chap. cclxi. p. 502.

and fig-trees were intermingled with vineyards, and orchards covered ground now reduced, by the want of irrigation, to yield only scanty winter pasturage to the flocks of nomade shepherds. The valonia, the cotton, the silk, and the leather of Attica then supplied native manufactories, and the surplus commanded a high price in foreign markets. The trade of Athens was considerable, and the luxury of the Athenian ducal court was celebrated in all the regions of the West where chivalry flourished. Genoese merchants carried on a prosperous trade at Athens, and shared with the native Greeks the profits of the silk manufacture of Thebes, where the richest brocades were still woven¹.

Nor was the position of the Greek subjects of the dukes at this period one of severe oppression. Civilization had penetrated deeper into the social relations of men in Greece than in the rest of Europe, and its effects were displayed in the existence of a middle class, living in ease, and by the decay of slavery and serfdom. Though the Greeks of Athens were a conquered race, the terms of capitulation granted by Otho de la Roche secured to them all the privileges, as individual citizens, which they had enjoyed under the Byzantine government, with much greater freedom from financial oppression. The feudal conquerors of Greece soon perceived that it was greatly for their interest to respect the terms of the capitulations concluded with their Greek subjects, and to gain their good-will. Each grand feudatory became aware that the Greeks, from their wealth and numbers, might be rendered useful allies in opposing the exorbitant pretensions of their own immediate vassals and military followers, and in restraining the avarice of the Latin clergy, the ambition of the Pope, or the pretensions of the emperor of Romania. The peculiar condition of the Greek landed proprietors, who were in some degree both capitalists and merchants, taught their princes the necessity of alleviating the natural severity of the feudal system, and modifying the contempt it inculcated for the industrious and unwarlike classes of society. The

¹ A charter of Guy de la Roche, dated in 1240, attests that Genoese mercantile colonies, possessing their own warehouses, exchanges, and resident consuls, were already established both at Athens and Thebes. Heyd, *Die italienischen Handelscolonien in Griechenland zur Zeit des lateinischen Kaiserthums*, 76; Canale, *Storia de' Genovesi*, ii. 773; *Liber Jurium Reip. Genuensis*, i. 992, forming part of the *Historiae Patriae Monumenta*, published at Turin by the government.

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high value of some of the productions of Greece, before the discovery of America and of the route to India by the Cape of Good Hope, placed the landed proprietors on the coasts of Greece in the receipt of considerable money-revenues. They were thus enabled to pay to their dukes an amount of taxation which many monarchs in Western Europe were unable to extract from numerous cities and burghs, whose trade depended on slow and expensive land-communications, and from cultivators without capital, who raised little but corn and hay. An alliance of interest was thus formed between the Frank princes and their Greek subjects. The taxes paid by the Greeks supplied their sovereign with the means of hiring more obedient military followers than the array of the vassals of the fief. It became consequently an object of importance to the Frank barons in Greece to protect the natives as allodial proprietors, or, at least, as holding their lands directly from the prince, on payment of a money-rent, corresponding to the amount of taxation they had previously paid to the Byzantine empire, instead of distributing the land among the invaders as military fiefs. The richest portions of the conquered territory in the immediate vicinity of the towns were therefore left in the hands of the Greeks, while the Crusaders generally received the territorial domains, for which they were bound to pay personal military service, in the more distant districts—a fact which is still proved by the existing divisions of property, and by the ruins of feudal strongholds. Out of this state of things a constant struggle arose between the dukes, who desired to extend their authority and increase their revenues—the Frank military vassals, who demanded the complete division of the whole conquered country, in order to increase the numbers and power of their own class—and the Greeks, who laboured and intrigued to defend their possessions and maintain the capitulations. To the existence of this struggle for a long period, without any party venturing openly to disregard the principles of justice and the force of public opinion, we must in a great measure attribute the prosperous state of Athens and Thebes, under the government of the house of de la Roche and the long duration of the Frank domination in Attica. The security enjoyed by the Greeks attached them to their dukes. Many obtained the privilege of bearing arms, and though they

never became a match for the Frank chivalry in a pitched battle, they often bore a prominent part, and performed good service, in the wars of the period ¹.

SECT. III.—*Walter de Brienne.—The Catalan Grand Company.*

Walter de Brienne was the son of Isabella de la Roche, sister of the dukes John and William. She married Hugh de Brienne, count of Lecce, in the kingdom of Naples. The family of Brienne was pre-eminent for brilliant actions in the brightest age of chivalry; but the fortunes of this celebrated house were more splendid and glorious than solid, and the character of its members bore a strong resemblance to the gorgeous edifice of their renown. The life of Walter, duke of Athens, was like that of many other members of his illustrious family in its bright career and bloody end. His grandfather, Walter de Brienne, count of Jaffa, was that gallant freebooter of the Syrian desert whom the Saracens long regarded with intense fear and hatred, but whom they at last captured, and hanged before the walls of his own castle². His great-grandfather was Walter de Brienne, who assumed the title of king of Sicily, and died in prison. John de Brienne, king of Jerusalem and emperor of Romania, was his great-grand-uncle; and his father, Hugh, had not degenerated from the valour of the house, or allowed its glory to diminish in his person. He was one of the band of three hundred French knights who called themselves the Knights of Death, and who perished at the battle of Gagliano, in Sicily. Hugh de Brienne, after performing prodigies of valour, and keeping his banner flying on the field of battle with his own hand, after every one of his followers and companions had fallen, was himself slain, refusing quarter³.

The death of Guy II. had no sooner put Walter in possession of the duchy of Athens, than he found his dominions

¹ George Acropolita (93) mentions the Greeks as forming part of the army of William, prince of Achaia, at the battle of Pelagonia.

² Joinville's *Memoirs of St. Louis*, p. 490 (Bohn's translation).

³ Muntaner, cxci.

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threatened with invasion by his neighbours, the despot of Epirus and the prince of Vlachia. His territories were exposed to attack, for Guy II. had extended his authority as far as Armyros on the gulf of Volo, so that their geographical configuration left them open to invasion at many points¹. In order to punish his enemies, and revenge himself by conquering some portion of their dominions, Walter concluded a treaty of alliance with the Catalan Grand Company, which had established its winter quarters in Thessaly during the year 1308².

The expedition of the Catalans in the East is a wonderful instance of the success which sometimes attends a career of rapacity and crime, in opposition to all the ordinary maxims of human prudence. Had their military executions and inhuman devastations been the only prominent features in their history, we might regret that all the military virtues can exist in union with most of the crimes that disgrace human nature, but we should feel no astonishment at their great success. But when we find that internal dissensions and civil anarchy frequently reigned in their camp, their victorious military career and their steady discipline under arms becomes a strange historical phenomenon. The leaders quarrelled among themselves, the chiefs assassinated one another, the troops murdered or banished their generals, and yet victory remained faithful to a standard under which every crime was committed with impunity: while the most terrific anarchy prevailed in the councils of the leaders, the strictest discipline was observed whenever the ranks were formed for service in the field. Their great leader, Roger de Florez, was assassinated by the Greeks. D'Entenza, one of their most distinguished chiefs, was murdered, with many knights of rank and renown, by the troops themselves, on the march from Gallipoli to Cassandra. Fernand Ximenes only saved himself by a precipitate flight. The infant Don Fernand of Majorca, and his friend Muntaner, the delightful historian of their singular exploits, were compelled to quit the expedition, seeing that all regular authority was treated with contempt. The royal and aristocratic feelings of the prince and the warrior were too deeply wounded to permit

¹ Muntaner, cxc. p. 467, edit. of 1840.² Niceph. Greg. 151; Muntaner, 474.

them to live in a republican army. Rocafort, the oldest general in the Grand Company, the chief demagogue of the camp, and the man who incited them to commit many of their previous acts of violence, was at last treacherously seized by his own officers, and delivered up a prisoner to a French admiral, who carried him to Naples, where he perished in a prison, starved to death by the mean revenge and inexorable cruelty of the house of Anjou. The soldiers revenged their veteran leader by murdering the fourteen chiefs of the army who had delivered him to the French. Two knights, an Adalil, and a colonel of Almogavars, were then elected by the troops to perform the duties of commander-in-chief; and a council of twelve officers was added, in accordance with a usage already established in the republican government of the Grand Company. After this bloody revolution, the Catalans marched forward to new conquests, and to the establishment of a permanent territorial dominion in Greece.

On their march they encountered serious opposition from the officers of the Byzantine emperor in the mountains of Macedonia, and from the forces of the prince of Vallachian Thessaly. The hardy mountaineers of these districts, Sclavonians, Vallachians, and Greeks, were found to be a very different class of men from the Greeks of the Thracian cities whom the Catalans had so often vanquished. The campaign in 1308 was consumed in these contests, and the Grand Company took up its winter quarters in Thessaly. It suffered many hardships before it could force its way though the Vallachian district, which was then one of the most redoubtable countries in the world¹. In the year 1309 it effected its junction with the army of the duke of Athens, and from the time of its entry into his dominions Walter became bound to pay each horseman in complete heavy armour four gold ounces a-month, each light-armed horseman two, and each Almogavar or foot-soldier one ounce². As the Grand Company then counted in its ranks three thousand five hundred cavalry and three thousand

¹ Muntaner, 474.

² Ibid. A letter of Pope Benedict XI. informs us that in 1304 the ounce of gold was equal to five florins of Florence, that is, in weight of gold nearly two sovereigns and a half. Raynaldi *Ann.* xiv. 597; Sismondi, *Histoire des Républiques Italiennes*, ii. 341, note 2, edit. Brux. 1838.

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infantry, while the army of the duke of Athens was still more numerous, these facts afford some data for estimating the wealth and population of the dominions of Walter de Brienne at this time.

The duke of Athens was at first highly popular with the Catalans, whose language he spoke with facility¹. The campaign of 1309 was very successful. Walter defeated all his enemies, and compelled them to purchase peace by ceding to him thirty castles, which he added to his dominions. The war was now terminated. Walter felt strong in the numbers of the knights he had assembled under his banner, and in the impregnable nature of the fortresses and castles that commanded every road and valley in his territory. Relying on these resources, he determined to get rid of his Spanish allies, whose high pay exhausted his treasury, and whose rapacity and licentious habits oppressed his subjects. The Catalans, on the other hand, were too well satisfied with their life in the Boeotian and Phocian plains, which had long enjoyed immunity from the ravages of war, to be easily induced to quit a land so alluring to their avarice. When the duke proposed to dismiss them, however, they contented themselves with demanding payment of the arrears due for their services, and liberty to march forward into the Morea. Both demands were refused; and Walter de Brienne, who, as an adherent of the house of Anjou, was inclined to quarrel with them as soon as he no longer stood in need of their services, replied to their propositions that he would give them nothing but the gibbet if they ventured to advance.

In the month of March 1310, the Grand Company marched down into the plain of Boeotia and took up a position on the banks of the Cephissus near Skripou, the ancient Orchomenos².

¹ Muntaner tells us that Walter de Brienne learned Catalan in the castle of Augusta in Sicily, where he passed a long time when young, as hostage for his father.

² The ignorance which Nicephorus Gregoras shows of the geography of Greece, in his account of this battle on the banks of the Boeotian Cephissus, is curious. He says that the great river Cephissus, rising in Mount Parnassus, flows eastward through Locris, Achaia, and Boeotia in an undivided stream, as far as Livadea and Haliartos, where it separates into two branches, changing its name into Asopos and Ismene. The branch Asopos divides Attica into two parts and flows into the sea. The branch Ismene falls into the straits of Euboea near Aulis, where the heroes of Greece stopped on their expedition to Troy. After this specimen of the ignorance of a Byzantine historian concerning classic Greece, whose authors he was always reading, and with allusions to whose history and mythology he was always encumbering his own pages by a tasteless display of

The level plain appeared to offer great advantages to the party that possessed the most numerous cavalry, and the duke of Athens, confident in numbers, felt assured of victory, and hastened forward to attack them at the head of the army he had assembled at Thebes. His forces consisted of six thousand cavalry and eight thousand infantry, partly raised in the Morea, but principally composed of the Frank knights of his own duchy, their feudal retainers, and the Greeks of his dominions¹. Walter placed himself at the head of a band of two hundred nobles in the richest armour; and seven hundred feudal chiefs, who had received the honour of knighthood, fought under his standard. It required all the experience of the Spanish veterans, and their firm conviction of the superiority of military discipline over numbers and individual valour, to preserve their confidence of success in a contest with a force so superior to their own on a level plain. But the Spaniards were the first people, in modern times, who knew the full value of a well-disciplined and steady corps of infantry.

In spring, all the rich plains of Greece are covered with green corn. The Catalan leaders carefully conducted the waters of the Cephissus into the fields immediately in front of the ground on which they had drawn up their army. The soil was allowed to drink in the moisture until it became so soft that a man in armour could only traverse a few narrow dykes that intersected the fields of wheat and barley; yet the verdure effectually concealed every appearance of recent irrigation². The duke of Athens, who expected to drive the Spaniards back into Thessaly without much trouble, advanced with all the arrogance of a prince secure of victory. Reserving the whole glory of the triumph which he contemplated to himself, he drew up his army in order of battle; and then, placing himself at the head of nine hundred knights and nobles who attended his banner, he rushed forward to overwhelm the ranks of the Grand Company with the irresistible charge of

learning, we need not wonder at any fables and absurdities the Greeks adopted concerning the inhabitants and countries of Western Europe: p. 154.

¹ Niceph. Greg. 155.

² A similar expedient was adopted by the Spartans, who diverted the waters of the Eurotas into the land near the city, in order to embarrass the retreat of Philip V. of Macedon as he returned from ravaging the southern part of Laconia, B. C. 218. Οὐ διαβρόχον γενηθέντος, οὐχ ὅλον τοὺς ἴππους ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἂν τοὺς πεζοὺς δυνατὸν ἦν ἐμβαλεῖν. Polybius, lib. v. cap. xxii. § 6.

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the Frank chivalry. Everything promised the duke victory as he moved rapidly over the plain to the attack, and the shafts of the archers were already beginning to recoil from the strong panoply of the knights, when Walter de Brienne shouted his war-cry, and charged with all his chivalry in full career. Their course was soon arrested. The whole body plunged simultaneously into the concealed and new-formed marsh, where there was as little possibility of retreat as there was thought of flight. Every knight, in the belief that he had only some ditch to cross, spurred forward, expecting that another step would place him on the firm ground, where he saw the Catalan army drawn up almost within reach of his lance. Every exertion was vain: no Frank knight ever crossed the muddy fields: horse and man floundered about until both fell; and as none that fell could rise again, the confusion soon became inextricable. The Catalan light troops were at last ordered to rush in, and slay knights and nobles without mercy. Never did the knife of Aragon do more unsparing execution, for mercy would have been folly while the Spanish army still remained exposed to the attack of a superior force ranged before it in battle array, and which could easily have effected its retreat in unbroken order to the fortresses in its rear. It is reported that, of all the nobles present with Walter de Brienne, two only escaped alive and were kept as prisoners—Boniface of Verona, and Roger Deslau of Roussillon. The duke of Athens was among the first who perished. The Athenian forces had witnessed the total defeat of their choicest band of cavalry; the news that the duke was slain spread quickly through their ranks; and, without waiting for any orders, the whole army broke its order, and each man endeavoured to save himself, leaving the camp and all the baggage to the Grand Company¹.

¹ The authorities for this account of the battle are Nicephorus Gregoras, 155, and Muntaner, ccxl. Two great battles had decided the fate of Greece on this plain in ancient times; the victory of Philip of Macedon at Chaeronea, B.C. 338, and that of Sylla over the generals of Mithridates, B.C. 86.

The chronology of the Catalan expedition admits of discussion, but several events are fixed by official documents. Don Fernand and Muntaner were taken prisoners, and Muntaner was plundered of property to the value of 25,000 ounces of gold at Negrepont in July 1307. Hopf, *Veneto-Byzantinische Annalen*, 149. Compare Niceph. Greg. 151, and Pachymeres, ii. 455. In the following winter the Grand Company was in Thessaly. Niceph. Greg. 153. The order of events is then traced by Nicephorus Gregoras (155) and Muntaner (ch. ccxl.). The grand-daughter of Muntaner succeeded in obtaining an indemnity of 11,000 gold florins from the heirs of the two Venetian nobles who had joined the French

This victory put an end to the power of the French families in northern Greece; but the house of Brienne continued to possess the fiefs of Nauplia and Argos in the principality of Achaia. Walter de Brienne, son of the slain duke, assumed his father's title, and was remarkable for more than his father's pride. After an unsuccessful attempt to recover possession of the duchy of Athens in 1331, in which he landed near Arta with a force of eight hundred French cavalry and five hundred Tuscan infantry, he became general of Florence, but was expelled from that city for his tyrannical conduct. He was subsequently appointed constable of France, and perished at the battle of Poitiers¹.

The Catalans followed up their victory with vigour: Thebes, Athens, and every fortified place within the duchy, quickly submitted to their authority. But their conquest, in spite of its facility, was stained with their usual violence. The magnificent palace at Thebes, built by Nicholas Saint-Omer, which was the admiration of the minstrels of that age, was burned to the ground, lest it should serve as a stronghold for some of the French barons. A portion of the olive grove in the Athenian plain, in the classic environs of Colonos and the Academy, was reduced to ashes either from carelessness or wantonness².

Admiral Cepoy and plundered Muntaner's ship. The suit was compromised at Venice in the year 1356. The *Chronicle of the Conquest of the Morea* (Greek text, v. 5960) says the battle occurred on Monday, 15th March, in the year A.M. 6817, and the 8th indiction. But the year A.M. 6817 gives A.D. 1309, and the 8th indiction would place it in 1310. Monday was the 15th of March, only in the year 1311.

¹ After the death of the constable Walter de Brienne, in 1356, Sohier d'Enghien, his nephew, assumed the title of duke of Athens, but it expired with his son Walter, who died childless in 1381. The family of d'Enghien ended in a female, who sold Argos and Nauplia to the Venetian republic.

² *Book of the Conquest*, Greek text, v. 6749. Fallmerayer, *Geschichte der Halbinsel Morea*, ii. 182. The paintings on the walls of the palace represented the conquest of Palestine by the Crusaders—τὸ πᾶν ἐκονησατέσθαι οἱ Φράγκοι τὴν Συρίαν. The emperor Manuel I. of Constantinople decorated his palace at Blachern with hunting scenes representing his own exploits, and it became so much the fashion of courtly sycophants to imitate these paintings, that Alexis Axouchos was looked upon as a traitor for omitting similar scenes in the decoration of his new palace. Cinnamus, 154; Benjamin of Tudela, i. 53. The representation of the Last Judgment, which may be seen in the porch of many a Greek church, probably gives some idea of the style of these mural paintings. A rather ludicrous but not inaccurate description of these church paintings will be found in *A Visit to Monasteries in the Levant*, by the Hon. Robert Curzon, ch. xxiv.

SECT. IV.—*Dukes of Athens and Neopatras of the Sicilian Branch of the House of Aragon.*

The Spaniards resolved to settle in their new conquest, and the Grand Company assumed the position of a sovereign prince, though there never existed an army worse adapted for administering the affairs of civil government. Its first act was to share the fiefs of the nobles who had fallen in the battle on the banks of the Boeotian Cephissus, and to bestow their widows and heiresses in marriage on the best officers, who thus became possessed not only of well-fortified castles and rich estates, but also of suitable and splendid household establishments. The descendants of the French now felt all the miseries their forefathers had inflicted on the Greeks. Muntaner, the former associate of the Spanish soldiers, observes that on this occasion many stout Catalan warriors received as wives noble ladies, for whom, the day before their victory, they would have counted it an honour to be allowed to hold the wash-hand basin¹.

No sooner did the Catalan warriors become lords and barons, than they felt the necessity of living under civil as well as military law; and so satisfied were they of the incompetency of all their own generals to act as civilians, that they appointed Roger Deslau to act as their leader, until they could arrange their differences with the house of Aragon; for in spite of their rebellious conduct, the ties of the feudal system still bound the minds of the majority in allegiance to their lawful sovereign. Under Roger Deslau the Grand Company pursued its career of conquest, and extended its dominion both to the north and west. Neopatras and Soula (Salona) were annexed to the duchy; and their incursions into the territories of the despot of Epirus on the one side, and of the prince of Achaia on the other, alarmed the French barons of the Morea to such a degree that they solicited assistance from the spiritual arms of the Pope, whom they persuaded to threaten the Spaniards with excommunication, unless they restored their conquests to the rightful owners; though probably, in most cases, it would have puzzled even

¹ Muntaner, p. 477.

his holiness to determine where the rightful claimants were to be found. The archbishops of Corinth, Patras, and Otranto were authorized to preach a crusade against the Catalans in their dioceses¹. Neopatras, from its strong position, important military situation, and delightful climate in summer, divided with Athens the honour of being the capital of the Catalan principality, which was styled the duchy of Athens and Neopatras.

During the administration of Roger Deslau, in 1326, the Catalans sent a deputation to Sicily, begging Frederick II. to invest his second son, Manfred, with the dukedom of Athens, and praying him to send a regent to govern the country during his son's minority. From that time the duchy of Athens and Neopatras became an appanage of the house of Aragon².

During the period the duchy of Athens was possessed by the Sicilian branch of the house of Aragon, the Catalans were incessantly engaged in wars with all their neighbours. The despots of Epirus, the Venetians in Euboea, and the French in Achaia, were in turn attacked; but it was only in the earlier years of their power, while the veterans of the Grand Company still retained their military habits and passion for war, that their operations were attended with success. As happens with all conquering armies, the number of those who were fitted by their physical and mental qualities to make good soldiers was considerably diminished in the second generation. Some families became extinct, some fell into opposition by attaching themselves to their maternal race, while many of the best soldiers were constantly engaged in watching and defending their own private possessions against foreign invaders or internal brigandage. The lieutenants-general of the dukes, who arrived from Sicily, were always compelled to bring with them fresh supplies of mercenary troops³. The lieutenants of the Sicilian dukes mentioned

¹ This bull of Pope John XXII. is dated in 1330.

² Manfred, William, and John, the younger sons of King Frederic II. of Sicily, held the duchy in succession. Manfred died about the year 1317, William in 1331, and John in 1338. Frederic, Marquis of Randazzo, son of John, succeeded his father, and died childless in 1355 without visiting Athens. The duchy then reverted to Frederic III. of Sicily, whose daughter Maria inherited it in 1377. From Maria the title passed to Alphonso V. of Aragon, and after the union of the crowns of Aragon and Castille the kings of Spain retained the title of Dukes of Athens and Neopatras.

³ Buchon, *Nouvelles Recherches*, i. 99, note.

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in history are Beranger d'Estañol, and Alphonso, the natural son of king Frederic II. Roger de Lauria, son of the renowned admiral, represented Frederic of Randazzo. Afterwards, Francis George, marquis of Boudonitza, Philip of Dalmas, and Roger and Antonio de Lauria, sons of the preceding Roger, ruled the duchy¹. During the government of Roger and Antonio de Lauria, Louis, count of Salona, son of the regent Alphonso, died, leaving an only daughter as his heiress². Louis was proprietor of a very large portion of the duchy, and the disputes that arose concerning the marriage of his daughter caused the ruin of the Catalan power, and the conquest of Athens by Nerio Acciaiuoli, the governor of Corinth.

The Catalans were the constant rivals of the Franks of Achaia, and Nerio Acciaiuoli, as governor of Corinth, was the guardian of the principality against their hostile projects. The marriage of the young countess of Salona involved the two parties in war. The mother of the bride was a Greek lady: she betrothed her daughter to Simeon, son of the prince of Vallachian Thessaly; and the Catalans, with the two Laurias at their head, supported this arrangement. But the barons of Achaia, headed by Nerio Acciaiuoli, pretended that the Prince of Achaia as feudal suzerain of Athens was entitled to dispose of the hand of the countess. Nerio was determined to bestow the young countess, with all her immense possessions, on a relation of the Acciaiuoli family, named Peter Sarrasin³. The war concerning the countess of Salona and her heritage appears to have commenced about the year 1386. The Catalans were defeated, and Nerio gained possession of Athens, Thebes, and Livadea; but a few of the Spanish proprietors, and the remains of the military force attached to the viceroys, continued for some years to offer a determined resistance in other parts of the duchy, and

¹ The count de Foix, endeavouring to persuade Roger de Lauria, the great admiral, to consent to a truce, observed, 'France can arm three hundred galleys.' 'Let her do it,' exclaimed Lauria: 'I will sweep the sea with my hundred, and no ship without leave from the king of Aragon shall pass: no, nor shall a fish dare to raise its head above the water, unless I can see that it bears the arms of Aragon on its tail.' Desclot, c. 166.

² Moncada, *Espedicion de los Catalanes y Aragoneses*, cap. lxx. The *Chronicle of the Conquest* fixes the position of La Sola or Soula at the ancient Amphissa with certitude. Troops marching from Vetrinitza to Gravia pass by La Sola. *Livre de la Conquete*, p. 413; Ducange, *Histoire de Constantinople*, 243, 299.

³ Ducange, *Histoire de Constantinople*, 299.

rallied round them a body of Navarrese troops in the service of the last Spanish governors.

During the war, a quarrel broke out between the dowager countess of Salona and the bishop of Phocis. The Athenian historian Chalcocondylas narrates that the bishop accused the lady, whose name was Helena Cantacuzena, of adultery with a priest, and that this conscientious bishop hastened to the court of the sultan Bayezid I. (Ilderim), who was then in Thessaly, and begged him to remove the scandal from Greek society by conquering the country. In order to attract the sultan, who was passionately fond of the chase, the reverend bishop vaunted the extent of the marshes of Boeotia filled with herons and cranes, and the numerous advantages the country offered for hunting and hawking. Bayezid made his interference a pretext for occupying the northern part of the duchy around Neopatras; but, being soon after engaged with other projects, the Turks do not appear to have retained permanent possession of the district then seized. Chalcocondylas affirms that the dowager countess delivered up her daughter to Bayezid to be placed in his harem, which would imply that her marriage with the prince of Vlachia had not yet been celebrated¹.

The Laurias, pressed by the Turks on the north, and by Nerio Acciaiuoli and the Franks of Achaia on the south, abandoned the duchy, in which only a few small bands of troops continued to defend themselves almost in the capacity of brigands.

SECT. V.—*Dukes of the family of Acciaiuoli of Florence.—
Termination of the Frank domination in Athens.*

The decline of mediaeval Athens commences with the Catalan conquest. The ties of interest which had hitherto connected the prosperity of the Greek landed proprietors with the power of the sovereign were then broken, and every Greek was exposed to the oppression and avarice of a thousand mercenary soldiers suddenly converted into petty princes, and to the exactions of the rapacious agents of absent sovereigns. The feudal system was everywhere

¹ Ducange, *Histoire de Constantinople*, 298; Chalcocondylas, p. 35, edit. Paris.

[A.D. 1386-1456.]

giving way; the authority of the prince and the money of the commons were rapidly gaining power, as the new elements of political government. Several members of the family of Acciaiuoli, which formed a distinguished commercial company at Florence in the thirteenth century, settled in the Peloponnesus about the middle of the fourteenth, under the protection of Robert, king of Naples. Nicholas Acciaiuoli was invested, in the year 1334, with the administration of the lands which the company had acquired in payment or in security of the loans it had made to the royal house of Anjou; and he acquired additional possessions in the principality of Achaia, both by purchase and by grant, from Catherine of Valois, titular empress of Romania, and regent of Achaia for her son prince Robert¹. The encroachments of the mercantile spirit on the feudal system are displayed in the concessions obtained by Nicholas Acciaiuoli, in the grants he received from Catherine of Valois. He was invested with the power of mortgaging, exchanging, and selling his fiefs, without any previous authorization from his suzerain². Nicholas acted as principal minister of Catherine, during a residence of three years in the Morea; and he made use of his position, like a prudent banker, to obtain considerable grants of territory. He returned to Italy in 1341, and never again visited Greece; but his estates in Achaia were administered by his relations and other members of the banking house at Florence, many of whom obtained considerable fiefs for themselves through his influence.

Nicholas Acciaiuoli was appointed hereditary grand seneschal of the kingdom of Naples by queen Jeanne, whom he accompanied in her flight to Provence when she was driven from her kingdom by Louis of Hungary. On her return, he received the rich county of Amalfi, as a reward for his fidelity, and subsequently Malta was added to his possessions³. He was an able statesman, and a keen political intriguer; and he

¹ The company of Acciaiuoli made a loan to John, count of Gravina, brother of Robert, king of Naples, to enable him to prosecute his iniquitous scheme of seizing the principality of Achaia, under the pretext that he was the husband of the princess Maud of Hainault, who was already married.

² Buchon, *Nouvelles Recherches; Diplomes*, Florence, No. VII. tom. ii. p. 70.

³ Buchon (*Nouvelles Recherches*, i. 101) cites some documents, relating to the possession of the county of Malta by the Acciaiuoli, not previously known. The imposing ruins of a castle built by Nicholas at Lettore may still be seen, after quitting the valley of Gragnano, near Castellamare.

was almost the first example of the superior position the purse of the moneyed citizen was destined to assume over the sword of the feudal baron and the learning of the politic churchman. Nicholas Acciaiuoli was the first of that banking aristocracy, which has since held an important position in European history. He was the type of a class destined at times to decide the fate of kingdoms, and at times to arrest the progress of armies. He certainly deserved to have his life written by a man of genius; but his superciliousness and assumption of princely state, even in his intercourse with the friends of his youth, disgusted Boccaccio, who alone of his Florentine contemporaries could have left a vivid sketch of the career which raised him from the partner of a banking-house to the rank of a great feudal baron, and to live in the companionship of kings. Boccaccio, offended by his insolence, seems not to have appreciated his true importance, as the type of a coming age and a new state of society; and the indignant and satirical record he has left us of the pride and presumption of the mercantile noble is by no means a correct portrait of the Neapolitan minister. Yet even Boccaccio records, in his usual truthful manner, that Nicholas had dispersed powerful armies, though he unjustly depreciates the merit of the success, because the victory was gained by combinations effected by gold, and not by the headlong charge of a line of lances¹.

Nicholas Acciaiuoli obtained a grant of the barony and hereditary governorship of the fortress of Corinth in the year 1358. He was already in possession of the castles of Vulcano (Messene), Piadha, near Epidaurus, and large estates in other parts of the Peloponnesus. He died in 1365; and his sons, Angelo and Robert, succeeded in turn to the barony and government of Corinth². Angelo mortgaged Corinth to his relation, Nerio Acciaiuoli, who already possessed fiefs in Achaia, and who took up his residence at Corinth, on account

¹ Boccaccio, *Opere Volgari*, Florence, 1834, tom. xvii. p. 37, quoted at length by Buchon, *Nouvelles Recherches*, i. 87. Nicholas was unfortunate in his intercourse with the great literary characters of his age. Petrarch was displeased with him for not keeping a promise, for which act he is sharply reproached by the poet. Napier, *Florentine History*, ii. 163, note.

² The tomb of Nicholas Acciaiuoli, in the monastery of St. Lawrence, near Florence, is said to be the workmanship of Andrea Orcagna, and is one of the richest sepulchral monuments of the time. Buchon, *Nouvelles Recherches*, plate xxxvii.

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of the political and military importance of the fortress, as well as to enable him to administer the revenues of the barony in the most profitable manner.

Nerio Acciaiuoli, though he held the governorship of Corinth only as the deputy of his relation, and the barony only in security of a debt, was nevertheless, from his ability, enterprising character, great wealth, and extensive connections, one of the most influential barons of Achaia; and, from the disorderly state of the principality, he was enabled to act as an independent prince. We have already seen under what pretext he succeeded in gaining possession of the greater part of the Catalan possessions in Attica and Boeotia. About the commencement of the year 1394, Ladislas, king of Naples, conferred on him by patent the title of duke of Athens—Athens forming, as the king pretended, part of the principality of Achaia¹. But almost about the same time the new duke had the misfortune to be taken prisoner by a band of Navarrese troops, which still maintained itself in eastern Greece, and with which he was holding a conference, trusting to the safe conduct of a Catalan chief, who also continued to preserve his independence. Nerio was compelled to purchase his liberty by paying a large ransom, part of which he raised by seizing the treasures and jewels in all the churches throughout his territories, and selling all the ornaments of value, even to the silver plates on the door, of the church of St. Mary at Athens. He died shortly after. By his will he placed all his possessions under the protection of the republic of Venice, supplicating it to defend the rights of his daughter Francesca, wife of Charles Tocco, count of Cephalonia and despot of Arta, or Romania². Nerio left the castle and district of Livadea to his natural son Antonio, as well as the city of Thebes, with the right to redeem it, on payment of the sum for which it had been pledged on account of his ransom.

The first bequest in the will of Nerio Acciaiuoli is a very singular one. It bequeaths the city of Athens to the church of St. Mary. The bequest implied the acquisition of municipal liberty, under the protection of the clergy; and thus,

¹ Buchon, *Nouvelles Recherches; Diplomes*, No. xli. tom. ii. p. 223. Ladislas had really no title to the suzerainty over Achaia. This patent is incorrectly abridged in Fanelli, *Athene Attica*, p. 290.

² Chalcocondylas, 113. The testament of Nerio is published by Buchon, *Nouvelles Recherches*, ii. 260.

after fourteen centuries of slavery, Athens regained for a moment a halo of liberty, under the shadow of papal influence, through the superstition or piety of a Florentine merchant prince¹. The archbishop was the true defender of the commons in the East, but, unfortunately, the archbishop of Athens was of the Catholic Church, and the people were orthodox; so that, even if he could have succeeded in maintaining his authority, he must have done so as a feudal prince. But the bequest of Nerio was a delusion, by which the dying sinner calmed the reproaches of a conscience troubled with the memory of the plundered ornaments of many churches, and, above all, of the silver plates of the doors of St. Mary, with which he had paid his own ransom. The archbishop of Athens and the administrators of church property belonging to the papal church being hated by the majority of the inhabitants of Athens, who were orthodox Greeks, it is probable that a revolution would have soon followed the assumption of power by the chapter of St. Mary, had the Venetian republic not been called in to protect their government, in virtue of the general superintendence over the execution of the testament confided to Venice.

In the mean time, Antonio, who was master of Livadea and Thebes, trusting to his popularity, and counting on the active support of the Greeks, to whose nation his mother belonged, advanced to attack Athens. He besieged the city before the Venetians had placed a garrison in the Acropolis. To create a diversion the Venetian governor of Negrepont marched to attack Thebes at the head of six thousand troops. Antonio hastened to meet them before they could intrench themselves; and, by a skilful disposition of a very inferior numerical force, he completely routed this army, and captured many of the Latin feudal chiefs who had joined the Venetians. On his return to his camp before Athens, he was immediately admitted within the walls by his partizans. The Acropolis soon surrendered, and Antonio assumed the government of the duchy, adopting the title of Lord of the duchy of Athens². As soon as his power was firmly estab-

¹ The words of the bequest are—'Lasciamo all' ecclesia di Santa Maria di Atene la città di Atene, con tutte sue pertinentie et ragioni.'

² It is not easy to fix the time that Antonio assumed the title of duke of Athens, if indeed he ever used it. The patent of the dukedom by king Ladislas granted the title to the son of Donato Acciaiuoli, the brother of Nerio, on the death

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lished in all the country, from Livadea to Athens, he visited the court of sultan Bayezid I., whose impetuous character rendered him the terror of the Christian princes in his neighbourhood. From this restless enemy of the Christian name he succeeded in obtaining a recognition of his sovereignty over Attica and Boeotia¹.

Under the government of Antonio Acciaiuoli, Athens enjoyed uninterrupted tranquillity for forty years. Its wealth and commercial importance, though in a state of decline, were still considerable, for it required many generations of misfortune and bad government to reduce Attica to the miserable condition in which we see it at the present time—languishing under what is called the protection of the great powers of Europe². The republic of Florence deemed it an object worthy of its especial attention to obtain a commercial treaty with the duchy, for the purpose of securing to the citizens of the republic all the privileges enjoyed by the Venetians, Catalans, and Genoese. The conclusion of this treaty is almost the only event recorded concerning the external relations of Athens during the long reign of Antonio³. The Athenians appear to have lived happily under his government; and he himself seems to have spent his time in a joyous manner, inviting his Florentine relations to Greece, and entertaining them with festivals and hunting parties. Yet he was neither a spendthrift nor a tyrant; for Chalcocondylas, whose father lived at his court, records that while he accumulated great wealth with prudent economy, he at the same time adorned the city of Athens with many new buildings⁴. Phrantzes, who visited the court of Athens, at a subsequent period, on a mission from Constantine, the last emperor of Constantinople, then despot in the Morea, says that Antonio married Maria Melissenos, and received several

of the first duke without heirs male. Antonio lived on friendly terms with the members of his father's family; and Nerio, the third son of Donato, resided often at his court. The title Antonio assumes in the commercial charter he granted to the citizens of Florence, in 1423, is, *Αυθέντης Ἀθηνῶν Θηβῶν παντὸς δουκίμου καὶ τῶν ἐξῆς*.

¹ Chalcocondylas, 113, 114.

² A.D. 1850.

³ The Greek charter is printed by Buchon, *Nouvelles Recherches; Diplomes*, lxvii. tom. ii. p. 289. It is dated August 1422.

⁴ Chalcocondylas, 114. Colonel Leake thinks that the high tower in the Acropolis may have been built by Antonio; I own I feel inclined, from the manner of its construction, to attribute it to an earlier period. Leake's *Topography of Athens*, vol. i. p. 73.

towns in the district of Tzakonia as her dowry. Antonio died of apoplexy in 1435¹.

Nerio II., the grandson of Donato Acciaiuoli, brother of the first duke, was now the legal heir to the dukedom. He and his brother Antonio had been invited to Athens, and treated as heirs to the principality by the Duke Antonio; but when the Duke Antonio died without a will, his widow succeeded in gaining possession of the Acropolis, through the favour of the Greek population, who desired the expulsion of their Latin rulers. Phrantzes was sent by the despot Constantine, as envoy, to treat with her for the cession of Athens and Thebes to the Greek empire, on condition of her receiving an increase of her paternal heritage in the Peloponnesus; but her power proved of too short duration to enable the envoy to conclude anything. Military assistance, not diplomatic negotiation, was what the widow required, in order to enable her to maintain the position she had occupied. As she could not procure this from the Greeks, she endeavoured to obtain it from the Turks. For this purpose she sent the father of the historian Chalcocondylas as ambassador to sultan Murad II., with rich presents, in order to purchase the ratification or recognition of her authority at the Porte. The principal men at Athens were then of the papal church, and they were consequently averse to the government of a Greek lady, whose administration could not fail to terminate by the sale of her authority to the Greek despot of the Peloponnesus, or by her conceding a portion of her power to the lower order of citizens, who adhered to the Greek rite. The long prosperity of Antonio's government had attached the majority, in some degree, to the family of Acciaiuoli. The Latin aristocracy, therefore, contrived to put an end to the power of his widow by enticing her to quit the Acropolis, seizing on that fortress, and expelling her most active partizans from the city. Chalcocondylas was driven into banishment, and Nerio II. was established on the ducal throne, with the approbation of the sultan, whose troops had advanced as far as Thebes.

The new duke was a man of weak character, and the

¹ Phrantzes, p. 159, edit. Bonn. Chalcocondylas (114) and Fanelli (*Atene Attica*, p. 294) indicate that he was twice married. The towns that formed the dowry of Maria Melissenos were, Astros, Aghios Petros, Aghios Joannes, Platamonas, Melingou, Proasteion, Leonidas, Kyparissia, Rheontas, and Sitanas.

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direction of the administration fell into the hands of his brother Antonio. Nerio visited Florence, in order to regulate the affairs of his father's succession; and it was generally reported in Greece, and perhaps not entirely without foundation, that he had been compelled to surrender the government of the duchy to his brother. Still there does not appear to have been any feeling of personal animosity between the brothers, for Nerio II. left his wife and son to the care of Antonio during his absence¹. On his return he found his brother dead. Nothing more is recorded of Nerio, except that he was compelled to pay tribute to Constantine, despot of the Morea, in the year 1443, when the victorious campaign of John Hunniades in Bulgaria enabled the Moreotes to make a temporary incursion into northern Greece. But as soon as Murad II. had restored the superiority of the Turkish arms by his victory at Varna, Nerio abandoned the cause of the Greeks, and hastened to join his forces to those of the Othoman general Turakhan, at Thebes, as he advanced to invade the Peloponnesus. Nerio was allowed to retain possession of Athens as a vassal and tributary of the Othoman empire; but he was obliged to remain a tame spectator while part of his dominions was plundered by a detachment of the Turkish army. His death happened about the time Constantinople was taken by Mohammed II.

Nerio II. left an infant son, and his widow acted as regent during the minority. She fell in love with Pietro Almerio, the Venetian governor of Nauplia, and promised to marry him if he could obtain a divorce from his wife. Almerio thought that he could remove all obstacles to the marriage most readily by murdering his wife, a crime which he doubtless expected to be able to conceal. He was so far successful that he married the duchess, and obtained the direction of the government of Athens. But his crime became known, and the principal Athenians, both Latins and Greeks, fearing to fall under the severe authority of the Venetian senate, and indignant at the conduct of the duchess, complained to sultan Mohammed II. of the crimes of her Venetian lover. The principal men, or Archonts, of Athens, had acquired a recognized right to interfere in the affairs of the administration

¹ Compare Chalcocondylas, 170, with Buchon, *Nouvelles Recherches*, i. 185.

from the moment the duchy became tributary to the Othoman Porte. Their complaints met with immediate attention, for it did not suit the sultan's policy to permit Venice to extend her influence in Greece, and the Othoman sultans were the protectors of religious toleration and of the equality of all Christian sects. Almerio was summoned to the Othoman court, to defend himself against the accusation of the Athenians; and in his position as guardian of a tributary prince, he could not venture to dispute the order without resigning the charge to obtain which he had committed his crime. On his arrival, he found Franco Acciaiuoli, the son of Antonio and cousin of the young duke, already in high favour at the Porte. Sultan Mohammed II. no sooner heard Almerio's reply to the accusations of the Athenians, than he removed the Venetian from the government, and conferred the duchy on Franco, who was received by the inhabitants with great demonstrations of joy.

The first act of Franco Acciaiuoli proved that his residence at the Turkish court had utterly corrupted his morals. He sent his aunt to Megara, where, after keeping her a short time in prison, he ordered her to be secretly put to death. Almerio accused him of this murder at the Porte, and solicited the government of Athens as the guardian of the young duke, whose person, it was evident, could not be safe in the custody of his mother's murderer. Mohammed II., finding that the Athenians were now equally disgusted with both pretenders, ordered Omar the son of Turakhan to take possession of the Acropolis, and annexed Attica to the Othoman empire. Franco held out the Acropolis against the Turkish army for a short time, but surrendered it on receiving a promise that he should be allowed to remove his treasures to Thebes, and be acknowledged as prince of that city. This conquest put an end to the domination of the Latins, in the year 1456¹.

Two years after the conquest, sultan Mohammed II. visited Athens in person, on his return from the Morea. The magnificence of the ancient buildings in the city and Acropolis, and the splendid aspect of the Piræus, with its quays and

¹ Chalcocondylas (241) places the final conquest of Athens during Mohammed's expedition into the Peloponnesus in 1458; but Phrantzes (385, edit. Bonn) gives the correct date.

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moles recently adorned by the duke Antonio, struck the sultan with admiration, who exclaimed with delight, 'Islam is in truth deeply indebted to the son of Turakhan.' Mohammed visited Athens a second time in the year 1460, after he had put an end to the power of the Greek despots in the Morea; and on this occasion some of the Athenian archonts were accused of having formed a plot to place Franco again in possession of the city. In order to remove all chance of disorder after his own departure, Mohammed carried away ten of the principal inhabitants as hostages; and Saganos, who was left as pasha of the Morea, was ordered to put Franco to death. Saganos cited Franco to appear before him, and as the criminal had once been his intimate friend, he permitted him to be privately strangled in his own tent¹. The government of the last sovereigns of Athens and the bigotry of the papal church had become intolerable to the Greek population, who hailed the establishment of the Othoman power with delight. For some time the administration of the Turks was considered mild and liberal: they invested Greek local magistrates with a greater degree of authority than they had previously possessed; they allowed the orthodox clergy to dispense justice to the Greek population, and the local authorities to collect the tribute which the province was compelled to remit to Constantinople. The arrival of the Turks appeared like the dawn of liberty to those who could forget that they were compelled to pay a tribute of children to recruit the ranks of the Janissaries. Slavery, and the religious quarrels of the Greeks and Latins, had so deadened the moral feelings of the people to this calamity that, to all outward appearance, they seemed long contented with their lot, and by no means inclined to participate in the schemes formed by the Christians of the West for their deliverance from the Turkish yoke, which, even with the burden of the tribute of Greek children, was considered preferable to that of the Catholics.

¹ Chalcocondylas, 257. The *Historia Patriarchica Constantinopoleos* (p. 121, edit. Crusius) says that the wife of Franco was a daughter of Demetrius Asan of Corinth.

SECT. VI.—*Condition of the Greek Population under
the Dukes of Athens.*

Chronicles and official documents replace in some degree the want of a Thucydides or a Xenophon, and enable us to reconstruct at least an outline of the political history of mediaeval Athens. But the blank left by the want of an Aristophanes is irreparable, and we are unfortunately completely ignorant of the condition of those whom Shakspeare calls—

‘The rude mechanicals,
That worked for bread upon Athenian stalls.’

Still, in order to mark the peculiarities of the period that witnessed the almost total extinction of rural slavery, it is necessary to pass in review the few facts that are recorded concerning the condition of the labouring classes during the Frank domination in Attica. There is no doubt that the conquest of the Byzantine empire by the Latins, and the division of the territory among several independent princes, must have tended to ameliorate the condition of the cultivators of the soil who were still slaves or serfs. The Sclavonian or Albanian slave found a protector against his Greek master in the Frank feudal chief; and whenever his condition became insupportable, he could without much difficulty escape into the territories of some neighbouring and generally hostile prince.

It has been supposed, from the tendency of Justinian’s legislation, compared with subsequent laws of the Byzantine emperors, that Christians were not retained in slavery by the Greeks in the thirteenth century; and that rural slavery had been long extinguished, and replaced by the labour of serfs or colons, who made fixed payments in produce and labour for the land to which they were attached. Two laws are frequently quoted to prove the advances made by the Byzantine government towards the abolition of slavery. One of these laws displays an extremely favourable disposition with regard to the slaves, while the other indicates a desire to see slavery extinguished. The first, dated at the end of the eleventh century, declares, that if any person be claimed as a slave, and can produce two witnesses of character

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to prove that he has been known as a freeman, the process must be terminated by his own oath. The same law declares, also, that even slaves shall be entitled to claim their liberty, if their masters refuse to permit the religious celebration of their marriages¹. The second law, which belongs to the middle of the twelfth century, gives freedom to all persons who have been reduced to slavery by the sale of their property, by the necessity of cultivating the lands of others in a servile capacity, or by poverty which had compelled them to sell themselves in order to obtain the necessaries of life². The enactment of these laws must not be attributed entirely to feelings of humanity or Christian charity, caused by the advanced state of moral civilization in Byzantine society, or to the powerful influence exercised on the religious feelings of Eastern Christians by the Greek church. They had their origin partly in political motives; and when these motives ceased to operate, we find, from subsequent history, that they were forgotten or neglected. As late as the year 1344, imperial selfishness extinguished every sentiment of humanity and religion in the Byzantine government and the Greek people on the subject of slavery. During the civil war between the empress Anne of Savoy, guardian of John V., and the usurper Cantacuzenos, the empress concluded a treaty with the Othoman sultan Orkhan, by which the Mohammedan auxiliaries in the imperial armies were allowed to export as slaves into Asia any Christians they might take prisoners belonging to the adverse party; and this treaty even permitted the slave-merchants, who purchased these slaves, to convey them from the markets held in the Turkish camp through Constantinople and Scutari to their destination in the Mussulman countries³. The provisions of this treaty were ratified by Cantacuzenos when he gained over the sultan to his party by making him his son-in-law; yet this unprincipled hypocrite, in his pompous history, gravely records that it was forbidden by the Roman law to reduce prisoners of war to the condition of slaves, unless they were barbarians

¹ Mortreuil, *Hi toire du droit Byzantin*, tom. iii. p. 158; E. Bonefidius, *Jus Orientale*, p. 67.

² Cinnami *Hist. Byz.* 161. This law has escaped the attention both of Bonefidius and Mortreuil, but is noticed by Le Beau, *Histoire du Bas-Empire*, tom. xvi. p. 302.

³ Cantacuzeni *Hist.* p. 302.

who did not believe in the doctrines of Christianity. The hypocrisy of princes sometimes succeeds in falsifying history, even when they are not writing it themselves, like Cantacuzenos, in a monastery where they excite sympathy by having exchanged the robes of an emperor for the garb of a monk.

A few documents have been preserved which prove the existence both of domestic and rural slavery in Athens, down to the latest period of the ducal government. A letter of Pope Innocent III. to the archbishop of Patras, in the year 1209, shows that the soil was very generally cultivated by serfs throughout Greece at the time of the Frank conquest¹. A charter of the titular Latin emperor Robert, in 1358, mentions the loss of slaves as one of the greatest misfortunes to which landed proprietors could be exposed². In the will of Nerio I., duke of Athens, there is a clause conferring liberty on a slave named Maria Rendi, and declaring that all her property, whether movable or immovable, must be given up to her. This clause affords conclusive proof of the existence both of domestic and rural servitude, for the idea of a domestic slave possessing immovable property indicates that the legal position of rural serfs had modified the condition of domestic slaves³. There is still a more decisive proof of the generality of domestic slavery in an act of donation of a female slave, by Francesca, countess of Cephalonia, daughter of Nerio I., to her cousin Nerio, by which she gives him one of her female slaves or serfs from the despotat of Arta, in absolute property, with full power to sell or emancipate her⁴. The last official act relating to slavery during the government of the Frank dukes is dated in 1437. It mentions numerous personal services as due by serfs in Attica, corresponding to those to which the villeins were subjected in western Europe; and it liberates a slave of duke Antonio, named Gregorios Chamaches, and his posterity, from the servitudes of transporting agricultural

¹ *Innocentii III. Epist. lib. xiii. ep. 159, tom. ii. p. 485, edit. Baluze.*

² Buchon, *Nouvelles Recherches; Diplomes*, tom. ii. p. 145.

³ *Ibid.* ii. 256.

⁴ *Ibid.* ii. 286. We know that slaves were publicly sold at Venice in the fourteenth century. Still it appears that, in certain cases, the consent of the slave was necessary for a legal transference from one master to another. Gamba, *Serie degli scritti impressi in Dialetto Veneziano*, Venezia 1832, where, at p. 32, an *Instrumento di vendita d'uno schiavo scritto l'anno 1365* is given.

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produce to the city, of transporting new wine from the vats, of collecting and making offerings of oil and olives, and from all other obligations of rural servitude, making him as free as a Frank¹.

But rural slavery did not become completely extinct in Greece until the country was conquered by the Turks. The fact is, that in no country where it prevailed has rural slavery ceased until the price of the productions raised by slave-labour has fallen so low as to leave no profit to the slave-owner. When some change in the condition of the population admits of land being let for a greater share of the produce than can be reserved by the proprietor, when he cultivates it himself with the labour of his slaves, then it will be impossible to perpetuate slavery; but on the other hand it will be very difficult to abolish slavery in any society where the labour of the slave gives fertility to the soil and wealth to the slave-owner, and where no free labourers can be found to secure a corresponding profit to the landowner. History affords its testimony that neither the doctrines of Christianity, nor the sentiments of humanity, have ever yet succeeded in persuading slave-owners that it was their duty as men or as Christians to abolish slavery, where the soil could be cultivated with profit by slave-labour. No Christian community of slaveholders has yet voluntarily abolished slavery. Philanthropy is the late production of an advanced state of civilization, operating on a society free from external danger, whose members are not under the necessity of rendering personal military service, and where the majority remain ignorant of the sufferings and passions of actual warfare.

It may not be uninteresting to notice here some proofs of the wealth and importance of Athens during the government of the dukes. Muntaner, a valuable testimony, since he was long engaged in war with the French along the whole shores of the Mediterranean, declares that the Frank chivalry of

¹ The original words are curious.—'Ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον ἔστω σοι φράγγος ἐλεύθερος καὶ παιδία τῶν παιδίων σου ἀπὸ πάσης ὑπαρκοίας τε δουλοσύνης ἀπὸ τε ἐγγαρίας κατισκίαν, μυστοφοριῶν, ἐλαιοπαρουχίαν καὶ ἑτέρων ἄλλων τοιαύτης ὑπαρκοίας προνόμιον. Buchon, *Nouvelles Recherches; Diplomes*, ii. 297. The system of paroekia or feudal servitudes that prevailed in the Venetian possessions in the East, and particularly in Cyprus, was extremely odious and oppressive. It caused the flight of many Greek families to the Turkish dominions.

Greece was in nobility and deeds of arms second to none in Europe; that they spoke as good French as the nobles of Paris; that the title of prince of the Morea was, after that of king, one of the highest and noblest in the world; and that the duke of Athens was one of the greatest princes of the empire of Romania, and among the noblest of those sovereigns who did not bear the kingly title¹.

The palace of the dukes of Athens was built over the columns of the Propylaea of the Acropolis, and the great tower which still exists was the keep of that edifice. Though perhaps it may disfigure the classic elegance of the spot, it is a grand historical landmark, and testifies, by the solidity of its construction, both the wealth of the dukes and their firm confidence in the stability of their power, now that every other trace of their palaces has disappeared². The Turks only whitewashed the fortresses which the Franks strengthened. The palace erected by the Franks at Thebes was far more celebrated in the days of its splendour than their buildings in the Acropolis of Athens. A single ruined tower is now all that remains of this renowned construction, and it still retains the name of Santomeri, in memory of Nicholas Saint-Omer, by whom it was built. This magnificent baron possessed one half of the barony of Thebes, in consequence of his grandfather's marriage with the sister of Guy I., duke of Athens³. Nicholas married the princess of Antioch, who brought him an immense dowry. His fortified palace at Thebes was built with a strength and solidity of which the ruined tower affords us some evidence; and the jealousy of the Catalans who

¹ Muntaner, chap. ccxlv., cclxi., cclxii.

² Some remains of the ducal palace were visible in the northern chamber of the Propylaea, called the Pinacotheca, until they were removed with the battery that encumbered the centre of the building. The period at which this tower was constructed is not certain, but it seems to be a monument of the dukes of the family of De la Roche, and to belong to the same epoch as the ruined tower of Mark Sanudo, in the citadel of Naxos, and that of Santomeri at Thebes. This early age was the period in which towers were a universal system of defence. For the strong towers in Palestine constructed by the French, see Michaud, *Histoire des Croisades*, *Pièces Justif.*; *Vie de Malek Mantour Kelaoun*; and *Bibliothèque des Croisades*, iv. partie, p. 491. The tower built by Philip Augustus at Bourges was a hundred and twenty feet high, and the walls twenty feet thick. In Italy, many republics would not allow towers to be built more than eighty feet high, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Vincens, *Histoire de Gènes*, i. 247. [It is greatly to be regretted that so valuable a mediæval monument as this Venetian tower has been removed within the last two years. Ed.]

³ The sister of Guy de la Roche, who married Nicholas Saint-Omer, was widow of Demetrius, king of Saloniki.

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destroyed it gives us additional testimony; while of its magnificence the Greek *Chronicle of the Conquest of the Morea* speaks in terms of great admiration, celebrating its apartments as worthy of royalty, and its walls as works of wonderful art, adorned with paintings of the chivalric exploits of the Crusaders in the Holy Land¹. A few lines in rude Greek verse, and a ruined tower, are all that remains of the pride of Saint-Omer. The Acropolis and city of Athens, even to the present day, contain some rude but laborious sculptures executed during the period of the Frank domination; and their number was much greater before the recent reconstruction of the town, and the destruction of numerous mediaeval churches, which formed a valuable link in the records of Athens, and an interesting feature in Athenian topography, while they illustrated the history of art by their curious and sometimes precious paintings. But in the space of a few years, the greater and most valuable part of the paintings has disappeared; and hundreds of sculptured monuments of Byzantine and Frank pride and piety have been broken in pieces, and converted into building materials or paving-stones².

But though the marble monuments of the dukes and archbishops, their charters and their archives, have disappeared, the renown of the dukedom lives, and will live for ever, in many imperishable works of European literature. The Catalan chronicle of Ramon Muntaner, a work considerably older and not less delightful than the brightest pages of Froissart, gives us an account of the chivalric pomp and magnificent tournaments of the ducal court³. Muntaner bore a prominent part in many of the scenes he so vividly describes. He had fought in numerous bloody battles with the Turks and Greeks; he had visited the court of Guy II., the last duke of the family of De la Roche; he had viewed the magnificent halls of the castle of Santomeri at Thebes, where his friend and master, the Infant Don Fernand, of Majorca, was detained a prisoner. What can be more touching than the stout old warrior's tale

¹ Greek text of Copenhagen, v. 6743. See above, p. 152, note 2.

² The destruction of historical records contained in the remains of Byzantine and Frank sculpture and painting, and Turkish inscriptions, which have been annihilated by Bavarians and Greeks during the reign of king Otho, has deprived Greece of records of mediaeval art and Turkish chronology, valuable even among the classic remains of Hellas. Such conduct ratifies the proceedings of Lord Elgin on the part of Germany and Greece.

³ Muntaner, chap. ccxlv.

of how his heart swelled in his breast as he took leave of his king's son in prison; and how he gave his own rich habit to the cook of the castle, and made him swear on the Holy Scriptures that he would rather allow his own head to be cut off, than permit anything hurtful to be put in the food of the Infant of Majorca¹?

Gibbon tells us that 'from the Latin princes of the fourteenth century, Boccaccio, Chaucer, and Shakspeare have borrowed their "Theseus, duke of Athens;"' and the great historian adds, 'An ignorant age transfers its own language and manners to the most distant times².' The fact is, that every age does the same thing. The name of Dante must be added to those enumerated by Gibbon. Dante was a contemporary of Guy II. and Walter de Brienne, and in his day the fame of the dukes of Athens was a familiar theme in the mouths of the Italians of all the commercial republics, as well as of the statesmen at Naples and the priests at Rome. It was natural, therefore, that the 'great poet-sire of Italy' should think that he gave his readers a not unapt idea of the grandeur of Pisistratus, by calling him

'Sire della villa
Dei cui nome ne' Dei fu tanta lite,
Ed onde ogni scienza disfavilla³.'

Surely this is at least as correct as our established phrase, which styles him tyrant of Athens. Dante also calls Theseus *duca d'Atene*—and he did so, doubtless, because the title appeared to him more appropriate than that of king, and he was compelled to choose between them⁴.

Boccaccio, whose relations with Nicholas Acciaiuoli have been already noticed, and who was familiar with the state of Athens from many sources, has left us a charming picture of the Athenian court⁵.

Chaucer and his contemporary readers must have been well acquainted with the fame of Walter de Brienne, titular duke of Athens, who, as constable of France, perished on the field of Poitiers; and the history of his father, whom the Catalans had deprived of life and duchy in the battle of the

¹ Muntaner, chap. ccxxxviii.

² *Decline and Fall*, chap. lxii, vol. vii. p. 385.

³ *Purgatorio*, xv. st. 33.

⁴ *Inferno*, xii. st. 6.

⁵ See the history of the princess Alathiel; *Decameron*, ii. 7.

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Cephissus, must have been the theme of many a tale in every country in Europe. Chaucer may therefore have considered that he adorned the name of Theseus by lending it the title of a great and wealthy prince, instead of associating it with that of a paltry king¹.

Shakspeare, on the contrary, probably never bestowed a thought either on the history of Theseus or the chronology of the Athenian duchy. Little did he care for that literary fastidiousness which allows the attention to be diverted from a true picture of human nature by historical anachronisms. To such critics it is possible that the *Midsummer Night's Dream* would appear more perfect if Theseus had been inventoried in the *dramatis personae* as a member of the house of De la Roche, and Hippolyta as a princess of Achaia; but the defect is in the critics, who can allow their minds to go wandering into history, and thinking of Doric temples or feudal towers, when they ought to be following Shakspeare into the fairy-land he creates.

¹ *The Knight's Tale.*

CHAPTER VII.

PRINCIPALITY OF ACHAIA, OR THE MOREA.

SECT. I.—*Conquest of Achaia by William of Champlitte.— Feudal Organization of the Principality.*

THE conquest of the Peloponnesus by the French differs considerably from the other military operations of the Crusaders in the Byzantine empire, and bears a closer resemblance to the conquest of England by the Normans. The conquering force was small—the conquest was quickly yet gradually effected—the opposition did not become a national struggle that interested the great mass of the population, and the conquerors perpetuated their power and kept their race, for some generations, distinct from the conquered people ; so that the enterprise unites in some degree the character of a military conquest with that of a colonial establishment. The number of the Frank troops that invaded the Peloponnesus, or at least that began its conquest after the retreat of the king of Saloniki from Corinth, was numerically inadequate to the undertaking ; nor could any degree of military skill and discipline have compensated for this inferiority, had the Byzantine provincial government possessed the means of organizing any efficient union among the local authorities, or had the native Greek population felt a patriotic determination to defend their country, and avail themselves of the many strong positions scattered over the surface of a land filled with defiles and mountain-passes. But the high state of material civilization—the wealth of a large portion of the inhabitants, who generally lived collected together in towns—their love of ease, and their indifference to the fate of the Byzantine emperors, made the people both careless of any

change in their rulers, and unfit to offer any serious resistance to a determined enemy. The inhabitants of Greece were habitually viewed with jealousy by the Byzantine government, which feared to see them in possession of arms, lest they should avail themselves of the singular advantages their country presents for asserting their independence. Several Greek islands and the town of Modon in the Morea had been occupied by the Venetians as early as the year 1125, so that the effects of foreign domination were not unknown, and were not found to be intolerable¹. The Peloponnesians were little exercised in the use of offensive weapons, unaccustomed to bear the weight of defensive armour, and unacquainted with military discipline; they were, therefore, absolutely ignorant of the simplest dispositions necessary to render their numbers of any practical advantage in the occupation of posts and the defence of towns. The Frank invaders found that they had little else to do but to drive them together into masses, in order to insure their defeat and submission. Under such circumstances, it need not surprise us to learn that the little army of Champlitte subdued the Greeks with as much ease as the band of Cortes conquered the Mexicans; for the bravest men, not habituated to the use of arms, and ignorant how to range themselves on the field of battle or behind the leaguered rampart, can do little to avert the catastrophe of their country's ruin. Like the virtuous priest who, ignorant of theological lore, plunges boldly into public controversy with a learned and eloquent heretic, they can only injure the cause they are anxious to defend.

William de Champlitte and his brother Eudes are frequently mentioned by Geoffrey de Villehardouin, in his Chronicle, as distinguished leaders of the Crusaders during the siege of Constantinople. Eudes, the elder brother, died before the conquest of the Byzantine empire, but William received his portion of territory in the Peloponnesus, and accompanied Boniface, king of Saloniki, in his expedition into Greece². The Crusaders, after defeating Leo Sguros at

¹ See above, p. 77.

² The family of Champlitte was often called of Champagne. The father of the two Crusaders was Eudes, son of Hugh, eighth count of Champagne, and his wife, Elizabeth of Burgundy. Hugh, believing himself impotent, refused to acknowledge his son Eudes, and ceded the county of Champagne and all his property to his nephew, Thibaut, count of Blois and Chartres. It was this Hugh, count of Champagne, who bestowed Clairvaux on St. Bernard. He died a

Thermopylae, and installing Otho de la Roche in his possession at Thebes and Athens, pursued the Greeks into the Peloponnesus, and laid siege to Corinth and Nauplia. James d'Avesnes commanded the force which held Sgueros himself blockaded in the Acrocorinth, while Boniface and William de Champlitte advanced with the main body, and invested Nauplia.

In the mean time, Geffrey Villehardouin the younger arrived in the camp. He was nephew of the celebrated marshal of Romania, whose inimitable history of the expedition to Constantinople is one of the most interesting literary monuments of the middle ages; but instead of accompanying his uncle and the members of the fourth Crusade who attacked the Byzantine empire, he had sailed direct from Marseilles to Syria. Like most of the Crusaders who visited the Holy Land on this occasion, he performed no exploit worthy of notice; and as soon as he had completed the year's service to which he was bound by his vow, he hastened to return to France. On his voyage he was assailed by a tempest, which drove his ships into the harbour of Modon, where he found himself compelled to pass the winter. It was already known in Greece that the Crusaders had taken Constantinople, and that the central government of the Byzantine empire was destroyed. One of the Greek nobles of the Peloponnesus, who possessed extensive property and influence in Messenia, deemed the moment favourable for increasing his power. For this purpose he hired the military services of Villehardouin and his followers, who were passing the winter at Modon in idleness, and by their assistance subdued all the neighbouring towns. The city of Modon was conceded to Villehardouin as the reward of his alliance; but the Greek dying in a short time, hostilities commenced between his successor and the Franks. At this conjuncture, the French at Modon heard of the arrival of the army of Boniface before Nauplia. Geffrey Villehardouin, who had made up his mind to seek his fortune in Greece (the flourishing condition of which contrasted in his imagination with the

Templar in Palestine. Eudes, who was called le Champenois, was bred up at his mother's property of Champlitte, which he inherited. Ducange, note to *Villehardouin*, p. 268; *L'Art de vérifier les Dates; Comtes de Champagne et Blois*, tom. iii. part ii. p. 125.

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squalid poverty of France and the wretched disorder in Palestine), boldly resolved to march through the centre of the Peloponnesus and join the camp of the Crusaders. This enterprise he accomplished in six days, without encountering any opposition on his way. Geffrey was probably already aware that William of Champlitte had received his share of the spoils of the empire in the Peloponnesus; at all events, he offered to serve under his banner, and persuaded him that it would be more advantageous to turn their arms against the western coast of Greece, then called the Morea, than to persist in besieging the impregnable fortresses of Acrocorinth, Argos, and Nauplia. Champlitte quitted the main army with one hundred knights and a considerable body of men-at-arms, and, marching westward, entered the land of the Morea, as the plain of Elis was then called, to unite his forces with those left by Villehardouin at Modon¹. The news of an insurrection in Thessalonica compelled Boniface to hasten back to his own dominions; but before the Franks quitted the Peloponnesus, the force besieging Corinth was roughly handled by the Greeks in a sortie, and James d'Avesnes, one of the bravest leaders of the Crusaders, was severely wounded.

By the act of partition—which William de Champlitte doubtless felt every disposition to carry into execution, as one of those who profited in the highest degree by its provisions—Modon was assigned to the Venetians. It seems probable, from the words of the Chronicle of the marshal, that the first operation of Champlitte was to effect a junction of his forces with those of Villehardouin left to guard the ships at Modon. This was done by marching along the southern coast of the gulf of Corinth, and ordering the ships of Villehardouin to join the expedition at Patras, which was thus blockaded by land and sea. The city of Patras, and the castle of Katakolo, which commands a small port to the north-west of the mouth of the Alpheus, were taken almost as soon as they were invested; and the inhabitants of the populous but open town of Andravida, in the

¹ Villehardouin, *Conquête de Constantinople*, p. 122, edit. Buchon. It must be remembered that the act of partition assigned a considerable portion of the Peloponnesus to the Venetians, and Lacedaemon, Patras, Modon, and Corinth were included in their share. Many modifications were made, but Modon from its importance as a naval station remained always in the hands of the Venetians.

plain of Elis, voluntarily submitted to Champlitte, who then led his troops southward along the coast¹. Coron and Kalamata were soon after attacked and captured, without serious resistance. As Modon belonged of right to the Venetian republic, Champlitte conferred on Geoffrey Villehardouin the fief of Kalamata, as a reward for his assistance, and it long continued to be the family estate of the house of Villehardouin. The Greeks at last collected an army to resist the further progress of the French. It consisted of the few Byzantine troops in the garrisons, the armed citizens of the towns of Lacedaemon, Veligosti, and Nikli, and the Sclavonian mountaineers of the canton of Melingou, on Mount Taygetus, the whole amounting to about four thousand men, under the command of a Greek named Michael. The French had not more than seven hundred cavalry to attack this force; but the battle was fought in the Lakkos, or north-eastern portion of the Messenian plain, where the Franks could turn their superior discipline and heavy armour to the greatest advantage. The victory was not long doubtful. The Greeks were utterly routed; and this insignificant engagement was the only battle fought by the Greeks to defend their independence and orthodoxy. The city of Arkadia, on the western coast, attempted to make some resistance, but ended by submitting to the victorious army².

The arrangements of Champlitte for the government of the Greek population were by no means unfavourable to the inhabitants. They prove that the feudal barons of the West already understood something of the art of government as well as of war. The citizens of the towns were guaranteed in the unmolested enjoyment of their private property, and of all the

¹ The *Book of the Conquest* describes Andravida as a rich town without either walls or a citadel, and as there were other populous towns without fortifications in the Morea, we have a strong proof of the order and security which existed in Greece under the Byzantine government. To judge it equitably, we ought to contrast the state of Greece with that of England under King John, and that of Italy, where in the free cities every rich man was compelled to make his house a castle.

² In this account I have followed Nicetas (p. 393) and Villehardouin (p. 134) who agree, and who appear to me to be much better authorities than the *Chronicle of the Conquest*, in French and Greek, published by Buchon. I accept, however, the traditional evidence of the Chronicle for the fact that there was only one battle fought between the Greeks and the French in the time of Champlitte.

αὐτὸν μόνον τὸν πόλεμον ἔπηκαν οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι

εἰς τὸν καιρὸν ὅπου ἐκέρδισαν οἱ Φράγκοι τὸν Μωραῖαν: τ. 405.

The battle was fought near the olive-grove of Koundoura.

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municipal privileges they had possessed under the Byzantine government. The Sclavonian cantons of Skorta and Melingou were allowed to retain all the privileges which had been conceded to them by imperial charters. The idea of local administrations and privileged corporations was familiar to all feudal Europe by the glorious exploits of the Italian cities against the German emperors, and by the charters which had already been granted to several communes in France; so that the feudal prejudices of Champlitte and his followers were by no means adverse to the concession of capitulations securing a considerable degree of liberty to the Greek city population. The principle adopted by the Crusaders, in all these political arrangements, was extremely simple and well defined. The Greeks were allowed to retain their personal property and individual rights and privileges, and were allowed to preserve the use of the Byzantine law; while the victors entered into possession of all the power and authority of the Byzantine emperors, of all the imperial domains, and of the private estates of the nobles and clergy who had emigrated and preferred sharing the fortunes of the Greek emperor and Patriarch at Nicaea, or of the despot in Epirus. The powers of government, and the property thus acquired, were divided and administered according to the feudal system. Patras, Andravida, Coron, Kalamata, and Arkadia, which surrendered in succession to Champlitte, were all received to submission on the same terms, guaranteed by the oath of their conqueror¹.

Champlitte employed persuasion as well as arms to assist his progress; and the picture which Villehardouin, his most active agent, was enabled to present to the Greeks of their own political condition must have made a deep impression on their minds, and proved a powerful argument for their immediate submission. The conquest of Constantinople, and of all eastern Greece, had left them with little hope of forming a national government. Leo Sgueros, even if he had been popular in the Peloponnesus, had been completely defeated in the field, and could not dispute the sovereignty with the

¹ *Greek Chronicle*, v. 765:—

ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν καὶ ἐμπροσθεν Φράγκες γὰρ μὴ μᾶς βιάσθω
 ν' ἀλλόχομεν τὴν πίστιν μας διὰ τῶν Φράγκεων τὴν πίστιν
 μήτε ἀπὸ τὰ συνηθείᾳ μας, τὸν νόμον τῶν Ῥωμαίων.

Franks who remained in Attica, Boeotia, and Euboea, after the retreat of the king of Saloniki. Anarchy and civil war had commenced. Champlitte assured the inhabitants of the Peloponnesus that he came among them as a prince determined to occupy the vacant sovereignty, and not as a passing conqueror bent on pillage. He offered terms of peace that put an end to all grounds of hostility; while the continuance of the war would expose them to certain ruin, as the invading army must then be maintained by plunder. The Greek people, destitute of military leaders, freed from alarm by the small number of the French troops, and confiding in the strict military discipline that prevailed in their camp, submitted to a domination which did not appear likely to become very burdensome. The French took possession of estates in the rural districts, and established themselves in all the strong castles scattered over the country; but they left the local administration of the urban population very much in the state they found it. The two nations quickly perceived that their interests and habits of life would allow them to live together in greater harmony than they supposed possible at first sight, from the strong contrast produced by their different states of civilization and the adverse prejudices of their religious feelings.

William de Champlitte remained about three years in the Peloponnesus, and during that time he completed the conquest of more than one-half of the peninsula¹. He organized the invading army into a feudal society, completed a register of the territory partitioned among his knights and soldiers, in the style of the famous Doomesday-book of England, and regulated the terms and the nature of the service which the different vassals were bound to perform. The arrangements adopted afford us an interesting insight into the manner of life of the dominant class in this feudal colony, and throw considerable light on an interesting but dark period of mediaeval history.

The feudal organization of Achaia is now a dream of the past, and a record of men who left no inheritors; but every dream or tradition that enters the domain of literature must

¹ His departure took place early in 1209, for he was at Paris on the 8th May. *Livre de la Conquête*, p. 45, note 1. He was obliged to appear in France to receive investiture of the fief of Champlitte, vacant by the death of his brother.

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have exercised sufficient influence on the minds of men to make it deserving of calm investigation. Enthusiasts, by means of a few well-known phrases of sacred writ cunningly misapplied, have authorized deeds of rapine and murder by recollections of Jewish history. The songs of the Scandinavians encouraged the piracies of the Vikings of the north. The romances concerning Charlemagne and his twelve peers formed the political repertory of the French nobles during the middle ages, and from this strange magazine of the art of government they drew many of their rules of conduct in state affairs. One of these rules was, that in every well-organized state the sovereign ought to be surrounded by twelve peers. It was necessary, therefore, for Champlitte, as prince of Achaia, to form his court of twelve peers, if he intended to arrogate to himself the position of a sovereign; and it appears that such a court was really constituted, though it is difficult to ascertain at what precise period the arrangement was made. The *Chronicle of the Conquest* informs us that the distribution of the fiefs was effected by a commission consisting of Geffrey Villehardouin, two knights, two Latin prelates, and four Greek archonts, on the same basis as that which had been adopted in the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem, whose assize served as the model for the legislation of the new empire of Romania¹. The Greek archonts were admitted as members of the commission, to secure the observance of the capitulations, and to guard against encroachments on private property. The scheme of partition, when completed, was formally adopted by Champlitte and the army, with various general laws concerning the internal government of the principality. In short, what in modern language would be called the constitution of Achaia was then promulgated. The slight sketch of the institutions adopted at this time that has been transmitted to us is unfortunately interpolated with additions of a more modern date, added after the house of Anjou of Naples had acquired a claim to the suzerainty of the principality. In its principal features however, if not in all its details, it appears to be a record of an earlier age.

¹ *Livre de la Conqueste*, p. 46. [Hopf regards this story of the partition of the Peloponnese, as related in the *Livre de la Conqueste*, as legendary (*Griechische Geschichte*, p. 236). Ed.]

A domain was marked out for the prince; and Andravida, where probably a great confiscation of imperial property had taken place, was fixed upon as the capital of the principality and the residence of the sovereign. Twelve baronies were formed, and these peers of Achaia were bound to serve with two banners, furnishing a knight and two sergeants with their attendants for each fief they possessed. The lesser barons or baronets who possessed only four knights'-fees were bound to serve in person with a knight and twelve sergeants, while every knight who held a single fee performed personal service with the usual following of his rank, and every sergeant who held land performed the service due for his sergeantry. The number of knights and sergeants who served for pay in the crusading armies was at this period very great, and the leaders in Greece, not being rich enough to pay large bodies of troops, were compelled to secure military service by grants of land. The archbishop of Patras was recognized as primate of the principality, and received eight fiefs to maintain the dignity of his position; while his six suffragan bishops and the three military orders of the Hospital of St. John of Jerusalem, the Temple, and the Teutonic Order, each received four.

Military service in this feudal colony was declared to be permanently due by the vassals. Four months' duty in garrison and four months' service in the field compelled the vassal to be generally absent from his fief. Even during the four months which he was entitled to spend on his property, he was bound to hold himself in constant readiness to brace on his armour, and defend both his own possessions and those of his absent companions, in case of revolt or invasion. It was the duty of the prince and the parliament to arrange the various terms of service of the different vassals in such a manner as to insure a sufficient defence for the lands of those who happened to be absent on military service, and this duty greatly increased the authority of the prince. The prelates and the military orders were exempt from garrison-duty, but in other respects were bound to furnish the military service due from the fiefs they held like the other vassals of the principality. The courts of justice were modelled on the institutions of France; but the Assize of Jerusalem, which was adopted at Constantinople as the

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code of the Latin empire, under the title of the Assize of Romania, was received as the legal code of the principality. Indeed, the principality of Achaia presented a miniature copy of the empire, which proved more durable than the original¹.

The geographical division of the baronies of the principality throws considerable light on the early history of the conquest. The first vassal in rank and importance was unquestionably Geoffrey Villehardouin, on whom the fief of Kalamata had been conferred immediately after its conquest, and who was elected bailly by the vassals on the death of Hugh, whom Champlitte had left in that capacity when he returned to France². But the list of the baronies as we now possess it dates after Villehardouin had gained possession of the principality, and in it the most important barony in a military point of view, and the largest in extent, was that of Akova. This barony embraced the valley of the Ladon, and the district that still retains the name of Achoves. It protected the rich valley of the Alpheus and the plains of Elis from the attacks of the Sclavonians, who occupied the mountains to the north of the upper valley of the Alpheus, immediately to the east of the possessions of the baron of Akova. The country inhabited by the Sclavonians was called Skorta. The French had found it for their interest to detach these Sclavonians from the Greek cause by a separate treaty, concluded soon after the taking of Patras, and had left them in possession of their local independence, with all the privileges they had enjoyed under the Byzantine emperors³.

¹ The assize of Jerusalem, as we possess that code, was remodelled at a later period, but a number of regulations were established, and a register like Doomesday-book was formed either by Godfrey or his brother Baldwin. It was imitated in the kingdom of Cyprus by Richard Cœur-de-Lion and Guy de Lusignan. The *Assises du Royaume de Jerusalem* have been published by Count Beugnot, in the splendid work entitled *Historiens des Croisades*, under the title *Assises de Jerusalem, ou Recueil des Ouvrages de Jurisprudence, composés pendant le XIII^e. siècle, dans les Royaumes de Jerusalem et de Chypre*, 2 vols. fol. Paris, 1841-43. A Greek text has been published in part by Zachariä, *Historiae Juris Graeco-Romani Delineatio*, p. 137. The *Assises de Romania* are inserted in the work of Canciani, *Barbarorum Leges Antiquae*, tom. iii. Ven. 1781, 1792.

² Villehardouin, p. 123. Though Buchon's edition generally offers the best text, there appears to be an inadvertence at this place, as Coron is said to be the city granted to Geoffrey; but Coron in the act of partition is appropriated to the Venetians, and we know that Kalamata was the family fief of the Villehardouins.

³ *Livre de la Conquête*, p. 39, where Skorta is called Escorta. The word appears to be a corruption of Gortys.

The Slavonians of Skorta, or the Gortynian district, and of Melingou, or the slopes of Mount Taygetus, were at this period the only survivors of the great immigration that had threatened to exterminate the Hellenic race in the eighth and ninth centuries. The barony of Akova, established to watch the Slavonians of Skorta, was endowed with twenty-four knights'-fees; and the fortress which its barons constructed as a bulwark of the French power was called Mategrifon, or Stop-Greek¹.

The barony next in importance was that of Karitena or Skorta, placed within the limits of the territory once held by the Slavonian Skortiots, and commanding the ordinary line of communication between the central plains of the Peloponnesus and the western coast. The castle of Karitena, which the French constructed, was well selected as a post for maintaining the command of the upper valley of the Alpheus, while it secured the passes into the maritime plain. This barony consisted of twenty-two knights'-fees. The two great baronies of Akova and Karitena formed the barrier of the French possessions against the Slavonians of Skorta, the Greeks of Argolis, and the Byzantine garrisons of Corinth, Argos, and Nauplia.

The other important military positions in which baronies were established, but which are now deserted and almost unknown, were Veligosti, Gritzena, Passava, Geraki, and Nikli. Veligosti was a considerable Greek town at the epoch of the invasion, but, like Andravida, it had grown up in a time of general security, and was without fortifications. It was situated on a low hill near the point of intersection of the ancient roads from Sparta to Megalopolis, and from Messene to Tegea, where they quit the mountains to enter the upper valley of the Alpheus. Its site is not far from the modern town of Leondari, which rose out of its ruins about the end of the fourteenth century. The barony of Veligosti consisted

¹ Colonel Leake (*Peloponnesiaca*, p. 149) and Boblaye (*Recherches géographiques sur les Ruines de la Morée*, p. 152) agree in thinking that the ruined castle named Galata, near the site of Teuthis, marks the position of Akova, or Mategrifon. Perhaps armorial bearings may be some day discovered in the ruins, that will identify this important position. Meletius calls it Iakova, and says it was in ruins in his time (p. 370, edit. 1728). The western nations at this time generally called the Greeks Grifons. Ducange, *Glossarium mediæ et infimæ Latinitatis*, s. v. *Griffone*. Compare *Richard of Devizes*; Bohn's *Chronicles of the Crusaders*, pp. 19, 41.

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of only four knights'-fees, but the city lying within the baron's military jurisdiction gave him baronial rank. Gritzena was the barony created to watch the Sclavonian mountaineers on Mount Taygetus—the Melings of Byzantine history—and to defend the valley of the Pamisus against their incursions¹. Passava was an advanced post established at the eastern threshold of Maina, to tame the Greek mountaineers of the savage peaks that run out into the sea to the south of the great summits of Taygetus, and to command the fertile region which was afterwards called Bardunia. It was situated about four miles to the south of Gythium, where the ruins of a castle destroyed by the Venetians under Morosini may still be seen rising over the foundations of a city of the heroic age². Passava was a frontier garrison which required to be occupied by a permanent body of troops, to watch the Mainates, the Sclavonians, and the Greek serfs who cultivated the rich plain of Helos. The baron of Passava was consequently named hereditary marshal of Achaia, as being the head of the standing army and military establishment of the principality. His office gave him full baronial power in his territory, as well as peculiar judicial authority in the army, though his fief consisted of only four knights'-fees. The selection of this position for a French fortress, on the frontier of a district into which cavalry could not penetrate, but in the vicinity of an excellent port, proves that it was also selected to protect the commerce of the Greek subjects of the principality from the corsairs of Maina. Geraki was built on the lower slope of the mountains that rise to the east of the valley of the Eurotas, near the site of Geronthrae, and was destined to protect the country east of the Eurotas from the forays of the mountaineers of Tzakonia and the incursions of the Byzantine garrison of Monemvasia. Nikli was a walled town of considerable importance, occupying the site of Tegea, and commanding the lines of communication between the southern provinces of Lacedaemonia and Messenia, and the northern of

¹ Gritzena was in Lakkos, the name given to the upper part of the great Messenian valley; but its exact position is not known. *Book of the Conquest*, Greek text, p. 73, v. 617.

² Colonel Leake identifies Passava with Las, a city destroyed by Castor and Pollux. Leake's *Travels in the Morea*, i. 266; Strabo, lib. viii. c. 5, p. 364; Boblaye, *Recherches*, 87. Coronelli gives a plan of the fort (p. 38). In the list of places at the end of the letters of Plethon Gemistus on the state of the Peloponnesus, Gythion is called Palaiopolis or Pasabas.

Corinthia and Argolis¹. Only a portion of the territory allotted to several of the feudatories had been subdued in the time of William de Champlitte.

SECT. II.—*Acquisition of the Principality by Geoffrey Villehardouin.—Geoffrey I.; Geoffrey II.*

William de Champlitte left his relation Hugh to act as his bailly in the principality during his absence²; but, Hugh dying soon after the prince's departure, Geoffrey Villehardouin

¹ The list of the feudatories of Achaia given by count Beugnot in his edition of the *Assizes de Jerusalem* (p. 428) is taken from the imperfect edition of the Greek Chronicle published in 1840. Buchon's subsequent editions of the French and Greek texts supply the means of correcting it; but it must not be forgotten that, as far as its chronology is concerned, the authority is doubtful. The following is the list:—

		Fiefs.
1.	Kalamata, . . . Geoffrey de Villehardouin, . . .	
2.	Akova, . . . Walter de Rosières, . . .	24
3.	Karitena or Skorta, . . . Hugh de Brières, . . .	22
4.	Patras, . . . William de Alaman, . . .	
5.	Vostitza, . . . Hugh de Charnpigny, . . .	8
6.	Chalandritza, . . . Robert de Tremouille, . . .	4
7.	Kalavryta, . . . Otho de Tournay, . . .	12
8.	Nikli, . . . William, . . .	6
9.	Veligosti, . . . Matthew de Mons, . . .	4
10.	Gritzena, . . . Luke, . . .	4
11.	Geraki, . . . Guy de Nivelet, . . .	6
12.	Passava, . . . John de Neuilly, hereditary Marshal, . . .	4

All those rated at only four knights'-fees must have had a city under their jurisdiction, or else been in possession of a baronial office. The list of the twelve barons of Achaia having the right to build fortresses and exercise supreme jurisdiction, which is given in the Achaian copy of the *Assize of Romania* (art. 43 and 94), is of a comparatively modern date, probably about the middle of the fourteenth century. Compare Buchon, *Recherches et Matériaux*, p. 118.

The ecclesiastical barons were:—

		Fiefs.
1.	The archbishop of Patras, primate of Achaia, . . .	8
2.	The bishop of Olenos, or Andravida, . . .	4
3.	„ Modon, . . .	4
4.	„ Coron, . . .	4
5.	„ Veligosti, . . .	4
6.	„ Nikli, afterwards transferred to Mouchli, and called Amyclae, . . .	4
7.	„ Lacedaemon, . . .	4

The military orders:—

1.	The knights of the Hospital of St. John of Jerusalem, . . .	4
2.	„ Temple, . . .	4
3.	„ Teutonic order, . . .	4

[The family names of Nos. 8 and 10 in the first list are not known. The name of No. 6 is in reality Audebert, and not Robert, de Tremouille. See Hopf, *Griechische Geschichte*, p. 237, note. Ed.]

² We learn this from a letter of Pope Innocent III. addressed to Hugh de Cham—, doubtless Champlitte. Tom. ii. 488, edit. Baluze.

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was elected by the feudatories to fill the vacant office, on account of his high reputation for ability and warlike skill, his influence over the Greek population, and his intimate connection with the family of Champlitte. The election was in strict conformity with the feudal usages established in the empire of Romania. Geffrey availed himself of his position to increase his popularity in the principality, and to gain the favour of Henry, emperor of Romania, and the great vassals of the empire. He obtained from the emperor Henry a grant of the office of seneschal of Romania, which raised him to the rank of great feudatory of the empire¹. The manner in which he possessed himself of the principality of Achaia affords a curious example of the laws and customs of the Crusaders in their eastern possessions. From the terms in which the acquisition is stigmatized in the assize of Jerusalem, it is implied that William of Champlitte died while Villehardouin was acting as his bailly, and that the bailly basely availed himself of the defenceless condition of his patron's infant children in France, to rob the absent orphans of their heritage².

The *Chronicle of the Conquest of the Morea* gives a different account of the method by which Geffrey Villehardouin gained possession of the principality, but the character of the bailly gains very little by the change. He is represented as having retained possession of the principality by a dishonourable fraud. It was known in the Peloponnesus that Champlitte proposed sending Robert de Champlitte, a young member of his own family, to replace his relation Hugh. The nomination was displeasing both to Villehardouin, and to the barons and troops who had undergone all the fatigues of the conquest, and who feared to behold a crowd of young nobles arrive from France to share the spoils of war without having shared its dangers. A plot was formed to prevent the new bailly

¹ D'Outremann (*Constantinopolis Belgica*, 669) gives a charter by Geffrey as seneschal of Romania dated Sept. 1209, reprinted by Buchon, *Eclaircissements*, 89, note 2, and again in *Greek Chronicle*, edit. 1845, *Recueil de diplomes*, 375.

² *Assises de Jérusalem*, MS. de Venise, c. 272, appendix to Count Beugnot's edition. It is evident that the manner in which Villehardouin acquired Achaia was viewed with general reprobation even from the expressions of the *Livre de la Conquête*, p. 59.

In a letter of Pope Innocent III., dated 4th March 1210, Geffrey is called only Seneschal of Romania. Tom. ii. p. 409, edit. Baluze. But at the end of March he receives the title of the Prince of Achaia in the Pope's letters. Tom. ii. p. 420, ep. 23, 24, 25, edit. Baluze.

from taking possession of his office. Geoffrey sent envoys to Venice, who induced the doge to retard as much as possible the arrival of Robert de Champlitte, and the Venetian ship in which he had engaged a passage to the Morea treacherously left him on shore at Corfu. But in spite of these delays Robert arrived in the principality within the year accorded by the feudal law, as the term beyond which a fief could not remain vacant without incurring the penalty of forfeiture. Geoffrey avoided meeting him for some time, and led him into the interior of the province, where a meeting at length took place at Lacedaemon. An assembly of the barons, knights, and clergy favourable to the projects of Villehardouin had already assembled, and in this parliament Robert claimed to be received as bailly of Achaia in virtue of his cousin's act of investiture, which he produced. The assembly, however, had already concerted with Villehardouin the manner in which the claim was to be disallowed. It was pretended that William de Champlitte had engaged to cede the principality to Villehardouin in case he failed to return, or send a bailly to govern it on his own account within a year from the day of his departure. The parliament now declared that, the year having expired, they were bound to acknowledge Villehardouin as prince of Achaia. In vain Robert de Champlitte argued that, even according to this compact, he was entitled to be received as bailly, for he had landed in the principality before the expiry of the year. The parliament replied that of that circumstance they were incompetent to judge, as the public act of his appearance in the parliament of the principality could alone be taken into consideration. Robert, seeing that it was vain to resist, demanded a certificate of the decision and returned to France, while Geoffrey Villehardouin was acknowledged prince of Achaia. Such is the story of the Chronicles, and its foundation rests on truth, though it appears very like a fable invented to explain the transfer of the principality to the family of Villehardouin in conformity with the customs of Romania, when it was really acquired by illegal conduct¹.

Geoffrey had conducted himself with great prudence during the time he ruled as bailly. He had successively conquered

¹ See the provisions of the *Liber consuetudinum Imperii Romaniae* in Canciani, *Barbarorum Leges Antiquae*, tom. iii. tit. 36, p. 5056.

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the cities of Veligosti, Nikli, and Lacedaemon, though the two last were well fortified; and he had granted favourable terms of capitulation to the Greek inhabitants. He then laid siege to Corinth, which on the death of Leo Sguros had placed itself under the protection of Michael, despot of Epirus¹. The conquest of Corinth was of vital importance to all the Frank establishments in Greece, for, so long as it remained in the hands of the despot of Epirus, the communications of Achaia with the great feudatories in northern Greece were exposed to be constantly interrupted, and their armies to be attacked on the flank and rear. Geoffrey Villehardouin and Otho de la Roche united their forces to attack Corinth, but before they had taken the Acrocorinth a treaty of peace was concluded between the emperor Henry and Michael, despot of Epirus, which left the Greeks in possession of that fortress, with Argos, Nauplia, Monemvasia, and the whole of Argolis and Tzakonia².

The conduct of the Latin clergy, at this time, was far less charitable than that of the French nobles and knights; and it required all the prudence and firmness of Geoffrey to prevent their avarice and bigotry from interrupting the friendly relations established with the Greek population under the Frank government. Even Pope Innocent III., the most zealous of pontiffs in the acquisition of temporal power, was compelled to rebuke the Latin archbishops for the violence with which they treated the Greek bishops who had recognized the papal supremacy. The Pope, satisfied with the acknowledgment of his own authority, was not inclined to allow the Latin prelates to drive the Greeks from their episcopal sees, in order to confer the vacant benefices on the herd of clerical emigrants and poor relations of the barons, who flocked to the East to profit by the conquest³. The violent conduct of these ecclesiastical fortune-hunters compelled Geoffrey to become the defender of the Greeks, and the enemy of clerical

¹ *Acropolita*, p. 6. Compare the letter of Innocent III. lib. xv. ep. 77, tom. ii. p. 628, edit. Baluze.

² It seems, from a letter of Pope Innocent III., that the Franks had at one time gained possession of Argos. They must have lost it again, or restored it to the Greeks at the peace concluded with the despot of Epirus. *Ep. Innocent. III.* lib. xv. ep. 77. [The statement in the text, that Corinth, Argos, and Nauplia were not conquered by the Franks at this time, is erroneous. See below, p. 194. Ed.]

³ *Epist. Innocent. III.* lib. x. ep. 51; lib. xi. ep. 179; tom. ii. pp. 23, 228.

abuses. As the clergy of Achaia frequently sold the fiefs they had acquired, and returned home with the profit, Geoffrey steadily enforced the law of the emperor Henry, prohibiting all donations of immovable property to the church, either in life or by testament; and, even though the all-powerful Innocent III. threatened him with excommunication, he persisted in his course. At the same time, he sent envoys to Rome to explain to his holiness the peculiar difficulties and exigencies of his situation. After the death of Innocent, Gervais the patriarch of Constantinople excommunicated both Geoffrey and Otho de la Roche, for their conduct to the clergy; but they were both relieved from this interdict by the order of Honorius III.¹

Geoffrey I. strengthened his family influence and increased his political importance by the marriage of his son and successor Geoffrey, with Agnes, daughter of the emperor Peter of Courtenay, and sister of the emperors Robert and Baldwin II. In the year 1217, the empress Yoland sailed from Brindisi to proceed to Constantinople by sea, when her husband undertook the unfortunate expedition through Epirus in which he perished. On the voyage the fleet of Yoland stopped at the port of Katakolo, then protected by a castle called by the French Beauvoir, of which the ruins, still existing, are distinguished by the degraded name of Pondikokastron, or the Castle of Rats. Geoffrey Villehardouin presented himself to the empress as her seneschal, and invited her to repose a few days at the castle of Vlisiri in the neighbourhood, while the fleet revictualled. During this visit the marriage of young Geoffrey with Agnes Courtenay was celebrated with due pomp, in presence of the empress Yoland².

¹ *Epist. Innocent III.* tom. ii. pp. 421, 486; Raynaldi, *Ann. Eccles.* anno 1218, tom. i. p. 438, edit. Lucca; Buchon, *Recherches et Matériaux*, 141.

² Buchon, *Recherches et Matériaux*, p. 146. The *Chronicles of the Conquest* give the following account of this marriage, which they pretend happened after the death of Geoffrey I. They narrate that the emperor Robert (?) sent a fleet to convey his daughter from Constantinople to Catalonia, as she was engaged to the king of Aragon. This fleet touched at Katakolo, and Geoffrey II., then prince of Achaia, persuaded the young princess to accept him for her husband instead of the king of Aragon. The quarrel that ensued between the emperor and the prince was arranged at a parliament held at Larissa, where the emperor Robert conferred on his son-in-law the feudal superiority over the Archipelago, the title of prince of Achaia, the office of grand seneschal, and the right of coining silver pennies (petits tornoyes). The emperor also delivered to the prince a copy of the usages of Romania, which the emperor Baldwin, Robert's brother, had received

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Geffrey I. appears to have died about the year 1218.

The commencement of the reign of Geffrey II. was troubled by a serious quarrel with the Church. The young prince proposed to assemble the whole military force of Achaia, in order to drive the Greeks from the fortresses they still possessed in the Peloponnesus, and complete the conquest of the peninsula. But when he summoned the clergy and military orders to send their contingents to the camp, they refused to obey his orders. In spite of all the opposition his father had offered to the aggrandizement of the church, the clergy and the military orders had acquired possession of almost one-third of the conquered territory; and they now, in defiance of the constitution of the principality, refused to send their contingents into the field, declaring that the clergy held their fiefs from the Pope, and owed no military service, except at his command and for holy wars. Had Geffrey II. permitted these pretensions to pass unpunished, there would have been a speedy end of the principality of Achaia. Without a moment's hesitation, therefore, he seized all the fiefs held by the clergy on the tenure of military service; and to those clerical vassals who had no other revenue than that derived from their fiefs, he assigned a pension sufficient for their subsistence. This statesmanlike conduct threw the Latin church in the East into a state of frenzy, and Geffrey II. was immediately excommunicated. But excommunication was not a very terrific weapon where the majority of the population was of the Greek church, so that the prince of Achaia was enabled to pursue his scheme of compelling the church to submit to the civil power without much danger. Yet in order to prove to the world that his conduct was not influenced by avarice, he proposed, in the parliament of the principality, that all profits resulting from the ecclesiastical fiefs placed under sequestration should be employed in

from Jerusalem. In return, the prince became the liege-man of the emperor. Now it is evident that this fable must have been invented after the Catalans had conquered Attica and rendered themselves a terror to the French. It was a gratification to French vanity to hear of this imaginary insult inflicted on a Spanish king by a French prince. But after this specimen of the way in which times, places, and persons are confounded, it must be evident that history and chronology cannot by any process be extracted from such a mass of inaccuracy. On the other hand, much may be learned concerning manners and customs.

constructing a strong fortress, commanding the whole western promontory of Elis, as well as the port of Clarentza, which was then the principal seat of the trade of the principality with the rest of Europe. This was adopted, and the walls of the fortress then constructed still exist. The ruins are called by the Greeks Chlomoutzi, but they are also known by their Frank name of Castel Tornese. They are situated about three miles from the remains of Clarentza¹. Three years were employed in its construction. When it was terminated, the declining state of the Latin empire induced Geoffrey II. to send an embassy to the Pope, to prevail on his holiness to put an end to the quarrel with the church in Achaia. The prince expressed his readiness to restore all the fiefs that had been placed under sequestration; but he required that the possessors should engage to perform military service; for without this service, he declared that it would be impossible to defend the country against the Greeks, whom the successes of Theodore, despot of Epirus, and Theodore Lascaris, emperor of Nicaea, had emboldened to such a degree that they contemplated being able to expel the Franks from the Peloponnesus. Honorius III., satisfied that the pretensions of Geoffrey II. were just and reasonable, ordered his legate at Constantinople, John Colonna, to absolve him from excommunication².

The vigour displayed by Geoffrey extended his power, by gaining the voluntary submission of a powerful vassal. The count of Zante and Cephalonia, though brother-in-law of Theodore, despot of Epirus, became a vassal of the princi-

¹ Chlomoutzi was frequently called Clarenza, as well as Castel Tornese, by the Franks. It received the latter name probably from having contained the mint and treasury of the princes of Achaia. It was generally termed Clairmont by the French of the principality. Colonel Leake derives Chlomoutzi from *χλωμός*, *χλωμός*, or *χελμός*. *Peloponnesiaca*, p. 210. Most of the coins of the princes of Achaia extant are inscribed as coined at *Clarencia*, but many are found also with *Corintum*. Colonel Leake remarks—'An unfounded opinion has long prevailed, and has been repeated by some of the latest travellers, that the name of the English dukedom of Clarence was derived from Klarentza. But there can be no question that Clarentia or Clarencia was the district of Clare in Suffolk. The title was first given, in 1362, by Edward III. to his third son, Lionel, when the latter succeeded to the estates of Gilbert, earl of Clare and Gloucester.' *Peloponnesiaca*, p. 212. During the Greek revolution the ruined fortress of Chlomoutzi was occupied by the Christians in 1826. It was taken by Ibrahim Pasha's Egyptian troops in 1827.

² Most of the facts relating to the quarrel between Geoffrey II. and the clergy of Achaia are only mentioned in the Chronicles, but here their authority is confirmed by various documents. Raynaldi, *Annales Eccles. an. 1222*, tom. i. p. 501, edit. Lucca.

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pality of Achaia, in order to secure the support and alliance of Geoffrey II.¹

In the year 1236, Constantinople was threatened by the united forces of the Greek emperor, John III. (Vatatzes), and the Bulgarian king, John Asan. On this occasion Geoffrey hastened to its relief with one hundred knights, three hundred crossbowmen, and five hundred archers, and with a considerable sum of money, raised by a tax which he had been authorized by Pope Gregory IX. to levy on the clergy of the principality, for the purpose of succouring the Latin empire. All these supplies were embarked in a fleet of ten war galleys². The Greeks attempted in vain to intercept the Achaian squadron: their fleet was defeated, and Geoffrey entered the port of Constantinople in triumph³. He again visited Constantinople in the year 1239, to attend the coronation of his brother-in-law, the emperor Baldwin II., and do homage for his principality and for his office of seneschal. On this occasion he lent the young emperor a considerable sum of money; and like a prudent prince rather than a generous relation, he exacted from the imprudent Baldwin the cession of the lordship of Courtenay, the hereditary fief of the imperial family in France, as the price of his assistance. This hard bargain was doubly usurious, since part of the money advanced consisted of the funds Geoffrey had been authorized by the Pope to levy on the ecclesiastics of Achaia for the service of the empire. The cession of Courtenay, extorted from the young Baldwin by his brother-in-law, who was a vassal and grand seneschal of the empire, appeared to the equitable mind of Louis IX. of France so gross an act of rapacity, that as feudal suzerain he refused to ratify the act, and compelled the parties to annul the transaction⁴. It seems, however, not improbable that Geoffrey received a compensation in the East in lieu of the lordship of Courtenay, for he continued to maintain a hundred knights and crossbowmen at Constantinople for the service of the empire—

¹ Alberic (trium fontium), p. 558; Buchon, *Histoire des Conquêtes des Français dans les Etats de l'ancienne Grèce*, p. 215.

² Raynaldi, *Annales Eccles.*, an. 1236, tom. ii. p. 159.

³ Alberic, 558; Philip Mouskes, in Ducange's edition of Villehardouin, pp. 224, 227.

⁴ Baldwin's reply to the letter of St. Louis is printed in Buchon's *Recherches et Matériaux*, p. 153.

a contingent which, though he might have been bound to maintain it as a great feudatory, and in consequence of the tax levied under the papal grant, he would perhaps have found the means of eluding, had it not been particularly his interest to please and cajole the emperor¹. It seems, therefore, that these events may be connected with the claim of suzerainty subsequently advanced by the principality of Achaia over the other great fiefs of Romania in Greece.

Geffrey II. died about the year 1246, without leaving any children, and was succeeded in the principality of Achaia by his brother William.

SECT. III.—*William Villehardouin completes the Conquest of the Morea.—Cedes Monemvasia, Misithra, and Maina to the Emperor Michael VIII.*

William Villehardouin was born in the castle of Kalamata, and was therefore the first prince of Achaia who had some pretensions to be regarded as a native of Greece. In the eyes of the Greek catholics, at least, he was a countryman, and as he spoke the language of the country, and entered into the prejudices and political views of the Eastern princes, he gave the principality of Achaia a more prominent position in the eyes of the Greeks than it had hitherto occupied. Even the Frank nobility of his dominions had now acquired something of an Eastern character, and become weaned from their attachment to France, where the rank and fortune of their ancestors had generally been much inferior to that which they themselves held in Greece. Many now laid aside their family names, and adopted titles and designations derived from their Eastern possessions.

The first act of William was to complete the conquest of the Peloponnesus². The Greek empire of Nicaea had

¹ Raynaldi, *Annales Eccles.* an. 1244, tom. ii. p. 304.

² [Both in what follows, and in a previous passage (above, p. 189), the author has been led into a mistake by following the authority of the *Chronicle of the Conquest*. The cities of Corinth, Nauplia, and Argos were conquered by Geffrey I. between the years 1210-1212, whereas Monemvasia was conquered in 1248 by William Villehardouin, as here related. The *Chronicle* combines these events, and places them all in the latter reign. See Hopf, *Griechische Geschichte*, pp. 240, 273. Ed.]

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already grown so powerful both by sea and land, that he could not besiege the maritime cities of Nauplia and Monemvasia with any prospect of success, without the aid of such a fleet as one of the Italian commercial republics could alone supply. The Venetians who possessed Modon were his natural allies, and he concluded a treaty with the republic, by which they engaged to maintain the blockade of Nauplia and Monemvasia with four war galleys, in consideration of the cession of Coron, to which they laid claim, as a portion of their territory under the original partition treaty of the Byzantine empire. The prince of Achaia considered it necessary, also, to increase his land forces, by obtaining the assistance of Guy de la Roche, the Grand-sire of Athens and Thebes; and it would appear that this was purchased by a promise of the cession of Argos and Nauplia to the Athenian prince, to be held by the freest holding known to the feudal system. Guy joined the Achaian army with a considerable force, and the first operations of the Franks were directed against Corinth. The city was soon taken, and the Acrocorinth closely blockaded by the construction of two forts; one to the south, on a peaked rock which was called Montesquiou, now corrupted into Penteskoupia¹; the other to the north-east. The citadel was thus cut off from all supplies, but the impregnable fortress, well supplied with water and provisions, might have defied the efforts of its besiegers, had its garrison not consisted in great part of the proprietors of the lands around. These men, when they saw their houses ruined by the Frank soldiers, their olive-trees cut down for fuel, their orchards and vineyards destroyed, their grain reaped by the enemy, and their own supplies gradually diminishing, began to think of submission; and they soon consented to surrender the mighty bulwark of the Peloponnesus to the Franks, on condition of being allowed to retain possession of their private property and local privileges, like the other Greeks under the Frank domination. To these terms William Villehardouin consented, and took possession of the Acrocorinth.

Nauplia was then invested, for Argos seems to have offered no serious resistance. The siege of a strong maritime fortress offered many difficulties to the Franks. On the land side

¹ i.e. the five caps.

Nauplia was quite as impregnable as the Acrocorinth, while the position of its citadel, Palamedi, afforded greater advantages for sorties, and its port facilitated the introduction of supplies in spite of the vigilance of the Venetians in maintaining the blockade. The inhabitants of the neighbouring provinces of Argolis and Tzakonia were a warlike race of mountaineers, exercised in skirmishes with the Latins, and whose activity and knowledge of the country exposed the convoys of provisions and the foraging parties of the besiegers to constant danger. These circumstances sustained the courage of the besieged, so that very little progress had been made towards reducing the place by military operations, when Guy de la Roche succeeded in disposing the minds of the Greeks to a capitulation, by his success in driving back the mountaineers, and by contrasting the fiscal rapacity of the Byzantine government with the more moderate pecuniary demands of the French princes. The terms of capitulation were such as to place the Greeks of Nauplia in much more favourable circumstances than the rest of their countrymen, for as a guarantee that their commercial and municipal privileges should be inviolable, they were allowed to guard the fortifications of the town, while the Franks only placed a permanent garrison in the citadel on Palamedi¹. The Greeks considered it an additional security for the observance of the treaty, that Guy de la Roche was invested with the fiefs of Nauplia and Argos.

Monemvasia was now the only fortress in the hands of the Greeks, and Tzakonia the only province that preserved its independence. The town of Monemvasia, situated on a rock rising out of the sea, so near the mainland as to be joined to it by a long bridge, was quite impregnable; but the insecurity of its port, or rather, its want of a port capable of protecting ships from the enemy, exposed it to suffer every evil that could be inflicted by a naval blockade. The activity of the Venetian and Achaian squadrons, which had safe ports

¹ It seems singular that Palamedi is not mentioned by name in the Chronicles; but there can hardly be a doubt that the two fortresses alluded to are Palamedi and Itch-kalé. The insular fort is too insignificant to be the one that was left in the hands of the Greeks; and Palamedi must then have been fortified, not only on account of the passion of the military engineers of the time for occupying almost inaccessible peaks, but also because an enemy, even with the engines then in use, could from its sides have set fire to the town below.

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of retreat at Epidaurus Limera, and Zarax, from whence they could watch the sea around, effectually excluded all supplies; yet the place was defended until the third year. At last the inhabitants, seeing no prospect of relief from the Greek emperor, John III., who was then occupied with the war in Thrace, and having suffered all the miseries of famine, made an offer to capitulate¹. They were allowed to retain possession of their private property; and, instead of being bound to furnish a contingent of armed men for the military service, they engaged to supply a certain number of experienced sailors to man the galleys of the prince of Achaia, who engaged to pay them the same wages which they had hitherto been in the habit of receiving from the Byzantine emperors. The surrender of Monemvasia was followed by the complete submission of the Tzakonian mountaineers, who then occupied all the country from Argolis to Cape Malea.

William, having completed the conquest of the eastern coast, turned his arms against the Sclavonians of Mount Taygetus and the Greeks of Maina, whom he now resolved to reduce to immediate dependence on his government. The richest possessions of the Sclavonians were situated in the plain of the Eurotas, near the lowest slopes of the mountain. In order to cut them off from the resources they derived from this fertile district, the prince of Achaia built a strong fortress on a hill called Misithra, about three miles from the city of Lacedaemon, and five from Sklavochorion, the chief town of the Sclavonian population of the district. High on the summit of this hill, perched on a precipitous rock, William erected a strong castle, and at its base his Frank followers constructed a fortified town, that they might live as much as possible separate from their Greek and Sclavonian subjects. Misithra soon became the capital of the district, and it still remains the most considerable place in the valley of the Eurotas². The residence of the prince was established within

¹ The three years of the Chronicles were 1246-8, for there is a letter of William, prince of Achaia, to Thibaut, king of Navarre, dated at Lacedaemon in Feb. 1248; and as the year then began in March, this is really Feb. 1249. This letter must have been written after the fall of Monemvasia. It is therefore necessary to suppose that the blockade commenced at the same time as the siege of Corinth.

² The name of Misithra, pronounced generally at present Mistrá, was the name applied to the locality before Villehardouin constructed his citadel. *Greek Chronicle*, v. 1663. But whether the name was introduced by the Sclavonian colonists,

its walls, and the mediaeval Lacedaemon soon sank into the same state of desolation as the ancient Sparta, over whose ruins it had risen; nor have the ill-judged royal ordinances promulgated in the modern kingdom of Greece, to revive classic names and create imaginary cities by destroying existing towns, succeeded in rendering Sparta a rival to Villehardouin's city¹. The Slavonians, overawed by the proceedings of the prince, which they did not dare to interrupt, sent envoys offering to submit to the Frank domination, to pay a fixed tribute, and to furnish a contingent of armed men on the same terms on which they had formerly acknowledged the supremacy of the Byzantine government; but they demanded, and obtained, exemption from direct taxation and feudal services, and it was stipulated that no Frank barony was to be established within their limits. About the same time William likewise completed the conquest of the Mainates, and ordered two castles to be constructed in their territory, to keep them in subjection. One of these castles was situated at Maina, in the vicinity of the Taenarian promontory, and the other at Leftro, on the west coast near Kisternes. The Mainates, intimidated by the garrisons of these fortresses, and by the galleys of the prince, which interrupted their communications and cut them off from receiving supplies from the Greek empire, submitted to the same terms as had been imposed on the rest of their countrymen. It seems that the operations against the Tzakonians, Slavonians, and Mainates, were carried on simultaneously, and they were thus prevented from concentrating their forces and affording one another aid. The whole of the Peloponnesus was thus reduced under the Frank domination by William Villehardouin, before the end of the year 1248².

or derived from ancient Greek, has been warmly disputed by two learned Germans—viz. Zinkeisen, *Geschichte Griechenlands*, p. 885, and Fallmerayer, *Entstehung der heutigen Griechen*, p. 90. [Hopf considers the name undoubtedly Slavonic; *Griechische Geschichte*, p. 267. Ed.]

¹ The government of King Otho having transferred the residence of the official authorities to the new town of Sparta, the inhabitants of Misithra have followed, and the town of the Frank princes is sinking into a village. [Amidst the ruins there are some very fine specimens of mediaeval Byzantine architecture; one of the churches is figured in Fergusson's *Handbook of Architecture*, Lond. 1855, p. 961. Ed.]

² Pachymeres (i. p. 52, edit. Rom.) proves that Kisterna, or Kinsterna, was the name applied to the district along the north-western coast of Maina, below Zygos, which embraces the two modern capitaneries of Platza and Melaia. It is not incorrectly described by the Byzantine historian as a district abounding in good

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The prosperity of the Franks of Achaia had now attained its highest point of elevation. Their prince was the recognized sovereign of the whole peninsula. His revenues were so considerable, that he was enabled to build a cathedral at Andravida, and several fortresses in his principality, without oppressing his subjects by any additional taxes. The barons also constructed many well fortified castles and impregnable towers throughout the country, of which numerous ruins still exist. The wealth of all sought frequent opportunities of display, in festivals and tournaments that rivalled the most brilliant in western Europe, and their splendour was sung by many minstrels.

While the principality was in this flourishing condition, William took the cross and joined the crusade of St. Louis. The prince of Achaia, and Hugh, duke of Burgundy, sailed from the Morea in the spring of 1249. On their way to join the king of France they stopped at Rhodes, to assist the Genoese in defending that island against the Greek emperor, John III. The Achaian and Burgundian forces compelled the Greeks to abandon the siege of Rhodes, and the two princes continued their voyage. They fell in with the fleet of St. Louis off the coast of Cyprus, and the united force landed at Damietta on the 4th of June. As Louis remained several months at Damietta without advancing, William Villehardouin demanded permission to return to his principality, from which he did not consider it prudent to be long absent.

William's ambition increased with his wealth and power,

things, τὸ περὶ τὴν Κινστέρναν θέμα πολὺ γὰρ ἐν τῷ μήκῳ καὶ πολλοὶς βρῶν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς. Leftro is the ancient Leuktron; but there is a difference of opinion concerning the position of Maina. Colonel Leake thinks the castle erected by Villehardouin is that still called Maina, above Porto Quaglio; and the vicinity of the only fountain in the promontory renders this opinion the most probable. *Peloponnesiaca*, 142. There is a port called Kisternes, to the south of Porto Quaglio. The geographical nomenclature of Greece is singularly poor, and the same names are as often repeated as in English colonies. The only ruins of a considerable mediæval town, in this vicinity, are on the west coast of the cape, at the site of the ancient Taenaros, about four miles from the extreme southern point; and this appears to be the town called Maina in the Byzantine period. Constant. Porphy. *de Adm. Imp.* c. 50, p. 134. There are also considerable remains of a fortress to the north of Cape Grosso, on the peninsula called Tegani—from its resemblance to a frying-pan. This place is also called Kisternes, and is supposed by Boblaye to be the Maina of Villehardouin. *Recherches Géographiques*, p. 92. But the towns at Taenaros and Tegani appear both to have existed before Villehardouin's time. Here, however, we have three Mainas and three Kisternas to exercise the sagacity of antiquaries and the subtlety of the Greeks, when they begin to devote some attention to the study of their own history.

and he began to regret the liberality with which he had rewarded the services of his ally, Guy de la Roche. He quarrelled with his former friend, and called on the prince of Athens to do personal homage for the fiefs of Argos and Nauplia; and, if we can credit the Chronicles, he even pretended to the suzerainty over the lordships of Athens and Thebes, on the plea that this superiority had been vested in the princes of Achaia by the king of Saloniki. The claim to a right of suzerainty may possibly have been made, but there can hardly be a doubt that it was never based by William Villehardouin on a grant to Champlitte by the king of Saloniki. It could only have arisen out of a grant from the Latin emperor of Constantinople, if it rested on any plausible grounds. Guy de la Roche was now an old man; he had arrived in Greece in the year 1208. Whatever claim Villehardouin really made, it excited the indignation of de la Roche, as an insulting and unjust demand. He replied, that he was willing to acquit himself of the feudal obligations due for the fiefs of Argos and Nauplia, by furnishing the military service they owed to the prince of Achaia; but he refused to pay any personal service, or to swear fealty, for he declared the fiefs were conferred free of personal homage. War followed. The Athenian army was defeated at Karidi, and the dispute was referred to the decision of king Louis of France, as has been already mentioned. The king of France evidently thought William the party most to blame in this transaction, as he had considered his brother, Geoffrey II., deeply culpable in the matter of the lordship of Courtenay. The Villehardouins seem to have been rather too rapacious, and addicted to seek sordid profit in chicanery. Louis absolved the sovereign of Athens from all criminality, and considered that the question at issue, whatever its precise terms may have been, was one that justified private war between two great feudatories¹.

William Villehardouin married a daughter of Michael II., despot of Epirus. This alliance, joined to his own enterprising and warlike disposition, induced him to join his father-in-law in a war against the Greek empire. The disturbed state of the court of Nicaea, after the death of the

¹ *Livre de la Conquête*, p. 114.

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emperor Theodore II., held out great hopes to the despot and his allies, of gaining both honour and an extension of territory by the war. William joined Michael with all the forces of Achaia; but the united army was defeated, in the plains of Pelagonia, by the Byzantine troops, though inferior in number, in consequence of the skilful military combinations of John Palaeologos, the brother of the emperor Michael VIII. Prince William of Achaia, after fighting bravely with the Frank cavalry, until he saw it all destroyed, fled from the field of battle. He gained the neighbourhood of Kastoria in safety; but he was there discovered by his pursuers concealed under a heap of straw. His front teeth, which projected in a remarkable manner, enabled them to identify their prize¹. He was sent prisoner to the emperor Michael VIII., who retained him in captivity for three years.

The conditions on which William regained his liberty inflicted an irremediable injury on the principality of Achaia. He ceded to the Greek emperor, as the price of his deliverance, the fortresses of Monemvasia, Misithra, and Maina, the very cities which were especially connected with his own glory; and he engaged, besides, with solemn oaths and the direst imprecations, never to make war on the Greek emperor—ratifying his assurances of perpetual amity by standing godfather to the emperor's youngest son, which was considered a sacred family tie amongst the Greeks. Yet the Chronicles, speaking in the spirit of the times, declare that he resolved to pay no attention to these engagements, as soon as he could obtain the authority of the Pope and the Latin church to violate his oath, trusting that his Holiness would readily release him from obligations entered into with a heretic and extorted by force. The ecclesiastical morality of the age viewed the violations of the most sacred promises as lawful whenever they interfered with the interests of the papal

¹ Acropolita, 94. The desertion of John Dukas, prince of Vallachian Thessaly, natural son of Michael II. despot of Epirus, was said to have caused the loss of this battle; and this desertion was caused by the behaviour of William prince of Achaia. The wife of John Dukas, the heiress of Vlachia, who was extremely beautiful, had accompanied her husband to the camp: the French knights made unseemly demonstrations of gallantry to attract her attention. Her husband was offended, and quarrels ensued, in which blood was shed. The prince of Achaia, taking part with his young knights, accused John Dukas of exciting dissension in the camp, and insulted him to his face, by calling him a bastard, and no better than a slave. Pachymeres, i. p. 50, edit. Rom.

church¹. But the emperor Michael VIII. respected his own promises too little, to place any confidence in the good faith of the prince of Achaia, with whatever oaths it might be guaranteed, and he would not release his prisoner until the three fortresses were consigned to Byzantine garrisons.

From this period the history of the Morea assumes a new aspect. It now becomes divided into two provinces—one held by the Franks, and the other immediately dependent on the Greek emperor of Constantinople. The Greek population aspired at expelling their heterodox masters, and a long series of national wars was the consequence. But as the numbers, both of the Franks and Greeks, who bore arms, continually diminished, these wars were principally carried on by foreign mercenaries. The country was laid waste by rival rulers, the people pillaged by foreign soldiers, and the numerous unfortified towns and villages scattered over the face of the peninsula at this time began to be ruined. The garrisons in the fortresses of Monemvasia, Misithra, and Maina gave the Greek emperor the command over the whole coast of Laconia. The mountaineers of Tzakonia, Vatika, and Taygetus hastened to throw off the yoke of the Franks, who were soon compelled to abandon the fortresses of Passava and Leftro, in consequence of the rebellion of the inhabitants of Kisterna or Exo-Mani². The Slavonians of Skorta, roused by the success of their countrymen, the Melings of Taygetus, who had established themselves in virtual independence between the two contending parties, made a desperate effort to expel the Franks; and though they were assailed on all sides by the barons of Akova and Karitena, and by the whole army of Achaia, they were not reduced to obedience until a body of Turkish troops, who had deserted from the Greeks, joined the Franks. The savage cruelty and fearful devastations of

¹ The Greek Chronicle lays down the church principles of the time in very plain language:—

οἱ ὄρκοι ἐκείνοι οὐκ ἔπηκε 'ς τὴν φυλακὴν οὐκ ἦτον
τίποτε οὐδὲν τὸν ἐβλαβαν νὰ τὸν κρατοῦν διὰ ἀφιόρκων,
καθὼς τὸ ὀρίζει ἡ ἐκκλησιὰ καὶ οἱ φρόνιμοι τὸ λέγουσιν.

v. 3031.

² Pachymeres, i. 52, edit. Rom. confirmed by the Greek Chronicle:—

τὰ Βάτικα ἐπροσκύνησαν, ὁμοίως καὶ ἡ Τζακωνία,
ὁ δρόγγος γὰρ τοῦ Μελιγού, τὸ μέρος τῆς Γιστέρνας,
ἐκείνοι ἐροβύλευσαν μετὰ τὸν Βασιλέα.

v. 3265.

Compare Leake's *Travels in the Morea*, i. 261, for the extent of Exo-Mani.

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these mercenaries overpowered the resistance of the Sclavonians, and ruined their country¹.

There may be some difficulty in pronouncing whether the prince of Achaia, the Pope, or the Greek emperor was most to blame for commencing the war in the Morea. The Pope authorized the commencement of hostilities by relieving prince William from the obligations of his oath. His Holiness was alarmed at the blow the papal church had received in the East by the loss of Constantinople, and the prospect of seeing the Frank clergy excluded from a considerable part of the Peloponnesus. In order to recover the ground lost, he sanctioned the preaching of a crusade for the deliverance of the Morea from the Greek emperor². The Venetians joined their solicitations to the papal exhortations; and the rebellion of the mountaineers, who voluntarily placed themselves under the Byzantine protection, gave the prince of Achaia a legitimate pretext for assembling an army to watch the Greek forces in Misithra. Michael VIII. was as much determined to avail himself of the territory he had acquired, to extend his dominions at the expense of the Franks, as William was resolved to make every exertion for its recovery. For many years a war of mutual invasions was carried on, which degenerated into a system of rapine. The whole Peloponnesus, from Monemvasia to Andravida, was wasted by the hostile armies, the resources of the land were ruined, its population diminished, and its civilization deteriorated.

The Franks laboured under many disadvantages in the prosecution of this war. Their best troops had been annihilated at the battle of Pelagonia, which had thrown many fiefs into the hands of females³; nor was it easy to recruit their armies from western Europe, since the fortune of war had changed, and there was no hope of acquiring fiefs as a reward of valour. The Greeks, who formed the majority of the population even in the districts still under the Frank domination, were secretly attached to the cause of the emperor;

¹ The instructions to the Turks were—'Que il gastent et essillent celle mal-veise gent et qu'il leur faichent le pys que il porront.' *Livre de la Conquête*, p. 191.

² *Urban. IV. Epist.* lib. ii. ep. 94; lib. iii. ep. 137, 138, referred to by Ducange, *Histoire de Constantinople*, p. 167.

³ Sanudo (*Liber Secretorum Fidelium Crucis*) mentions the inconvenience that resulted in the Morea from women being allowed to hold fiefs. Beugnot, *Assizes de Jerusalem*, i. p. 427.

and most of the higher orders emigrated into the Byzantine fortresses. When the prince of Achaia visited the city of Lacedaemon, of which he retained possession after the cession of Misithra, and which he was anxious to hold as a bulwark against the Byzantine troops, he found it deserted by all its Greek inhabitants, who had abandoned their houses and taken up their residence within the fortifications of Misithra¹. The weakness of the two contending parties, and the rude nature of the military operations of the age, are depicted by the fact that the prince of Achaia continued to retain possession of Lacedaemon for several years after the war had broken out, though it was only three miles distant from Misithra, which served as the head-quarters of the Byzantine army. Under every disadvantage, the Franks displayed their usual warlike spirit and indomitable courage, and the Greeks were no match for them on the field of battle. The first tide of success, however, ran strongly in favour of the Byzantine forces, and the insurrection of the native population drove the Frank army back into the plain of Elis. Andravida the capital of the principality was attacked, and William Villehardouin was compelled to construct intrenchments, in order to place his forces in a condition to defend the open town. Had Andravida fallen, it is probable the Franks would have been expelled from the Morea; but the imperial forces were repulsed, and subsequently defeated in two battles. Their first defeat was at Prinitza, in the lower valley of the Alpheus; the other at the defile of Makryplagia, between the plains of Veligosti and Lakkos². In this last engagement the imperial generals, Philes and Makrinos, were taken prisoners, and the open country, as far as Helos and Monemvasia, was ravaged by the victorious army. But the valour of the Franks would have been insufficient to defend every corner of their territory from the incessant attacks of the large bodies of light troops which the Byzantine emperor was able to direct against every exposed point, had the prince

¹ *Greek Chronicle*, v. 4276.

² The ruin called Palati, on the left bank of the Alpheus, nearly opposite to its junction with the Erymanthos, is supposed to be the site of the monastery of Isova, burned by the Greeks before the battle of Prinitza. The Franks considered their victory as the vengeance of the Madonna for her desecrated shrine. Prinitza must have been near Agoulonitza. In the part of the *Greek Chronicle* which treats of this war, there are several passages that prove the term Morea was even then often restricted to the western coast of the peninsula.

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of Achaia not found a new and powerful ally in Charles of Anjou, the conqueror of the kingdom of Naples.

SECT. IV.—*Alliance and feudal Connection between the Principality of Achaia and the Kingdom of Naples.*

In the year 1266, Charles of Anjou, the brother of St. Louis, rendered himself master of the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily by the defeat and death of king Manfred ; and in the following year, though William Villehardouin had been the brother-in-law of Manfred, he purchased the alliance of the new king by betrothing his infant daughter Isabella, the heiress of his principality, to Philip, the second son of Charles of Anjou. This alliance exerted a powerful influence on the condition of the Frank establishments in Greece, and infused new vigour into the French chivalry in Achaia. It also gave a new direction to the political projects of the Latins throughout the East, by involving them in the mortal quarrel between the houses of Anjou and Aragon. The general advance of society in western Europe was daily diminishing the proportion of the population that lived constantly with arms in their hands, and the inadequacy of feudal institutions to meet the new exigencies of social life was becoming gradually more apparent. In this state of things the Franks of Achaia, if they had not been supported by a powerful prince, and a numerous military population in their immediate neighbourhood, to whom they could apply in every sudden and pressing emergency, would have been unable to resist the vigorous assaults of the Byzantine Greeks on the one hand, and the encroachments of the republics of Venice and Genoa on the other.

The dethroned emperor, Baldwin II., had concluded a treaty with Charles of Anjou at Viterbo, the professed object of which was to purchase the assistance of the king of Naples for recovering the empire of Romania, and re-establishing his throne at Constantinople. Among other stipulations in this treaty, Baldwin ceded to Charles the suzerainty of the principality of Achaia and the Morea, which he separated entirely from the empire of Romania, and vested in the crown of Sicily and Naples. The betrothal of Philip, the

second son of Charles, to Isabella Villehardouin took place at the same time, and the king of Naples invested his son, who was still a child, with the suzerainty over his wife's future heritage¹. This alliance rendered William the liegeman of his son-in-law; but it also enabled him to claim succours from the king of Naples in his wars with the emperor Michael VIII. William repaid the assistance he received at a very critical moment. He joined the French army with a chosen band of knights, long exercised in the wars of the East, on the eve of the contest with Conradin; and their brilliant valour contributed materially to the success of Charles of Anjou at the decisive battle of Tagliacozzo. After the death of Conradin, William received from the king of Naples a strong auxiliary force, which enabled him to conclude peace with the Greek emperor on favourable terms, and for several years the Peloponnesus enjoyed tranquillity.

The condition of the Greek population in the peninsula underwent a considerable alteration at this period, though it is impossible to trace in detail all the causes of the great change which was soon produced. The commerce of the East passed out of the hands of the Greeks, and was transferred to the citizens of the Italian republics and of the Spanish coast; besides this, many of the productions of which the Greeks had long enjoyed a monopoly, were now raised more abundantly and of better quality in Sicily, Italy, and Spain. The men of Tzakonia and Maina, no longer able to find constant employment in the merchant ships of the Byzantine empire, and cut off from continuing their forays into the Frank territory, sought service in the fleet at Constantinople, and aided in ravaging the islands of the Archipelago which were in the possession of the Franks, or the coasts of Asia Minor that had been conquered by the Turks. The women, old men, and children were left as the principal inhabitants of the mountain districts in the Peloponnesus, because their labour was sufficient for the collection of the olives, valonia, dye-stuffs, and mulberry-leaves, and for weaving cloth and rearing silk-worms, which were the only occupations

¹ The treaty of Viterbo, dated 27th May 1267, is printed by Ducange, *Histoire de Constantinople*; *Recueil des Chartes*, p. 7; and by Buchon, *Recherches et Matériaux*, p. 30. The second son of Charles of Anjou is called Philip by the French historian, and Louis by the *Chronicles of the Conquest*.

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that yielded any considerable profit in their country. Many entire families, however, quitted their native mountains and settled at Constantinople¹.

The eventful reign of William Villehardouin at last drew to a close. The only act recorded of his latter years proves that rapacity was the characteristic feature of his government. Under the pretext of executing the strict letter of the feudal laws of Romania, which he had shown himself so ready to infringe in the case of the duchy of Athens, he perpetrated a disgraceful violation of every principle of equity. Ambition might be urged as a plea in excuse for his attack on the independence of Guy de la Roche, but avarice and ingratitude darkened the infamous rapacity he displayed in seizing the property of Margaret de Neuilly. When William had been released from his captivity by the Greek emperor, he had been forced to give hostages for his faithful execution of the treaty. One of these hostages was a child, the daughter of his friend John de Neuilly, baron of Passava, and hereditary marshal of Achaia. The young lady was allowed to reside at the court of Constantinople; for at that time there was no better school for female education in Europe than the household of the princesses of the Byzantine empire; and as Margaret would be received under the sacred character of a hostage, her parents knew that she would be treated with every care, and receive such an education as could hardly be obtained by a king's daughter in any feudal court. The young lady remained a prisoner until peace was concluded between the prince of Achaia and the emperor of Constantinople. She then returned to Greece to find her father, the marshal, dead, and her paternal castle of Passava in the hands of the Greeks. Her fortune, however, was still brilliant, for she was heiress of her maternal uncle, Walter de Rosières, baron of Akova, the lord of four-and-twenty knights'-fees, who had died a short time before her father. When Margaret de Neuilly presented herself at the court of the principality of Achaia to claim the investiture of her father's empty title and of her uncle's large estates, she met with an answer worthy of the pettifogging spirit of Villehardouin. The worthless investiture of the barony of Passava, and the empty

¹ Niceph. Greg. 58; Pachymeres, i. 209, edit. Rom.; Leake, *Peloponnesiaca*, 35.

honour of the hereditary title of marshal, were readily conferred on her, as her father had died within a year. But her claim to the barony of Akova was rejected on the plea that her uncle had been dead more than a year; and in consequence of her not having demanded the investiture in person within a year and day after his decease, the fief was forfeited according to the provisions of the feudal code¹. To her allegation, that she had only been prevented from appearing to claim the investiture of her heritage by the act of the prince of Achaia himself, who had placed her person in pledge as a hostage, William replied, that the terms of the law made no exception for such a case; and as every vassal was bound to become hostage for his lord, he was equally bound to suffer every loss which might be entailed on him in consequence of fulfilling this obligation. The barony of Akova was, therefore, declared to have reverted to the prince of Achaia as its immediate lord-paramount. By this mean subterfuge William Villehardouin obtained possession of the most extensive barony in his principality, and defrauded the orphan daughter of his friend of her inheritance. Margaret de Neuilly married John de Saint-Omer; and her brother-in-law, Nicholas de Saint-Omer of Thebes, came to Andravida with great pomp to plead her cause before the high court of Achaia. The appeal, however, proved fruitless. The influence of the prince secured a confirmation of the previous decision. Prudence, some slight respect for public opinion, and, perhaps, some fear of the great power of the family of Saint-Omer, induced the prince of Achaia to grant eight knights'-fees out of the barony to Margaret and her husband; but he retained the others, which he bestowed on his younger daughter, Margaret, who was called the lady of Akova, or more commonly the Lady of Mategrifon; and the sins of her father were visited on her head.

William Villehardouin died at Kalamata, the place of his birth, in the year 1277. He left two daughters, Isabella and Margaret. Misfortune soon extinguished his race. Matilda of Hainault, the daughter of Isabella, was deprived of the principality of Achaia, and died childless, a prisoner in the Castel del Uovo at Naples; Margaret, the lady of Akova,

¹ William's authority for his unjust seizure of the barony of Akova is found in chap. clxxii.^{bis} of the *Assises de Jerusalem*, tom. i. p. 267, edit. Beugnot.

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died a prisoner in the hands of the barons of Achaia, who were displeased at her sanctioning her daughter's alliance with the house of Aragon; and her daughter Elizabeth, after marrying Fernand of Majorca, the enemy of the French, died in childbed at Catania¹.

SECT. V.—*Isabella de Villehardouin.*—*Florenz of Hainault.*—*Philip of Savoy.*

Isabella de Villehardouin lost her betrothed husband, Philip of Anjou, while both were children. During her minority the administration of the principality of Achaia was carried on by baillies appointed by Charles, king of Naples, in virtue of his rights as lord-paramount of the principality acquired by the treaty of Viterbo. Under these baillies, war was renewed with the Byzantine governors of Misithra; and the Peloponnesus was wasted by the continual forays of the Franks and Greeks, until it fell into a state of anarchy, during which all the landed proprietors, but especially the Greek population of Achaia, suffered severely from the extortions of the political and military adventurers, who made the war a pretext for collecting contributions in the principality. William de la Roche, duke of Athens, governed the principality for ten years, and his administration seems to have been temperate and not unpopular: but after his death, the state of things became intolerable; and at last the barons became so impatient of their sufferings, that they petitioned Charles II., king of Naples, to send them a prince, who, as the husband of Isabella, would take up his residence among them. Charles selected Florenz of Hainault, a cadet of one of the noblest houses of Belgium, who had visited Naples to seek his fortune in the military service of the house of Anjou, as a prince worthy to receive the hand of Isabella and the government of the principality of Achaia, in the critical condition to which it was reduced. After the celebration of the marriage, the king of Naples invested Florenz with sovereign power, as regent for his wife, and renounced for himself the use of the title of the prince of Achaia, which was to be borne by the actual

¹ Muntaner, chap. cclxv.; Buchon's *Genealogy of the House of Villehardouin* in *Recherches et Matériaux*.

sovereigns of the country, and not by the lords-paramount, who had begun to assume it; but he reserved the homage due to the crown of Naples, and he added a provision, that in case Isabella should become a widow, without having a male heir, it should neither be lawful for her, nor for any female heir to the principality, to marry without the consent of the kings of Naples, as their feudal suzerains¹.

The reign of Isabella and Florenz lasted about five years. It was afterwards looked back to by the population of the Morea with regret, as the last prosperous epoch in the Frank domination. Florenz of Hainault showed that he really wished to remedy the evils under which the country was suffering. His first measure was to conclude a treaty of peace with the Greek emperor Andronicus II.; and as soon as he was relieved from the necessity of keeping large bands of military retainers in constant movement, he endeavoured to reform the internal government. But though his administration was subsequently regretted, because succeeding times were worse, still his government was marked by many scenes of violence, which prove that the general state of society in the Morea was not far removed from universal intestine war. Men who had it not in their power to revenge the injuries they sustained, had very little chance of obtaining justice. A few anecdotes, illustrative of the social state of Greece at this period, taken from the chronicles written during the next generation, afford a more correct delineation of the government, and the condition of the people, than any narrative founded on the scanty official documents that have been preserved.

Florenz named one of his Flemish relations, Walter de Luidekerke, governor of Corinth. Walter maintained a gallant establishment; but the revenues of his barony being insufficient to support his magnificent style of housekeeping, he supplied the deficiency in his treasury by various acts of pillage and extortion. In those days it was not easy for the prodigal to run into debt unless they possessed large landed estates; the luxurious and extravagant military chieftains could only repair their finances by robbing strangers and waylaying

¹ *Livre de la Conquête*, pp. 291, 293, notes; Ducange, *Histoire de Constantinople*, edit. Buchon, ii. 375, *Extrait d'un Mémoire touchant les Droits du Roi de Majorque*; Muntaner, p. 521, edit. Buchon.

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and ransoming travellers: it was reserved for a chivalry of a later age to preserve its social pre-eminence by defrauding tradesmen or cheating friends. At a moment when Walter de Luidekerke was in want of money, it happened that a wealthy Greek, named Photios, visited some property he possessed within the limits of the province of Corinth. The governor, hearing of his presence, sent a party of his men-at-arms to seize Photios, pretending that he was violating the treaty with the Byzantine authorities, by living at free quarters within the limits of the Frank territory. When the prisoner was secured, the peasants of the district were incited to make a demand for damage done by Photios, to the amount of ten thousand perpers¹; and Walter insisted that this sum should be paid to him by his prisoner. Photios, who knew the accusation was got up as a pretext to extort money, treated the demand with contempt. Though he was imprisoned and treated with great severity, he resisted the demands of Walter with constancy, not thinking that the governor would dare to make use of any personal violence, which might become a ground of war with the Byzantine government. But the governor of Corinth was determined to obtain money, even at the most desperate risk; and in order to compel Photios to agree to his demands, he ordered two of the Greek's teeth to be extracted. As it was now clear that Walter was ready to proceed to extremities, Photios consented to purchase his liberty, by paying one thousand perpers².

Photios, as soon as he was released from confinement, applied for justice to the Byzantine governor of Misithra, who represented the matter to the prince of Achaia; but Florenz, who was anxious to protect his relation, affected to believe that the accusation brought by the peasants was well founded, and rejected the claim for satisfaction. The Byzantine authorities did not consider the moment favourable for renewing hostilities; so that Photios, disgusted with his ineffectual attempt to obtain justice, resolved to seek revenge. Hearing that his enemy was returning to Corinth from Patras,

¹ These perpers must have been silver coins of ten to a gold florin; see below, p. 213, note. Joinville says the gold *besant* was worth *dix sols d'argent*. Such byzants were not of the value of the old Byzantine gold pieces from the fall of the Western empire to the reign of Isaac II. Angelos.

² This would be one hundred gold florins.

he assembled some armed men, and placed himself in ambush on the southern shore of the Corinthian gulf. While he was thus on the watch, a galley was perceived coming from the entrance of the gulf, and bearing the pennon of a Frank knight. It approached the shore, and a young noble, with light hair and a fair complexion, landed to dine near a fountain shaded with plane-trees, not far from the ambush. The Greeks cautiously crept up to the spot; and Photios, seeing a man whom he supposed to be Walter de Luidekerke seated on a carpet, while his attendants prepared his meal, became inflamed with rage at the sight of his oppressor; and rushing forward, with his drawn sword struck the knight several blows, exclaiming, 'There, my lord Walter, take your quittance.' The attendants of the prostrate noble recognized the assailant, and shouted 'Photy, Photy! what are you doing? It is the lord of Vostitza, not lord Walter.' But the information came too late: the fair hair and handsome countenance of the lord of Vostitza had made him the sacrifice for Walter's vices. Both parties raised the wounded knight from the ground, with feelings of deep regret; for the lord of Vostitza was as much beloved as he of Corinth was disliked. He was conveyed in his galley to Corinth, where he expired next day. The prince of Achaia now called on the Byzantine governor to deliver up Photios, but he met with the same denial of justice he had formerly used. The Byzantine authorities declared that the crime committed was accidental, and originated in a mistake while Photios was in search of a legitimate revenge. In spite of the high rank of the young baron of Vostitza, the affair was allowed to drop; for it was evident that Florenz could obtain no satisfaction without war, and he did not think it prudent to renew hostilities on account of a private injury.

The Slavonians of Mount Taygetus were still governed by their own local magistrates. They were tributary to the Byzantine government, but not subject to the Byzantine administration. Two Slavonian chiefs, who resided at Ghianitza, about three miles from Kalamata, formed a plan to surprise that fortress. This design was carried into execution by scaling a tower that commanded the internal defences of the citadel, during a stormy night, with a band of fifty followers. At daybreak, the assailants were joined by 600 of

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their countrymen, in good hauberks, who drove the Franks out of the citadel and garrisoned Kalamata. The moment prince Florenz heard of this disaster, he hastened to Kalamata, and formed the siege of the place in person; but the Sclavonians had sufficient time to augment the garrison, and the citadel contained ample magazines of provisions and military stores. The surprisal of Kalamata was an open infraction of the treaty, and Florenz called on the Byzantine governor of Misithra to compel the Sclavonians to surrender the place they had so treacherously seized; but the governor replied that the Sclavonians were a people who lived according to their own customs and paid no obedience to the laws of the Byzantine empire. Nothing, therefore, remained for the prince but to send an embassy to Constantinople, to demand justice from the emperor Andronicus II.; and, in the mean time, he prosecuted the siege with the greatest vigour. His ambassadors received very much the same reply from the emperor as the prince had received from the imperial authorities in Greece. At last, however, they succeeded in obtaining the nomination of a Greek commissioner to examine into the facts on the spot, with full powers to terminate the business. This commissioner, whose name, Sgueros-Mailly, indicates a family connection with the Latins, was bribed by the Achaian ambassadors, and through his treachery Florenz succeeded in recovering possession of Kalamata, merely on paying the traitor three hundred gold florins, and making him a present of a valuable horse¹.

At this period the Peloponnesus was rich in that accumulation of capital on landed property which forms the surest mark of a long period of civilization, and which it often takes ages of barbarism and bad government to annihilate. Roads, wells, cisterns, aqueducts, and plantations, with commodious houses, barns, and magazines, enable a numerous population to live in ease and plenty, where, without this accumulation of capital, only a few ploughmen and shepherds could drag out a laborious and scanty existence. Abundance creates

¹ *Livre de la Conquete*, 350-355. This chronicle makes three thousand perpers equal to three hundred gold florins; so that it would seem the perper, at this time, was a silver coin about the size of the gros tournois of France, and the gold florin equal in value to those of St. Louis or Philip IV. Sgueros-Mailly, from his name, must have been what was called a Gasmul—half Greek, half Frank.

markets where the difficulties of communication are not insurmountable.

In a fine meadow, near the town of Vervena, a fair of some importance was held, during the thirteenth century, in the month of June. Vervena was subject to the Franks, and was still included in the district of Skorta, once inhabited exclusively by Sclavonians. A rich Greek, named Chalkokondylas¹, from Great Arachova, on the western side of the Tzakonian mountains, had visited this fair to sell his silk. In consequence of some dispute in the public square, a Frank knight struck him with the stave of a lance. There was no hope of redress for the insult at Vervena, so Chalkokondylas returned home, and laid plans for revenging himself on the Franks by expelling them from the castle of St. George, the frontier fortress on the eastern limits of their territory, situated not far from Great Arachova. He succeeded in his project, by gaining over the Greeks employed in the castle to act as cellarer and butler; and with the aid of a few troops, lent by the Byzantine governor of Misithra, who considered the prize of sufficient value to warrant the treachery and risk a renewal of hostilities with the prince of Achaia, he made himself master of the strong castle of St. George.

Florenz, who was never wanting in activity and energy, hastened to besiege the castle in person, hoping to recover possession of it before the Greeks were able to lay in a store of provisions. Its situation, however, rendered it almost impregnable, so that a very small force sufficed for its defence, and there seemed little chance of taking it, except by famine. In order, therefore, to prevent the Byzantine garrison which occupied it from commanding the roads leading to Nikli and Veligosti, Florenz constructed a new castle, called Beaufort, in which he stationed a strong body of men. In the mean time, he sent agents to Italy to enrol veteran troops, experienced in the operations of sieges, and hired the services of Spany, the Sclavonian lord of the district of Kisterna, who joined the Achaian army with two hundred infantry, pikemen, and archers, accustomed to mountain warfare, and habituated to besiege their neighbours in the rock forts of their native

¹ Called in the French chronicle *Corcondille*, p. 378.

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province¹. Spány received from the prince of Achaia two fiefs in the plain near Kalamata, and in return engaged to maintain an armed vessel at the command of the prince. But before all the necessary preparations for making a vigorous attack on the castle of St. George were completed, Florenz of Hainault died in the year 1297.

During the reign of Isabella and Florenz, the suzerainty of Achaia was transferred from the crown of Naples by king Charles II., and conferred on Philip of Tarentum, his second son, on the occasion of his marriage with Ithamar, daughter of Nicephorus, despot of Epirus. Philip received from his father-in-law the cities of Naupaktos, Vrachori, Angelokastron, and Vonitza, as the dowry of his wife; and his father bestowed on him Corfu, and all the lands possessed by the crown of Naples in Epirus, in actual sovereignty. These possessions, united to the suzerainty of Achaia, were intended to form the foundations of a Graeco-Latin kingdom. The death of Ithamar, and the subsequent marriage of Philip of Tarentum with Catherine of Valois, the titular empress of Romania, opened new prospects of ambition to the house of Anjou.

Isabella, princess of Achaia, after a widowhood of four years, married Philip of Savoy. The marriage was ratified by Charles II. of Naples, who invested Philip of Savoy with the actual sovereignty of the principality of Achaia, in the name of his son Philip of Tarentum, the real suzerain². Philip of Savoy, on arriving in the Morea, was compelled by the feudatories of the principality to take an oath to

¹ The district of Kisterna, above Kardamyle and Leuktron, appears from existing remains to have been then, as now, filled with defensible towers. Spány was the master of several castles in the district. *Livre de la Conquête*, 384.

² For the act of investiture, dated at Rome, 23rd Feb. 1301, see Guichenon, *Preuves de l'Histoire de la Maison de Savoie*, p. 103; Buchon's edition of *Muntaner*, p. 505. But Buchon, in his *Nouvelles Recherches* (vol. i. p. 236, and vol. ii. p. 339), has published an act, dated at Calvi, 6th February, 1301, in which Charles II. of Naples declares that Isabella had forfeited her title to the principality, in virtue of the stipulation entered into at the time of her marriage with Florenz of Hainault, prohibiting her or her female heirs to marry without the consent of the kings of Naples, as lords-paramount. It would appear that the influence of Pope Boniface VIII. effected the change in the conduct of the king of Naples; but Buchon does not mention this discrepancy in his last work. [Isabella had visited Rome in 1300, on the occasion of the Jubilee, and had an interview with the Pope. Hopf, who has compared the unpublished documents relating to the subject, shows that Finlay was right in supposing that the Pope's influence with the Angevin princes caused them to consent to the arrangement (*Griechische Geschichte*, p. 351). Ed.]

respect the usages and privileges of the state before they would consent to offer him their homage as vassals. He was considerably younger than his wife; and his fear of losing the government of the principality after her death, and of sinking into the rank of a titular prince on his Italian lands, induced him to employ his time in amassing money, in violation of all the usages he had sworn to respect. In order to avoid awakening the opposition of the Frank knights and barons, he directed his first attacks against the purses of the Sclavonians and Greeks who inhabited the privileged territory of Skorta, on whom he imposed a tax. This was a direct violation of the charter under which these people had long lived in tranquillity, and they determined to resist it. The Byzantine authorities at Misithra were invited to assist the insurrection; and the population of Skorta, with the auxiliary force sent to aid them from the Byzantine province, succeeded, by a sudden attack, in capturing the two castles of St. Helena and Crevecœur, in the passes between Karitena and the lower plain of the Alpheus, both of which they levelled with the ground. The vigour of Philip, who collected all the military force of the principality and hastened to the scene of action, arrested the progress of the insurrection, and recovered the ground lost by the Franks; but the country was laid waste, the wealth of the knights in the district was diminished, two strong castles were utterly destroyed, and there seemed little probability that means would be found to rebuild them. The ruinous effects of the avarice of the prince became evident to all, and it was made too apparent that the tenure on which the Franks continued to hold their possessions in the centre of the Peloponnesus would by a repetition of such conduct become extremely precarious. The Greeks and Sclavonians henceforward made common cause; and whenever an opportunity was afforded them, they threw off the yoke of the Franks, in order to place themselves under the protection of their Byzantine coreligionaries, who gradually gained ground on the Latins, and year after year expelled them from some new district. To this union of the Greeks and Sclavonians for a common object, we must attribute the complete amalgamation of the two races in the Peloponnesus, and the creation of social feelings, which soon led to the utter extinction of the Sclavonian language,

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and the abolition of all the distinctive privileges still retained by the Sclavonian population.

Isabella and Philip of Savoy quitted Greece in the year 1304. They appear to have taken this step in consequence of differences with their vassals in the principality, and of disputes with Philip of Tarentum, their lord-paramount, who, after the death of Boniface VIII., seems to have called in question the legality of the investiture granted by his father to Philip of Savoy¹. Isabella died at her husband's Italian possessions in the year 1311, and Philip of Savoy then became merely titular prince of Achaia, without having subsequently any direct connection with the political affairs in the principality².

SECT. VI.—*Maud of Hainault and Louis of Burgundy.*

Maud or Matilda, the daughter of Isabella Villehardouin and Florenz of Hainault, though only eighteen years of age when she succeeded to the principality of Achaia, was already widow of Guy II., duke of Athens³. In the year 1313, two years after her accession, she was married to Louis of Burgundy, a treaty having been concluded between the king of France, the duke of Burgundy, and Philip of Tarentum, in which her rights were most shamefully trafficked to serve the private interests of these princes. Hugh, duke of Burgundy, had been already engaged to Catherine of Valois, the titular empress of Romania; but it now suited the interests of all parties that Philip of Tarentum, who was a widower, should marry Catherine of Valois; and in order to bribe the duke of Burgundy to consent, Maud of Hainault was forced to cede her principality to her husband, Louis of Burgundy, the duke's brother, and to his collateral heirs, even to the exclusion of her own children by any future marriage. Pope Clement V., the royal houses of France and Naples, and the proud dukes

¹ Ducange, *Histoire de Constantinople*, 213.

² Neither Philip's daughter by Isabella, nor his son by a subsequent marriage, though that son assumed the title of prince of Achaia, had any influence on the public affairs of Greece. Buchon, *Recherches et Matériaux*, pp. 260, 280; Datta, *Storia dei Principi di Savoia del Ramo d'Achaia*, 2 vols., Turin, 1832.

³ Maud, Mahaut, Matilda, Maiatis, and Maár, are all variations of her name found in documents and chronicles, and on coins.

of Burgundy, all conspired to advance their political schemes by defrauding a young girl of nineteen of her inheritance¹.

About the end of the year 1315, Maud and Louis set out from Venice with a small army, to take possession of their principality, which was governed by the Count of Cephalonia as bailly for Maud. In the mean time, Fernand, son of Don Jayme I., king of Majorca, had married Elizabeth, only daughter of Margaret de Villehardouin, the lady of Akova, or Mategrifon², and he advanced a claim to the principality on the pretext that William Villehardouin had by will declared that the survivor of his daughters was to inherit his dominions. The French barons of Achaia, however, were not inclined to favour the pretensions of a Spanish prince, who might easily deprive them of all their privileges by uniting with the Grand Company which had already conquered Athens. As a precautionary measure they imprisoned the lady of Akova on her return from Messina, where the marriage of her daughter was celebrated, and sequestered her estates while waiting anxiously for the arrival of Louis of Burgundy. The lady of Akova died shortly after her arrest. Her daughter Elizabeth only survived a few weeks, dying after she gave birth to Jayme II., king of Majorca, one of the most unfortunate princes that ever bore the royal title³. Fernand was a widower before he quitted Sicily to invade Achaia, and he counted far more on the valour of his Almo-gavars, than on the validity of his son's title. Taking advantage of the war that had broken out between Robert, king of Naples, and Frederic, king of Sicily, he collected a fleet on the Sicilian coast, and sailed from Catania with a corps of five hundred cavalry, and a strong body of the redoubtable infantry of Spain, in 1315. Clarentza and Pondikokastron

¹ On the subject of these arrangements, see p. 120, *note*, and Duchesne, *Histoire générale des Ducs de Bourgogne de la maison de France*; preuves, p. 115. Buchon (*Recherches et Matériaux*, 238) has printed that part of the treaty which relates to the principality of Achaia.

² Elizabeth is sometimes called Isabella d'Adria. The stipulations relating to her marriage with Don Fernand of Majorca are given in d'Achery, *Spicilegium*, tom. iii. p. 704. and Buchon's translation of Muntaner, p. 508, edit. 1840.

³ Jayme II., the last king of Majorca, was driven from his dominions by the king of Aragon, Don Pedro IV. (the Ceremonious), and fell in battle like his father. It is said that he incurred the implacable hatred of Don Pedro, in consequence of a Majorcan squire giving the horse of the ceremonious king a cut with his whip in a contemptuous manner as that monarch was making his public entry into Avignon. This unceremonious conduct of the man was avenged on the master.

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surrendered on his arrival, and the greater part of the western coast of the Morea was soon subdued ; but Fernand, though a gallant knight, was no general, and his wilfulness ruined the enterprise, and cost him his life, at a moment when with a little prudence it seemed probable that he might have completed the conquest of Achaia, and expelled the French from the Peloponnesus as completely as his countrymen had driven them out of Athens¹.

Early in the year 1316, Louis of Burgundy, who had just arrived in Achaia, led out his army against Fernand, who was slain in a petty skirmish where he had no business to be present. After his death, his Spanish followers abandoned all idea of conquering the principality. Their force was inadequate to the undertaking ; and what was worse, they had no expectation of finding another leader who could procure the supplies of men and money required to prosecute the war. Yet the Spaniards were generally accused of treachery for yielding up the fortified places in their possession to the French, who were considerably their inferiors in warlike spirit and military discipline². Louis of Burgundy survived his rival only about two months. It was said that he was poisoned by the Count of Cephalonia, who was one of a family in which poisoning appears to have been a common practice. The death of Louis rendered his widow Maud merely a liferenter in her own hereditary dominions, since, by her contract of marriage and the will of her deceased husband, it now descended in fee after her death to Eudes IV., duke of Burgundy ; while even her own personal rights were exposed to confiscation, in case she should marry again without the consent of Philip of Tarentum, the lord-paramount of the principality.

¹ Muntaner, who seems to have loved Fernand as if he had been his son, complains in amusing terms of his wilfulness when they quitted the Grand Company together in 1307, and Fernand ran himself into captivity at Negrepont. 'It is always a service of danger to wait on the son of a king when he is young,' says the stout old Spaniard ; 'for on account of their high blood, they can never believe that anything in the world can induce other people to do what will not please them. . . . And it must be confessed also, that they hold themselves such great lords, that no one dare contradict anything which they wish to be done ; and this was what happened to us ; so Don Fernand forced us to consent to our own ruin.' Ch. ccxxxv.

² Extracts from a curious memoir, relating to the circumstances that attended the death of Fernand, are given in Ducange, *Histoire de Constantinople*, tom. ii. p. 175. Buchon's edit. ; and in a note to Buchon's translation of Muntaner, p. 518, edit. 1840.

The Neapolitan house of Anjou was as famous for relentless cruelty as for unprincipled ambition and boundless rapacity. The object of Robert, king of Naples, and Philip of Tarentum, was to unite the sovereignty as well as the suzerainty of the principality in their own family. They expected to do this, and to find a pretext for frustrating the claims of the duke of Burgundy, by marrying the princess Maud to their brother John, count of Gravina; but to this marriage the young widow refused to consent. In vain entreaties and threats were employed to make her yield; at last the king of Naples carried her before the pope, John XXII., when she declared that she was already secretly married to Hugh de la Palisse, a French knight. The princes of Anjou determined that this secret marriage should not prove a bar to their ambitious projects. The king of Naples declared the marriage null, and ordered the marriage ceremony to be celebrated between Maud and his brother, the count of Gravina, in defiance of the determined opposition of the young princess. Immediately after this infamous ceremony, the unfortunate Maud was immured in the prisons of the Castel del Uovo, which she was never allowed to quit, and where she is supposed to have died about the year 1324. She was the last of the line of Villehardouin who possessed the principality of Achaia. The frauds of Geoffrey I., and of William his son, seem to have been punished in the third and fourth generation of his house, every member of which suffered the severest private calamities as well as public misfortunes¹.

SECT. VII.—*Achaia under the Neapolitan Princes.—Ruin of the Principality.*

John of Gravina assumed the title of Prince of Achaia immediately after his pretended marriage with the princess Maud, in 1317, and gained possession of part of the principality; but his brother, Philip of Tarentum, reclaimed her liferent, as lord-paramount, in virtue of her forfeiture; and

¹ Jayme III., titular king of Majorca, who married Jeanne I., queen of Naples, and Isabella, who married John II., marquis of Montferrat, were the children of Jayme II., son of Elizabeth of Adria. Jayme died without issue, but Isabella, Elizabeth, or Esclarmonde, was the mother of Otho, John, and Theodore, who became in succession Marquis of Montferrat. *Art de vérifier les Dates*; compare *Rois de Majorque* and *Marquis de Montferrat*.

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the eventual right to the sovereignty was vested in the duke of Burgundy. Eudes IV. sold his claim to Philip of Tarentum, in the year 1320, for the sum of forty thousand livres; and, Maud dying soon after, he became the real sovereign as well as the lord-paramount of Achaia. Philip died in 1322, and was succeeded by his son Robert, whose real sovereignty was disputed by his uncle, John of Gravina. Catherine of Valois, who acted as regent for her son Robert, in order to terminate this family dispute, ceded to John of Gravina the duchy of Durazzo, thereby obtaining a renunciation of all his claims on Achaia.

During this period of confusion in the claims to the principality, the barons of the Morea endeavoured to extend their privileges, and to acquire virtual independence, by forming amongst themselves associations to support that claimant whose interest seemed most likely to coincide with their own; while in some cases new claimants were invited to enter the field, merely to embarrass the proceedings of those who might otherwise become too powerful. All patriotism was lost by the French of Achaia; and in the year 1341, after the death of the Greek emperor Andronicus III., a party of nobles sent a deputation to Constantinople to offer their fealty to the Byzantine empire. The rebellion of Cantacuzenos put an end to this intrigue, by depriving them of all hope of obtaining any effectual aid from this quarter¹. The same party then turned their attention to Don Jayme II., king of Majorca, as the representative of the family of Villehardouin, and they invited him to invade the Morea in the year 1344; but Jayme, who was an exile from Spain, was more intent on recovering possession of his hereditary kingdom than on acquiring a distant principality².

Philip of Tarentum bequeathed the suzerainty of Achaia to his wife, Catherine of Valois, titular empress of Romania. At her death, in 1346, her son Robert reunited in his person the suzerainty with the actual sovereignty of the principality; and, as titular emperor of Romania, he became lord-paramount of the duchies of Athens and of the Archipelago, as

¹ Cantacuzeni *Hist.*, p. 384.

² Ducange. *Histoire de Constantinople*, tom. ii. p. 375, Buchon's edit.; and the notes to Buchon's edition of Muntaner, p. 521, edit. 1840, where the memorial sent by the barons of the Morea to Don Jayme II. of Majorca is printed.

well as of all the other fiefs of the empire still in the possession of the Franks. It is needless to say that the Catalans, the Venetians, and the Genoese attached very little importance to this remnant of feudal pretensions. Still the position of the emperor Robert might, in the hands of a man of talent and energy, have been converted into a station of great power and eminence; but he was of a very feeble character, and in his hands the feudal suzerainty sank into an insignificant title. He died in the year 1364, leaving the real sovereignty of Achaia to his wife, Mary de Bourbon; while the direct suzerainty passed, with the title of emperor, to his brother Philip III. Mary de Bourbon established herself in Greece, but her authority was circumscribed by the power of the barons, and by the claims which others advanced to the princely title; while the ravages of the Turkish pirates, who now began to infest all the coasts of Greece, and the increasing power of the Byzantine governors in the Morea, rendered the administration in that portion of the peninsula still in the possession of the Franks a task of daily increasing difficulty. Disgusted with her position, Mary de Bourbon retired to Naples, where she died about the year 1387. She was the last sovereign whose title was recognized in the whole of the principality.

The barons of the Morea had succeeded in defending their privileges and local independence even against the power of the house of Anjou. The configuration of the country, in which the richest valleys are encircled by stupendous and rugged mountains, rising to a height that prevents all communication between contiguous districts except through a few narrow and defensible passes, must always enable the people of the Peloponnesus, when they are moved by a strong feeling of patriotism, to secure their local independence. The lord of every little valley was thus enabled to live in as complete a state of exemption from direct control as the greatest prince of the Germanic empire. The spirit of separation inherent in the feudal system was assisted by the same physical and geographical causes which had secured the existence of the little republics of Pellene, Tritaea, and Methydrium, in ancient Greece, and now enabled the barons of Chalandritza, Akova, and Karitena to share the political sovereignty of the Pelopon-

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nesus with the princes of Achaia, the dukes of Argos and Nauplia, and the Greek despots of Misithra.

Whenever the power and wealth of their sovereign appeared to threaten any encroachment on their privileges, the Moreote barons united to resist his measures; but after the death of Robert of Tarentum left the succession divided between his wife and brother, the barons began separately to form projects for their individual aggrandizement, by appropriating the rights which belonged to their sovereigns. Various confederacies were constituted for organizing a new constitution. John de Heredia, grand-master of the order of the Hospital at Rhodes, claimed the principality in virtue of a grant from Jeanne I., queen of Naples, confirmed by pope Clement VII. The grand-master stormed Patras sword in hand, and for a short time stood at the head of a powerful confederacy, which threatened to place the whole of Achaia under his dominion; but difficulties presented themselves, and the power of the order soon melted away¹. Subsequently, in the year 1391, Amadeus of Savoy, titular prince of Achaia, was invited by another confederacy to assume the government of the principality; but he died in the midst of his preparations². In the mean time, the predominant influence in the country was exercised by Peter San Superano, bailly of the titular emperor of Romania, Jacques de Baux (Balza); by Asan Zacharias Centurione, baron of Chalandritza and Arcadia; and by Nerio Acciaiuoli, governor of Corinth. It is unnecessary to record the names of any more pretenders to the title of Prince of Achaia. This portion of history belongs to the family annals of the houses of Anjou, Aragon, and Savoy, and has little connection with the progress of events in Greece, or with the fate of the Greek population.

It would be an unprofitable task to trace the intrigues and negotiations of the barons, their civil broils and petty wars with the Catalans, Greeks, and Turkish pirates. Achaia was a scene of anarchy; but we should err greatly if we concluded that such a state of things was considered by contemporaries as one of intolerable suffering. It is unquestionably the

¹ Vertot, *Histoire des Chevaliers Hospitaliers de St. Jean de Jérusalem*, tom. ii. p. 94.

² Datta, *Storia dei Principi di Savoia del Ramo d'Acaia*, tom. i. p. 271. Clement VII. recalled his confirmation of the grant to the grand-master of Rhodes, and issued a new bull in favour of Amadeus of Savoy.

source of much trouble and confusion to the historian, who must toil through wearisome pages of tumid phrases before he can form any classification of the records of the time, or understand the spirit of an age in a society which often avoided expressing its real feelings. We may, however, form a not incorrect estimate of the general feeling, if we reflect that the men of that age, whether nobles, gentlemen, burghers, or peasants, were obliged to choose between two evils. On the one hand, the sovereign, whether emperor, king, prince, or duke, was always engaged in extorting as much money as possible from his subjects, both by taxes, monopolies, and forced contributions; and this treasure was expended for distant objects in distant lands, so that those who paid it rarely derived the smallest benefit from their sacrifices. On the other hand, the local signors, whatever might be the evils caused by their warlike propensities, were compelled to cultivate the good-will of those among whom they passed their lives: their quarrelsome nature was restrained by habits of military fellowship, and their insolence to inferiors softened by personal intercourse. The Greeks could not be oppressed with impunity, for they could easily make their escape into the Byzantine province. Thus prudence placed a salutary restraint on the conduct of the local nobles. To guard against hostile forays and piratical incursions was a necessity of existence; and, as far as personal position was concerned, it must not be forgotten that what the historian feels himself compelled to call anarchy, contemporaries usually dignified with the name of liberty.

While the possession of the principality was disputed by rival princes, and the country governed by the bailties of absent sovereigns, the Franks were compelled to devote all their attention to plans for mutual defence. Their position was one of serious danger: they were a foreign caste, incapable of perpetuating their numbers without fresh immigrations, for they were cut off by national and religious barriers from recruiting their ranks from the native Greek population. They were consequently obliged to watch carefully every sign of domestic discontent, for rebellion was always likely to prove more dangerous than hostile attacks from abroad. In such a state of insecurity, it is natural that the wealth of the country should decline. But the slow decay wrought by

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these causes was suddenly converted into a general destruction of property, by the piratical expeditions of the Seljouk Turks of Asia Minor, who about the latter half of the fourteenth century filled the Grecian seas with their squadrons, and laid waste every coast and island inhabited by Greeks. Omar, son of Aidin, the friend of the usurper Cantacuzenos, was the bloodiest pirate of the Eastern seas; under the name of Morbassan, he has obtained celebrity in the pages of European writers. His power was great, and his insolence even greater. He depopulated the shores of Greece by his piracies, assumed the title of Sovereign master of Achaia, and gloried in the appellation of the Scourge of the Christians¹. Large bodies of the Seljouk pirates who had acquired an accurate knowledge of the topography of the peninsula by serving as mercenaries in the armies of the Greek despots of the Morea, ravaged the principality. These plunderers destroyed everything that was spared in Christian warfare. Other enemies only carried off movable wealth, leaving the peasant and his family to renew their toil, and be plundered on a future occasion. The Turks, on the contrary, after burning down the wretched habitations of the labourer, destroyed the olive and fruit trees, in order to depopulate the country and render it a fit residence for their own nomadic tribes. And they also carried off the young women and children, as the article of commerce that found the readiest sale in the slave-markets of the Asiatic cities. Indeed, for several generations the Seljouk Turks recruited their city population, throughout the greater part of their wide-extended empire, not by the natural influx of the rural population of the neighbourhood, but by foreign slaves, obtained by their warlike expeditions by land and sea. This accumulation of ills diminished the Greek population to such a degree that the country was prepared for the immigration of the Albanian colonists who soon after entered it: the power of the Frank lords of the soil was undermined, and the principality was ready to yield to the first vigorous assailant.

¹ We find the ravages of the Seljouk pirates complained of by the inhabitants of Corinth in a letter to the emperor Robert, prince of Achaia, dated in 1358—
'Insupportabiles afflictiones quibus ab infidelibus Turchis affligimur omni die.'
 Buchon, *Nouvelles Recherches*, Diplomes, tom. ii. p. 145.

Other causes of decay were also at work. The princes of Achaia possessed the right of coining money, and, like all avaricious and needy sovereigns who possess the power of cheating their subjects by issuing a debased coinage, they availed themselves of the privilege to an infamous extent. They were also masters of several commercial ports of some importance, and possessed the power of levying taxes on the foreign trade of the Peloponnesus. This power they abused to such a degree, that the whole trade of the principality was gradually transferred to the ports of the Peninsula in possession of the Venetians. As a consequence of the change, much of the internal trade of the country was annihilated. The value of produce in the interior was depreciated, on account of the increased cost of its transport to the point of exportation; roads, bridges, and buildings fell to ruin; property ceased to yield any rent to the signors; many castles were abandoned, and a few foot-soldiers guarded the walls of fortresses from which, in former days, bands of horsemen in complete panoply had sallied forth at the slightest alarm. The extent of the change which a single century had produced in the state of Greece became apparent when the Othoman Turks invaded the country. These barbarians found the Morea peopled by a scanty and impoverished population, ruled by a few wealthy and luxurious nobles—both classes equally unfit to oppose the attacks of brave and active invaders. The condition of the Morea was even more degraded, morally, than it was financially impoverished and politically weakened. The whole wealth of the country flowed into a few hands, and was wasted in idle enjoyments; while the vested capital that supplied a considerable portion of this wealth was sensibly diminishing from year to year. The surplus revenue which the principality of Achaia, even in its later days, contributed to the treasury of its princes, after deducting the sums required for payment of the permanent garrisons maintained in the fortresses of the state, and the expenses of the civil administration, amounted to one hundred thousand gold florins. This, therefore, was what we term, in modern language, the civil list of the sovereign of Achaia towards the end of the fourteenth century; and it is more than Otho, the present king of Greece, succeeds in extracting from the whole Hellenic soil south of the Ambracian and

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Malian gulfs, though, with reference to the revenues of the country he governs, king Otho has the largest civil list of any European monarch¹.

The Franks had now ruled the greater part of the Peloponnesus for two centuries; and the feudal system had been maintained in full vigour for sufficient time to admit of its effects on civilized communities living under the simpler system of personal rights, traced out in the Roman law, being fully developed. The result was that the Franks were demoralized, the Greeks impoverished, and Greece ruined.

The study of the feudal government in Greece offers much that is peculiarly worthy of an Englishman's attention, since it supplies an illustration of a state of things resembling, in many points, the condition of society that resulted from the Norman Conquest. The fate of England and Greece proved very different. It is true that the difference of religion placed the conquered Greeks in a much worse condition than that of the conquered Saxons, but the discordant results of the two conquests are in no inconsiderable degree to be attributed to the discipline of the private family, and to the domestic and parish life of the two countries. Order and liberty grew up in the secluded districts of England, as well as in the towns and cities; self-respect in the individual gradually gained the reverence of his fellow-citizens; society moved forward simultaneously, and bore down gradually the tyranny of the Norman master, the rapacity of the monarch, and the jobbing of the aristocracy. The spirit of liberty was rarely separated from the spirit of order, so that in the end it achieved the most difficult task in the circle of politics—it converted the rulers of the country to liberal views. In Greece, on the other hand, anarchy and slavery demoralized all classes of society, and involved the rulers and their subjects in common destruction.

Both in England and Greece, the conquest was effected as

¹ This amount is given in the memoir of the barons of Achaia, who invited Jayme II. of Majorca to invade the principality in 1344. Ducange, *Histoire de Constantinople*, ii. 375, edit. Buchon; Muntaner, 522, note to Buchon's translation of 1840. The domains of the prince were immense at a later period. In 1391 the barons possessed fiefs with 1904 hearths, the prince with 2320. This enumeration can hardly be assumed as a guide for determining the total of the population, nor perhaps even the relative extent of country occupied by the parties, since the prince was lord of the populous fiefs of Clarentza and Saint-Omer. Buchon, *Recherches et Matériaux*, 296.

much by the apathy of the natives as by the military superiority of the conquerors, and in both the feudal system was forced upon the conquered in spite of their efforts to resist it and their detestation of its principles. Unfortunately we cannot contrast the effects of the system on the very different social condition of the two countries, for the records of the Frank domination in Greece are almost entirely confined to the political history of the country, and afford us but scanty glimpses into the ordinary life of the people. We see few traces of anything but war and violence; and we are led to the lamentable conclusion that the great result of the power of the Franks in Greece was to extirpate that portion of Byzantine civilization which existed at its commencement, and to root out all the principles of Roman law and Roman administration on which that civilization rested. The higher and educated classes of Greek society vanished, as might be expected, where their masters made use of the French language and revered the Latin church. In England, the conflict of the Normans and the Saxons prepared the way for the submission of both to the law; while in Greece the wars of the French and Greeks only prepared the country to seek repose from anarchy and civil broils under the shade of Turkish despotism. The Norman Conquest proved the forerunner of English liberty, the French domination the herald of Turkish tyranny. The explanation of the varied course of events must be sought in the family, the parish, the borough, and the county; not in the parliament, the exchequer, and the central government.

CHAPTER VIII.

BYZANTINE PROVINCE IN THE PELOPONNESUS RECON- QUERED FROM THE FRENCH.

SECT. I.—*Early State of the Byzantine Province.—Government of the Despot Theodore I.*

THE emperor Michael VIII. no sooner took possession of Misithra, Monemvasia, and Maina, which had been surrendered to him as the ransom for William Villehardouin, than he sent able officers into the Peloponnesus with instructions to spare neither exertions nor intrigues for recovering possession of the whole peninsula. He believed that there would be little difficulty in raising such a rebellion of the Greeks as would expel the French from the territory they retained. The Sclavonians of Mount Taygetus, encouraged by the vicinity of the Byzantine garrison of Misithra, which was the residence of the principal officers from Constantinople; the Tzakones, relying on support from the fortress of Monemvasia; and the Mainates, incited by imperial money,—all flew to arms, and drove the French from their territories. The Sclavonians of Skorta were less fortunate, for they were surrounded on every side by French barons, all the avenues into their mountains were guarded by strong castles, and Akova and Karitena, two impregnable holds, commanded the very heart of their country. Even though they received aid from a Byzantine army, their rebellion was soon suppressed. The Greeks, though they swept over nearly the whole peninsula in the first tide of national enthusiasm, and displayed the imperial eagle before the palace of the princes of Achaia at Andravida, were still unable to encounter the French on the field of battle. Two victories re-established the authority of the Franks. The first was at Prinitza, where

a small body of French knights and men-at-arms, under John de Katavas, defeated the Byzantine army with great loss; but this defeat did not prevent the advance of the Greeks into the plain of Elis. The second battle was more decisive. The armies met at the defile of Makryplagi, and the Byzantine troops were routed with great slaughter. Their generals were taken prisoners, and the commander-in-chief, the grand-domestikos Alexis Philes, died in prison. Makrinos, the second in command, obtained his liberty by paying a high ransom, but on his return to Constantinople he was deprived of sight by his jealous master, who suspected him of secret dealings with the prince of Achaia¹. For five years (1264 to 1268) the war was prosecuted with varied success; but at length the exhaustion of both parties induced them to conclude a truce, which was subsequently converted into a permanent treaty of peace. These events have been already noticed in reviewing the history of the reign of William Villehardouin, prince of Achaia².

It has also been mentioned that, in the year 1341, a number of the French barons offered the sovereignty of Achaia to the Greek emperor³. The Byzantine throne was at that time occupied by John V. (Palaeologos), and the regency was in the hands of his mother, Anne of Savoy: but John Cantacuzenos, the usurper, then acted as prime-minister. The dissensions of the French nobles would probably have caused the speedy subjection of the whole principality to the Greek empire, had the rebellion of Cantacuzenos not compelled the Byzantine government to neglect the affairs of Greece. The strategos at Misithra, who governed the Byzantine province, was watched with as much jealousy by the primates and archonts, as the Frank princes and baillies at Andravida were by the barons and knights of the principality of Achaia. At last the success of the rebellion of Cantacuzenos enabled that emperor to send his son Manuel to the Peloponnesus as imperial viceroy, with the title of Despot, in the year 1349.

The despot Manuel Cantacuzenos found the country suffer-

¹ Pachymeres (i. 138, edit. Rom.) confirms the general account of the events given in the *Chronicles of the Conquest*.

² See above, p. 203.

³ Cantacuzenos, 384; above, p. 221.

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ing severely from the incessant forays of the Franks of Achaia, the Catalans of Attica, and the Seljouk pirates. Each district was forced to rely solely on its own means of defence. Each archont pursued his own private interest as his only rule of action, without any reference to the national cause. The open country was everywhere left exposed to be plundered by foreign enemies, while the walled cities were weakened by intestine factions. Manuel, arriving in the peninsula with a strong body of troops, succeeded in concluding a peace with the principality of Achaia, in repulsing the attacks of the Turkish pirates, and in terminating for a while the civil dissensions of the Greek archonts; so that the Peloponnesus enjoyed more security under his government than it had known for many years. The despot had, nevertheless, his own personal views to serve, for patriotism was not an active principle in any class of Byzantine Greeks. The position of his family at Constantinople was so insecure, that he resolved to take measures for maintaining his own authority in the Peloponnesus, no matter what might happen elsewhere. Under the pretext that it was necessary to keep a fleet in order to defend the country from the ravages of the Seljouk pirates, he imposed a tax on the province. The collection of this tax was intrusted to a Moreot archont, named Lampoudios, who had been exiled on account of his previous intrigues, but whose talents now induced Manuel to recall and employ him. The arbitrary imposition of a tax by the despot was considered an illegal act of power, and the Greeks everywhere flew to arms. Lampoudios, thinking that he was most likely to advance his private fortunes by joining the popular cause, deserted his patron, and took up arms with his insurgent countrymen. For a moment all the intestine broils and local quarrels, which even time rarely assuaged in the rancorous hearts of the Peloponnesian Greeks, were suddenly suspended. The mutual hatred which the archonts cherished to the hour of death, and the feuds which were regularly transmitted as a deathbed legacy to children and to heirs, as an inalienable family inheritance, were for once suspended¹. The Moreots, if we may believe the perfidious Cantacuzenos,

¹ These strong expressions, which depict the present state of Maina, are copied from Cantacuzenos, *Hist.* p 751.

in this record of his son's fortunes, were on this single occasion sincerely united, and made a bold attempt to surprise the despot in the fortress of Misithra ; but Manuel was a soldier of some experience, trained in the arduous school of a treacherous civil war, and with a guard of three hundred chosen men-at-arms, and a body of Albanian mercenaries, who now for the first time make their appearance in the affairs of the Morea, he sallied out from the fortress, and completely defeated the insurgents¹. The patriotic confederacy was dissolved by the loss of this one battle. Some of the archonts submitted to the terms imposed on them by the despot, some attempted to defend themselves in the fortified towns, while others endeavoured to secure their independence by retiring into the mountains and carrying on a desultory warfare. But as soon as the chiefs saw their property ravaged by the Byzantine mercenaries, they hastened to make their peace with the despot.

The fall of the emperor Cantacuzenos induced the Greeks of the Peloponnesus to take up arms a second time against Manuel ; and they welcomed Asan, the governor deputed by the emperor John V. to supersede him, with every demonstration of devotion. Manuel was compelled to abandon the whole province, and shut himself up in the fortress of Monemvasia with the troops that remained faithful to his standard. His administration had been marked by great prudence, and his unusual moderation, in pardoning all those concerned in the insurrection against his plans of taxation, had produced a general feeling in his favour. When the first storm of the new outbreak was in some degree calmed, the archonts came to the conclusion that it would be more advantageous to their interests to be ruled by a governor who was viewed with little favour by the emperor, than to be exposed to the commands of one who was sure of energetic support from the central authority at Constantinople. The result of their intrigues was, that Manuel Cantacuzenos was invited back to Misithra, where he soon succeeded in regaining all his former power, and more, perhaps, than his former influence. He contrived, also, to obtain the recognition of

¹ These Albanians were from the despotat of Acarnania, a name then given not only to the ancient Acarnania and the west of Aetolia, but also to the southern part of Epirus.

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his title from the feeble court at Constantinople, and he continued to rule the Byzantine possessions in the Peloponnesus until the time of his death, in 1380. His administration was only troubled by partial hostilities on the part of the Franks of Achaia, with whom he usually maintained a close alliance, in order that both might be able to employ their whole military force in protecting their territories against the incursions of the Catalans and the Turkish pirates. On one occasion, a joint expedition of the Greek and Frank troops invaded Boeotia, to punish the Grand Company for plundering in the Morea. This expedition took place while the duchy of Athens and Neopatras was governed by Roger Lauria, as viceroy for Frederic, duke of Randazzo.

In the year 1388, Theodore Palaeologos, the son of the emperor John V., arrived at Misithra, as governor of the Byzantine province; and from that time, until the final conquest of the country by the Othoman Turks, it was always governed by members of the imperial family of Palaeologos, with the title of Despot. In later years, when the territory of the Byzantine empire became circumscribed to the vicinity of Constantinople, several despots were often quartered on the revenues of the Morea at the same time. Theodore I., however, reigned without a colleague. But the archonts having taken measures to prevent his governing with the degree of absolute power which he considered to be the inherent right of a viceroy of the emperors of the East, he hired a corps of Turkish auxiliaries to support his despotic authority, under the command of Evrenos, whose name became subsequently celebrated in Othoman history as one of the ablest generals of sultan Murad I.¹ This was the first introduction of the Othoman Turks into the Peloponnesus. But the incapacity of the Byzantine despots, and the selfishness of the Greek archonts, soon rendered them the arbiters of its fate. In the year 1391, hostilities broke out with the Franks, and Evrenos, who had quitted the Morea, was invited to return. The Othomans displayed their usual military energy and talent. In the first campaign they captured the celebrated fortress of Akova, or

¹ Evrenos was a native of Yanitza in Macedonia. His tomb is still shown, and he is regarded as a saint. His countrymen call him Ghazi Gavrinos, and his descendants hold considerable estates, and possessed until lately considerable feudal rights.

Mategrifon¹. About the same time, a corps of Albanian and Byzantine troops, issuing from Leondari, which had now risen up as a Greek town on the decline of the Frank city of Veligosti, defeated the Franks, and took the prince who commanded them prisoner. This prince, however, redeemed himself before the end of the year, by paying a ransom².

Incessant hostilities had now destroyed all the farm-houses of the better class, and the peasants were either crowded into the walled towns and fortified castles, or lodged in wretched huts, that the destruction of these temporary habitations might be a matter of little importance. The great plains were almost depopulated; the Greeks had almost entirely abandoned the occupation of agriculture, restricting themselves to the cultivation of their olive-groves, orchards, mulberry-trees, and vineyards. A new race of labourers was required to till the soil, and to guard the cattle that were becoming wild in the mountains: such a race was required to endure greater hardships and perpetuate its existence on coarser food and scantier clothing than satisfied either the Greeks or the Slavonians who previously pursued the occupation of agriculturists. This class was found among the rude peasantry of Albania, who began about this time to emigrate into the Peloponnesus as colonists and labourers, as well as in the capacity of mercenary soldiers. An immigration of about ten thousand souls is mentioned as having taken place at one time; and from year to year the Albanian population of the peninsula acquired increased importance, while the Slavonians rapidly diminished, or became confounded in the greater numbers of the Greeks³.

¹ The *Chronicon Breve*, at the end of Ducas, says that Evrenos united with the prince; but the context warrants the inference that the despot is thereby meant, who had moved from Leondari before the arrival of the Othoman general.

² This prince appears to have been Hugh, prince of Galilee, son of the empress Mary de Bourbon, widow of Robert, emperor and prince of Achaia, by her first marriage with Guy de Lusignan. Hugh was his mother's bailly in Achaia at the time of her death in 1387, and continued to possess considerable fiefs in the principality. In the year 1391, the principality of Achaia was governed by Peter of San Superano, as vicar-general, in virtue of an appointment from the titular emperor James de Baux, the lord-paramount.

³ The Slavonians are mentioned for the last time as forming part of the population of the Peloponnesus in an enumeration of the various races inhabiting the country, by Mazaris, a Byzantine writer of the first quarter of the fifteenth century. He enumerates Lacedaemonians (Tzakones), Italians (Franks), Peloponnesians (Greeks), Slavonians, Illyrians (Albanians), Egyptians (Gipsies), and Jews. Boissonade, *Anecdota Graeca*, tom. iii. p. 174. See above, p. 33.

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In the year 1397, sultan Bayezid I. sent his generals Iakoub and Evrenos into the Peloponnesus, to punish the despot Theodore for having taken part in the confederacy of the Christian princes that was broken up by the defeat of Sigismund, king of Hungary, at the battle of Nicopolis on the Danube. On this occasion a powerful Othoman army entered the peninsula by the isthmus of Corinth, and extended its ravages as far as the walls of Modon. Argos then belonged to the Venetian republic, which had purchased it from Mary d'Enghien, the last heir of the fief granted by William Villehardouin to Guy de la Roche¹. Though it was defended by a Venetian garrison, the Othoman troops stormed the place, and the inhabitants were either massacred or carried away as slaves and sold in the Asiatic markets. The sultan's object in this invasion was merely to punish the despot and to employ and enrich his troops, not to take permanent possession of the country. His army therefore retired in autumn, carrying with it an immense booty and about thirty thousand slaves. The destruction of the crops and cattle, and the depopulation and desolate condition of the country, produced a severe famine.

The despot Theodore, seeing the deplorable state to which his territory was reduced, endeavoured to procure ready money by selling the city of Misithra to the grand-master of the knights of the Hospital at Rhodes, as if the Morea had been his own private domain. The Greek inhabitants resisted this transfer of their allegiance to a society of Latin military monks, so that it was impossible to complete the transaction, and by the advice and at the intercession of the archbishop of Lacedaemon, the Greek archonts consented to receive the despot Theodore again as their prince, on his promising with a solemn oath not to take any important step in the government of the province without convoking an assembly of the Greek aristocracy and receiving their consent to the proposed measure. Had the Greek archonts of the Morea possessed any capacity for government, or any patriotism, they might from this time have conducted the public administration; but their mutual jealousies and family feuds soon enabled the

¹ Crusius, *Turcograecia*, 92. Compare Chalcocondylas, 51; Phrantzes, 62, p. 83, edit. Bonn., where correct the year; the indiction, however, is right; see the *Chronicon Breve* at the end of Ducas, anno 1389-1394.

despot to regain the authority he had lost. Theodore died in the year 1407, and was succeeded by his nephew, Theodore Palaeologos II., son of his brother the emperor Manuel II.¹ At the time of his death, the Byzantine possessions had increased so much that they embraced fully two-thirds of the peninsula. He had annexed Corinth to the despotat in the year 1404. The Frank principality of Achaia was divided among several barons. The counts of Cephalonia, of the family of Tocco, who had risen to power by the favour of the house of Anjou, were in possession of Clarentza, and divided the sovereignty of the rich plain of Elis with the family of Centurione, who held Chalandritza, the city of Arcadia, and a part of Messenia. The Pope was the possessor of Patras, which was governed by its Latin archbishop; and the Venetian republic possessed Modon, Coron, Nauplia, Argos, and Thermisi².

SECT. II.—*The Emperor Manuel II. attempts to ameliorate the Byzantine Government in the Peloponnesus.*

In the year 1415 the emperor Manuel II. visited the Peloponnesus, in order to strengthen the position of his son Theodore II. by reorganizing the province, which, in consequence of the rapid conquests of the Othoman Turks, had become the most valuable possession of the Byzantine empire beyond the Hellespont, and excited a degree of attention it had never before received from the statesmen of Constantinople. As it was the native seat of the Greek race, and the only country that offered profitable posts, these Byzantine politicians at last made the discovery that they were themselves Greeks, and not Romans. To the Peloponnesus, therefore, the imperial government directed its care, in the hope that this most important part of ancient Greece might furnish the means of prolonging the resistance of the

¹ Chalcocondylas, 114.

² Thermisi is a castle of the middle ages, on the coast of Argolis, nearly opposite the town of Hydra. It is now in ruins. It was built to command the anchorage, which was often used by vessels ascending the Archipelago when met by a northerly wind. A few traces of Hellenic remains are visible in the walls, and the modern name is evidently connected with the temple of Ceres Thermesia. Pausanias, ii. 34, § 11.

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eastern empire to the progress of the Othomans. Manuel II. devoted himself to the task he had undertaken both with zeal and judgment. He regulated the amount of taxes to be paid by the inhabitants with justice, and with what he conceived to be great moderation; and he introduced so many administrative reforms that he put an end to the tyranny of the archonts, and restored power to the administration of the despotat at Misithra. But it was far beyond the genius of Manuel, or of any man then living, to infuse a spirit of unity into the discordant elements of Greek society in the fifteenth century. The vices of the Greeks were nourished by the circumstances in which they were individually placed, even more than by the defects of their political institutions. This insuperable barrier to their improvement could not be removed by financial and administrative reforms; the moral regeneration of every class would have been necessary, to remove the prohibition which Greek society then imposed on all national progress. Had the demoralized, rapacious, and intriguing aristocrats of the Morea been all suddenly destroyed, they would immediately have been replaced by men equally vicious, for no healthier social elements existed in the classes below. Under the most favourable possible circumstances, time was necessary to enable a better administration and a good system of education to produce any effect; and there was no time to lose, for the avengers of the moral degradation of Greece were at the gate. The armies of the Othoman sultan waited only for a word to destroy the troops, fortresses, government, and people of Greece.

There is no doubt that the emperor Manuel, and many statesmen of the time, were fully aware of the evil state of things. The depopulation of the country was apparent from the remains that were everywhere visible of recently abandoned habitations. But still no one was able to point out the precise method by which the evil could be remedied. All perceived that the weakness of the country invited the ravages of the Franks, Catalans, and Turks, but how to infuse new strength into society was a problem none could solve. The emperor Manuel, in a funeral oration he delivered at Misithra, in memory of his deceased brother Theodore, praised the despot for the great care he had devoted to establishing Albanian colonies on the waste lands in the

Peloponnesus; but it does not appear to have struck the emperor's mind that Greeks ought to have been able, under a proper system of government, to multiply in a country into which foreigners could immigrate with advantage. In the United States of America at present we see an immense annual immigration, but we see at the same time a greater proportional increase of the native population. The Greek emperor, however, could see no means of preventing the native seats of the Greek race from becoming an uninhabited waste, except by repeopling them with Albanian colonists.

The defence of the peninsula was not neglected. The plan adopted by Manuel for completing the fortifications at the Isthmus of Corinth, where he believed a Greek army might effectually resist the Othoman forces, affords us a curious illustration of the state of society at the time. Either the Byzantine government was unwilling to pay for labour, or it knew that money alone, in the condition to which the Morea was then reduced, would not procure a competent supply. Forced labour was therefore necessarily employed to construct the wall across the isthmus. The archonts and landed proprietors, the local magistrates and government officials collected labourers in their respective districts, and the fortifications from the Saronic Gulf to the Gulf of Corinth were divided into suitable portions, according to the numerical strength or masonic skill of the different contingents, each being employed in the construction of a fixed portion of the wall or of the ditch¹. The emperor directed the progress of the works, which were carried across the isthmus, on the remains of the fortifications constructed by Justinian on older foundations, just behind the Diolkos, or tram-road, by which vessels were dragged over the isthmus from sea to sea. The distance was about seven thousand six hundred yards, or forty-two stades. The wall was strengthened by one hundred and fifty-three towers². Remains of the work are still

¹ Edward III. built the palace at Windsor in the same way. Each county was required to send a certain number of masons, tilers, and carpenters. Hume, *History of England*, chap. xvi.

² Phrantzes (p. 96, edit. Bonn.) gives three thousand eight hundred *orgyiai* as the breadth of the isthmus; Chalcocondylas (p. 98, edit. Paris) forty-two stades. The real distance from sea to sea in a straight line is about three miles and a half, but the wall is longer. There is a memorable instance of the diolkos having been used for transporting a fleet across the isthmus in the Middle Ages. During the

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visible, but it proved utterly useless for the defence of the Peloponnesus.

When the emperor Manuel had completed his plans for the reorganization and defence of the Peloponnesus, he returned to Constantinople, carrying with him the most turbulent of the Moreot archonts, who had attempted to thwart his designs. He left his son, the despot Theodore II., to govern the province under the most favourable circumstances; but the attempt of the emperor to infuse vigour into the Byzantine administration proved unsuccessful. His plans never received a fair trial, for the government of the Morea was after his death divided among his sons, two or three of whom were generally established in different parts of the province, living at the expense of the inhabitants, and each maintaining a princely retinue and assuming the authority of an independent sovereign. Yet some good effects resulted from the emperor's labours: the Byzantine government gradually gained ground on the Franks of Achaia, and the progress was made more by the favourable disposition of the Greek people than by the military force employed by the Byzantine authorities. Manuel also succeeded in giving to the Peloponnesus a greater degree of security from foreign attacks than it had experienced for many years. But towards the end of his reign, he was unfortunately involved in hostilities with the Othoman Turks, and the Peloponnesus suffered severely in the quarrel. In 1423, sultan Murad II., having been compelled to raise the siege of Constantinople, revenged himself by plundering the Byzantine possessions in the Morea. An Othoman army under Turakhan invaded the Peloponnesus, and, meeting with no resistance from the despot Theodore, plundered the whole country. The Albanians established at Gardiki and Tavia alone had courage to oppose the Turks. Their courage was vain; they were completely defeated, and all the prisoners that fell into the hands of Turakhan were massacred without mercy, in order to intimidate the Christians. Pyramids of human heads were erected by the Turks, in commemoration of this victory

reign of Basil I., A.D. 883, Niketas Oryphas, the Byzantine admiral, conveyed his fleet over the isthmus in order to surprise the Saracens who were ravaging the western coasts of Greece. The best account of the Isthmus of Corinth is contained in Leake's *Travels in the Morea*, iii. 286.

over the Christians; but the sultan, not thinking that the hour had yet arrived for taking possession of all Greece, ordered Turakhan to evacuate the Morea and return to his post in Thessaly¹. The despot Theodore was a weak man, utterly incapable of directing the government: he took no measures either to circumscribe the ravages of the Turkish troops, or to alleviate the evils they had produced, after their retreat.

Every thinking man began to feel that nothing but a radical change in the government and in the social condition of the inhabitants could save the country from ruin. Mazaris, a Byzantine satirist, describes the inhabitants of the Peloponnesus as a barbarous and demoralized rabble, consisting of a mixture of Tzakones, Franks, Greeks, Sclavonians, Albanians, Gipsies, and Jews, of whose improvement there was no hope. A political moralist of the time, Gemistos Plethon, with the boldness that characterises speculative politicians, proposed schemes for the regeneration of the people as daringly opposed to existing rights, and as impracticable in their execution, as the wildest projects of any modern socialist². Plethon's project was to divide the population into three distinct classes,—cultivators of the soil, landlords and capitalists who live on rent or profits, and officials who guard order whether soldiers, administrators, lawyers, or princes. It is not necessary to review the details of his scheme, for, though he frequently displays much acuteness his project was impracticable. The evils that struck him most forcibly in the social condition of the peninsula were,—the wretched state of the military force; the oppressive nature of the system of taxation, which ruined the people by a multiplicity of imposts; the imperfect administration of justice, and the

¹ Ruins retaining the name of Gardiki, and a church called Kokala (Bones), in a deep glen in one of the counterforts of the rugged mountain Hellenitza, to the south of Leondari, mark the site of this tragedy. Tavia or Davia still exists as a village in the valley of the Helisson, west of Tripolitza.

² George Gemistos Plethon is best known as a Platonic philosopher, whose reputation was great in Italy in the fifteenth century. He attended the Byzantine emperor John VI. to the council of Ferrara and Florence, in 1433, and became a public lecturer under the patronage of Cosmo de' Medici. His two discourses on the political condition of the Peloponnesus are printed in Canter's edition of Stobæus, Antwerp, 1575. Fallmerayer, in his *Geschichte der Halbinsel Morea*, first drew the public attention of modern scholars to these works. Dr. Ellissen of Göttingen has reprinted these works of Mazaris and Plethon with German translations in Part iv. of *Analekten der mittel- und neugriechischen Literatur*, Leipzig, 1860.

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debased state of the metallic currency, which filled the country with foreign coin of base alloy. Plethon thought that all wealth resulted from the cultivation of the soil, and he supposed that society could prosper if the farmer received one third of its produce, the landlord and capitalist another third, and the government, including every branch of public expenditure, the remaining third. The soldiers were to be quartered in the families of the peasantry to consume the produce appropriated to the government. All money taxes were to be abolished; and the revenue necessary for the prince and higher officials was to be raised by exporting the surplus produce of the country. It is evident that the project of Gemistos Plethon would have rendered society even more barbarous than he found it, but it would be a waste of time to expose its theoretical errors. The test by which we can decide on the impracticability of his scheme is very simple, and very generally applicable to many other schemes, which have a good theoretical aspect. Though he boldly offered himself to the emperor Manuel as the agent for carrying his plans into immediate execution, he fails to indicate the primary step which it would be necessary to take to prevent the administrative powers in existence from opposing the gradual introduction of measures which, from their very nature, required a certain lapse of time before they could be brought into operation. Now it is evident that no gradual reform can ever be carried through, unless the first step in the change creates a strong feeling in favour of the ulterior scheme, as well as a powerful body of partizans interested in its success; for unless the opposition of those who have an interest in opposing a change be instantaneously paralyzed, a long struggle may ensue, which is most likely to end by producing some arrangement totally different from that contemplated by the reformer. The difficulty of describing a better state of society than that in which we are living is never great, and most men believe that, if they could lay all mankind asleep, and only awaken each individual at the moment when his place in their new order of society is prepared to receive him, they could improve the condition of mankind. But statesmen know well that complicated schemes of reform can only be completed by society itself. They only seek to guide the movement, so that, while each

individual is hurrying on in pursuit of his own objects, a general improvement may be produced without any appearance of sudden change. It is only possible to point out with certainty the first step in the path of improvement. That step can be taken without delay; but, when taken, it may reveal unseen impediments, and open new paths, which require fresh measures and additional resources before further progress is attempted. The statesman concentrates all his powers on the first step; the theoretical political philosopher undertakes to arrange all society, with the exception of this first step.

SECT. III.—*Division of the Morea among the Brothers of the Emperor John VI.—War of the Despots Constantine and Thomas with the Othoman Turks, in 1446.*

The emperor John VI. succeeded his father, Manuel II., in the year 1426, and in the autumn of 1427 he visited the Peloponnesus, to create for his brothers Constantine and Thomas suitable establishments in the province. The despot Theodore had announced his intention of retiring into a monastery, and the emperor proposed conferring the most important part of the province, with the general direction of the administration, on his favourite brother Constantine. Thomas had already received an appanage in the peninsula by his father's will. Before the emperor reached Misithra the melancholy and discontented Theodore had changed his mind. For some years, therefore, the three brothers governed different portions of the Byzantine province simultaneously, almost with the power of independent princes. Theodore, as has been already noticed, was inconstant and weak; Constantine, the last unfortunate emperor of Constantinople, was brave but imprudent; while Thomas was a cruel and unprincipled tyrant.

The fortunes of the despot Constantine acquire a prominent interest, from his fate being linked with the conquest of Constantinople and the ruin of the Greek race. His bold and restless character connects the fate of the Morea with his personal history. When the emperor John VI. found that Theodore refused to resign his authority, he procured for

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Constantine a territorial establishment at the expense of the Franks. Charles Tocco, count-palatine of Cephalonia, was threatened with war; and as the wealth of the Byzantine empire, even in its impoverished condition, enabled it to bring into the field an overwhelming mercenary force, he was glad to purchase peace by marrying his niece Theodora to the despot Constantine, and ceding the city of Clarentza, with all his possessions in the Peloponnesus, as her dowry. After the celebration of this marriage, the emperor, before returning to Constantinople, conferred the government of Vostitza and Messenia on Constantine, and that of Kalavryta on Thomas.

Constantine resided at Clarentza, where he possessed the feudal jurisdiction of a Frank prince over the Latin inhabitants, whom he endeavoured to conciliate; while at the same time he entered into plots with the Greeks who resided in Patras, to gain possession of that place by treachery. The Latin archbishop, Pandolfo Malatesta, who governed as the temporal no less than spiritual deputy of the Pope, was at the moment absent in Rome. The attempt to surprise Patras failed, and a skirmish ensued, in which the historian Phrantzes was taken prisoner while bravely covering the retreat of Constantine, to whom he was attached as chamberlain¹. The despot, undismayed by his failure to surprise the city, soon returned with a sufficient force to form the siege; and though he received an order from sultan Murad II., who had constituted himself the arbiter of all the Christian princes in Greece, to suspend hostilities, he prosecuted his undertaking, and succeeded in persuading the inhabitants of the town of Patras to submit to his authority. The Latin archbishop arrived at Naupaktos with succours a few days after the Byzantine troops had entered the town; but it was found impossible to introduce any supplies into the citadel, which still held out, and whose garrison continued to defend it for a year. Phrantzes, who had been released by the Latins after forty days' imprisonment, was the envoy employed by Constantine to persuade sultan Murad II. to consent to the conquest of Patras. In the mean time a papal fleet, consisting of ten Catalan galleys, finding it

¹ Phrantzes, 138, edit. Bonn.

impossible to open any communication with the besieged garrison in the citadel of Patras, left their anchorage, and, sailing to Clarentza, suddenly stormed that city during the absence of Constantine. The Catalans threatened to destroy the town, unless they received immediately the sum of twelve thousand sequins as its ransom; and this sum the despot consented to pay, in order to obtain liberty for all the prisoners who had been captured in the place. The despot knew that the fortifications of Clarentza were so strong that the Catalans might have kept possession of this position for some time, and he feared lest some other Frank power might, by seizing the place, become master of a port in his dominions. To prevent this, he no sooner recovered possession of the city than he ordered the walls to be destroyed, and intrusted the defence of the whole coast to the garrison of the neighbouring fortress of Chlomoutzi, or Castel Tornese, which is only three miles distant. From this time Clarentza gradually declined. The Catalans continued to cruise in the Ionian seas, and they subsequently captured the unlucky Phrantzes, who appears to have been as severely persecuted by fortune as his unlucky master, without being so directly the cause of his own misfortunes. He had on this occasion been sent to the Ionian islands to arrange some differences in the family of Tocco, and he was now compelled by the Spaniards to ransom himself, and the other Greek prisoners who had fallen into their hands, by paying five thousand sequins¹. War was at that time an honourable mode of

¹ It would be more interesting to follow the private fortunes of the historian Phrantzes, at this period, than to pursue the record of public events in the Morea. The simplicity with which he recounts his bad and good fortune gives a character of truth to his narrative that is often wanting in the Byzantine writers. He tells us in the most entertaining manner of the presents he received from the despot Constantine on his release from the prison of Patras; and the sincere joy shown by his prince, on this occasion, inspires us with a feeling of affection for the unfortunate and imprudent despot. He must really have felt a friendship for Phrantzes not often experienced in the chilly atmosphere of a court, and his affection was repaid by sincere devotion. Phrantzes also narrates with diplomatic shamelessness and self-gratulation how he picked the pockets of the Turkish ministers of their despatches, after he had succeeded in making them drunk, and himself, according to his own confession, very nearly so. Thus we see that the irresponsible nature of diplomacy can hardly fail to stain the character even of the worthiest man. No gentleman who had not been a diplomatist would boast of his exploits as a pick-pocket. But the event of the historian's life which seems to have given him the greatest satisfaction, and which he hoped might induce his readers to rank the name of Phrantzes with the Spartan heroes of old, was the fact that he was intrusted by the despot with the government of the city

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collecting plunder; it had not yet assumed the pretext of being a means of obtaining justice.

The only Frank prince who now retained a feudal sovereignty in the Peloponnesus was Azan Zacharias Centurione, baron of Chalandritza and Arkadia, who had assumed the title of Prince of Achaia. During the siege of Patras, Thomas Palaeologos invested Chalandritza; and after its capture, Centurione, unable to receive succour either from Italy, or from the Catalan fleet, was compelled to make the best terms he was able with the Greeks. Thomas married his daughter Katherine, who was declared heir of all his territorial possessions, though her father was allowed to enjoy a liferent of them. This act extinguished the last trace of the principality of Achaia, after it had existed two hundred and twenty-five years, and as a reward for his exploits Thomas received from his brother the emperor the title of despot (A.D. 1430). The whole of the Peloponnesus, with the exception of the five maritime fortresses held by the Venetians, was now reunited to the Byzantine empire, and its government administered by the three despots, Theodore, Constantine, and Thomas.

The demon of discord had so long established his court in the Peloponnesus, and hatred, envy, and avarice had so thoroughly transfused themselves into Greek society, that it is not surprising to find the three brothers soon involved in disputes. The state of society, the configuration of the country, and the corruption of the Byzantine financial administration, invested the archonts and chieftains with considerable local power, while it debarred them from all participation in the legislation of their country, and all power to correct the abuses that prevailed in the general government. They were excluded from direct authority, except as financial or administrative agents of the central power. The consequence was, that the attention of every man in the country was directed to the courts of the despots, where every intrigue was employed to secure the favour of those individuals who were supposed to influence the decisions of the despots and the distribution of offices. The fraternal discord which disgraces the last period of the Byzantine domination was produced

of Misithra and its environs, consisting of the citadel, the Jews' quarter, Tzeramios, Pankotes, Sklavochorion, and some other villages.

as much by Moreot intrigue as by Constantinopolitan ambition; for, though the house of Palaeologos knew nothing of brotherly love, no violent personal hatred inflamed the passions of the brothers in their quarrels for power. There was more of meanness than of wickedness in their conduct; their very vices partook of the weakness of the empire and the degradation of the Greek race.

In the year 1436 the despots Theodore and Constantine visited Constantinople, and John VI. showed a disposition to select Constantine, though the younger of the two, to be his heir. He knew that Theodore was utterly incapable of preserving the city of Constantinople from falling into the hands of the Turks; while, if it were possible to prolong the existence of the Byzantine empire, the courage and popularity of Constantine alone held out any hope of success. Prudence, however, was no part of Constantine's character; and, in order to make sure of the imperial succession, he resolved to eject his brother Theodore from the government of Misithra, hoping that the blow would induce the melancholy despot to retire into a monastery, to which he often expressed an inclination. Leaving Constantinople secretly, he hastened to Clarentza, where he assembled a band of soldiers, composed in great part of the Frank military adventurers who still lingered in the western part of the Peloponnesus. He persuaded his brother Thomas to join in his plans, and they invaded the territories of Theodore, where they expected to meet with little opposition; but Constantine's project had transpired in time to allow Theodore to reach Misithra before it was besieged. Civil war soon spread over the whole country, and a pretext was afforded to the Moreot chiefs to gratify private revenge, under colour of serving the hostile despots. While the quarrel of the brothers was languidly prosecuted, the personal vengeance of individuals deluged the country with blood. Constantine on this occasion displayed an utter want of patriotism. In order to reign, he was ready to become a vassal of the Turks. Phrantzes was sent as envoy to solicit the support of sultan Murad II.; and it was with difficulty that the emperor John VI. prevailed on his infatuated brothers to conclude a peace, without making the sultan the arbiter of their differences. Constantine at last consented to return to Con-

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stantinople, and cede his government in the Peloponnesus to the despot Thomas, who continued to live in discord with Theodore until the year 1443. In that year Theodore finally quitted the Morea, and received in exchange the city of Selymbria as an appanage. He soon resigned his power, and retired into a monastery, where he died, before witnessing the final ruin of his country. On the retreat of Theodore from the Peloponnesus, Constantine was invested with the government of Misithra, including Laconia, Argolis, Corinthia, and the coast of Achaia as far as Patras. Thomas continued to rule the whole of Elis and Messenia, with part of the ancient Arcadia, and of Achaia¹.

About this time the Othoman power was threatened with serious embarrassments; and the despot Constantine immediately forgot the friendship he had professed for sultan Murad II., when he was soliciting Turkish assistance to drive his brother from Misithra. The news that the Hungarians had overthrown the Othoman army at Isladi, and that George Castriot, or Scanderbeg, had re-established a Christian principality in Albania, induced Constantine to strengthen the wall at the isthmus of Corinth, and repair the breaches made in it by Turakhan in 1423. As many troops as it was possible to collect were assembled at Corinth; and Constantine advanced into northern Greece with a considerable force, in order to invade the pashalik of Thessaly, and distract the operations of the Turks by attacking their rear. Nerio II., duke of Athens, was compelled to join the league against the sultan; and the Albanians of Epirus and the Vallachians of Pindus were incited to commence hostilities with the Mohammedans. The military operations of Constantine were soon brought to a conclusion by an Othoman army, under Omar, the son of Turakhan, who without difficulty dispersed the Greek troops, and, advancing to Thebes, gave the duke of Athens an opportunity of separating from the Greek alliance, which he had embraced to avert an attack on his own dominions. Constantine unable to face the well-disciplined army of Omar, abandoned all the conquests he had made beyond the isthmus, and thought only of defending

¹ In order to avoid confounding the name of the modern city of Arkadia (the ancient Cyparissiae, the fief of the Centurione) with the ancient state of Arcadia, it is convenient to make a difference in the spelling.

himself in the Peloponnesus. Circumstances seemed to promise him success.

Sultan Murad II., after destroying the Christian army at the battle of Varna, hastened to bury himself again in his beloved retirement at Magnesia, and left the direction of the Othoman government in the hands of his son Mohammed II. The young sultan, able as he proved himself to be a very few years afterwards, could not then preserve order in the mass of armed men who formed the nucleus of the Othoman empire, and the janissaries broke out into open rebellion. It was necessary for Murad to quit his Asiatic retreat a second time. The victory at Varna had put to flight the dreams of independence and national regeneration which were floating in the minds of a few enthusiastic Greeks; the return of Murad II. threatened the nation with immediate destruction: for nothing but constant employment could insure obedience in the Othoman armies. Murad's first enterprise was to punish Constantine for what he considered his ungrateful and rebellious conduct.

Late in the year 1445, Murad II. marched from Adrianople into Thessaly; and taking with him the veteran pasha Turakhan, whose long acquaintance with Greece and its inhabitants rendered him an invaluable counsellor, he pushed forward to Thebes, where he was joined by Nerio II., duke of Athens, a willing vassal in any enterprise against the Greeks. The Turkish army was accompanied by a number of waggons laden with bronze, to cast cannon¹. The army halted for a few days at Minzies, and while his officers were preparing the artillery for an attack on the fortifications of the isthmus of Corinth, the sultan advanced to reconnoitre the wall in person. The imposing appearance of its well-constructed battlements, manned by a numerous army of defenders, under the personal orders of the despots Constantine and Thomas, astonished Murad by a military display he had not expected to behold, and he reproached Turakhan for having persuaded him to attack these impregnable lines at the commencement of winter. Turakhan assured his master that many years' acquaintance with the Greeks enabled him to despise their military array; and declared that the

¹ Daru, *Histoire de Venise*, vii. 195.

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army, even though covered by fortifications, would not long resist a vigorous assault. The conduct of the Christians verified his opinion. The Greek officer sent by Constantine to reconnoitre the Turkish preparations returned with alarming accounts of the Othoman force, and assured the despots that it would be impossible to resist its attack. He advised them to abandon the lines at the isthmus without delay, and seek refuge in the impregnable fortresses in the interior of the Peloponnesus. Either from cowardice or treachery, he behaved so disgracefully that Constantine found it necessary to imprison him, in order to prevent his report from spreading a panic among the soldiery. The sultan soon established his camp before the Greek fortifications. Constantine then deputed Chalcocondylas, an Athenian in his service, to propose terms of peace¹. The Greek leaders must have been singularly confident of their diplomatic success, for they could not place much reliance on the courage of their troops. Chalcocondylas was instructed to demand that the sultan should acknowledge Constantine as independent sovereign of the Peloponnesus, and of all the territory beyond the isthmus which recognized the Byzantine government. On this condition, he offered to abstain from all future hostilities against the Othoman dominions. The proposition appeared to Murad a greater insult than the invasion of Thessaly. Chalcocondylas was thrown into prison, and military operations were prosecuted with vigour. The Othoman camp was established before the middle of the wall, on the last slopes of Mount Geranea, overlooking the whole isthmus and the two seas, with the Acrocorinth and the rugged mountains of the Morea in the

¹ This Chalcocondylas must have been the father of the historian, whom his son mentions as having been sent on an embassy to Murad by the widow of Antonio Acciaiuoli, duke of Athens, in 1435, though Hammer draws a contrary inference, and considers that the historian is speaking of himself. *Histoire de l'Empire Othoman*, tom. ii. p. 500, note 10, trad. par Hellert. Vossius mentions that the historian was alive in 1490, so it seems not very probable that he could have been intrusted with this important embassy forty-four years before; but it is very natural that his father, who had already been employed to negotiate with the sultan, should be again employed in the same way, when we recollect that he had been expelled from Athens by the Latin party, in consequence of his first embassy, and must have sought refuge at the court of the Greek despots in the Morea. Vossius, *De Historicis Græcis*, ii. 30. Compare Chalcocondylas, 169, 181. Demetrius Chalcocondylas, one of the restorers of learning in Italy, who died in Milan A.D. 1511, at the age of eighty-seven, and is buried in the church of St. Mary of the Passion, was a member of the same family as the historian.

background. The excellent police observed in the Turkish army, the plentiful supply of provisions that everywhere attended its march, the regular lines of shops that formed a market at every halt, the crowd of sutlers, with their well-laden mules, accompanying the troops in perfect security, and the regularity with which the soldiers received a daily advance on their monthly pay, calls forth, on this occasion, the admiration of the Greek historian. Chalcocondylas must have often himself witnessed the influence of the Turkish system in creating plenty, even while the army was marching through the most barren districts; but the order and discipline which were preserved among the soldiery may have been more deeply impressed on his memory on this occasion, in consequence of his having heard his father often dwell with wonder on the arrangements he had witnessed, while detained as a prisoner. This description of the Othoman commissariat explains the cause of the long continued success that attended the Turkish arms, better than any account of the tactics of the generals, or of the exercises of the soldiers. The valour of the janissaries was a consequence of their discipline; the talents of the Othoman generals a result of their superior moral as well as military training¹.

On the fourth morning after the Turkish batteries had opened on the wall, the troops mounted to the assault. In the centre of the lines, opposite to the principal battery, the sultan overlooked the storming party; and under his eye a young Servian janissary first gained the summit of the rampart, and planted the crescent firmly in the sight of the two armies. His followers mastered the central towers, broke open the gates of the great road into the Peloponnesus, and admitted the whole Othoman army. The Greek troops abandoned the whole line of the wall the moment the breach was stormed. Constantine and Thomas, unable to rally a single battalion, fled with precipitation to Misithra. Their imprudence had been so great that the Acrocorinth afforded no cover for the defeated army. It had been left without provisions, and surrendered to the first party of Turks that approached it. Three hundred Greeks attempted to resist the enemy. Entrenching themselves in Mount Oxi, above

¹ Chalcocondylas, p. 182.

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Kenchries, they were besieged by the Turks ; but when they found they were cut off from all aid their courage failed and they surrendered at discretion. They were fettered with six hundred prisoners the sultan had purchased from his janissaries, and the whole nine hundred were beheaded without mercy; yet historians tell us that Murad II. was one of the mildest and most humane of the Othoman sovereigns.

Constantine, the author of the war, was so alarmed at the sultan's vigour and cruelty, that he thought of quitting the Peloponnesus and abandoning the Greeks to their fate. The movements of the Othoman army saved him from this disgrace. The main body of the Turks advanced along the coast of Achaia to Patras; while Turakhan, at the head of a light division, was sent into the interior of the Peninsula, merely to lay waste the country and collect booty. The greater part of the inhabitants of Patras escaped over the gulf into the Venetian territory in Aetolia; but about four thousand Greeks who remained in the city, and threw themselves on the mercy of the sultan, were all reduced to slavery. The citadel made a brave defence, and even after the Turks succeeded in making a breach in the walls, they were repulsed. In the mean time Turakhan joined the sultan; and Murad, who was not inclined to waste any more time in Greece, led his army back to Thebes. He is said to have carried away about sixty thousand Greeks, who were distributed throughout the slave-markets in the Othoman dominions. Constantine had received so severe a lesson that he was glad to accept peace on the terms the sultan dictated, and to acknowledge himself a tributary of the Porte¹.

¹ Chalcocondylas, 168-180; Phrantzes, 202; Ducas, 125. The slight mention made of this campaign by Phrantzes, who was then in the Peloponnesus, and the care with which he throws a veil over everything disgraceful in the conduct of Constantine, gives us the standard of veracity in most Byzantine writers. From the conquest of Italy by the Lombards, to the desolation of the Peloponnesus by sultan Murad II., the Greek historians frequently leave the most important events connected with the history of the Greek nation unrecorded. Phrantzes says the isthmus was forced on the 10th December, 1446, but the *Breve Chronicon* says on Saturday 3rd December. Peace was concluded early in 1447. Chalcocondylas, 185. A Turkish historian speaks of the immense quantity of silver plate carried off by the Othoman troops, and says that the booty was so great that the most beautiful women were sold for 300 aspers. Daru, *Histoire de Venise*, vii. 196.

SECT. IV.—*Disorders in the Morea during the Government of the Despots Thomas and Demetrius.—Albanian Revolution.*

The death of the emperor John VI. called Constantine from Misithra to fill the imperial throne at Constantinople, and the government of the Peloponnesus was divided between his brothers Thomas and Demetrius. Thomas received Patras and a considerable portion of Achaia in addition to his former possessions; while Demetrius was established as despot in Laconia, Argolis, and the eastern parts of Arcadia and Achaia. Both were at Constantinople when the partition was made, and, before quitting the capital to assume the administration of their respective provinces, they swore in the most solemn manner, with all the fearful imprecations of which the Greek church makes liberal use, not to invade one another's possessions, but to live together in constant harmony. These oaths were disregarded the moment they set foot in the Peloponnesus. Thomas was a cruel tyrant, who assassinated his enemies and put out the eyes of his captives. Demetrius was an idle, luxurious, and worthless prince, who neglected the business of his station. Both had more than an ordinary share of Byzantine avidity for money, and a princely contempt for the feelings of their subjects. Strictly speaking, the despots who ruled in Morea were nothing more than viceroy of the emperor of Constantinople; but the circumstances in which the empire was placed had, for a long time, rendered them in point of fact absolute and independent sovereigns. The administration both of Thomas and Demetrius, nevertheless, afforded an example of that peculiar system of government, by means of courtly dependents imported from Constantinople in the train of the prince, which, in modern times, has produced the ruin and demoralization of Wallachia and Moldavia. It is a system which, wherever it has existed, has created the deepest execration in the hearts of those subjected to its tyranny. In modern times, the Byzantine officials, who have been the agents of this system, are called Phanariotes, from the name of the quarter of Constantinople in which they usually resided; and their conduct has been one cause of the general detestation with which the Greeks are regarded by other races in the East. Before the conquest

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of the Byzantine empire by the Turks, the officials at Constantinople were a powerful class¹. The two despots were naturally inclined to quarrel; the Byzantine officials who composed their courts expected new places and additional profits from their hostilities, so that their passions were pandered to by these adventurers. Nothing but the fear of the Turks prevented the more energetic Thomas from attacking his brother Demetrius².

When Mohammed II. prepared to attack Constantinople, he deemed it prudent to give the two despots in the Morea sufficient employment at home to prevent them from sending any assistance to their brother Constantine. In October 1452, a Turkish army under Turakhan and his two sons, Achmet and Omar, passed the isthmus, where a Greek corps stationed to guard the wall was cut to pieces. Leaving Corinth unattacked, Turakhan divided his army, and extended his ravages over the whole of the great Arcadian plain, from whence he marched by Leondari into the rich valleys of Messenia. He took Neochorion on the way; but on reaching Siderokastron he vainly endeavoured to storm that place, and was in the end compelled to abandon the attempt. The Othoman troops passed the winter in the soft climate of Messenia. After collecting an ample supply of plunder and slaves, they were ordered in the spring to evacuate the Morea, having fulfilled the object of their winter campaign. As the last division of the Turkish army under Achmet was retiring by the narrow pass on the road from Argos to Corinth, called by the ancients Tretos, and celebrated in modern times for the defeat of a Turkish army under Dramali Pasha in 1822, the Othomans were vigorously assailed by a Greek corps, commanded by Matthew Asan, a noble who possessed both valour and military talents. The Turks were routed with severe loss, and Achmet their general was taken prisoner and delivered up to the despot Demetrius at Misithra. Demetrius received his captive with the greatest attention, and released him without ransom as a mark of gratitude to Turakhan for the services he had received from

¹ The aversion felt by the Peloponnesian Greeks for the Byzantine officials is expressed by Chalcocondylas, p. 216.

² Chalcocondylas informs us that Thomas compelled Demetrius to yield up Skorta, and receive Kalamata in exchange; p. 200.

that pasha during his quarrels with his brother Thomas¹. The fall of Constantinople, and the conviction that the inhabitants of the Peloponnesus feared Turkish cruelty less than Byzantine rapacity, induced the despots to solicit peace on such terms as Mohammed II. might be pleased to dictate. The sultan received them as vassals of the Porte on their engaging to pay a yearly tribute of twelve thousand gold ducats; yet these miserable princes were so blinded by avidity, the master passion of their existence, as to neglect remitting this tribute until the sultan sent them an order either to send the tribute or quit the Morea. This message was delivered in a tone that met with implicit obedience².

At this unfortunate epoch in the history of the Greeks the people, oppressed by rulers who were aliens in feeling, lost all wish to defend their national independence; while the Albanian colonists in the Morea aspired at political liberty. The extent of land thrown out of cultivation by the depopulating ravages of the Turks had enabled the Albanian population to increase considerably, by spreading their flocks and herds over the districts left desolate. The reports that daily reached the Morea of the great exploits of their countryman, Scanderbeg, or George Castriot, inspired them with a desire for independence, and with the hope of rendering themselves absolute masters of the soil they occupied. The Albanians, habituated to hardship, increased in numbers amidst the general desolation of the Morea. The Greeks, on the other hand, nurtured among too many artificial wants, were unable to perpetuate their numbers in the state of privation to which they were reduced. The peasantry, crowded into the towns, were daily perishing from want; the artizans and traders, deprived of their occupations, were rapidly emigrating to other countries. This inauspicious moment was selected by the Moreot archonts, and the Byzantine officials, as a fit conjuncture for demanding from the Albanians an additional rent for the land they occupied. The exaction was resisted, and the moment appearing favourable for a general insurrection, the chiefs of the Albanians boldly proclaimed their

¹ Chalcocondylas, 202; Phrantzes, 235, edit. Bonn; Fallmerayer, ii. 352. Chalcocondylas fixes the place, which Phrantzes might lead his readers to suppose was near Leondari.

² Ducas, 177, 191; Chalcocondylas, 215, 219.

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project of expelling the Greek population from the Morea. Turkish interference perhaps alone saved the peninsula from becoming an Albanian land. Many discontented political adventurers deserted their Greek countrymen, and became the most active leaders in this revolution, which was, on the whole, as much a movement of Albanian cupidity and Greek intrigue, as a contest of national ambition and patriotic feeling. Manuel Cantacuzenos, a Byzantine noble who had acquired great influence among the semi-independent mountaineers of Taygetus and Maina, placed himself at the head of the principal body of the insurgents. By assuming an Albanian name, he expected that the rebels would be persuaded to elect him Prince of the Morea. Instead of Manuel, he adopted the Albanian appellation Ghin; and his wife, instead of Maria, called herself Cuchia¹. The insurgents, with Ghin at their head, besieged the despot Demetrius in Misithra. Centurione, the brother of the wife of the despot Thomas, was at this time confined in the castle of Chlomoutzi along with a Greek named Loukanos, who possessed considerable influence in the affairs of the Peloponnesus. The two prisoners succeeded in making their escape at this critical moment. Centurione, who styled himself Prince of Achaia, collected all the remains of the Latins and Greeks in communion with the papal church, and advanced to besiege Patras with a considerable body of armed men. Loukanos affected the character of an Albanian patriot, and, assembling the discontented of every class and nation in the west of the Morea, united his forces with those of Centurione, before Patras, into which they had driven the furious Thomas, who had been as unable to make head against the insurgents as his weaker brother Demetrius. Neither Patras nor Misithra could have offered any prolonged resistance, so that the fate of the Peloponnesus depended on the Turkish sultan. Both parties sent deputations to Mohammed, to gain his favour. The Albanian chiefs offered to pay the same tribute that had been imposed on the Greek despots, begging to be allowed to occupy the whole peninsula as vassals of the Porte. On the other hand, Matthew Asan, who commanded the Greek garrison in Corinth, assured the sultan that any party would

¹ Theodori Spandugini *Diss. de Orig. Imp. Turcicorum*, in Sansovino's Collection, Venet. 1600, p. 166; Fallmerayer, ii. 357.

readily pay the tribute; and he solicited assistance from the Turk to subdue the Albanian rebels, whose projects, he persuaded Mohammed, were partly directed to independence and partly to plunder. The sultan could not view any movement of the countrymen of Scanderbeg with favour. It suited his policy for the moment to maintain the two rival races in joint possession of the country, but it seemed that, unless he immediately interfered, the Greeks might be completely subdued. To prevent such a catastrophe, Turakhan was again ordered to march into the Peloponnesus, and deliver the despots from their Albanian besiegers. The popular fury was exhausted before the Othoman army entered the peninsula. As soon as the Greek adventurers succeeded in intruding themselves into the principal commands over the insurgent army, the Albanian population perceived that the war was no longer a revolution for their own objects alone.

Turakhan crossed the isthmus in October 1454, and hastened to attack the district of Borbotia, where the Albanians had secured the greater part of their wealth. This place served them as a citadel¹. The approach of the Turks compelled the Albanians to raise the siege of Misithra. The despot Demetrius immediately joined the Turkish army; which, aided by the topographical knowledge of the Greeks, penetrated into the enemy's stronghold and captured ten thousand women and children, as well as the greater part of the riches that had been accumulated by plundering the Greeks during the insurrection. The siege of Patras was raised about the same time, and Turakhan, on advancing into Messenia, was met by the despot Thomas, who conducted the Turks to the fortress of Aëtos, where the Albanian partizans of Centurione and Loukanos had secured their share of the plunder. This party of the insurgents purchased impunity and pardon, by delivering up one thousand slaves to the Turks, with a quantity of arms and a large supply of provisions and cattle. The Albanians now everywhere laid down their arms, and sued for peace. The terms which Turakhan thought fit to dictate were by no means severe, for he was too

¹ Phrantzes, 385, edit. Bonn; Chalcocondylas, 218, edit. Paris Zinkeisen (*Geschichte des Osmanischen Reichs in Europa*, ii. 184) calls the district Bordonia, which indicates that Bardunia was inhabited by Christian Albanians before the Turkish conquest, though their apostasy must have taken place at an early period.

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politic a statesman to allow the Greeks to gain any very decided superiority over their enemies. The terms of the pacification he forced on the despots are a sad testimony of the utter ruin that had overwhelmed the Greek agricultural population. The Albanians were allowed to retain possession of all the cattle they had plundered. They were also permitted to colonize all the waste lands they had occupied, on paying a fixed rent to the proprietors. After Turakhan had settled the affairs of the country, he gave the two despots some good advice, which, if it be correctly reported by Chalcocondylas, does honour both to the head and the heart of this experienced warrior, who had grown grey in the Grecian wars. He advised them to live in peace and cherish brotherly love, for he warned them that their dissensions could not fail to produce rebellions of their subjects, and he recommended them to keep a strict watch over every movement of the unruly Moreots. The Albanian insurrection was marked by many atrocities; it reduced whole districts to a state of desolation, and converted many Greek towns into mere sheepfolds, or *mandrai*¹.

SECT V.—*First Expedition of Sultan Mohammed II. into the Morea.*

The suppression of the Albanian revolt did not tranquillize the Peloponnesus. The country continued to be troubled with plots and convulsions. Byzantine nobles, Greek archonts, and Albanian chieftains were running a race for plunder through the mazes of political intrigue. Constant complaints reached the Porte, and at last Mohammed II. resolved to examine the state of the country in person. On the 15th of May 1458, he passed the ruined wall of the isthmus, and entered the town of Corinth. The Acrocorinth was in a neglected state; but Matthew Asan, with his usual promptitude, introduced a supply of provisions and military stores into it from the port of Kenchries, though he had to convey them almost through the middle of the Turkish camp during the night. The impregnable position of the fortress then

¹ Chalcocondylas, 215; Phrantzes, 383, edit. Bonn; Spandugnano, *op. cit.* p. 166.

defied any attempt at assault. Mohammed therefore left a body of troops to blockade it, while he advanced into the centre of the Morea with the rest of his army. In order to avoid traversing the Venetian possessions round Argos and Nauplia, as he was then at peace with the republic, he turned off at Nemea, and, passing by the lake Stymphalos, crossed a mountain road to Tarsos in the valley of the river of Phonia. Tarsos was inhabited by Albanians, who purchased immunity by furnishing the sultan with three hundred boys to recruit the ranks of the janissaries. A fortress called Aëtos bravely resisted the Othoman arms; but after suffering every extremity of thirst, the inhabitants saw their walls stormed by the janissaries, who pillaged all their property. Their lives were spared, that the young and active might be selected as slaves. From Aëtos the sultan marched to Akova, where numbers both of Greeks and Albanians had sought refuge with their families. The place was attacked ineffectually for two successive days; but when the sultan was on the point of raising the siege, the garrison sent an offer to capitulate. The inhabitants were personally well treated, but they were transported to Constantinople, which Mohammed was endeavouring to repeople with contingents from most of the cities he conquered. Twenty Albanians, who were found in Akova, were condemned by Mohammed to be executed with the most horrid cruelty, for having violated the capitulation of Tarsos by again bearing arms against the Mussulmans¹. The sultan now turned back, and entered the great Arcadian plain near the ruins of Mantinea. The Albanians of Pentecchoria, or Pazenika, were summoned to surrender by the agency of Manuel (or Ghin) Cantacuzenos, the leader of the Albanian revolt, who was now serving with the Turkish army; but they rejected all the sultan's offers, and repulsed the Othoman troops. Mohammed continued his march to Mouchli on Mount Parthenios. Mouchli was at this time one of the principal towns in the peninsula, and its ruins still cover a considerable space, and are said by the peasantry of the

¹ The sultan ordered the ankles and wrists of these Albanians to be broken with clubs, and in this state they were left to die. With that fiendish exultation in cruelty which characterizes Othoman history, the place was called Tokmak Hissari, or the Castle of Ankles. Akova is called Rupela by Chalcocondylas; but Hammer (*Histoire de l'Empire Othoman*, iii. 48) observes that the Turkish historian Seaddin agrees with Phrantzes in calling it Akova.

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neighbourhood to contain the remains of three hundred and sixty-five churches. Though nothing but rudely-built walls are now visible, the Albanian population around connect this Byzantine rubbish with vague traditions of imperial grandeur and of ancient wealth, while they look with indifference on the Hellenic walls of Mantinea, as the work of heathen giants. Mouchli soon surrendered from want of water, the besiegers cutting off the supply by the aqueduct, and the cisterns being insufficient for the inhabitants. From Mouchli, Mohammed returned to Corinth, where he bombarded the Acrocorinth with such effect that the bakehouse and magazines were reduced to ashes¹. The treachery of the archbishop caused the surrender of the place. He secretly informed the sultan of the condition to which the garrison would soon be reduced from want of provisions; and when Asan saw there was no hope of the siege being raised, or of receiving any further supplies, he surrendered the fortress. Mohammed had the generosity to treat this brave enemy with honour. He deputed him to the two despots, to communicate the terms on which they would be allowed to retain their posts. The country visited by the sultan as far as Mouchli, with the whole coast of Achaia as far as Patras, was annexed to the pashalic of Thessaly, and intrusted to the command of Omar, the son of Turakhan. The tribute of the two despots was fixed at five hundred staters of gold, and Demetrius was ordered to send his daughter as a bride to the sultan's harem².

When the despot Thomas believed that the attention of the Othoman government was exclusively occupied with the affairs of Servia and the troubled state of Asia Minor, he

¹ According to Chalcocondylas (240), the balls of Mohammed's artillery weighed seven talents, which, if the talent be estimated, with Suidas, at one hundred and twenty-five pounds, gives a ball of eight hundred and seventy-five pounds' weight. These balls were propelled to the distance of fourteen stades, or about a mile and a half.

² Chalcocondylas, 240; Phrantzes, 387, edit. Bonn; *Chronicon Breve*, A. M. 6066, A. D. 1458. I am not aware how we are to fix the value of what Chalcocondylas, with Byzantine pedantry, calls a stater of gold. Hammer supposes that he means a centner or hundred pounds' weight, as that was the usual mode of reckoning with the Byzantine officials at an earlier period. Until the time of the conquest of Constantinople by the Crusaders, the centner was one hundred pounds' weight of gold, and the pound contained seventy-two nomismata or byzants. The gold coinage of Constantinople lost its ancient purity in the empire of Nicaea and the restored Byzantine empire. Reiskii *Commentarii ad Constantinum Porphyrogenitum de Caeremoniis Aulæ Byzantinæ*, edit. Lips. vol. ii. p. 44; edit. Bonn, vol. ii. p. 139.

resolved to attack his brother Demetrius and the Turkish garrisons in the peninsula at the same time, hoping to render himself master of the whole of the Peloponnesus before the sultan could send any aid. Thomas trusted to the chapter of accidents for the means of making his peace with the sultan, or for resisting his attacks. Vanity whispered that his power as the prince of the Greeks made him a more redoubtable enemy than Scanderbeg the chieftain of the Albanians, whose exploits were then the theme of universal admiration, and whose great success proves to us the worthlessness of his Christian contemporaries. In the month of January 1459, Thomas formed a considerable army by assembling all the troops he could engage in his service. Karitena, St. George, Bordonia, and Kastritza were induced to drive out the officers of Demetrius and join the war party. A proclamation was issued, promising that the archonts and municipal authorities would be allowed to manage their local affairs. The national hatred of the Turks, the contempt felt for Demetrius, and the love of local independence among the Greeks, were the sentiments on which Thomas counted for securing the support of the whole Christian population of the Peloponnesus¹. One division of his army besieged the Turkish garrison in Patras, while the other captured the fortresses of Kalamata Zarnata, Leftron, and the castles in the Zygos of Maina. The whole peninsula was, by this ill-judged insurrection, converted into a scene of anarchy, pillage, and bloodshed. The Albanians, to revenge themselves for their former defeat, plundered all the Greeks alike, whether they were the partizans of one brother or the other; and availed themselves of the general anarchy to lay waste the villages whose farms they were eager to convert into pasture-lands. The Turkish garrisons of Mouchli, Vostitza, and Corinth found opportunities of making continual sorties, burning down the villages, carrying off the cattle in the surrounding country, and preventing the despot from concentrating a sufficient force to besiege them.

To repress these disorders, Mohammed II. sent the pasha of Thessaly against Thomas. The Moslems marched from Patras along the western coast of the Morea into the plain of Messenia, from which they ascended by the pass of Makry-

¹ Phrantzes, 389: *Ἐν αὐθιᾷ ἔχουσιν αὐτὰ οὐχ ὡς πρότερον ἐκυβέρνηον, ἀλλ' ὡς αὐθένται ἦσαν.*

A.D. 1458-1459.]

plagia into the valley of Leondari. Here Thomas had drawn out a numerous army to await their attack, under the walls of the town. The Duke of Wellington is said to have observed that, if fifty thousand men were drawn up in close order in Hyde Park, there would probably not be found three men in London who could move them out of it without producing a scene of confusion and disorder as dangerous as a battle. The Greek despot, in his long embroidered robes, surrounded by a crowd of ceremonious courtiers better versed in the formalities of Byzantine etiquette than the movements of troops in front of an enemy, surveyed his army in helpless pride. Younisbeg, the commander of the Othoman sipahis, after reconnoitring the close array of the Greeks, made a remark on the ignorance of their commanders not unlike the observation of the Duke. He soon verified the correctness of the judgment he had pronounced, by a charge which threw one flank of the army into inextricable confusion, while the great body of the troops remained utterly helpless. The rapid flight of the Greeks, however, showed the Turkish general that fear can often accomplish with ease manœuvres which military science only effects with difficulty. The defeated army left only two hundred men on the field of battle. The speedy capture of Leondari and the submission of Thomas seemed inevitable; but just at this critical moment a violent contagious disease broke out in the Turkish army, and compelled it to retire¹. The Greeks again advanced; Patras was once more besieged, and patriotism revived; but a fresh body of Turkish troops from continental Greece soon compelled the besiegers of Patras to take to flight, abandoning their camp-baggage and artillery to the enemy. Thomas, convinced that his troops were utterly unfit to cope with the Turkish militia, sued for peace, which the sultan, whose attention was occupied with more important affairs, readily granted. He was ordered to pay three thousand gold staters as indemnity for the expenses of the war, and to ratify the conditions of the peace at Corinth within twenty days in person before the Othoman plenipotentiary.

Fear of treachery, and a vague conviction that the sultan would not have consented to any terms had he been prepared for war, inspired Thomas with the courage of despair, and he

¹ Chalcocondylas, 243.

ventured to disobey the order. He reconciled himself with his brother Demetrius through the mediation of the bishop of Lacedaemon, and the two brothers met at the church of Kastritza. The meeting was singularly solemn: the bishop performed high mass in a small church, while the two despots stood side by side in his presence. They then stepped forward and swore perpetual amity, mutual oblivion of every past injury, and brotherly love—receiving the holy communion from the hands of the bishop as a guarantee of their oaths. But to these unprincipled Byzantine lords their plighted word was a jest; the ceremonies of their church mere mummery, to deceive the people; and their religion a device, by which they could cheat heaven out of pardon for the worst crimes. The light of the tapers they had held in their hands, as they uttered their imprecations on their own perjuries, was hardly extinguished before they were plotting how to violate their oaths. The year 1459 had not ended before they were both in arms, ravaging one another's possessions, and exterminating the scanty remains of the Greek population in the Peloponnesus. The Albanian shepherds had good reason to adore the Constantinopolitan rulers of Greece: to the Hellenic race they were far more destructive enemies than the Sclavonians or the Crusaders. We need not wonder when we find that, in this age, many Greeks quitted their religion to embrace Mohammedanism. The Greek church imposed no restraint on the worst vices, and the moralist might well fancy that such Christianity was less productive of moral good, and more at variance with the scheme of the creation, than the faith of Mahomet¹.

SECT. VI.—*Final Conquest of the Morea by Mohammed II.*

Instead of remitting the tribute to the sultan, and ratifying the treaty of peace, Thomas devoted all his endeavours to conquering his brother's territories before the arrival of the Turks. The patience of Mohammed was now exhausted, and he delayed his proposed expedition into Asia in order to lead an army in person into the Peloponnesus, and put an end to these disorders, by extinguishing every trace of

¹ It would be very easy to make a long list of distinguished men in the service of the sultans Murad II. and Mohammed II. who were renegades.

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Greek independence. He passed the Isthmus of Corinth in the month of May 1460, and marched direct to Misithra, where the despot Demetrius received him with profound submission; but the sultan immediately informed him that the state of affairs in the peninsula no longer admitted of a Greek governing any portion of the country, and ordered him to close his reign by commanding every city and fort in his territory to receive a Turkish garrison. The inhabitants of Monemvasia, whose situation had enabled them to retain some degree of independence, boldly refused to comply with these commands; and as they possessed a body of armed citizens sufficiently numerous to garrison their walls, they proclaimed the despot Thomas as their sovereign—preferring a Christian tyrant, against whom they could defend themselves, to a Mohammedan, who would soon destroy their liberties. The sultan marched from Misithra to Kastritza, which also refused to surrender—but, after a vigorous defence, it was compelled to capitulate; and Mohammed, in order to strike terror into all who might feel inclined to resist his arms, excluded three hundred of its brave defenders from the benefit of the capitulation, and ordered them to be put to death. Leondari offered no resistance, but the Turks found it abandoned by the greater part of its inhabitants, who had retired with their families and property to the secluded town of Gardiki. In this rocky retreat the refugees hoped to escape notice, until the storm should roll over, like so many that had preceded it; but the sultan had now resolved to exterminate all who possessed the means of resisting his authority at a future period. He led his troops into the defiles of Mount Hellenitza, and stormed Gardiki. The citadel, in spite of its rocky and almost impregnable position, capitulated as soon as the town was taken. Men, women, and children were then all collected in one spot, and massacred without mercy, by the orders of the sultan. Six thousand souls, among whom were the principal families of Leondari, perished on this occasion to expiate the vices and folly of their Byzantine princes¹. The inhabitants of Old Navarin and Arkadia

¹ Chalcocondylas, 252; Phrantzes, 406. Gardiki was the scene of the first great massacre perpetrated by the Turks in the Morea, in 1423 (*see* above, p. 239). The cruelty of Turakhan excited the emulation of Mohammed.

surrendered, and from their environs ten thousand persons were transported to repeople Constantinople. Amidst these scenes of desolation, the despot Thomas conducted himself with the basest cowardice. As soon as he heard that Mohammed had entered Misithra, he fled to the port of Navarin, and embarked in a ship he had prepared to be ready for his own escape, in case of any accident. When Mohammed approached the western coast, the despot sailed to Corfu.

The Byzantine government in Greece was now at an end. Most of the political adventurers from Constantinople, who had been one of the chief causes of its ruin, abandoned the country. They could no longer expect that the central government would allow them to extort wealth from the unhappy population—for the Othomans systematically preferred levying the tribute by the agency of local primates. The implicit submission of the whole Peloponnesus might have been expected to follow the resignation of one sovereign and the flight of the other, as a natural consequence; but it was not so. The fall of the Greek people was more dignified than that of their Byzantine rulers. Each separate community now acted on its own feelings, and the true national character of the population was for a moment visible ere it was washed out in blood by the Turks. Cowardice, at least, does not seem to have been the prevailing vice. The spirit 'attached to regions mountainous,' which, under a better system of family training, enabled the Swiss to maintain their national independence by the exertions of local communities, was not utterly wanting among the Greek and Albanian population of the Morea. Central governments are easily destroyed by a victorious enemy; local independence engenders permanent feelings that almost insure success, in a national struggle, against the most powerful conqueror.

Mohammed II. led the main body of the Turkish army into the centre of the Morea. Wherever he encountered opposition he treated his enemies with his usual inhuman cruelty. At Kalavryta he ordered an Albanian chief, who had repeatedly deserted from the Turks, to be sawn in two, though he had given up the citadel to the sultan's troops. Part of the garrison of Kalavryta were sold as slaves, and the rest were beheaded. Zagan Pasha was detached

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to complete the conquest of the north-western part of the peninsula. He behaved with such monstrous inhumanity that he displeased even Mohammed. Grevenos repulsed his attacks; but Santimeri, in which all the wealth of the surrounding country had been laid up, opened its gates on receiving a promise that he would protect the lives and property of the inhabitants¹. When he gained possession of the place, he allowed the Turkish troops to plunder the houses and murder the inhabitants. This open violation of his word caused such hatred against him that the whole population of the surrounding districts flew to arms, and, considering that it was vain to treat with such a monster, offered a determined resistance to the further progress of the Othoman arms. Zagan lost his master's favour by imitating too closely his master's example.

Mohammed II., who had met with no resistance, advanced from Arkadia through the plain of Elis, where all the towns opened their gates on his approach, and their inhabitants were uniformly treated with humanity. Grevenos, unable to resist any longer the additional force that attacked it, was compelled to surrender, and one-third of its inhabitants were selected by the conquerors to be sold as slaves. The garrison of Salmeniko commanded by Palaeologos Graitzas made a desperate defence. For seven days the sultan's troops reiterated their attempts to storm the walls, but were repulsed by the gallantry of its defenders. At last the Turks cut off the supply of water, and thus compelled the town to surrender. Six thousand of the inhabitants were reduced to slavery, and nine hundred young men were enrolled among the janissaries. But the citadel continued to hold out, as the cisterns were sufficient for its supply. Nothing, however, now remained for the garrison to protect; and the commandant offered to evacuate the place, on condition that the garrison should be allowed to cross the Gulf of Corinth into the Venetian territory at Lepanto. Mohammed gave his consent to the terms proposed, and withdrew his army to Vostitza to afford the besieged a free passage to the shore. The commandant, however, entertained great distrust of the Turks, in consequence of their conduct at Santimeri, and,

¹ Santimeri was founded by Nicholas de Saint-Omer about the year 1273.

in order to guard against any treachery, he sent forward a detachment with a considerable quantity of baggage, trusting that this display of booty would allure any ambushade from its concealment. The plan was successful. Hamza Pasha, the successor of Zagan, who had been charged by Mohammed to receive the surrender of the fortress, allowed his troops to waylay this detachment and plunder the baggage. The commandant of Salmeniko, finding that it was impossible to place any reliance on the capitulations he had concluded, sent a message to the sultan to announce that he was determined to defend the citadel to the last extremity. Mohammed disgraced Hamza, perhaps as much for his awkwardness as his treachery, and restored Zagan to his former post. He then continued his march, leaving troops to blockade the citadel of Salmeniko, which continued to hold out for a year. The garrison then obtained a capitulation, with proper guarantees for its faithful execution, and retired in safety into the Venetian territory¹.

Mohammed II. quitted the Morea in the autumn of 1460. On his way back to Constantinople he visited Athens for the second time; while the main body of his army, laden with spoil and encumbered with slaves, moved slowly northward from Megara by Thebes. This last campaign in the Morea was attended with wanton destruction of property and waste of human life. Mohammed's policy evidently was to ruin the resources of the country, as a preventive against insurrection, and a security that it would hold out little inducement to any Christian power to occupy it with an army. His measures were successful. The diminished population remained long in such a state of poverty and barbarism, that it could devote little care to anything beyond procuring the means of subsistence. Even the payment of the annual tribute of their children, which the Christians were compelled to send to Constantinople, in order to recruit the strength of

¹ The family name of the gallant leader of this heroic band was Graitzas, not Palaeologos. Phrantzes proves that he was not of the imperial family with which Phrantzes was himself connected, by calling him, with Byzantine superciliousness, a certain Palaeologos, whose surname was Graitzas. Phrantzes, 409; Chalcocondylas, 256, 258. Sir James Emerson Tennent, in his *History of Modern Greece* (i. 141), copying the Turkish History of Knolles (i. 242), speaks of the cowardly despot Thomas Palaeologos as the valiant chieftain who defended Salmeniko, and compelled Mohammed II. to exclaim 'that in the country of Peloponnesus he had found many slaves, but never a man but him.'

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the Othoman power, failed to awaken either patriotism or despair among the Greeks.

The fate of the two last despots hardly merits the attention of history, were it not that mankind has a morbid curiosity concerning the fortunes of the most worthless princes. Demetrius was sent by the sultan to reside at Enos, where he received from Mohammed's bounty an annual pension of six hundred thousand aspers¹. He died a monk at Adrianople in 1471. It is said that the sultan never married the daughter whom he had been compelled to send into the imperial harem. Thomas, whose life is one long act of infamy, attempted to purchase an appanage from the sultan, by offering to cede Monemvasia to the infidels, but Mohammed despised his offer, and he finished his life as a pensionary of the Pope, who was so liberal as to allow him three hundred ducats a month, to which the cardinals added two hundred more. He died at Rome in 1465. The papal pension of three hundred ducats a month was continued to his children. His eldest son, Andrew, married a woman from the streets of Rome, and, dying childless in 1502, left the visionary empire of the East, of which he deemed himself the heir, to Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain. His second son Manuel, tired of papal patronage, escaped from Rome to Constantinople, where he threw himself on the protection of the sultan. Mohammed gave him a hospitable reception, and prevented him from behaving as disreputably as his brother by supplying him with the means of maintaining a decent harem. Manuel left a son named Andrew, who became a Mussulman, and received the name of Mohammed. Thus ended the contemptible house of Palaeologos².

¹ Ἐξήκοντα μυριάδες ἀργυρίων. Chalcocondylas, 257. If we suppose the proportion to have continued the same between the common silver coin and the common gold coin in circulation at this period, as it was a century earlier, thirty of these silver pieces were equal to a gold piece. This would make the pension of Demetrius equal to twenty thousand ducats. The sultan Mohammed I. allowed the emperor Manuel II. only three hundred thousand aspers for the maintenance of his brother Mustapha; and this sum the Turkish historians make equal to thirty thousand ducats. Compare Ducas, 67, 90, and Hammer's *Histoire de l'Empire Othoman*, ii. 474. As it is not probable that Mohammed II. allowed Demetrius more than Mohammed I. allowed Mustapha, we must suppose that in the first case a smaller coin is alluded to than in the second. There were aspers of twice the value of the ordinary silver coin in circulation, fifteen aspers being equal to thirty sterlings. Ducange, *Gloss. med. et inf. Latinitatis*, s.v. Asperi. Both sizes are found in the coinage of Trebizond.

² Ducange, *Familias Augustas Byzantinas*, 248. Andrew made an attempt in

The city of Monemvasia defended its independence for four years; but in 1464, when the inhabitants heard that the despot Thomas had offered to surrender their city to the Turks, they submitted to the Venetian republic and received an Italian garrison. The Venetians continued to hold possession of Nauplia, Argos, Thermisi, Coron, Modon, and Navarin, as well as Acarnania, Arta, Mesolonghi, Naupaktos, and Euboea. In the year 1463, the Turks endeavoured to complete the conquest of the Morea by attacking the Venetian possessions. Argos was betrayed into their hands by a Greek priest, and the greater part of its Greek inhabitants were transported to Constantinople. The territory of Coron and Modon was laid waste, and Acarnania invaded. But Venice, on this occasion, nobly exerted herself to gain the title of Europe's bulwark against the Othoman. A powerful expedition was fitted out, and great exertions were made to rouse the Greek population to attempt a general insurrection. The Italian condottieri and foreign mercenaries, who composed the armies of Venice, were no match for the severely disciplined regular troops of the Othoman empire, attended by the well-organized batteries of field and siege artillery, without which no Turkish army now entered on a campaign. The pashas who commanded the Othoman armies were almost the only soldiers in Europe accustomed to direct and combine the movements of large bodies of men for one definite result. The Venetians had a short gleam of success: Argos was recovered; the Isthmus of Corinth was occupied. Thirty thousand men were employed to work by relays, night and day, in order to repair the wall, which experience had so frequently proved to be useless. For a fortnight the work was pursued with ardour; but, in the mean time, the Venetian army was repulsed in all

1494 to cede his rights to the empire of Constantinople, as heir to his uncle Constantine the last emperor, to Charles VIII. of France, for an annual pension of 4300 gold ducats and other advantages; but the failure of the king's expedition to Italy prevented the transaction from being completed. *Mémoires de l'Académie des Inscriptions*, tom. xvii. p. 561. The notarial act is printed at the end of the Memoir. Sophia, the second daughter of the despot Thomas, married Ivan III. of Russia. The pretended descent of a Palaeologos, buried in the parish church of Landulph in Cornwall, from the despot Thomas, cannot be admitted as authentic. See the account by the Rev. F. Vyvyan Jago, F.S.A., rector of Landulph, in the eighteenth volume of the *Archæologia*. The name Palaeologos became, and continues to be, a common one, and all who bear it are, of course, prepared to substantiate their pretensions to descent from the imperial family.

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its attacks on Corinth; and, the season setting in with intense cold early in autumn, the lines at the isthmus were abandoned, and the whole Venetian force retreated to Nauplia. In 1466, the Venetians, under Victor Capello, the advocate of the war, succeeded in taking Athens; but subsequently, on his debarking his troops near Patras, they sustained a disastrous defeat. When peace was concluded between Venice and the Porte in 1479, the republic retained possession of Nauplia, Monemvasia, Coron, Modon, and Navarin; but it was compelled to cede to the Turks the fortresses of Maina, Vatica, and Rampano, which had been captured during the war. In the year 1500, sultan Bayezid II. gained possession of Modon and Coron; and in 1540 the Venetians were driven from all their remaining possessions in the Peloponnesus by Suleiman, who took Nauplia and Monemvasia.

To the last hour of the Byzantine domination in Greece learning was not neglected; and all men of any rank in society devoted some portion of their youth to study, and to acquiring some knowledge of ancient Greek and of the history and laws of the Greek church. The annals of the Morea have given us the means of estimating the value of such an education as can be obtained from books alone, without the soul-inspiring culture of the moral and religious feelings that can be gained only in the domestic circle, and which must have its seeds sown before books can enlarge the mind. Some Greek manuscripts have been preserved, written at this disastrous period, even in the mountains of Tzakonia and the city of Misithra, one of which contains the history of Herodotus, and another treats of the miraculous light on Mount Tabor. The selection indicates the nature of the Hellenic mind at this epoch. The classes that floated on the surface of society were in their mental dotage, and their pride and superstition sought gratification equally in the legends of Christian fable, narrated in pedantic phraseology, and in the tales of the father of history, sketched with the noble simplicity of nature¹.

¹ See notice of these MSS. in Montfaucon's *Palaeographia Græca*, p. 72. The discourses on the miraculous light were transcribed at Misithra in 1370. Herodotus was copied at Astros in 1372. Montfaucon, at p. 71, A.D. 1362, mentions another MS. by the same scribe of Misithra; and at p. 70 he notices several medical works by an Athenian scribe, A.D. 1339. There is also a MS. of the *Etymologicum Magnum* from Chalcis in Euboea, 1386, and one of five books of Polybius, by an Athenian, A.D. 1417 and 1435. See pp. 76, 79.

CHAPTER IX.

DUCHY OF THE ARCHIPELAGO OR NAXOS¹.

SECT. I.—*Observations on the Venetian Possessions in the Empire of Romania.*

AS soon as any part of the Byzantine empire was conquered by the Crusaders, the Venetians were reinstated in all the commercial privileges conceded to them by the Byzantine emperors². In addition to these privileges, the partition treaty extended the limits of their settlement in Constantinople over three-eighths of the city, for the capital was partitioned in the same manner as the whole empire. The Venetian town created by this arrangement formed a separate enclosure within the walls of Constantinople, and was governed by a podesta sent from Venice, who, though he was inferior to the Latin emperor in dignity, soon became his equal in power and his superior in real authority. The Venetian colony in this settlement was very prosperous; and, a few years later, it is said that the Senate of Venice debated whether the seat of government might not be advantageously transferred from the then humble city in the lagunes to the comparatively magnificent quarter of Constantinople which belonged to the re-

¹ Since the first edition was published, Dr. Hopf, by his researches in various archives, has proved that the *Histoire nouvelle des anciens Ducs et autres Souverains de l'Archipel* ought not to be trusted unless when it is confirmed by other authorities. The work was written by Robert Sauger, a Jesuit missionary in the Levant, and was supposed to have been compiled from documents since lost. As the author was often misled by following its guidance, considerable changes have been made in this edition. The *Histoire nouvelle* is a rare book. Two editions exist, both in 12mo, Paris 1698 and 1699. The latter of these is cited here. See Tournefort, *Voyage du Levant*, lettre v. vol. i. p. 254, 8vo. Lyon; Curtius, *Naxos*, p. 39.

² See above, p. 81, and compare Tafel and Thomas, *Urkunden Venedigs*, i. 446, 450.

public. A few ambitious nobles and enterprising merchants may probably have formed such a project, but patriotism and prejudice would alike prevent its execution, and there seems to be a doubt whether it was ever publicly discussed¹.

The establishment of the Latin empire in the East encountered many insurmountable obstacles. The feudal barons possessed little influence over their Greek vassals and little attachment to their own sovereign. The emperors had neither the power to restrain their great feudatories, nor the wealth to purchase the service of mercenary troops. The close contact of unfriendly nations and the unappeasable hostility of contentious churches caused incessant troubles. But from many of the evils of the Latin empire the republic of Venice escaped by rendering its principal territorial possessions in the East direct dependencies of the state, and sending Venetian colonists to occupy the fortified cities, Venetian governors to maintain order, and Venetian judges to administer justice according to the laws and usages of Venice. Only maritime possessions could be so treated, and even their obedience could not be permanently secured without frequent visits of the fleets of the republic.

At the commencement of the thirteenth century the influence of the Venetian republic was very great in the Levant, both among Christian and Mussulman nations; yet the Venetian state consisted only of the city and the islands of the lagunes. Its possessions in Istria and Dalmatia were held by garrisons, not peopled by citizens. The population of the republic was small, the duties of its citizens were great and various. Every Venetian toiled in order to win wealth for himself, and stood ready with his sword to defend the wealth he had won and the riches, power, and honour of his native city. Nobles and burghers, merchants and seamen, fought as fearlessly as barons and knights, but their numbers were insufficient, and Venice was compelled to hire the services of mercenary soldiers in her foreign dependencies. It was impossible therefore for the Venetian state to attempt conquering many of the provinces assigned to the republic by the partition treaty.

Crete was the most valuable possession which Venice acquired by the fourth crusade, both on account of its com-

¹ The project was attributed to the doge Pietro Ziani in 1225. Daru, *Histoire de Venise*, book v. § 11 (vol. i. p. 382, edit. 1821).

mercial importance and its position as a naval station. It was the refuge and the resting-place for the fleets that traded with Egypt, Palestine, Cyprus, Asia Minor, Constantinople, and the Black Sea as far as Trebizond and Tana. The republic, as has been already mentioned¹, purchased the island from the Marquis of Montferrat, but its conquest was not completed without a severe struggle.

During the confusion that prevailed in the Byzantine empire after its invasion, a military adventurer of the time, Henry Count of Malta, gained possession of great part of Crete, and entertained hopes of being able to found an independent principality with the assistance of the republic of Genoa². The Venetians succeeded with great exertions in expelling the count and his Genoese allies from Crete, which they governed by a duke sent from Venice. In order to retain a firm hold on the island, considerable bodies of colonists were settled in it at different periods³. The valour with which the Greeks of Crete defended their local independence, and their repeated insurrections against the Venetian government, offer a marked contrast to the submissive conduct of the majority of their countrymen on the Continent⁴. But the history of Crete, with its Greek inhabitants and Venetian colonists, its orthodox and its catholic clergy, its native and Italian municipalities, and its repeated civil wars, though it well deserves a place in the history of Greece under foreign domination, would require a whole volume to do justice to the subject⁵.

The islands of Corfu, Santa Maura, Cephalonia, and Zante, as well as great part of Albania, Acarnania, and Aetolia, and several towns in the Peloponnesus, were assigned to Venice by the partition treaty. But Michael Angelos, who founded the despotat of Epirus, prevented the republic from making

¹ Above, p. 98.

² Nicetas (411, edit. Paris) says that Crete was conquered by some Genoese pirates, offscourings of men and abortions of society (*πειραταί τινες Γενουίται, περιψήματα ἀνδρῶν καὶ ἀμβλώματα*), with five round ships and twenty-four galleys, which was surely a goodly fleet for such fellows to assemble. See Pagano, *Delle imprese e del dominio dei Genovesi nella Grecia*, 12, 15.

³ Tafel and Thomas, *Urkunden Venedigs*, ii. 129, 136, 143, 234.

⁴ Daru (*Histoire de Venise*, i. 321) mentions fourteen insurrections of the Cretans between 1207 and 1365. See extracts from Laurentius de Monacis in Tafel and Thomas, *Urkunden Venedigs*, ii. 129, 167; Cornelius, *Creta Sacra*, ii. 224.

⁵ [It is related in great detail in Hopf's *Geschichte Griechenlands*. Ed.]

A.D. 1204-1207.]

any conquests on the continent, and his successor, the despot Theodore, conquered Corfu (1216) after it had been occupied by Venetian colonists¹. Cephalonia and Zante fell into the hands of Count Maio, who was probably an Italian Crusader. At a later period the counts of Cephalonia, like some other vassals of the empire, became vassals of the princes of Achaia, with whom their interests connected them more closely than with the republic of Venice². The maritime cities in the Peloponnesus which belonged to Venice were, like Crete, governed by officers sent directly from Venice³. It would be impossible to give a lucid account of the condition of the direct dependencies of Venice in Greece without entering into more minute details concerning the administration of the republic than fall within the limits of this work, which must proceed onward with the main stream of Grecian history⁴.

The northern and southern parts of Euboea and the Cyclades were also assigned to Venice. But some of the islands in the Aegean Sea were reserved to the emperor, and unless there be an error in the existing copies of the act of partition, the Dodecanesos or province of the twelve islands was assigned to the Crusaders⁵. But whatever was the original distribution of the islands, the greater part fell into the hands of Venetian families, some of which retained their possessions until the sixteenth century⁶.

¹ Tafel and Thomas, ii. 54, 120.

² *Epist. Innocent. III.* vol. ii. pp. 16, 73, edit. Baluze; Buchon, *Recherches historiques*; *Première Époque*, vol. ii. p. 478.

³ Modon and Coron, to the possession of which the Venetians attached much importance, were occupied by colonists and governed by *castellani*. Tafel and Thomas, ii. 96, iii. 51.

⁴ For the history of the Ionian islands, see Count Lunzi, *περὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς καταστάσεως τῆς Ἑσπείρου ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι*, Athens, 1856, of which there is an Italian translation with additions, published at Venice in 1860.

⁵ The islands of Nisia (Naxos), Andros, and the Cyclades are enumerated as assigned to Venice; Samothrace, Mitylene, Lemnos, Skyros, Tenos, Chios, and Samos to the emperor; and the Dodecanesos, unless the word be corrupt, to the Crusaders. The Dodecanesos is mentioned as an administrative division of the Byzantine empire in the eighth century by Theophanes (383) and Cedrenus (ii. 479), but it is impossible to determine of what islands it was composed, and it does not appear that it was identical with the theme of the Aegean Sea or the Cyclades mentioned by Constantine Porphyrogenitus (*De Them.* i. 17). An earlier distribution of the Greek islands will be found in the Synecdemus of Hierocles. Compare Tafel, *Symbolarum criticarum geographiam Byzantinam spectantium partes duae*, i. 62.

⁶ Dr. Hopf, who has resuscitated the history of the Greek islands under their Venetian signors from unpublished documents, gives a list of the possessors of all the islands after the conquest of Constantinople in 1204. *Urkunden und Zusätze zur Geschichte der Insel Andros*, 7.

The Latin emperor gained possession of Lesbos, Chios, Samos, Cos, and some

In great part of Greece, the Venetian domination forms the connecting link between Byzantine oppression and Othoman tyranny. Its records are therefore inseparably interwoven with the national history. To understand them thoroughly, it is necessary to observe attentively the great political and social contrast offered by the Greeks and the Italians of the free republics at the commencement of the thirteenth century, when they were brought into the closest contact. The Venetians were not then the stationary and conservative people they became at a later period. No people was more enterprising and self-dependent. Their individual energy constituted the chief element of the power of the republic. The Greeks were passive and unambitious, seeking only to preserve the material advantages they enjoyed. They had been united to the Byzantine government by no political sympathy, but had obeyed it very much as slaves obey their master. They were consequently prepared to transfer their services passively to any other master. A conservative and despotic government and a jealous and absolute church had confined the movements of Greek society, and the thoughts of individuals within fixed and narrow limits for many generations. The spheres both of action and of thought were so circumscribed that no individual energy sufficed to break the shackles rivetted by education. The landed proprietor, the colon who cultivated the land, the merchant and the artisan, were all trained to walk through life along a beaten road. Their ordinary habits were determined with as much minuteness as the ceremonial of the imperial court. New social ideas were as rare as new forms of etiquette. For many centuries the great lesson inculcated on the Greeks was to abstain from thinking or acting for themselves, and to look for guidance in all civil and religious matters to the imperial government and the eastern church. The Greeks were by

smaller islands, which he held until they were reconquered by the Greek emperor of Nicea, John Vatatzes, in 1247 (Niceph. Greg. p. 16); and he also possessed Imbros and Samothrace. Lemnos was held as an immediate fief of the empire, with the title of Megaduca and the command of the imperial fleet.

Dr. Hopf has published *Urkundliche Mittheilungen über die Geschichte von Karystos in Euboea*, 1853. (Of this work there is an Italian translation with additions by G. B. de Sardagna); *Geschichte der Insel Andros und ihrer Beherrscher mit Urkunden und Zusätzen*, 1855; *Veneto-Byzantinische Analekten*, 1859. These were printed in the Transactions of the Academy of Vienna; also the articles *Ghisi* and *Gius-tiniani* in Ersch und Gruber, *Allgemeine Encyclopädie*.

A.D. 1204-1207.]

this system of education rendered utterly helpless in every social emergency or political catastrophe. Even when some irrepressible impulse of human feeling or some insupportable calamity goaded them to rebellion, they were incapable of conceiving any plan for improving their condition.

The citizens of Venice were almost in everything as unlike the Greeks as it was possible to be. Nobles, burghers, merchants, and seamen were all men in whom individual character was strongly marked, and in whom personal enterprise was the essence of existence. This character of the citizens was impressed on the government of Venice during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and impelled the republic onward in a career of restless activity.

When the Greeks and Venetians were brought into hostile collision, a phenomenon was repeated which history is constantly obtruding on the attention of mankind. The energy inspired by individual liberty in the breasts of a few thousand free citizens enabled them to conquer and retain in subjection millions of subjects as wealthy and perhaps as intelligent as their conquerors, because the Greeks, having been treated as children for ages, had been rendered incapable of independent thought or united action.

The Venetian republic acquired by the partition treaty a right to so many territories, that the government soon felt the impossibility of attempting their conquest. The high pay then demanded by knights and men-at-arms rendered it imprudent to employ mercenary troops in the conquest of distant and scattered possessions. The military leaders of the age were generally daring and adventurous nobles, who, if they were intrusted with the command of garrisons, might avail themselves of any favourable opportunity to render themselves independent, or to transfer the sovereignty of the cities where they commanded to some wealthy and powerful prince or rival state.

A passion for territorial acquisitions had also at this time taken possession of the minds of the wealthy citizens of Venice, in consequence of the sudden power which many of the crusading nobles from the north of Italy had obtained by the partition of the Byzantine empire. The ablest of the Venetian nobles were not disposed to toil in the service of the state merely to command garrisons in maritime cities.

By pursuing their own private enterprises in the East, they expected to obtain greater profits and higher honours, and they were sure of enjoying greater personal independence.

The knowledge of this disposition induced the Venetian government to pass a law authorizing wealthy citizens to conquer any of the territories assigned to the republic of which the state had not taken possession, and especially the islands of the Archipelago, by expeditions fitted out at their own expense. But their conquests, though they became family possessions, were to be held as fiefs of the republic, and were to be subject to the civil laws and commercial regulations of Venice. This concession induced many Venetian nobles who had taken part in the Crusade to combine together and form a great expedition, which by mutual assistance and simultaneous attacks effected the conquest of almost all the islands of the Archipelago during the year 1207¹.

SECT. II.—*Dukes of the Families of Sanudo and Dalle Carceri.*

Marco Sanudo, who founded the duchy of the Archipelago, was one of the ablest and most enterprising of the Venetian Crusaders, but, like old Dandolo, he seems never to have bestowed a thought on visiting the Holy Land, or on warring with the infidels. Sagacious in diplomacy, bold in war, and unscrupulous in his undertakings, he mingled in his character many of the virtues of the greatest Venetian citizens with some of the vices of the military adventurers of his time, who often held the rank of princes and conducted themselves like brigands and pirates. His knowledge placed him in many respects on a level with the western clergy; his valour rendered him the equal of the most distinguished knights, and his experience as a statesman made him the companion of princes. He had acquired so much influence in the camp of the Crusaders that he was selected by the republic to act with Ravano dalle Carceri, as Venetian commissioner, to conclude the treaty with Boniface, marquis of Montferrat and king of Saloniki, for the purchase of the island of Crete. In dividing the fiefs of the empire, the duchy of the Archi-

¹ Ramnusius, *De bello Constantinopolitano*, lib. vi. p. 272, edit. 1634.

A.D. 1207-1383.]

pelago was conferred on Marco Sanudo, and the island of Lemnos with the office of imperial admiral and the title of Megaduca or grand-duke on Filocalo Navigajosi¹. In the year 1207 the conquest of the Greek islands was completed; but Sanudo associated himself with other Venetians, some of whom agreed to hold islands comprised in his duchy as sub-fiefs, while others conquered islands assigned to the republic, which they held as fiefs of Venice². At the parliament of Ravenika in 1210 both Sanudo and Navigajosi received their investitures as great feudatories of the empire of Romania, and did homage to the emperor Henry.

The conquest of Naxos, which was the principal island of his duchy and the usual residence of the dukes of the Archipelago, gave Sanudo very little trouble. He landed with his troops at the port of Potamides, and immediately laid siege to Apaliri, the strongest fortress in the island, situated on a rugged rock and surrounded by a triple line of walls. The place, like all the fortified posts in the Byzantine empire, had been long neglected, and was ill prepared to offer a prolonged resistance. After a siege of five weeks it capitulated, and on its surrender the rest of the island submitted to Sanudo. The Greeks of Naxos, like their countrymen on the continent, obtained very favourable terms from their conqueror. Sanudo guaranteed them in the possession of their property, both landed and movable, in the exercise of their local privileges and immunities, and in the free practice of all the rites of their religion, according to the usage and doctrines of the Greek church; and he confirmed the Greek archbishop, the priests, and the monks in the possession of their property.

¹ Megaduka was the title of the grand-admiral of the fleet in the Byzantine empire; see Ducange, s. v. *Δούξ*.

² Marco Sanudo retained possession of Naxos, Paros, Antiparos, Syra, Kythnos or Thermia, Siphnos or Sifanto, Ios or Nio, Milos, Kimolos, Pholegandros or Policandro, and Sikinos. The islands held as sub-fiefs of the duchy of the Archipelago were,—Andros by Marino Dandolo from 1207 to 1233; Amorgos by Andrea and Geremia Ghisi from 1207 to 1269; Keos or Zia and Seriphos held in shares by the Ghisi, Giustiniani, and Michieli from 1207 to 1328; Thera or Santorini and Therasia by the Barozzi from 1207 to 1350; and Anaphe or Namfio by Foscoli from 1207 to 1269.

The islands held as fiefs of Venice were Tinos, Mykone, Skyros, Skiathos, and Skopelos by the Ghisi; Astypalaea or Stampalaea by the Quirini, to whom at a later period it gave the title of Count; and Scarpanto by the Cornari. Hopf, *Andros*, Urkunden und Zusätze, p. 7; Articles in the *Allgemeine Encyclopädie* of Ersch and Gruber on *Ghisi* and *Giustiniani*; *Veneto-Byzantinische Analekten*. [At the time when the above was written Hopf's *Geschichte Griechenlands* had not yet appeared. Ed.]

The imperial domains, the estates of the Greek proprietors who had attached themselves to the fortunes of the emperors of Nicaea or Trebizond or to the despot of Epirus, and the ecclesiastical possessions of Greek churches or monasteries abroad, were alone confiscated. From the wealth thus placed at his command, Sanudo was able to reward his followers, and yet to retain in his own possession an extensive domain. The power of Marco Sanudo depended on his wealth, which enabled him to maintain a squadron of well-armed galleys and a band of well-trained mercenary soldiers, for a considerable force was necessary to protect his duchy against the enemies of the Latin empire, and to defend it from the attacks of the corsairs who swarmed in the Grecian seas in this warlike and piratical age. Sanudo knew well how to watch the signs of the times, and the principality, which he founded on what was at the time deemed but an insecure basis, enjoyed the longest existence and the greatest degree of internal tranquillity of all the Latin establishments erected in the dismembered provinces of the Byzantine empire.

The first object of Sanudo in his new conquest was to improve the communications of Naxos with the capital of the Latin empire at Constantinople, and with the centre of the commercial power at Venice. For this purpose he rebuilt the ancient town on the sea-shore, repaired the port by constructing a new mole, formed an arsenal for his own galleys, and fortified the citadel which commanded the town. A tower that still remains attests the solidity of his buildings, rivalling in its strength the tall tower in the Acropolis of Athens, and the thick walls of the palace of Santameri at Thebes¹. Within the city constructed by Sanudo everything was Latin. Its population flourished by the commercial relations they maintained with the other Latins, and secured their superiority over the Greeks by the great additional facilities they enjoyed for receiving foreign assistance. A Catholic bishop was sent by the Pope to guide the political opinions as well as the religious consciences of the Latins of Naxos; and Sanudo, in order to secure the good-will of the papal power and clergy, built a cathedral in his new capital, and liberally endowed its chapter².

¹ *Histoire nouvelle des anciens Ducs et autres Souverains de l'Archipel*, 10.

² [The present inhabitants of Sanudo's city, now the upper town of Naxos, though

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The conduct of the new duke to his native country, when Venice was involved in a serious struggle for the possession of the island of Crete, shows that Sanudo, with the ability of a statesman and the ambition of a prince, had also the lax conscience of a piratical adventurer. The inhabitants of Crete had risen in rebellion against the Venetians, and the rebels had taken the fortresses of Mirabello and Setia when Tiepolo, the Venetian governor of Candia, sent to Naxos to solicit aid from Sanudo, as a citizen of the republic¹. The duke of the Archipelago hastened to the scene of action with a force which enabled the Venetians to suppress the rebellion. But Marco Sanudo, moved either by unprincipled ambition, or by a desire to avenge himself on Tiepolo for some imaginary affront, entered into a plot to expel his countrymen from the island, and render himself sovereign of Candia. A Greek named Sevastos Scordili was labouring at the same time to organize a plan for the deliverance of his country from a foreign yoke. Sanudo, hoping to render the patriotic projects of the Greek subservient to his own schemes of ambition and revenge, conspired secretly to assist him. The plan of the conspirators was to overpower the garrison and surprise Tiepolo. But though the conspiracy broke out unexpectedly, Tiepolo was fortunate enough to escape from Candia in woman's clothes, and reach the castle of Temenos in safety, where he soon collected a number of Venetians in arms. Sanudo having taken measures to secure the possession of Candia, marched out at the head of a strong body of Latin mercenaries and Greek insurgents to complete the conquest of the island. But his career was arrested by the arrival of reinforcements to the Venetians, which came from Venice under the command of Quirini. Tiepolo availed himself skilfully of these succours, which landed at the port of Kalilimenes². As soon as they had joined him at Temenos, he marched secretly to Candia, which he entered by surprise during the night, and made prisoners the garrison established

they speak Greek and consider themselves Greeks, are descendants of the original Italian occupants, and belong to the Latin church. One family is that of Sommaripa, whose ancestors for a long time were the rulers of Paros. There is a Lazarist and a Capuchin church, and the archbishop is not a native, but sent from Rome. Ed.]

¹ Tafel and Thomas, *Urkunden Venedigs*, ii. 159.

² The 'fair havens' of Acts xxvii. 8.

in the place by Sanudo, with several influential Greeks who had taken part in the insurrection. The rebels still remained in possession of a fertile region to the west of the capital, extending from Milopotamo to Cape Spada, and of the strong castle of Belvedere to the south, so that it was still in their power to carry on a long war. To prevent these districts from being laid waste and depopulated, Tiepolo prudently pardoned the treachery of Sanudo, and concluded with him a treaty, by which the duke of the Archipelago and his allies were permitted to depart from the island, and a sum of money was paid them on their delivering up the fortresses still in their possession¹. On his return to his own duchy, he sent envoys to Venice to deprecate the vengeance of the republic, and urge such excuses for his proceedings as he was able to frame. These explanations were accepted, for the senate wished to secure his alliance, in order to include his dominions within the circle of the commercial monopolies, which it was the policy of Venice to extend as far as possible, to the exclusion of the Genoese and Pisans.

Mark Sanudo died in the year 1220, and was succeeded by his son Angelo. The new duke assisted John de Brienne when he was besieged in Constantinople by the Greek emperor John III. (Vatatzes), and sent succours to the duke of Candia, when the Cretans revolted at the instigation of that indefatigable enemy of the Latins. But he was compelled to withdraw his troops from Crete in order to secure the tranquillity of his own islands, which were threatened by the fleet of the Greek emperor². He also furnished a squadron of three galleys to assist the emperor Baldwin II. in his last war with Michael VIII.; and when Constantinople was retaken by the Greeks, the duke of the Archipelago sent an embassy to Chalcis, where the fugitive emperor had sought refuge, to console him in his misfortunes, and furnished him with money to continue his voyage to Italy. The death of Angelo happened about 1262; he was succeeded by his son Marco II.

¹ Tafel and Thomas, ii. 159, and Laurentius de Monacis, quoted at p. 167; Cornelius, *Creta Sacra*, ii. 241.

² Ducange (*Histoire de Constantinople*, 134) places this in the year 1247, and says that the duke of the Archipelago, whom he calls Marco, 'abandonna la Candie avec tant de lâcheté que plusieurs estiment que Vatace le corrompit à force d'argent.' He mentions, nevertheless, that the Greek emperor had already conquered several of the islands of the Archipelago, and Amorgos was one.

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The decline of the Latin power augmented the authority of the Catholic clergy; and Mark II. was so much alarmed by the discontent of the orthodox Greeks that he deemed it necessary to construct a fortress in the interior of Naxos, to command the fertile plain of Drymalia, which then contained twelve large villages, a number of farm-buildings, country-houses, and towers, with about ten thousand inhabitants. The duke Mark II. had reason to distrust his Greek subjects, for he was far more intolerant of their superstitions than his father and grandfather. Induced by religious zeal, or by a mistaken policy, he destroyed an altar dedicated to the service of St. Pachys, the saint of the Naxiotes, whose mediation in heaven was supposed to confer on mortals the rotundity of figure then regarded by the Greeks as requisite for beauty in women and respectability in men. The devotion paid to this sanctification of obesity was probably a relic of superstition inherited from pagan times. A hollow stone existed in the island, which St. Pachys was believed to have taken under his peculiar care. Through this stone the mothers of lean or languishing children were in the habit of making their offspring pass; and the Naxiote matrons were convinced that this ceremony, joined to a due number of prayers to Saint Fat, an offering in his chapel, and some pieces of money placed in the hands of the priests, would infallibly render their children stout and healthy—unless, indeed, some evil eye of extraordinary power deprived the good-will of the saint of due effect. History has not recorded whether duke Mark II. was fat or lean. He, however, broke the altar in pieces, and then found that it was necessary to replace it by a fortress¹.

In the year 1262, when the Byzantine troops took possession of the maritime fortresses of Monemvasia and Maina, and the people of the eastern and southern coast of the Morea broke out in rebellion against the Frank power in Achaia, the inhabitants of the island of Melos also seized the opportunity of driving out the ducal garrison, and claiming the assistance of the Byzantine officers. Mark II. was a man of energy in war, with men as well as with saints; and on receiving the first tidings of the insurrection, he hastened to besiege the

¹ *Histoire nouvelle des anciens Ducs*, etc., 65.

city of Melos, with a fleet of sixteen galleys, and a troop of Frank refugees, collected from the soldiers who had fled from Constantinople. The place was invested before any succours could reach it, and, after repeated attacks, the duke at last carried it by storm. The Greek priest suspected or convicted of being the author of the insurrection was thrown into the port, with his hands and feet tied together. The rest of the inhabitants were pardoned. Duke Marco II. was not so fortunate in an expedition he conducted against the Byzantine admiral Licario, who defeated his galleys and plundered Naxos in his presence¹.

After the taking of Constantinople by the Greeks in 1261, the emperor Baldwin II. transferred the suzerainty of the duchy of the Archipelago to the principality of Achaia². The fall of the Latin empire, the death of William prince of Achaia without male issue, and the fear generally entertained of the ambition of Charles of Anjou, induced the Venetian government to attempt acquiring a direct authority over the duke of the Archipelago as a Venetian noble. Andros was a fief of the duchy, and Marco II. united the whole island to his immediate possessions on the death of Jelisa the widow of Marino Dandolo the first conqueror, who possessed one-half of the island as her dowry (A.D. 1262). Nicolo Quirini, the son of Jelisa by her second marriage, claimed his mother's half of Andros as her heir, but he did not arrive at Naxos to demand investiture and do homage until the term accorded by the usages of Romania had expired³. He was then returning from Acre, where he had exercised the office of bailly of the republic of Venice. His demand was refused by the duke, and he appealed to the Venetian senate for redress. But the time was not favourable for any attempt to extend the authority of the republic in the East. The fleet of

¹ *Histoire nouvelle des anciens Ducs*, etc., 79. The Byzantine fleet also laid waste Naxos, Paros, and Keos. Pachymeres, i. p. 136, edit. Rom. Licario, like most of the Greek admirals at this time, was an Italian.

² Baldwin II. ceded the suzerainty of Achaia in 1267 to Charles of Anjou, king of Naples, who thus became lord-paramount of the duchy of the Archipelago. William II., prince of Achaia, died in 1277, leaving a daughter, Isabella, married to Philip, son of Charles of Anjou.

³ If the heir did not appear to claim investiture of the vacant fief within forty days, the lord was entitled to a year's rent. If the heir was in Romania, he was bound to demand investiture and do homage within a year and a day, and if absent from Romania within two years and two days, or the fief was forfeited. *Liber Consuetudinum Imperii Romaniae*, i. tit. 36; Hopf, *Andros*, 23.

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the Greek emperor, Michael VIII. (Palaeologos), under the command of Licario, who had been grand-duke, began about this time a career of success which threatened the Venetian signors with the loss of all their possessions in the Greek islands. Many of these islands were conquered, and many more were plundered¹. The duke Marco II. was defeated by the Byzantine fleet, and Naxos and Andros were laid waste without his being able to defend them. The Venetian possessions in Euboea were ravaged, and Venetian merchantmen were captured in every part of the Aegean Sea by Greek and Genoese corsairs. For several years the Byzantine fleet with its Genoese grand-admiral might be regarded as master of the Aegean Sea. Quirini, who was at this time bailly of Venice at Negrepont, could not in such circumstances think of quarrelling with duke Marco about half of Andros, when there seemed to be imminent danger of the Greeks taking the whole; A.D. 1269-1278.

In the year 1282, Venice having recovered her ascendancy in the Grecian seas, the doge Giovanni Dandolo summoned duke Marco to answer the suit of Nicolo Quirini before the senate. To this summons the duke of the Archipelago, or, as he was generally called, the duke of Naxos and Andros, answered that his grandfather Marco Sanudo had conquered the islands and received investiture of the duchy as a baron of Romania from the emperor Henry, and that Marino Dandolo had done homage to him for Andros as a fief of the duchy of the Archipelago; that when the emperor Baldwin II. had transferred the suzerainty of the Archipelago from the empire of Romania to the principality of Achaia, his father duke Angelo had done homage to William II. prince of Achaia; and consequently, that any question relating to the fief of Andros must be decided according to the usages and laws of Romania, and the only competent court in the present suit was the ducal court of Naxos, before which it was the duty of Nicolo Quirini to plead, and where the duke assured

¹ Lemnos, Skiathos, Skyros, Siphnos, Ios, Anaphe, and Astypalaea were conquered by the grand-duke Licario in 1269; but all except Lemnos were subsequently reconquered by Venetian families. The family of Licario was originally from Vicenza, but settled at Karystos. He married the widow of Narzotto dalle Carceri, but being driven into exile, found protection at the court of Constantinople. Pachymeres (i. 280, edit. Rom.) calls him Icarios. *Dissertazione documentata sulla Storia di Karystos*, dal D^{ro}. Hopf, versione con aggiunte dell' autore da G. B. da Sardagna, 31; Hopf, *Veneto-Byzantinische Analekten*, 24.

the doge the case would be carefully examined and equitably judged. The duke's answer was considered to be satisfactory by the senate¹.

Not long after, a war occurred in the Archipelago, which affords us a better insight into the state of society and the insecurity of property among the inhabitants, whether Latins or Greeks, than the solemn proceedings of the Venetian senate or the state papers of the ducal chancellery. The origin of the hostilities was so trifling, that it might be treated as a satirical invention to ridicule the conduct of the Venetian nobles in Greece, were it not that the facts are recorded by Marino Sanudo Torsello, a relative of the ducal family, who had heard the events narrated by the duke himself and by many of the inhabitants of Andros².

In the year 1286 a valuable ass, marked with the cypher of Bartolommeo Ghisi signor of Tinos and Mycone, was carried off by corsairs and purchased by Guglielmo Sanudo son of duke Marco II. who resided at Syra, though there could be no doubt concerning the lawful proprietor of the ass nor how it had been obtained. Ghisi considered himself insulted by this mode of profiting by the pillage of his lands, and to revenge the injury and recover his ass he invaded Syra, ravaged the island, and besieged Sanudo in the castle. But when the place was reduced to extremities, a new combatant made his appearance and took part in the contest. Narjaud de Toucy, the admiral of Charles of Anjou king of Naples, having put into the port of Milos, was informed of the dangerous position in which the ass had placed the son of his master's ally, duke Marco II. He hastened to Andros where the duke was at the time, and having concerted measures for the relief of Guglielmo he sailed to Syra and raised the siege. But the contest still remaining unsettled, Ghisi and Sanudo agreed to submit their difference to the arbitration of the republic of Venice. The senate re-established peace in the Grecian seas, and we may conclude that if the ass had survived the want of provender during the siege of the castle of

¹ Hopf, *Andros*, 26.

² Marino Sanudo Torsello, the author of *Secreta Fidelium Crucis*, in the second volume of Bongars' *Gesta Dei per Francos*, wrote a history of Romania entitled *Istoria del Regno di Romania sive Regno di Morea* in 1328. Dr. Hopf discovered the value of a neglected MS. of this work in the Marcian Library at Venice. Hopf, *Andros*, 14.

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Syra, it was restored to its lawful owner. Besides the damage which the purchase of the stolen ass had caused to the Greek peasants in Syra, the war is said to have cost the belligerents the sum of 30,000 heavy soldi¹.

Marco II. was living in the year 1292; but before the year 1303 Guglielmo Sanudo had succeeded to the duchy. In that year corsairs employed by duke Guglielmo captured Jacopo Barozzi, signor of Santorin and Therasia, on his way to Negrepont, after he had filled the office of duke of Candia for the republic of Venice during two years.

The quarrel between duke Guglielmo and Barozzi arose out of a claim of homage. The islands of Santorin and Therasia had been originally held by the Barozzi as fiefs of the duchy of the Archipelago. But that family, like many other noble families of Venice, had been expelled from the Greek islands by the Byzantine fleet in 1269. The increasing power of the Venetian republic had however in the year 1296 enabled the families of Barozzi, Ghisi, Michieli, and Giustiniani to reconquer the islands they had formerly possessed. Venice claimed the sovereignty over these conquests, and this was willingly conceded by Venetian citizens, who felt that the protection of the republic was necessary to enable them to defend the possessions they had recovered.

On the other hand the duke of the Archipelago insisted, that his claim to suzerainty over all the islands which had originally formed part of the duchy was restored by their reconquest. Jacopo Barozzi denied this claim, and duke Guglielmo, who did not venture to attack his islands, was bold enough to arrest him on the high seas as a rebellious vassal. He was carried to Naxos as a prisoner and kept there closely confined. But Barozzi was an officer high in the service of Venice, and the republic was at this time far more powerful than in the days when duke Marco I. waged war against her troops in Candia with impunity. The senate adopted vigorous measures to deliver Barozzi. Duke Guglielmo was summoned not only to release him, but also to send him under safe escort to Negrepont within eight days, under pain of being proclaimed a pirate and treated as an enemy. This threat procured the immediate release of the Signor of Santorin².

¹ Hopf, *Andros*, 28.² Hopf, *Veneto-Byzantinische Analekten*, 26.

Duke Guglielmo died in the year 1323, and was succeeded by his son Nicolo who reigned until 1341. If we could trust the history of the dukes by Sauger, duke Nicolo was a brave warrior, a devoted son of the Latin church, and a great enemy of the schismatic Greeks. He spent much of his time in warring against the Turks, who began to ravage the islands and coasts of Greece, and the Jesuit says that no more valiant or active prince ever sat on the throne of Naxos. But unfortunately we know that too many of the details which are carefully narrated by the Jesuit missionary are destitute of all historical authority. Duke Nicolo died without children, and was succeeded by his brother Giovanni I.

Giovanni Sanudo occupied the ducal throne for twenty-one years (1341-1362). When called upon to preside over the government he was residing at a hermitage in the valley of Engarais in Naxos, to which he had retired on the death of his wife, and where he manifested an intention of entering the priesthood¹. One of his first acts was to invest his younger brother Marco with the signory of the island of Milos as a fief of the duchy.

Duke Giovanni died in 1362, leaving an only daughter Fiorenza, who was already a widow with an only son. She had married Giovanni dalle Carceri, signor of two-thirds of the island of Euboea, and one of the greatest of the Frank princes in Greece, who died in 1359. The Salic law not being in force according to the usages of the empire of Romania, Fiorenza became duchess of the Archipelago at her father's death. She was apparently then about twenty-two years of age, and both her beauty and her wealth rendered her hand a prize to which the proudest nobles aspired, and of which the republic of Venice and the titular emperor of Romania sought to dispose as means of extending their influence in Greece². Proposals of marriage had been made to the young widow during her father's life-time on the part of Pietro Recanelli, a Genoese noble, governor of Smyrna, which had been recently taken from the emir of Aïdin by a party of Crusaders or, as they might be more correctly termed, of Christian corsairs³.

¹ *Histoire nouvelle des anciens Ducs*, etc., 118.

² Fiorenza was probably born in 1340, for her father is said to have retired to the hermitage of Engarais on her mother's death.

³ The Latins kept possession of Smyrna for more than half a century, A.D. 1344 to 1402.

A.D. 1207-1383.]

Recanelli was one of the associates or *maonesi* who had conquered Chios, and as such became a member of the great Genoese house or clan of Giustiniani¹. His alliance would have been very valuable to the duchy of the Archipelago, if it could have been secured without offending Venice. But the Venetian senate was too jealous of any addition to the power of Genoa in the Greek islands to remain passive, and duke Giovanni was warned not to give his daughter to the citizen of a hostile state. The senate also wrote to the bailo of Negrepont and the duke of Candia, ordering them to place every obstacle in their power in the way of the young duchess marrying any husband who had not previously obtained the consent of the Venetian government.

After her father's death Fiorenza wished to bestow her hand on Nerio Acciaiuoli, who afterwards won the duchy of Athens, but it was intimated to her that Venice disapproved of her marriage with that enterprising Florentine. The senate then selected its own candidate for the prize, and a diplomatic contest ensued between Venice and Naples, similar to that which Europe lately witnessed between England and France on the subject of the Spanish marriages. Guglielmo Sanudo, a grandson of duke Marco II., who possessed estates in Negrepont, was sent to Naxos to persuade the duchess to marry his son Nicolo, called Spezzabanda or the Disperser, on account of the headlong valour he displayed as a soldier.

The cause of Nerio Acciaiuoli was warmly supported by his uncle the grand-seneschal Nicholas, whose influence in the kingdom of Naples secured the active interference of Robert, titular emperor of Romania and reigning prince of Achaia, the suzerain of the duchy of the Archipelago, and of Johanna I. queen of Naples². The hand of Fiorenza was claimed because she was a vassal of the principality of Achaia, and negotiations were opened with Venice. But the senate replied that the duchess was a child of the republic by her descent from a family of Venetian nobles who had always

¹ Chios was conquered in 1345 by Genoese adventurers under Simone Vignosi. The government of Genoa, not being able to repay the expenses they had incurred, authorized their forming a joint-stock company (*maona*) in 1347, and the shareholders (*maonesi*) became the real sovereigns of Chios, with some slight restrictions, under the suzerainty of Genoa. In 1362 the members of the *maona* laid aside their family names and adopted the name of Giustiniani, as it is said, from the circumstance of the company having acquired the Giustiniani palace.

² For some notice of the grand-seneschal Nicholas, see above, p. 157.

preserved their citizenship, and that the republic had often defended her duchy, which she could only preserve from attack by a close alliance with Venice. At the same time, the senate determined not to trust entirely to diplomatic negotiations and the prudence of the young duchess. Orders were sent to Michieli, the captain of the gulf fleet, to prevent some Genoese galleys which lay at Clarenza from conveying Nerio Acciaiuoli, or any envoy he might wish to send, from thence to Naxos, even should it be necessary to employ force for that purpose. Secret orders were also transmitted, which Michieli and Gradenigo the bailo of Negrepont interpreted as an authority for carrying off the duchess from her castle at Naxos. She was taken on board the Venetian fleet and transported to Candia, where she was received by Francesco Morasini, who was then duke, with due honour. She was there informed that if she wished to return to her duchy she must consent to marry her cousin Nicolo Spezzabanda.

It seems that the young widow had never seen her Florentine suitor, so that when her cousin arrived from Venice with his marriage contract in his pocket, with the recommendation of the senate and with his military fame, it is probable that his personal attentions effaced the imaginary portrait Fiorenza may have drawn of Nerio Acciaiuoli from her mind¹. The marriage was celebrated at Candia on the 12th March 1364, and as Fiorenza and Spezzabanda stood in the third degree of consanguinity, a papal dispensation ought to have preceded the marriage; but Venice was impatient to terminate her negotiations with Naples, and the young duchess was equally impatient to return to her palace at Naxos, so the dispensation followed the marriage².

Nicolo Spezzabanda administered the affairs of his wife's duchy. There was not a braver man, but his very name indicates that his most prominent qualities were those belonging rather to a popular captain than to a prudent prince. He attended honourably to the interests of his step-son, and one of his military expeditions was to defend the possessions of the Dalle Carceri in Euboea against the attacks of the Catalans of Attica. He carried on war also against them in

¹ The marriage contract was drawn up before a Venetian notary, and dated Aug. 19, 1363.

² Hopf, *Andros*, 35-40.

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Thessaly, where, at the head of a body of Albanian mercenaries, in conjunction with the Vallachians and Greeks of the country, he succeeded in expelling them from all their conquests north of the valley of the Spercheus.

The duchess Fiorenza had two daughters by her second marriage. She died in 1371, and her son Nicolo dalle Carceri, who had inherited his father's extensive possessions in Negrepont, became duke of the Archipelago.

Duke Nicolo II., though he always lived on good terms with his step-father and treated his relatives with favour, was of a violent and tyrannical disposition to his subjects. Immediately after his accession he separated the valuable island of Andros from his possessions, by conferring it on his step-sister Maria to be held by her and her heirs as a fief of the duchy of the Archipelago, to which it was never again reunited. He subsequently granted the small island of Antiparos, which must then have been of much greater value than it is at present, and an estate at Lithada in the north of Euboea, to his step-sister Elizabeth. The Venetian senate had almost as much trouble with the marriage of Maria Sanudo as with that of her mother. Bartolommeo Quirini, while bailo of Negrepont, made an attempt to obtain her hand for his son by force; but though he ventured to make use of the Venetian galley in station at Negrepont to enforce his enterprise, he was unsuccessful. Maria Sanudo married Gasparo de Sommaripa, and carried the signoria of Andros into that family¹.

Duke Nicolo II. formed a league with the Navarrese Grand Company, which had acquired great power in the principality of Achaia, and made an attempt to conquer the whole island of Euboea, which involved him in war with Venice. Baffled in this undertaking, he retired to Naxos, where his exactions caused great discontent, and at last drove the inhabitants into

¹ Hopf, *Geschichte der Insel Andros und ihrer Beherrscher in dem Zeitraume von 1207 zu 1566*, 47-82.

Maria Sanudo was expelled from Andros after the murder of her step-brother by duke Francesco I., but invested with the signoria of Paros before her marriage with Gasparo de Sommaripa. Pietro Zeno, who married Petronilla, the daughter of duke Francesco I., obtained Andros from his father-in-law, which he held for upwards of forty years (A.D. 1384-1427). He was one of the ablest diplomatists of Venice, and was employed in all the most important affairs of the republic in the Levant, and as ambassador at the courts of the despot of the Morea, the emperor of Constantinople, and the Othoman sultan. He received the title of duke of Andros. The son of Maria, Crusino de Sommaripa, recovered possession of Andros after a long law-suit at Venice in the year 1440.

rebellion. He was assassinated at a hunting party in the year 1383, and Francesco Crispo, the husband of his mother's cousin, who was on a visit at his court, was generally supposed to have been the real murderer, as he was the person who profited by the crime.

SECT. III.—*Dukes of the Family of Crispo.*

Francesco Crispo had rendered himself popular both with the Franks and Greeks of Naxos, who elected him duke of the Archipelago after the murder of Duke Nicolo II., excluding from the throne the two daughters of the duchess Fiorenza, who were the legal heirs. He was a Lombard by birth who had settled in Negrepoint. In the year 1376 he was selected by Marco Sanudo, the signor of Milos, to be the husband of his only daughter, named, like her cousin the duchess, Fiorenza; and after the marriage was celebrated Marco Sanudo abdicated the signoria of Milos in his favour.

Marco, who received Milos from his brother the duke Giovanni, governed the island with prudence. He increased the trade by the facilities he granted to foreign shipping, and rendered the port the usual resort of all merchantmen on entering the Archipelago in order to ascertain whether the sea was free from pirates, to learn the state of the markets in the Levant, and to take on board skilful pilots. Under his rule Milos prospered greatly, and Francesco Crispo, though he was tainted with the want of principle which distinguished the Italians of that age, appears to have had the prudent conduct of his father-in-law from policy.

His usurpation of the duchy of Naxos was recognized by the Venetian government. It was a principle of state policy with the senate to extend its influence by marriages; and Francesco secured its favour by betrothing one of his sons to the daughter of the doge Antonio Veniero, the marriage being declared to be for the honour and advantage of the republic. His own prudence, and the influence of his son-in-law Pietro Zeno the ablest Venetian diplomatist of the time, also assisted in enabling him to keep possession of the duchy, in spite of numerous law-suits in which he was involved with the members of the families of Sanudo and Dalle Carceri, whose

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inheritance he had usurped, and who compelled him to answer their complaints before the Venetian senate.

Duke Francesco lived in greater dependence on the republic than any of the preceding dukes, for the power of his feudal suzerains, the princes of Achaia and the titular emperors of Romania, having ceased, the power of the Turkish corsairs in the Grecian seas rendered the protection of Venice absolutely necessary to prevent the utter devastation of the islands of the Archipelago.

Duke Francesco I. died in the year 1397, and was succeeded by his eldest son Jacopo the Pacific. To his second son Giovanni he left the islands of Milos and Kimolos, to his third Nicolo he left Syra (Suda), to his fourth Guglielmo Anaphe (Namfio), and to his fifth Marco the island of Ios (Nio)¹.

Duke Jacopo I. the Pacific was, like his father, involved in numerous law-suits, and his dominions were often ravaged by Turkish corsairs. He died at Ferrara in 1418². At his death the Venetian senate ordered that his duchy should be sequestered in order to satisfy the claims of those who demanded justice against the usurpations of duke Francesco I., but the execution of this order was prevented by the nobles of Naxos, who elected Giovanni, signor of Milos and Kimolos, to be their duke immediately on the death of his brother. Giovanni II. secured the support of powerful friends at Venice by marrying a daughter of Vettore Morosini. He died in 1437. His son Jacopo II. reigned ten years, and at his death his brother Nicolo, signor of Syra and Santorin, became regent of the duchy for his posthumous child Giovanjacopo, who died in 1453 when only five years old. Francesco, the son of Nicolo, who was the lawful heir at the death of the child Giovanjacopo, yielded the duchy to his uncle Guglielmo II., signor of Anaphe, and did not become duke of Naxos until his uncle's death in 1463³.

¹ Hopf, *Veneto-Byzantinische Analekten*, 36.

² Duke Jacopo I. was in England at the court of Henry IV. in 1404, and in 1418 Henry Beaufort, bishop of Winchester and uncle of Henry V., returned from Palestine to Venice in a galley belonging to Pietro Zeno, duke of Andros, the brother-in-law of duke Jacopo I. Hopf, *Andros*, 59, 64.

³ Nicolo Crispo, signor of Syra and Santorin, married Valenza Komnena, a princess of Trebizond, daughter of the emperor John IV. In the year 1457, while his son Francesco was signor of Santorin, a great eruption of the submarine volcano threw up a new island in the port, which connected itself with the existing

The history of the duchy of the Archipelago is at this time little more than a record of family law-suits and Turkish depredations. Duke Francesco II. died almost immediately after he succeeded to the duchy. His eldest son Jacopo III. (1463-1480) saw his possessions terribly wasted by the Turks. In the year 1470 it is said that there were only 300 inhabitants left on the island of Santorin¹.

Giovanni III. took possession of the duchy at the death of his brother Jacopo III., whose daughters he excluded from their inheritance. He possessed Naxos, Milos, and Santorin. His exactions drove his subjects into rebellion, and he was murdered in 1494, leaving a natural son Francesco. The Venetian government sequestered the duchy, in order to render justice to the numerous suitors who had brought just claims against the dukes of the family of Crispo. But in the year 1500 Francesco III. was invested with the duchy². He died in the year 1519, leaving the duchy to his son Giovanni IV.

When war broke out between the sultan Suleiman the Magnificent and the republic of Venice in 1537, the celebrated Turkish admiral Barbarossa (Haïreddin pasha), after laying waste the island of Aegina and murdering a great part of the inhabitants, carried away 6000 as slaves³. He then subjected most of the islands of the Archipelago in the possession of Venetian nobles to the sultan's authority, and put an end to the independence of the duchy of the Archipelago, or, to speak more correctly, forced duke Giovanni IV. to transfer his allegiance from the Venetian republic to the Othoman empire⁴. He appeared before Naxos with a fleet of seventy galleys, from which he landed

island of old Kaumeni. Pègues, *Histoire et phénomènes du volcan et des îles volcaniques de Santorin*, 137.

¹ Hopf, *Veneto-Byzantinische Analekten*, 40. In the year 1850 the population of Santorin was 13,000 according to the statistical work of Dr. De Cigalla (*Γενική Στατιστική της Νήσου Θήρας, υπό Ι. Δε Κυγάλλα*).

² Francesco III. was born in 1483, and married to a daughter of Matteo Loredano in 1496, according to Hopf, *Veneto-Byzantinische Analekten*, 52; Zinkeisen, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches in Europa*, ii. 525.

³ See a notice of the ravages of Barbarossa in *Négociations de la France dans le Levant (Documents inédits sur l'histoire de France)*, i. 371.

⁴ Ceos and Kythnos were then taken from the Gozzadini and Premarini, Seriphos from the Michieli, Ios, Anaphe, and Antiparos from the Pisani, Paros from the Sangredi, Astypalaea and Amorgos from the Quirini and Grimani, Skyros, Skiathos, and Chelidromi, and in 1538 Skopelos, from the Venetians. Hopf, *Andros, Urkunden und Zusätze*, 7.

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a body of troops, and took possession of the town and citadel without meeting with the slightest resistance. The duke, seeing the immense force of the Turks, hastened on board the admiral's ship the moment it anchored, and declared his readiness to submit to any terms Barbarossa, as capitan-pasha, might think fit to impose. From the deck of the Turkish ship, where he was obliged to remain three days, Duke John IV. saw his capital plundered by the Turkish troops, and all his own wealth, and even the furniture of his palace, transported into the cabin of Barbarossa. He was at length allowed to return on shore and resume his rank of duke, after signing a treaty acknowledging himself a vassal of the Sublime Porte, and engaging to pay an annual tribute of five thousand sequins¹.

From this period the Latin power in the island of Naxos was virtually extinguished. The Greek inhabitants, who preferred the domination of the Turks to that of the Catholics, no longer respected the orders of their duke. The heads of the communities, who were charged with the collection of the taxes levied to pay the tribute, placed themselves in direct communication with the Turkish ministers, and served as spies on the conduct of their sovereign, under the pretext of attending to fiscal business. Both the Greek primates and the Turkish ministers contrived to render this connection a source of pecuniary profit. The primates obtained pretexts for extorting money from their countrymen at Naxos, and the ministers at Constantinople shared the fruits of their extortions. The Greek clergy, too, by their dependence on the Patriarch, who served the Porte as a kind of under-secretary of state for the affairs of the orthodox, were active agents in preparing the Greek people for the Turkish domination.

Giovanni IV., after writing a letter addressed to Pope Paul III. and the princes of Christendom, in which he announced the degradation into which he had fallen, died in

¹ The plunder the Turks carried off from Naxos was estimated at twenty thousand sequins. Paruta, lib. viii. p. 617; Sagredo, lib. v. p. 245. The curious letter of Duke John IV., giving a circumstantial account of the taking of Naxos, is dated 1st Dec. 1537. It is printed in the *Chronicorum Turcicorum, in quibus Turcorum origo, principes, imperatores, bella, praelia, caedes, victorias, reique militaris ratio exponuntur, omnia collecta* a Philippo Lonicero, Francofurti, 1584, 2 vols. 8vo., tom. ii. pp. 153-161; and in Buchon's *Recherches et Matériaux*, p. 360.

peace unmolested by the Turks, against whom his lamentations had vainly incited the Christians. He was succeeded by his son, Jacopo IV., in the year 1564. The impoverished treasury and enfeebled authority of the ducal government required the greatest prudence on the part of the new sovereign to preserve his position. Jacopo IV., to console himself for his political weakness, resolved to enjoy all the pleasures within his reach. His court was a scene of debauchery and vice; the Latin nobles, who were his principal associates, were poor, proud, and dissolute: the Catholic clergy, in whose hands the chief feudal estates in the island had accumulated, were rich, luxurious, and debauched, and lived openly with their avowed concubines¹. The Greeks laboured to put an end to the scandal of such a court and government which was both oppressive and disgraceful; but the Turks remained indifferent, as the annual tribute was regularly remitted to the Porte. At last the whole Greek inhabitants of Naxos sent deputies to the sultan, to complain of some extraordinary exactions, to demand the extinction of the duke's authority, and to petition the sultan to name a new governor. The Patriarch and the Greek clergy supported the petition of the primates, and the Porte prepared to give it a favourable reception. The duke was made sensible of his danger. Collecting a sum of twelve thousand crowns, he hastened to Constantinople to purchase some powerful protector at the Porte; but he arrived too late—his destiny was already decided. He was thrown into prison, and his property was confiscated; but, after a detention of six months, he was released and allowed to depart to Venice. Such was the final fate of the duchy of the Archipelago, the last of the great fiefs of the Latin empire of Romania, which was extinguished in the year 1566, after it had been governed by Catholic princes for about three hundred and sixty years. After the loss of his dominions, Jacopo IV. resided at Venice with his children, living on a pension which the republic continued to his descendants until the male line became extinct.

The Greeks gained little by their change of masters, for the sultan, Selim II., conferred the government of Naxos on a

¹ *Histoire nouvelle des anciens Ducs*, p. 300.

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Jew named Joa Miquez, who never visited the island in person, using it merely as a place from which to extract as much money as possible. The island was governed by Francis Coronello, a Spaniard, who, acting as his deputy, collected the tribute and overlooked the public administration¹.

SECT. IV.—*Condition of the Archipelago during its subjection to Venetian Families.*

The peculiar circumstances which enabled a long line of foreign princes to maintain themselves in a state of independence as sovereigns of the Archipelago require some explanation. The popes, who were powerful temporal princes on account of their great wealth, were the natural protectors of all the Latins in the East against the power of the Greek emperors—and they protected the dukes of the Archipelago; but it was unquestionably the alliance of the republic of Venice and the power of the Venetian fleets, rather than the zealous activity of the Holy See, that saved the duchy from being reconquered by Michael VIII., though the papal protection may have acted as a defence against the Genoese.

In forming our idea of the true basis of the Latin power in the Byzantine empire, we must never lose sight of the fact that

¹ Don Joa Miquez or Don Joseph Nasi belonged to a family of wealthy bankers which emigrated from Spain to escape the persecutions of Ferdinand and Isabella. The members of the family who obtained protection in Portugal and Flanders were compelled to embrace Christianity. The banking house of Nasi carried on extensive business in Flanders, France, and Italy, and lent money to kings and princes. Donna Garcia inherited the greater part of the wealth of the house, returned to the Jewish faith, and escaped from Venice to Constantinople. Don Joa Miquez, who had superintended the banking house at Antwerp, managed her affairs after her departure, but when he had realized the greater part of her fortune, he also quitted Christendom, returned to the faith of his fathers, and married her daughter. He became farmer of the revenues of the Greek islands, and is said to have collected 14,000 sequins from Naxos.

The conduct of the Othoman sultans to the Jews in the sixteenth century deserves to be contrasted with the conduct of Christian sovereigns. The departure of the Jews impoverished Christendom, and their arrival enriched Turkey as much by their industry and scientific knowledge as by the wealth they brought with them. They became the physicians of the sultans and the diplomatists of the Porte, and they were hated by the Christians for the zeal with which they served their benefactors, and envied by the Italian merchants for the influence they acquired by means of their capital in all the mercantile affairs of the Levant. See a memoir entitled *Don Joseph Nasi, Herzog von Naxos*, by Dr. Levy, Breslau, 1859.

the Venetians, who suggested the conquest, were induced to support the undertaking by their eagerness to obtain a monopoly of the Eastern trade; and the conquests of the republic were subordinate to the scheme of excluding every rival from the markets of the East. Monopoly was the object of all commercial policy in the thirteenth century. After the loss of Constantinople in 1261, and the close alliance of the Genoese with the Greek empire, which enabled those rival republicans to aim at a monopoly of the trade of the Black Sea, the islands of the Archipelago acquired an increased importance both in a military and commercial point of view. To exclude her rivals from the ports of the duchy, Venice formed a close alliance with the dukes, and persuaded them to include their dominions within the system of commercial privileges and monopolies which was applied to all the foreign settlements of Venice, and to hold no commercial communications with the western nations of Europe except through the port of Venice. The military character of several of the dukes of the family of Sanudo contributed to give the duchy more importance in the eyes of the Venetian government than it might otherwise have held.

It is not easy to fix the precise extent of the privileges and monopolies accorded to the commerce of Venice in the duchy; but foreign ships always paid double duties on the articles they imported or exported, and many articles could only be exported and imported in Venetian ships direct to Venice. This clause was a consequence of the right which the Venetians arrogated to themselves of the exclusive navigation of the Adriatic; so that the Greeks in the islands were compelled to sell to the Venetians alone that portion of their produce which was destined for the consumption of England and the continental ports on the ocean, from Cadiz to Hamburg. This commerce could only be carried on beyond the Straits of Gibraltar by the fleet periodically despatched from Venice, under the title of the Fleet of Flanders¹. The commercial system of Venice caused a stagnation of industry in Greece: the native traders were ruined, and either emigrated or dwindled into retail shopkeepers: all great commercial transactions passed into the hands of the Vene-

¹ Marin, *Storia Civile e Politica del Commercio de' Veneziani*, tom. v. lib. 3.

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tians, who left to the duke's subjects, who were not citizens of Venice, only the trifling coasting trade necessary to collect large cargoes at the ports visited by Venetian ships. The landed proprietors soon sank into idle gentlemen or rustic agriculturists; capital ceased to be accumulated on the land, for its accumulation promised no profit; the intercommunication between the different islands gradually diminished; time became of little value; population declined; and, in this debilitated condition of society, the dukes found a consolation in the thought that this state of things rendered any attempt at insurrection on the part of the orthodox Greeks hopeless. The wealth of the dukes, and even of the signors of the smaller islands, enabled them to maintain a small body of mercenaries sufficient to secure their castles from any sudden attack, while the fleets of Venice were never far distant, from which they were sure to receive effectual support. At the same time a Latin population, consisting partly of descendants of the conquering army, and partly of Greeks who had joined the Latin church, lived mingled with the native population, and served as spies on its conduct. The Greeks, however, who lived in communion with the papal church, were always regarded by the mass of the inhabitants as strangers, just as much as if they had been of Frank or Venetian extraction. Orthodoxy was the only test of nationality among the Byzantine Greeks.

The power of the dukes was thus rendered so firm, that they oppressed the Greeks without any fear of revolution; and the consequence was, that their financial exactions exceeded the limits which admit of wealth being reproduced with greater rapidity than it is devoured by taxation. A stationary state of things was first produced; then capital itself was consumed, and the ducal territories became incapable of sustaining as large a population as formerly. History presents innumerable examples of society in a similar state, produced by the same causes. Indeed, it is the great feature of Eastern history, from the fall of the Assyrian empire to the decay of the Othoman power. Central governments are incessantly devouring what nations are labouring to produce.

The Latin nobility in the Greek islands generally passed their lives in military service or in aristocratic idleness. Their education was usually begun at Venice, and completed on

board the Venetian fleet. When the wealth of the islands declined, only one son in a family was allowed to marry, in order to preserve the wealth and dignity of the house. Younger sons sought a career in the Venetian service or in the church, the daughters retired into a monastery. The consequence of these social arrangements was a degree of demoralization and vice that rendered Latin society the object of just detestation among the Greek population. The moral corruption of a dominant class soon works the political ruin of the institutions it upholds; and the Latins in Greece were almost exterminated by their own social laws, imposed for the purpose of maintaining their respectability, before they were conquered by the Turks.

The overthrow of the Byzantine empire produced as great a change in the social as in the political condition of the Greek race. In religion alone it remained unaltered; and henceforth religion became a more prominent characteristic than nationality, so that Greeks manifested a stronger attachment to their church than to their country. For more than 350 years Venetian nobles ruled in many of the Greek islands, and for 250 years Latin princes were masters of a considerable part of the continent of Greece. During this long period of subjection the natives of western Europe were constantly advancing in well-being and civilization. Society was quitting its feudal and aristocratic constitution in its progress towards the popular organization, which has rendered justice one of the elements of political power and given public opinion some control over the exercise of authority even by the most despotic sovereigns. But at the time the Latin nations began to hasten their pace on the way of improvement, the Greeks began to decline in civilization, and to diminish in numbers and national importance.

In the twelfth century the Greeks were the richest merchants, the greatest manufacturers, the most expert mechanics, and the ablest artists in Europe. In the sixteenth century they had lost their superiority both in arts and manufactures; their country was impoverished and depopulated, the people was without industry, and the nation was disorganized. It is easy to trace the progress of this decline in the islands of the Archipelago. During the early period of the Venetian rule, the Greeks suffered only the usual evils of conquered and

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heterodox races, which however were not inconsiderable in that age of crusading. But after Michael VIII. (Palaeologos) had expelled the Latins from Constantinople, the Archipelago became the scene of a long and bloody struggle for the mastery between the Greeks, aided by the Genoese and the Venetians. In this contest every island was attacked in turn; the wealth of the proprietors was plundered, and the peasants, whether slaves, serfs, or freemen, were kidnapped to serve as rowers in the hostile galleys. From this period a rapid diminution of the Greek race becomes apparent. If any contemporary chronicle had transmitted to us the events of a single successful assault on some flourishing and peaceful island, or preserved a detailed account of the calamities of a single captive family after its home had been pillaged by Greek or Venetian corsairs, we should have possessed materials for exciting pity in the most callous heart, and for making the most complacent philosopher feel somewhat ashamed of human nature.

It has been already mentioned that the Greek fleet pursued a long career of conquest in the Grecian seas during the reign of the emperor Michael VIII.¹ In 1269 the grand admiral Licario expelled the Venetians from many islands, and for several years Greek corsairs captured almost every merchant ship that ventured to quit a port without convoy². Santorin and Zia became two stations of the Greek cruisers who avenged the sufferings of their peaceable countrymen. There was a primate of Monemvasia who was terrible to the Latins as a corsair under the name of Demoiannes³.

The Spaniards soon arrived in the Levant to share in the plunder of Greece. The celebrated admiral Roger de Loria plundered the islands of Andros, Tinos, Mycone, and Thermia in the year 1292; and we know from the chronicle of Ramon Muntaner that the Spaniards ravaged the East with the unsparing ferocity and insatiable rapacity which they afterwards displayed under Cortes and Pizarro in Mexico and Peru⁴. At the commencement of the fourteenth century the

¹ See above, p. 283.

² Tafel and Thomas, *Urkunden Venedigs*, iii. 159-281, 'Judicum Venetorum in causis piraticis contra Graecos decisiones;' Hopf, *Andros*, and *Veneto-Byzantinische Analecten*.

³ Demo (a contraction for Demetrius), the son of John.

⁴ Muntaner, ch. cxvii.

Catalan Grand Company under Roger de Flor and the Seljouk emirs of Aidin and Mentesche ravaged the islands, and their expeditions were doubly destructive, for they depopulated the places they plundered by carrying off the youth of both sexes to sell as slaves, and the able-bodied men to serve as soldiers or sailors, leaving the old and the helpless children to die of starvation¹.

The possessions of the Venetians in the Greek islands were at this time so insecure that even in Candia no proprietor who owed military service was allowed to quit the island. In the year 1313 Andrea Cornaro, signor of Scarpanto, who possessed large estates in Candia, became by his marriage with the widow of Alberto Pallavicino, margrave of Boudonitz, signor of one-sixth of the island of Negrepont, but before he could visit the fiefs he had acquired in the empire of Romania, he was obliged to obtain permission of the senate of Venice. Leave of absence was granted him for five years, on condition that his heir remained to do service and keep guard in his castles during his absence².

The history of Andros presents an epitome of the history of the other islands under a favourable aspect. From it therefore we may estimate the decline and depopulation of the whole Archipelago without any danger of exaggeration. Andros was long one of the most flourishing, as it must always from its abundant springs be one of the most agreeable, of the Greek islands. In the ninth century Leo, the greatest mathematician of his age, studied at a college in Andros. His scientific reputation obtained for him an invitation to the court of the Caliph Almamun³. In the twelfth

¹ Pachymeres, ii. 344, edit. Rom.; Nicephorus Gregoras, i. 285, 523, 525, edit. Paris. Again, in 1317, Don Alfonso Fadrique of Aragon with the Catalans of the duchy of Athens carried off 700 slaves from Milos. [Some of the Catalans appear to have settled in the Greek islands. Two of the principal Greek families now inhabiting Santorin, those of De Cigallas and Delenda, are descended from them, as their names testify; traditions of Spanish occupation are also to be found in several places on the mainland of Greece, and in Crete Pashley mentions a village still called Spaniako for this reason. Ed.]

² Hopf, *Veneto-Byzantinische Analekten*, 121.

³ See above, vol. ii. p. 224. Some years ago, Theophilus Kalres, a Greek monk who had studied metaphysics and physical science in western Europe, and who was a man of vast attainments and great originality, founded a college at Andros, which acquired great celebrity in Greece. He was adored by his pupils, but his heretical doctrines caused the Greek government to dissolve his college, and his ecclesiastical superiors confined him in a monastery. He attempted to modify Christianity into what he called *θεοσέβεια*. The building he erected remains, and its arrangements were singularly judicious. [The story of Kalres has

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century the island was renowned for its manufacture of velvet and silk¹. Its iron-bound coast and rugged mountains afforded its inhabitants a sure defence against the Saracen pirates who plundered the coasts and islands of Greece in the tenth and eleventh centuries.

When the Venetians conquered Andros, the island exported wheat, which it produces of a very fine quality, and barley, which was abundant. But about the middle of the fourteenth century, the ravages of Greek, Genoese, Catalan, and Seljouk corsairs had ruined agriculture, and grain was imported from Euboea². A century later, Andros had been so depopulated by the devastations of Turkish pirates that it contained only 2,000 inhabitants³. This depopulation was followed by the immigration of Albanian colonists, who now occupy more than one-third of the island⁴.

Most of the other islands suffered more severely than Andros. In the middle of the thirteenth century Amorgos was abandoned by the cultivators of the soil, who fled to Naxos to escape from Greek corsairs, and in the middle of the fourteenth century the inhabitants of the island emigrated to Candia to escape from the Catalans and Seljouk Turks. The islands belonging to several Venetian nobles were depopulated, and they were obliged to colonize their deserted possessions by bringing peasants from Crete and the Morea.

been made the subject of a short poem by the Rev. H. N. Oxenham, who, in 1854, published a volume entitled *The Sentence of Kaires and other Poems*. The circumstances are related, from a point of view unfavourable to Kaires, in the *Christian Remembrancer* for 1849, vol. xviii. pp. 126-8. At the end of the eighth century a writer named Michael Psellus, a namesake of the more famous author of the eleventh century, studied in Andros. See above, vol. iii. p. 38, note 1. Ed.]

¹ Bohn's *Early Travels in Palestine*. Saewulf, p. 34.

² Hopf, *Andros*, 34; *Veneto-Byzantinische Analekten*, 21. In 1364 Marco Dandolo was allowed to export 100 measures of wheat annually from Negrepoint to Andros.

³ Hopf, *Andros*, 92.

⁴ At present (1861) the population is nearly 19,000, of whom about 7000 are Albanians, who have preserved their manners and language. I may here mention a circumstance which I think travellers have omitted to notice. The form of the Homeric palace is preserved in some of the houses of the Greeks of Andros. There is a large hall, so high that the chambers of the upper storey of the remaining part of the house have windows which look down into it. From such a window Penelope looked down on the suitors in the palace of Ithaca. I have not seen a similar tradition of Homeric architecture in any other part of Greece. [It is a little difficult to discover from the author's description the arrangement of the houses he saw in Andros. But there is nothing in the *Odyssey* to lead us to suppose that there was a window in Penelope's chamber looking down into the hall in the palace of Ithaca. That chamber was on the upper storey, and was reached by a ladder, but Penelope is described as hearing the singing in the hall from thence, not as seeing the suitors: *Od.* i. 328-330. Ed.]

Marco Crispo, the fifth son of Duke Francesco I. of Naxos, when he became signor of Ios at his father's death in 1397, found that island almost deserted by the agricultural population. He fortified the port and other points accessible to corsairs to ensure protection to the peasantry, and then brought over a number of families from the Morea to cultivate the soil. These colonists are said to have been of the Albanian race¹. The population of Paros fell at one time to 3,000 souls, and many of the smaller islands were at times almost entirely deserted. The islands of Naxos and Santorin had once exported cotton to Venice, but Santorin was so devastated that it contained only 300 inhabitants². Mules were also exported from Naxos and Andros in the period that preceded the ravages of the corsairs, and a breed of ponies of great strength and activity from Tinos, Skiathos, and Karystos, where a few are still reared³.

The insecurity of commerce in the Grecian seas has produced a repetition of similar measures for its protection in distant ages. In the fourteenth century the desert rock of Gaidaronisi was fortified by the Venetians and became a flourishing Italian town. In the eighteenth century the arid island of Hydra was colonized by a numerous population of Albanian shipowners and sailors. The settlement of Gaidaronisi is interesting, not only from its commercial importance, but also on account of the man by whom it was founded. In the year 1330 Andrea Dandolo, the earliest historian of Venice, who became doge in 1343, was invested with the island of Gaidaronisi, which served as a harbour of refuge for vessels in the Levant, on the condition that he should fortify it in such a manner as to give effectual protection against the corsairs that then swarmed in the Archipelago. He fulfilled this obligation so well that Gaidaronisi became for more than a century an important commercial station⁴.

In the fifteenth century the protection of the Venetian

¹ *Histoire nouvelle des anciens Ducs de l'Archipel.* 215. There are now no remains of an Albanian population in Ios, and there is no tradition of its existence.

² Naxos and Santorin now contain each upwards of 13,000 inhabitants. A perennial species of cotton is still cultivated in Santorin, the produce of which is consumed there and in the adjacent islands.

³ Hopf, *Venetio-Byzantinische Analekten*, 40, 82; *Andros*, 47, 59, 64, 67.

⁴ Hopf, *Andros*, 34.

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republic prevented the Turks from conquering the Archipelago, but it was not always sufficient to prevent the possessions of the Venetian signors from being plundered by Othoman corsairs, even when the dukes of Naxos and the signors of the other islands were included in the treaties of peace between the sultans and the republic. The continual ravages of Turkish corsairs in time of peace with Venice induced the senate to allow the signors of the islands to conclude separate treaties for their own security¹.

It is generally believed, and the opinion seems to be well founded, that the Latin domination in Greece was extremely destructive to the remains of ancient art and architecture. It is true that the Byzantine Greeks appear to have loathed Hellenic art, while several Latin signors felt a sincere admiration for the monuments, and particularly for the sculpture, of the ancient Greeks. But Hellenic buildings were not often destroyed for their materials under the Byzantine emperors, because materials were more abundant and society more stationary than after the conquests of the Crusaders. Under the Venetian and Latin signors society became more active, and that activity, though it may have added little to the prosperity of the country, made great changes in its appearance. Towns were built and castles were erected in new situations. Ports which had long remained deserted were frequented and fortified. The materials of the Hellenic buildings which the Byzantine Greeks had spared were required for these constructions. Every petty signor required a palace, and blocks of well-worked stone, pieces of broken cornices, and fragments of sculptured marble inserted into many a wall attest that many magnificent Hellenic buildings served as quarries in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries². When a taste for Greek literature and art arose in Italy, many Italians collected manuscripts, coins, and statues in Greece, but the collectors were few and the destroyers were many. The conception

¹ Hopf, *Veneto-Byzantinische Analekten*, 35. In the treaties of 1419, 1430, and most of the subsequent treaties, the dukes of Naxos and other signors are included by name.

² [This is especially noticeable at Paroekia, the modern capital of Paros, where, owing to the ancient quarries in the neighbourhood, white marble blocks are very abundant. On one side of the low hill which formed the ancient Acropolis the wall of the Venetian fortress is composed of drums of columns laid on their sides and slabs unequally fitted together. In the town pieces of cornices serve for door-steps, and triglyphs and other ornaments are built into the house-walls. Ed.]

of art and the sentiment of beauty found no place in the breasts of modern Greeks or Latin colonists. The revival of classic taste in the West awakened no echo in Greece, until political revolutions in recent times roused in the minds of Eastern Christians a desire for civil liberty.

HISTORY
OF THE
EMPIRE OF TREBIZOND.

VOL. IV.

X

EMPIRE OF TREBIZOND.

CHAPTER I.

FOUNDATION OF THE EMPIRE.

SECT. I.—*Early History of Trebizond.*

THE empire of Trebizond was the creation of accident¹. No necessity in the condition of the people called it into existence. The popular resources had undergone no development that demanded change; no increase had taken place in the wealth or knowledge of the inhabitants; nor did any sudden augmentation of national power impel them to assume

¹ The history of Trebizond was almost unknown, until Professor Fallmerayer discovered the Chronicle of Michael Panaretos among the books of Cardinal Bessarion, preserved at Venice. From this chronicle, with the aid of some unpublished MSS., and a careful review of all the published sources of information, he wrote a history of Trebizond, which displays great critical acuteness. His able work is entitled, *Geschichte des Kaiserthums von Trapezunt*, München, 1827, 4to. After visiting Trebizond, in 1840, the learned professor published the results of his personal researches at Trebizond and Mount Athos in the *Transactions of the Historical Class of the Royal Academy of Munich*, vol. iii. part 3, and vol. iv. part 1. The Chronicle of Panaretos, and a discourse of Eugenikos in praise of Trebizond, were published by the learned Professor Tafel of Tübingen, who has by his researches shed much light on several dark periods of Byzantine history; Eustathii Metropolitae Thessalonicensis *Opuscula, accedunt Trapezuntinas Historias Scriptores Panaretus et Eugenicus*, Francofurti ad M., 4to.

The little that can be learned concerning the history of Trebizond in English literature will be found in Gibbon's *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, vii. 327, edit. Smith. Walter Scott implies that Trebizond had been conquered by the Turks in the time of Richard Cœur-de-Lion, for in *Ivanhoe* the Templar says to Rebecca, 'Mount thee behind me on my gallant steed—on Zamor the gallant horse that never failed his rider. I won him in single fight from the Soldan of Trebizond.' Sir Walter overlooked Gibbon's observation (vii. 169), 'Trebizond alone, defended on either side by the sea and mountains, preserved at the extremity of the Euxine the ancient character of a Greek colony and the future destiny of a Christian empire.'

an independent position and claim for their capital the rank of an imperial city. The destruction of a distant central government, when Constantinople was conquered by the Frank Crusaders, left their provincial administration without the pivot on which it had revolved. The conjuncture was seized by a young man who bore the name of Alexios Komnenos, and was descended from the worst tyrant in the Byzantine annals¹. This youth grasped the vacant sovereignty, and merely by assuming the imperial title, and placing himself at the head of the local administration, founded a new empire. Power changed its name and its dwelling, but the history of the people was hardly modified. The grandeur of the empire of Trebizond exists only in romance. Its government owed its permanence to its being nothing more than a continuation of a long-established order of civil polity, and to its making no attempt to effect any social revolution.

The city of Trebizond wants only a secure port to be one of the richest jewels of the globe. It is admirably situated to form the capital of an independent state. The southern shores of the Black Sea offer every advantage for maintaining a numerous population, and the physical configuration of the country supplies its inhabitants with excellent natural barriers to defend them on every side. There are few spots on the earth richer in picturesque beauty, or abounding in more luxuriant vegetation, than the south-eastern shores of the inhospitable Euxine. The magnificent country that extends from the mouth of the Halys to the snowy range of Caucasus is formed of a singular union of rich plains, verdant hills, bold rocks, wooded mountains, primæval forests, and rapid streams. In this fertile and majestic region, Trebizond has been, now for more than six centuries, the noblest and the fairest city.

At an early period its trapezoid citadel was occupied by a Greek colony, and received its name from the tabular appearance of the rock on which the first settlers dwelt. In those days, the Hellenic race occupied a position among the nations of the earth not dissimilar to that now held by the Anglo-Saxon population. Greek society had embraced a

¹ Andronicus I. See above, vol. iii. p. 201.

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social organization that enabled the people to nourish a rapidly-augmenting population in territories where mankind had previously barely succeeded in gleaning a scanty supply of necessities for a few families, who neither increased in number, nor deviated from the footsteps traced by their fathers in agriculture or commerce. Many cities on the shores of the Black Sea, which received Greek colonists seven centuries before the Christian era, have ever since retained a body of Greek inhabitants. The conquests of peace are more durable than those of war. The Chronicle of Eusebius places the foundation of Trebizond 756 B.C.¹ Sinope was an earlier settlement; for Xenophon informs us that both Trebizond and Kerasunt were colonies of Sinope². But it is in vain to suppose that we can see any historical forms distinctly in the twilight of such antiquity.

Trebizond rose to a high degree of commercial importance in the time of the Roman empire. The advantages of its position, as a point of communication between Persia and the European provinces of Rome, rendered it the seat of an active and industrious population. The municipal institutions of Grecian colonies, less dependent on the central administration than those of Roman origin, insured an excellent local government to all the wealthy Greek cities which were allowed to retain their own communal organization; and we know from Pliny that Trebizond was a free city³. The emperor Hadrian, at the representation of Arrian, constructed a well-sheltered port, to protect the shipping from winter storms, to which vessels had been previously exposed in the unprotected anchorage. From that time the city became one of the principal marts for the produce of the East. Three great Roman roads connected it with the rest of Asia—one from the westward, along the shores of the Euxine; another eastward, to the banks of the Phasis; and a third southward, over the great mountain barrier to the banks of the Euphrates, where, separating into two branches, one communicated with the valley of the Araxes, and proceeded to Persia, while the other conducted to Syria⁴.

The country from Trebizond eastward to the summits of

¹ Clinton, *Fasti Hellenici*, i. 156.

² *Hist. Nat.* vi. 11.

³ *Anabasis*, iv. 8, 22; v. 3. 2.

⁴ See the *Tabula Peutingeriana*.

Caucasus was anciently called Colchis; but in the time of Justinian the district as far as the banks of the Phasis had received the name of Lazia, from one of the many small nations which have composed the indigenous population of this singular region from the earliest period. The Chalybes, the Chaldians, the Albanians, the Iberians, the Thianni, Sanni, or Tzans, the Khazirs, and the Huns, appear as separate nations round the Caucasian mountains in former days, just as the Georgians and Mingrelians, the Circassians, the Abazecs, the Ossetes, the Tchenchez, the Lesguians, and the Tzans—who each speak a distinct language—cluster round the counterforts of this great range at the present hour.

The history of Trebizond from the time of Justinian to the accession of Leo III. (the Isaurian) is almost without interest. The iconoclast hero infused new life into the attenuated body of the Eastern empire, and his stern spirit awakened new springs of moral and religious feeling in the breasts of the Christians in Asia. The palsy that threatened Christian society with annihilation, under the reigns of the successors of Justinian, was healed. The empire was restored to some portion of its ancient power and glory, and remodelled by reforms so extensive, that Leo may justly be termed the reformer of the Roman, or, more properly, the founder of the Byzantine empire. In this reformed empire Trebizond acquired an additional degree of importance. It became the capital of the frontier province called the theme of Chaldia, and the centre from which the military, political, commercial, and diplomatic relations of the Byzantine empire were conducted with the Christian princes of Armenia and Iberia¹. The direction of the complicated business that resulted from the incessant warfare between the Christians and Saracens, on the frontiers of Armenia, was necessarily intrusted to the dukes of Chaldia, who made Trebizond their habitual residence. The freedom of action accorded to these viceroys afforded them frequent opportunities of forming personal alliances with the neighbouring princes and people, and when the central government at Constantinople displayed any

¹ The people who inhabited this country before the arrival of the Romans were called Chaldaei and Sanni. Strabo, lib. xii. p. 548. The Byzantine theme of Chaldia dates from the commencement of the tenth century. Constant. Porphy. *De Thematibus*, lib. i. p. 12, edit. Paris. The trade of Trebizond with Iberia is mentioned by Constantine Porphyrogenitus, *De Adm. Imp.* c. 46.

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weakness, the power of the dukes of Chaldia enabled them to act as if they were independent princes. The position of the city of Trebizond, the nature of its mixed population, the condition of its society, divided into many separate classes, and the individual ambition of the leading men in the neighbouring provinces, all tended in the same direction.

Under the vigorous and prudent administration of the iconoclast emperors, and the legislative wisdom of the Basilian dynasty, the Byzantine empire held a dominant position in the commercial world; and Trebizond, secure from anarchy, blessed with municipal liberty, and protected against external danger, flourished in repose. Still, though the wealth of Trebizond preserved the people in the enjoyment of some advantages, little care was bestowed by the central administration on their local interests. Many of the public works constructed in Roman times, while Trebizond was a free city, were allowed to fall into decay; while their ruins, which were constantly before the eyes of the inhabitants, perhaps awakened some aspirations after political independence. It was not unnatural, therefore, for the people of Trebizond to recur to the memory of the days when the Romans allowed the municipality to expend part of the money levied on the inhabitants in the city itself, and to contrast it with the Byzantine government, which had converted the ancient municipalities into police and fiscal offices, and had made it a state maxim to collect the whole taxes of the empire at Constantinople, where report said that immense treasures were expended in the pompous ceremonies of an idle court, or in pampering the mob of the capital with extravagant shows in the hippodrome.

About the period of the extinction of the Basilian dynasty, the Byzantine administration fell into disorder: the imperial government ceased to be regarded by its subjects as the only human type of power that could guarantee religious orthodoxy, political order, and security of private property. The spell was broken that for centuries had bound together the various provinces and nations of the Eastern empire into one state. The growing incapacity of the Byzantine government to execute the duties imposed on them as the heirs of the Romans, added to the great changes that time had effected in the very elements of society, destroyed all public ties.

Society was in a state of revolution at the conclusion of the eleventh century. Public opinion had done more to uphold the fabric of the Byzantine empire than the sword: civil virtues, as well as military, had driven back the Saracens beyond Mount Taurus, and rescued southern Italy from Charlemagne and his successors; the laws of Rome, rather than the fleets of Greece, had upheld the emperor of Constantinople as the autocrat of the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. As long as the Byzantine emperor was looked up to, from the most distant provinces of his dominions, as the only fountain of justice on earth, so long did a conviction of the necessity of maintaining the supremacy of the central administration find an advocate in every breast; and this conviction, as much as devotion to the divine right of the orthodox emperor, saved the empire both from the Saracens, the Bulgarians, and the Sclavonians, and from rebellion and dismemberment.

From the period when the Asiatic aristocracy mastered the Byzantine administration, and placed Isaac I. (Comnenos) on the imperial throne, in the year 1057, a change took place in the conduct of public affairs. Provinces were bartered as rewards for political and military support, and the law began to lose a portion of its previous omnipotence. The people, as well as the provincial governors, showed themselves ready to seize every opportunity of escaping from the fiscal avidity of the central government, even at the risk of dissolving the ties that had hitherto bound them to the orthodox emperor. The imperial power was felt to be daily more arbitrary and oppressive, as the administration grew less systematic.

The arrival of the Seljouk Turks in the west of Asia, about the same period, changed the condition of the inhabitants of all the countries between the Indus and the Halys. These warriors swept from the face of the earth many of the accessories of civilization, and destroyed vast accumulations of labour and capital, which afforded the means of life to millions of men. Wherever these Turkish nomades passed, cities were destroyed, water-courses were ruined, canals and wells were filled up, and trees cut down; so that provinces which, a few years before their arrival, nourished thousands of wealthy inhabitants, became unable to support more than a

few families. A few herdsmen could barely find subsistence by wandering over territories that had previously maintained populous cities. Provinces, where mankind had once been reckoned by millions, saw their inhabitants counted by thousands. The defeat of Romanos IV. (Diogenes) at the battle of Manzikert, in 1071, led to the expulsion of the Greeks from the greater part of Asia Minor, and carried the conquests of the Seljouk Turks up to the walls of Trebizond. The province of Chaldia was wasted by their incursions, but the city was saved from their attacks. It owed its safety, however, more to the strength of its position, defended by a great mountain barrier to the south, and to the spirit of its inhabitants, than to its Byzantine garrison, or to the protection of the emperors of Constantinople.

The Turks were ultimately expelled from the Trebizantine territory by the skill and prudence of Theodore Gabras, a nobleman of the province, who ruled Chaldia almost as an independent prince during part of the reign of the Byzantine emperor Alexius I. The personal differences of Theodore Gabras with Alexius I., in the year 1091, are recorded by Anna Comnena, but they afford us little insight into the real nature of the position of Gabras at Trebizond, except in so far as they prove that the emperor feared his power, and was unwilling to risk hostilities with an able vassal who could count on popular support¹. In the year 1104, the office of duke of Trebizond was filled by Gregorios Taronites, who was allied to the imperial family. Taronites went a step beyond Gabras, and, not satisfied with being virtually independent, acted as a sovereign prince, and set the orders of the emperor at defiance. Alexius sent an expedition against him, by which he was defeated and taken prisoner; but though he was kept in prison for some time at Constantinople, he was subsequently, for reasons of which we are not informed, released and reinstated in the government of Trebizond. He ruled the province until the year 1119. In that year he formed an alliance with the emir of Kamakh, to attack the Seljouk prince of Melitene. The confederates were defeated, and Taronites fell into the hands of the Turks, who compelled him to purchase his freedom by paying a ransom of thirty thousand gold byzants—a sum then regarded in the

¹ Anna Comnena, 240.

East as the usual ransom of officers of the highest rank in the Byzantine empire¹.

Constantine Gabras obtained the government of Trebizond after the misfortune of Taronites. Nicetas mentions him, in the year 1139, as having long governed the province as an independent prince. In that year the emperor John II. (Comnenus) led an expedition into Paphlagonia, with the expectation of being able to advance as far eastward as Trebizond, where he hoped to re-establish the imperial authority, and recover possession of the whole southern shore of the Black Sea. But the emperor found Paphlagonia in such a depopulated condition that his progress was interrupted by the difficulty of procuring supplies, and it was late in the year before he reached Neocaesarea. That city was in the hands of the Seljouk Turks, who defended it with such valour that John was compelled to abandon the siege, and retreat to Constantinople after a fruitless campaign². During the reign of his son, Manuel I., however, we find the imperial authority completely re-established in Trebizond; and the city continued to remain in immediate subjection to the central administration at Constantinople, until the overthrow of the Byzantine empire by the Crusaders, in 1204³.

History has preserved no documents for estimating the proportions in which the different races of Lazes and Greeks inhabited the city of Trebizond and the surrounding country, nor can we arrive at any precise idea of the relative influence which each exercised on the various political changes that

¹ The ransom of Richard Cœur-de-Lion, who was regarded as the richest king of his time in the west of Europe, was fixed at 150,000 marks of pure silver, in the year 1193. The mark was eight ounces troy weight, which, taking the price of gold at sixty shillings an ounce, makes 300,000*l*. But supposing the proportion of the value of silver to that of gold to have been as twelve to one, the sum was equivalent to about 600,000 gold byzants.

Fallmerayer (*Kaiserthum von Trapezunt*, p. 19) calls Gregorios Taronites the son of Theodore Gabras; but Byzantine history, I believe, does not certify this affiliation. It is true Anna Comnena (pp. 241 and 364) tells us that Gabras had a son named Gregorios. The capture of Taronites is mentioned by Abulpharagius, who alone connects him with the family of Gabras (p. 300). Compare Ducange, *Familiae Aug. Byzantinae*, pp. 172 and 177. Cinnamus (p. 31) mentions a Gabras about this time, who was born in the Byzantine empire, but bred up among the Seljouk Turks, in whose armies he served.

² Nicetas, 23. A Constantine Gabras was sent by the emperor Manuel I. as ambassador to sultan Kilidji-Arslan of Iconium. Nicetas, 79.

³ Cinnamus, 171. A Michael Gabras is noticed as charged with the care of assembling the troops of Pontus and Trebizond, and he is mentioned as having commanded the Byzantine army on the Danube (150). Nicetas (87) recounts an anecdote not much to his credit as a soldier.

Ch. I. § 2.]

occurred under the Byzantine government. There was always a numerous Greek population dwelling in all the maritime cities of Colchis and Pontus, though whether these colonists had perpetuated their existence by descent, or recruited their numbers by constant immigrations from those lands where the Greek race formed the native population of the soil, is by no means certain. This Greek population permanently established at Trebizond lived in a state of opposition to the power and pretensions of the Byzantine aristocracy, which grew up in the province under the shadow of the central administration. Both these sections of Greeks were regarded with jealousy by the indigenous population of Lazes or Tzans, who inhabited the mountain districts that overhang the coast.

SECT. II.—*Origin of the Family of Grand Komnenos or Comnenus.*

The name of Komnenos, or Comnenus, was originally borrowed from Italy. But Roman names were too generally diffused in the provinces among the clients and the freedmen of distinguished Romans, for us to draw any inference concerning the descent of an Asiatic family, merely because it bore a name once used in Italy. All Gaul was filled with families of the name of Julius, few of whom had the slightest claim to any relationship with the Julian house of Rome. The family of Komnenos, which gave a dynasty of able sovereigns to the Byzantine empire, and a long line of emperors to Trebizond, first made its appearance in Eastern history about the year 976, when Manuel Komnenos held the office of praefect in Asia. Manuel, at his death, left his children under the guardianship of the emperor Basil II.¹ Of these children the eldest was Isaac I., who seated himself on the imperial throne after the extinction of the Basilian dynasty, by heading a successful rebellion of the Asiatic aristocracy in the year 1057. After occupying the throne for little more than two years, he voluntarily retired into a monastery, without attempting to secure the empire as a

¹ Niceph. Bryenn. 16; Ducange, *Familiae Aug. Byzantinae*, 169.

heritage to his family. The domains of the house of Komnenos, their hereditary castle and the seat of their territorial power, was at Kastamona, in Paphlagonia, before that province was depopulated by the ravages of the Seljouk Turks¹. The emperor Alexius I. was the third son of John Komnenos, the brother of Isaac I. Like his uncle, he mounted the imperial throne by heading a successful rebellion. Andronicus I. dethroned and murdered Alexius II., then about sixteen years of age, who was the great-grandson of Alexius I., of whom Andronicus was the grandson.

In the year 1185, the savage cruelty of Andronicus produced a terrible revolution at Constantinople. Andronicus was dethroned and murdered by a popular insurrection. A city mob overthrew the imperial government, executed the emperor as a criminal, and remained masters of Constantinople for several days. The people plundered the treasury, and celebrated their orgies in the palace. These acts dissolved the spell that had invested the power of the emperor with a halo of divine authority. All legislative, judicial, civil, and military power, remained annulled by the will of the rabble. The new sovereign, Isaac II. (Angelos), was a man destitute of capacity and courage, and he only gradually recovered the semblance of the power held by his predecessors. But a mortal wound had been inflicted on the imperial government, and from the hour that the aged tyrant Andronicus, with his long forked beard, was led through the streets of Constantinople on a mangy camel, to perish amidst inhuman tortures, a hideous spectacle to the mob in the hippodrome, the public administration became daily more anarchical. The worthless princes of the house of Angelos were high priests well suited to conduct the sacrifice of an empire exhausted by the energetic tyranny of the bold house of Komnenos.

The people had certainly good reason to hate the name of Komnenos, for the princes of that able and haughty race had been severe rulers, treating their subjects as the instruments of their personal aggrandizement, wasting the wealth of the state, and pouring out the blood of the people with a lavish hand, to gratify every whim of power. Yet their name was a spell on the minds of the people, wherever the

¹ Cedrenus, 798.

Ch. I. § 2.]

Greek language was spoken ; and when the empire broke up into fragments, the sovereigns of every province used the mighty name as a passport to power.

Manuel Komnenos, the eldest son of the tyrant Andronicus, had acquired some popularity by opposing the cruelties of his father, and by declaring that his respect for the authority of the Greek church compelled him to refuse marrying Agnes of France, the betrothed of his murdered relation Alexius II.,—the affinity established by the ceremony of betrothal, according to the ecclesiastical rules of the Greeks, creating a bar to marriage where the parties stand as Alexius II. and Manuel did, in the relationship of second cousins. The prudent conduct of Manuel, and his reverence for established laws, excited distrust in the breast of his passionate father, who deprived him of his birthright, and raised his younger brother John to the imperial dignity, investing him with the rank of colleague and successor. Yet the virtues of Manuel proved no protection, when the popular fury was roused against his father. The very name of Komnenos was for a while hateful, and every one who bore it was proscribed. The new emperor, Isaac II., weak, envious, and cruel, was induced, by the memory of the popularity which these good qualities had once inspired, to guard against a reaction in Manuel's favour. To prevent the possibility of his ever being called to the throne, Isaac ordered his eyes to be put out ; and the sentence was executed with such barbarity that Manuel died from the effects of the operation. He left two children, Alexios and David.

Alexios was only four years old at the time of his father's murder. The friends of his family placed him and his infant brother in security during the fury of the revolution, keeping them concealed from the jealousy of Isaac II. and the vengeance of the enemies of their house. When all danger was passed, the two children were allowed to reside unmolested at Constantinople, where they received their education, neglected and forgotten by the imperial court. Their title to the throne could give little disquietude to the reigning sovereign in a government which, like that of the Byzantine empire, was recognized to be elective, and in which their father had been excluded from the throne by the exercise of an acknowledged constitutional prerogative. In

virtue of the same power of selecting a successor, to be publicly ratified by what was termed the Senate and the Roman people, the emperor John II., the best prince of the name of Komnenos, had excluded his eldest son, Isaac, from the succession, and left the empire to Manuel, his youngest. Alexios and David lived in obscurity until the Crusaders besieged Constantinople. Before the city was taken, the two young men escaped to the coast of Colchis, where their paternal aunt, Tamar, possessed wealth and influence. Assisted by her power, and by the memory of their tyrannical grandfather, who had been popular in the east of Asia Minor, they were enabled to collect an army of Iberian mercenaries. At the head of this force Alexios entered Trebizond in the month of April 1204, about the time Constantinople fell into the hands of the Crusaders. He had been proclaimed emperor by his army on crossing the frontier¹. To mark that he was the legitimate representative of the imperial family of Komnenos, and to prevent his being confounded with the numerous descendants of females, or with the family of the emperor Alexius III., who had arrogated to themselves his name, he assumed the designation of Grand-Komnenos².

¹ Fallmerayer, in his *Kaiserthum von Trapezunt*, corrects the errors of Ducange and Gibbon concerning Alexios I., whom these authors represent as not having assumed the title of emperor. But he does not appear to have sufficient authority for representing Tamar as having escaped from Constantinople, with her nephews, at the time of the revolution against Andronicus. When he argues that this flight was necessary to save their lives, he attributes too much importance to hereditary rights in the Byzantine empire. Had the young Alexios been educated as a pretender to the throne, this could only have been done under the protection of some powerful independent sovereign like Queen Tamar of Georgia, or Sultan Kilidji-Arslan of Iconium; and of this there is no evidence in history. Indeed, Manuel, the father of Alexios, never having received the title of emperor, Alexios, according to Byzantine ideas, had no claim to the empire. He required to conquer it, when of age, like his ancestors Isaac I. and Alexius I. Panaretos, in his *Chronicle*, informs us that Alexios, leaving Constantinople, arrived in Iberia, where he assembled an army by the influence of his aunt Tamar, and gained possession of Trebizond in April, 1204. This is really all we know of his life before he ascended the throne; and this leads to the conclusion that Tamar, but not Alexios, had been long established in Iberia. She may have been the widow of some Colchian prince who had maintained his independence against Queen Tamar of Georgia, or, as the Georgian historians call her, on account of her great exploits, King Tamar—the Georgian queen having only succeeded in extending her dominions as far westward as the shores of the Black Sea for a short time. She died in 1201. Saint-Martin, *Mémoires de l'Arménie*, ii. pp. 249, 255; Le Beau, *Histoire du Bas-Empire*, xvii. p. 256, Brosset's note. It seems probable that the emperor Andronicus I. had married an Iberian princess, who introduced the Georgian names of Tamar and David into his branch of the family of Komnenos, and connected it by ties of consanguinity with the Colchian regions.

² It has been considered convenient, for distinction, to employ the usual Latin names for the Byzantine emperors, and to adopt the Greek orthography for the sovereigns of Trebizond.

Ch. I. § 3.]

Wherever he appeared, he was acknowledged as the lawful sovereign of the Roman empire. The Greeks of Trebizond were in a state of alarm at the frightful revolution which had overthrown the political and commercial position of their race. The duke who then governed the province of Trebizond possessed neither the talents nor the power necessary to convert his government into an independent principality; nor had he the energy or the influence required to oppose the progress of the young Alexios, who had a considerable share of the active vigour and decision of character for which so many of his ancestors had been remarkable. The inhabitants of the city were sensible of the danger they would incur should the Franks or the Georgians attack them while isolated from the other provinces of the empire, and their fear of foreign conquest and domestic anarchy operated in favour of the claims of an emperor who could boast a name renowned in the East. Trebizond was sure of enjoying the advantage of being the seat of government for some time. It might become the capital of an empire. At all events, if victory attended the arms of the young Grand-Komnenos, and if he succeeded in expelling the Franks from Constantinople, and restoring the Byzantine empire to the wealth and power it had formerly possessed under the emperors of his family, there could be no doubt that his early partizans would reap a rich harvest of reward.

SECT. III.—*Reign of Alexios I., Grand-Komnenos.*

Alexios Grand-Komnenos was twenty-two years of age when he was crowned emperor in Trebizond¹. The title to

¹ It was the fashion of this age to magnify titles. There was a Grand Chan of Tartary, a Grand Sultan of the Seljouk Turks, a Grand Sire of Athens; and when the Greeks recovered possession of Constantinople, they called their sovereign the Grand Emperor, *Μέγας Βασιλεὺς*. The first modification of the title of the emperors of Trebizond, after they ceased to style themselves emperors of the Romans, is stated to have been, The faithful Emperor and Autocrat of all the East, Iberia, and Perateia: *Πιστὸς Βασιλεὺς καὶ Αὐτοκράτωρ πάσης Ἀνατολῆς, Ἰβήρων, καὶ Περαιέας, ὁ Μέγας Κομνηνός*. Perateia, or the transmarine province, was the name given to the possessions of Trebizond in the Tauric Chersonesos, Cherson, and Gothia. It may be doubted whether they used this title before the reign of the emperor John II., who married Eudocia, the daughter of Michael VIII. Palaeologos, emperor of Constantinople. The earlier emperors of Trebizond, however, appear to have attached less importance to the title of Grand than the later, for Manuel I. is called simply Komnenos, emperor and autocrat

which he laid claim was, The Faithful Emperor of the Romans. Such had been the title of the emperors of Constantinople until the dismemberment of the Eastern empire by the Crusaders; and Alexios, regarding the family of Angelos as dethroned usurpers, naturally laid claim to the position from which they had fallen, and which had been long occupied by his ancestors. The title of the emperors of Trebizond subsequently underwent some modification, particularly when it became necessary to conciliate the house of Palaeologos, after Michael VIII. had reconquered Constantinople; and the title of Emperor of the Romans was then exchanged for that of Emperor of all the East, Iberia, and the Transmarine dominions.

The conquests of Alexios at the commencement of his career were rapid and brilliant. The helplessness and incapacity of the Byzantine provincial authorities, however, favoured the progress of his arms quite as much as his own talents, for whenever he met with a determined resistance his advance was arrested. The governors of most of the cities before whose walls he appeared, knowing that they could entertain no hope of support from the central government, unable to place any reliance on their own administrative powers, and without any chance of receiving assistance from the native population, submitted to the new emperor as their lawful sovereign. The Byzantine troops flocked to his standard with enthusiasm, for under his command a new career of activity was suddenly opened to the ambitious, while long dormant hopes of plunder, glory, and power were awakened in many breasts. Another cause affecting the minds of all the Greek Christians in the East favoured his enterprise. The fear of the Mussulman yoke was becoming daily greater. The family of Angelos had neglected the defence of the eastern Asiatic provinces, while the Seljouk

of the Romans, in the inscription which exists in the church or mosque of St. Sophia, and which appears contemporaneous. [The expression *Πιστὸς βασιλεὺς* at the commencement of the title here given is apt to create an erroneous impression. It should rather be *Ἐν Χριστῷ πιστὸς βασιλεὺς*, as it is in the miniature of the emperor Basil, the Slayer of the Bulgarians, referred to below (p. 341), or *Ἐν Χριστῷ τῷ Θεῷ πιστὸς βασιλεὺς*, as it is in the inscription of Manuel I. of Trebizond which is there given, and in that of Alexius III. on the fresco in the monastery of the Panaghia Theotocos near Trebizond. The latter runs thus—*Ἀλέξιος ἐν Χριστῷ τῷ Θεῷ πιστὸς βασιλεὺς καὶ αὐτοκράτωρ πάσης Ἀνατολῆς ὁ μέγας Κομνηνός*. See Texier and Pullan's *Byzantine Architecture*, p. 201. Ed.]

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Turks had taken advantage of this indifference, and threatened to overwhelm the orthodox from the south. The invasion of the Latin Christians had cut off all retreat to the westward. The Eastern nations had long believed that the power of the Greek emperors could alone offer a successful resistance to the progress of Mohammedanism, and drive the Seljouk Turks out of Asia Minor, as their predecessors had driven out the Saracens.

Alexios Grand-Komnenos presented himself at the appropriate moment to profit by this state of public opinion. In the course of a few months he rendered himself master of the fortresses of Tripolis, Kerasunt, Mesochaldaion, Jasonis, and Oinaion, and without fighting a single battle he conquered the whole country from the Phasis to the Thermodon. In the mean time his brother David invaded Paphlagonia at the head of a strong body of Iberian mercenaries and Lazian volunteers. His success was as great as that of his brother. The whole coast, from Sinope to Heracleia, submitted to his orders, and was incorporated into the empire of Alexios. The rich and strongly fortified cities of Sinope, Amastris, Tios, and Heracleia, opened their gates, and welcomed David as the representative of the lawful emperor of the Romans. He then advanced to the Sangarios, hoping soon to render his brother master of all the country which the Greeks still defended against the Crusaders.

The condition of the Greeks at Nicaea favoured the project. Theodore Lascaris then ruled in Bithynia, but he still contented himself with the title of despot, and acted in the disadvantageous position of viceroy for his worthless father-in-law Alexius III., whose tyrannical government and cowardly flight from Constantinople, after the first assault of the Crusaders, rendered him universally detested. David, confident in the popularity of his family, and trusting to the valour of his Iberian cuirassiers, expected to enter Nicomedia without resistance. But Theodore Lascaris was a better soldier and abler statesman than either David or Alexios. He made every preparation in his power for stopping the tide of conquest which had borne forward the banner of Grand-Komnenos with uninterrupted success over all the southern shores of the Euxine. To prevent the two brothers from uniting the armies under their command, Theodore concluded

a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, with Galaseddin Kaikhosrou, sultan of Iconium or Roum¹, who was alarmed alike at the progress of the Crusaders and at that of the new emperor of Trebizond. While Theodore prepared to encounter the army of David in Bithynia, the sultan marched against Alexios, who had laid siege to Amisos. Both brothers were defeated. Neither of them had been trained as soldiers, and nature had not endowed them with that rare genius which sometimes enables an individual in early youth to divine the strategic knowledge and military experience that are usually only to be acquired as the result of long service in the field.

David had intrusted the command of his army to Synadenos, a young and inexperienced general, who was ordered to occupy Nicomedia, as if the operation could be effected by a simple march. Theodore Lascaris cautiously watched the movements of his enemies, and assembled a considerable force on their flank before they entertained any suspicion that a hostile army was observing them in their immediate vicinity. The troops of Trebizond advanced in careless confidence until they were surprised by a sudden attack. The Iberian mercenaries, on whom David had principally relied for extending his conquests westward, fought bravely, and were cut to pieces. The general Synadenos was taken prisoner, and carried to Nicaea. This defeat arrested the progress of David, but he was still at the head of so large a force that he was able to retain possession of all his previous conquests². For a moment the empire of his brother extended from the chain of Caucasus to the shores of the Bosphorus, with the exception of the two contiguous cities of Amisos and Samsoun.

Alexios was defeated by the Turks shortly after the loss of his brother's army. Amisos was the only Greek city on the coast that refused to acknowledge his authority. The Turks had built a town at Samsoun about a mile from the gates of Amisos. This Turkish possession, though forming a fortified town, was really only a commercial factory, resembling in its

¹ The Seljouk sultans of Minor Asia, who held their court at Iconium, called themselves the sultans of Roum, or Romania, as having subdued the most valuable portion of the dominions of the Byzantine emperors, who called themselves emperors of the Romans.

² Nicetas, 403.

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object what the Genoese town of Galata, in the port of Constantinople, became at a subsequent period. Commercial interests united the Greeks of Amisos and the Turks of Samsoun in close alliance. This point of the coast offers the easiest line of communication with that part of the interior of Asia Minor which extends from the Halys to the Euphrates, as far southward as Syria. The walls of Samsoun, consequently, protected warehouses filled with merchandise of immense value, which was first collected in the cities of the interior, from whence it was transmitted to the coast, for the Turks had from early ages been a commercial people¹. It is only the Othoman race that has always been a tribe of warriors. The produce accumulated at Samsoun was purchased by the Greeks of Amisos, who furnished the capital and the ships necessary for its distribution through Russia and western Europe. The capitalists and the mariners of Amisos dispersed the manufactures of the nomades, their cloth of hair and wool, and their variegated carpets, the copper of Tokat, and the brilliant dye-stuffs of Caesarea, among the populous cities of the Byzantine empire and the Italian commercial republics. They conveyed them to Alexandria, Tripoli, and Tunis, from whence they reached Morocco and Spain; and to Bulgaria and the Tauric Chersonesos, from whence they were transported by various routes over the north of Europe and Asia. The present aspect of the small fortified city of Samsoun probably gives a tolerably exact idea of the aspect it presented at the commencement of the thirteenth century, by supposing everything that now appears old and dilapidated as then new and substantial. Amisos, however, which was then a larger, wealthier, and stronger city, has now disappeared; and the traveller who visits its site can only trace a few ruined walls on the hill which rises to the north-westward of Samsoun².

At the time Constantinople fell into the hands of the Latins, Amisos was governed by a Byzantine officer named Sabbas. Like several provincial governors in Europe and western Asia, he assumed the position of an independent prince. His government had been so prudent that the citizens of Amisos acknowledged his authority with readiness; and

¹ Menander, 398, edit. Bonn.

² Hamilton's *Researches in Asia Minor*, i. 290.

both the Greeks of the surrounding country and the Turks of Samsoun considered their interests so closely identified with the continuation of the order he had preserved, during his administration, that they joined in defending him against the attacks of the emperor of Trebizond, and assisted him in preserving his independence after Alexios was defeated by the sultan of Iconium. Alexios, on his way westward to complete the conquest of the Greek empire, encamped with his army before the walls of Amisos, and summoned Sabbas to surrender the city. His demand was rejected, and he laid siege to the place. The Turks of Samsoun, persuaded that the conquest of Amisos would be followed by an attack on their town, and would cause their exclusion from any direct communication with the Black Sea, made common cause with the Greeks of Amisos. Messengers were despatched to Iconium, to urge the Seljouk sultan to expedite his movements. The defence of the place was so vigorous that Alexios had made little progress with the siege when Galaseddin Kaikhosrou arrived with the Turkish army. A battle was fought under the walls of the city, in which the troops of Trebizond were completely defeated, and the emperor escaped with only a remnant of his forces.

The position of the city of Amisos at this period affords us a glimpse into the anomalous state of society and political power that was not uncommon in Asia Minor during the later days of the Byzantine empire, and to which many parallels may be found even in European history. Sabbas occupied an intermediate position between that of an independent prince and a popular chief. The citizens of Amisos were enabled to defend their liberty in the midst of powerful and hostile states, rather by a favourable combination of circumstances, of which they availed themselves with prudence and moderation, than by any power they derived from their own wealth, or the strength of their position. They were contented to submit to a foreign leader, because they found him a wise and judicious administrator. Sabbas, on the other hand, accidentally raised from the rank of a provincial governor to that of an independent sovereign, unable to count on the support of a large military force, and possessing only a limited power over the revenues of a single city with no very extensive territory, was dependent for the continuance of his

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high position on his popularity and good behaviour. He showed himself every way well adapted for his situation. He repulsed the attacks of the Christian emperor of Trebizond, and conciliated the good-will and active assistance of the Turks of Samsoun, without admitting the army of the sultan of Iconium within the walls of Amisos. Satisfied, however, that it would be an act of rashness to attempt defending his independence, unless he could secure the support of some powerful ally against both Alexios and Gaiaseddin, he became a voluntary vassal of the Greek empire of Nicaea as soon as Theodore Lascaris assumed the title of emperor. Theodore was too distant to interfere with the local administration of the city, but he was able from his position to afford an effective protection to Amisos, should it be attacked either by the troops of David Grand-Komnenos or of the sultan of Iconium¹.

David found himself so much weakened by the loss of his Iberian troops, and the impossibility of drawing further succours from Trebizond after his brother's defeat, that he sought a new alliance to maintain his ground against Theodore and Gaiaseddin. The emperor of Nicaea had leagued with the Turks; David formed a treaty with the Latins in Constantinople. Without their assistance he feared that he should be unable to preserve his conquests in Paphlagonia; and to purchase their aid, he became a vassal of the Latin empire of Romania, and consented to hold Heracleia and the neighbouring country as a fief from the emperor Henry; thus virtually separating himself from his brother's empire. The emperor Henry had already gained possession of Nicomedia, and was eager to press the war against Theodore Lascaris, whose dominions he had compressed into a narrow space, by the conquest of all the southern shore of the Propontis, from the Hellespont to the Rhyndacus. David received the assistance of a body of crusading knights, with their followers and men-at-arms. These vain-glorious auxiliaries, despising both their Greek enemies and their Greek allies, advanced boldly forward to attack the troops of the emperor of Nicaea, without condescending to combine their movements with the other corps that composed the army

¹ Acropolis, 6.

of David. Andronikos Ghidos, who commanded the army of Nicaea, availing himself of the rashness of the Latins, surrounded their cavalry in the great forest that extends over the highlands between Nicomedia and Heracleia, called by the Turks, with poetic feeling and descriptive observation, the 'ocean of trees.' The crusading knights were completely routed. Those who escaped death on the field of battle were carried as prisoners to Nicaea, and the trust David had placed in foreign aid was annihilated¹.

About the year 1214, Theodore concluded a treaty of peace with Henry, in which David was not included. The Greek emperor immediately endeavoured to unite the territory still held by David to the empire of Nicaea. He successively conquered Heracleia, Amastris, and Tios, making himself master of the whole country as far as Cape Carambis². His progress was facilitated by the sultan Azeddin, who laid siege to Sinope about the same time, and whose invasion induced the Greeks to submit to their countrymen rather than run the risk of falling under the sway of the Turks. Sinope was the richest city in David's dominions, and he hastened to defend it with all the troops he could assemble. A battle ensued, in which he terminated his active career on a bloody and disastrous field. Sinope surrendered to the victor, and Azeddin subdued the whole country from Cape Carambis eastward to the territory of Amisos³.

The affairs of Alexios at Trebizond now assumed a threatening aspect. From the time of his defeat at Amisos he had been cut off from all regular communication by land with his brother, to whose activity he had been so much indebted at the commencement of his career. Enemies who were alarmed at the sudden formation of a new empire in their vicinity attacked his dominions on every side. The Turks of Cappadocia assailed Pontus, while the Georgians ravaged

¹ Nicetas, 412.

² Acropolita, 9.

³ This is the result of the notices in Abulpharagius and Abulfeda, as they have been well explained by Fallmerayer, *Geschichte*, 94. Abulpharagius mentions that Sinope was taken, and its ruler Kyr Alexis slain. Abulfeda states that this year (i.e. 1214) the Turkomans (Seljouks) took prisoner the emperor Lascaris. Fallmerayer points out how these errors arose; and, indeed, it is not surprising that David, who was the real sovereign of Sinope, should be confounded with Alexios, who was the emperor; nor that the Greek emperor of Trebizond, called by the orientals Kyr Alexios, should have his name confounded with that of Lascaris, the better known Greek emperor of Nicaea.

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Colchis. The Georgians, or Iberians, were the bravest warriors in all Asia; and it was fortunate for the young emperor of Trebizond that, at this crisis, their hostilities were principally directed against the Mussulmans in Armenia, for, had they turned all their energy to effect the overthrow of the empire of Trebizond, they might have stifled the existence of the imperial house of Grand-Komnenos in the cradle¹.

It was not until after the fall of Sinope, and the conquest of the country eastward to the Thermodon, that the sultan of Iconium and the emperor of Trebizond were brought into direct collision for the second time. Azeddin proved a more active and dangerous enemy than his father Gaṭaseddin. He was a man of great ambition and few prejudices; indeed, the contemporary Europeans reported that he was extremely favourable to the Christians, and almost, if not really in secret, a Christian. The report was propagated in the West as a ground of praise; in the East, his enemies gave it currency as proving him a traitor to his faith and nation. He may, like some other members of his family, have been an infidel, as far as the divine commission of Mahomet was concerned; but the accusation of his preferring Christianity was spread among the Turks by those who feared his political ambition. Like the caliphs of Bagdad and Cairo, he had more confidence in veteran mercenaries than in patriotic native troops. He feared the turbulent and independent spirit of his Seljouk subjects. Neither the nomade hordes nor the territorial nobles were the instruments which he could employ at will, to extend his dominions and augment his personal power. In order to possess a body of troops on whose service he could constantly reckon, he formed a guard of mercenaries; and circumstances rendered it easier for him to hire Christian warriors than to purchase slaves, like the Mamlouk sultans of Egypt, or collect neophytes and renegades, like later Moslem princes. His infidel guards, hated by all around, and looking only to the sultan for wealth and honour, were ready to execute all his orders without distinction of rank or respect for law or religion. At this time the East swarmed with European adventurers, who, having secured indulgences

¹ Abulpharagius, 449; Fallmerayer, *Geschichte*, 90.

to an unlimited amount by their services as Crusaders, were eager to enjoy the interest of the treasures they had laid up in heaven by committing a few additional sins on earth. Their visit to the tomb of Christ, and their wars against the infidels, had brought them neither wealth nor lands as a reward for their pious exertions. They had, however, obtained indulgences, which in their opinion authorized them to seek riches by hiring their swords to Greek heretics or Turkish infidels without shame or sin. Theodore I. (Lascaris), the Greek emperor of Nicaea, had at one time eight hundred of these soldiers of fortune in his service¹. Azeddin assembled round his person a powerful corps of similar mercenaries.

Alexios of Trebizond was unable to resist a powerful, wealthy, and warlike sovereign like Azeddin. Cut off from all direct collision with the Greek empire of Nicaea, and the Latin empire of Romania, he was almost forgotten in the West. Involved in a political and international circle of alliances and hostilities, that disconnected his interests from those of the Greeks on the Asiatic and European shores of the Aegean, his wars and treaties placed him in close relations with the Christian princes of Georgia and Iberia, with the Turkoman chieftains of Cappadocia, and the emirs of Armenia. In this state of comparative isolation, he was unable to offer any effectual resistance to the arms of the grand-sultan of Roum, and he was glad to purchase tranquillity, and save his dominions from devastation, by acknowledging himself a vassal of the Seljouk empire, by paying an annual tribute to the treasury of Azeddin, and sending a contingent of troops to serve in the Turkish armies². Of the particular circumstances or misfortunes that reduced him to this extremity, nothing is known: the fact alone is recorded. It is probable, however, that the commercial relations of the Greeks of Trebizond with the rest of Asia both assisted the emperor in concluding this treaty of peace with the sultan, and rendered it, in spite

¹ Niceph. Greg. 10.

² MS. of Lazaros the Skeuophylax (intendant of the plate), discovered by Fallmerayer at the monastery of St. Dionysios, on Mount Athos, founded by the emperor Alexios III. of Trebizond. *Original-Fragmente*, Pt. i. p. 85, in the Transactions of the Academy of Munich for 1843.

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of its humiliating conditions, not unpopular among his own subjects.

Of the internal history of Trebizond during the reign of Alexios I. nothing has been preserved. We know, however, that the emperor or his ministers did not neglect to profit by the advantages of his position, and of the extensive commercial relations of his subjects in the Black Sea. Cherson, Gothia, and all the Byzantine possessions in the Tauric Chersonesos, were united to his empire; and so close was the alliance of interest, that these districts remained dependent on the government of Trebizond until the period of its fall¹. It is not very probable that this conquest could have been effected by an imprudent or unpopular sovereign. We know, too, that Trebizond rose rapidly in power and wealth immediately after the establishment of its independence. This was a natural consequence of increased security and the great addition to the size of its territory, which from a province grew suddenly into an empire.

Alexios I. died at Trebizond in the year 1222. Of his character, feelings, passions, and talents so little is known, that any attempt to embody his personality would be an encroachment on the domain of poetry or romance. He appears in the history of Trebizond as the shadow of a mythic hero, the founder of an empire, whose origin we may perhaps, without sufficient warrant, feel inclined to trace to his individual actions, when he himself may have been nothing more than an ordinary man accidentally selected by fortune to act a prominent part. That he possessed the noble figure, handsome face, and active frame that were hereditary in the house of Grand-Komnenos, and which they probably derived from their Georgian ancestors, may be admitted, though the epithet of great was not applied to his stature².

A Greek empire, in the thirteenth century, required a new saint just as necessarily as a Greek colony, in the heroic ages, required its demi-god or eponymous hero. This new

¹ This is another of the facts with which Fallmerayer's researches have enriched history. MS. of Lazaros, *Original-Fragments*, Pt. i. p. 110. The territory of the city of Cherson, and the province of Gothia, embraced the southern and south-eastern parts of the Crimea.

² Gibbon, vii. 327: 'The epithet of great was applied perhaps to his stature rather than to his exploits.'

saint was indispensable, for it was his duty to appear in the celestial tribunals unencumbered with the business of older clients. St. Eugenios was chosen by the emperor and people of Trebizond to act as their advocate in heaven and their protector on earth¹. His name and worship served to separate the citizens of the empire of Trebizond from the Greeks of the Byzantine empire. The votaries of St. Eugenios formed a nation apart, united together by their own ecclesiastical ideas and religious prejudices, then the most powerful feelings and motives of action with the Christian population in the East. St. Eugenios was a native martyr, who had been condemned to death during the persecution of Diocletian for boldly destroying a statue of Mithras, which had long been an object of adoration to the people of Trebizond, on the romantic Mount of Mithrios, now Bouz-tepe, that overlooks the city with its wall of rock. The martyrdom of St. Eugenios took place at an isolated point between two ravines that separate the upper citadel and the great eastern suburb, and on this spot Alexios erected a splendid church and monastery to the patron of the city and empire. The buildings dedicated to St. Eugenios were more than once destroyed amidst the revolutions of Trebizond; but a Christian church, now converted into a mosque by the Osmanlis, and called Yeni Djuma djami, still exists. The effigy of St. Eugenios was also impressed on all the silver coins of Trebizond². The festivals of St. Eugenios became the bond of social communication between the emperor and his subjects: the biography of the saint was the text-book of Trapezuntine literature; his praise the subject of every oratorical display; his name the appellation of one member in every family, the object of universal veneration, and the centre of patriotic enthusiasm³. The religion, the literature,

¹ [St. Eugenios was not altogether a 'new saint' with the people of Trebizond, for Procopius informs us that the aqueduct which Justinian built there was named by the inhabitants after that saint. *De Aedif.* lib. iii. c. 7. Ed.]

² No coins of Alexios I. and Andronikos I. have been identified, but all the known silver coins of Trebizond bear the effigy of St. Eugenios on their reverse. The earlier, while the emperor and people had some warlike habits, represent the saint on foot, as the spiritual guide and shepherd of his flock; the later, when the emperor and people were effeminate and luxurious in their way of life, display him on horseback with a cross in his hand, as a mace-at-arms, ready to protect the city, which the sovereign and the people felt themselves too weak to defend without miraculous aid.

³ In a lawsuit of which Fallmerayer discovered the records in the monastery of

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and the politics of the inhabitants of Trebizond, during the whole existence of the empire, identified themselves with the worship and the legends of St. Eugenios.

St. Dionysios, on Mount Athos, three citizens of Trebizond appear as witnesses, all named Eugenios.

CHAPTER II.

TREBIZOND TRIBUTARY TO THE SELJOUK SULTANS AND GRAND-KHANS OF THE MONGOLS.

SECT. I.—*Reigns of Andronikos I. (Ghidos), and Joannes I. (Axouchos), 1222–1238.*

THE succession to the imperial title was never considered to be hereditary among the Byzantine Greeks; but the new Greek empire at Trebizond forgot many of the old Roman traditions, and soon assumed a hereditary form. At the death of Alexios I., however, the hereditary principle had not prevailed over the elective constitution imprinted by imperial Rome on all its offshoots, and the vacant throne was occupied by Andronikos Ghidos, the son-in-law of Alexios, to the exclusion of Joannes, the eldest son of the deceased emperor¹.

Though Andronikos continued to be tributary to the Seljouk empire, he availed himself so skilfully of the embarrassments which arose on the decease of the emperor at Iconium, as to succeed in concluding a treaty with Alaeddin, who had succeeded his brother Azeddin (A.D. 1214). This treaty made no change in the relations of vassalage already established between the two empires, but it provided that the two sovereigns were to live in perpetual amity, and that the subjects and frontier garrisons of the one were never to molest those of the other. Such a treaty of a suzerain with his tributary, being a direct acknowledgment of complete political independence, was not likely to be long respected; and the manner in which it was broken indicates that Alaeddin soon repented of his concession.

¹ Panareti *Chronicon Trapezuntinum*, 362. The emperor Andronikos I. was perhaps the same Andronikos Ghidos who commanded the army of Theodore Lascaris, when the Latin auxiliaries of David Grand-Komnenos were destroyed.

A ship bearing the imperial flag of Trebizond was driven on shore near Sinope. It carried the receiver-general of Cherson and several archonts of Peratea, with a large sum of money destined for the public treasury of the empire. The ship was seized by Hayton, the reis or governor of Sinope, who took possession of the treasure destined for Andronikos, and detained the archonts in order to enrich himself by their ransom. The emperor no sooner heard of this act of piracy than he sent a fleet to punish Hayton. The Trapezuntine expedition proceeded to Karousa, where troops were landed, and the whole country, up to the very walls of Sinope, was wasted and plundered. The fleet attacked the ships in the port with equal success; and Hayton, distracted by the ruin of his dominions, the captivity of his people, and the signs of discontent within his city, purchased peace by giving up the captured ship with the treasure seized, and releasing all his prisoners without ransom. At the same time all the prisoners on board the fleet were released, but the troops and sailors carried off all the plunder they had collected.

Hayton was a vassal of the Seljouk empire, and the termination of the affair was extremely displeasing to the sultan Alaeddin, who considered that the emperor of Trebizond, as a tributary of his throne, was bound to appeal to his suzerain at Iconium, before attacking Sinope and ravaging the Turkish territory. He resolved to avail himself of the occasion, to set aside the treaty by which he had placed Andronikos on the footing of an equal, and to conquer Trebizond. The Greek emperor could bring no force into the field capable of contending with the Seljouks. Alaeddin ordered an army to be assembled at Erzeroum, which he strengthened with a body of veteran troops from Melitene. The command of the expedition was intrusted to his son Melik, who was ordered to lay siege to Trebizond¹. The young Melik pressed rapidly forward through the passes to Baibert, where he encamped for a couple of days to make the necessary dispositions for descending with his army to the coast, by the defiles of the wooded mountains that surround Trebizond. Andronikos

¹ Lazaros says distinctly that Melik, the commander-in-chief of the Turkish army, was the son of the grand sultan Alaeddin, the son of Sa Apatines, the Iathatines of Acropolita—Gaiaseddin Kaikhosrou. Fallmerayer, *Original-Fragmente, Chroniken, Inschriften, und anderes Materials zur Geschichte des Kaiserthums Trapezunt*, 18.

had done everything in his power to meet the threatened danger. The fortress of Trebizond was put in the best state of defence, the wealth of the suburbs was secured within its walls, and arrangements were made for lodging the immense population crowded within its narrow circuit. All the chosen warriors of the empire, from Sotiropolis, under the Mingrelian mountains, to Oinaion, in the land of the Chalybes, were summoned to the imperial standard; and the emperor, hoping to delay the march of the Seljouk troops, advanced to the summit of the mountain range with his army. But his followers were sadly inferior to the Turks both in courage and discipline, and as soon as they perceived the numerous array of their enemies, the greater part dispersed. Some sought the recesses of the forests, from which they subsequently issued to interrupt the communications of the Turkish army during the siege. Others fled back on Trebizond, to seek shelter at the shrines of the Panaghia Chrysokephalos and St. Eugenios, where they quartered themselves in the monasteries around those churches. Andronikos covered the retreat with a small guard of five hundred chosen cavalry armed with shield and lance, who distinguished themselves by a valiant attack on the advanced guard of the Turkish army, at a bridge over the Pyxites. Melik, however, moved steadily forward with the main body; while Andronikos, unable to defend even the extensive suburb of Trebizond to the east of the citadel, shut himself up within its walls. The Seljouk army encamped along the whole space from St. Eugenios to St. Constantine, down to the sea. The besieging army was only separated from the fortress by the deep ravine that bounds it on the eastern side.

At this period the fortress of Trebizond occupied only the table-rock between the two great ravines of Gouzgoun-deré and Issé-lepol, including what now forms the central and upper citadels. The northern wall ran parallel to the shore at some distance from the sea, and the intervening space was not yet fortified by the wall which now protects it, and includes part of the suburb beyond the western ravine. The first attack of the Seljouk army was directed against this northern wall. In this spot alone the ground offered facilities for approaching the fortifications, and admitted of an attempt to carry the place by storm. But though the ramparts at this point did not tower so high above the assailants as at

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every other, the narrowness of the space between the wall and the sea deprived the Turks of the advantages to be derived from their superior numbers; and, by crowding them closely together, exposed those engaged in the assault to every missile discharged by the besieged. The consequence was that this attack was repulsed with considerable loss; and Andronikos, by a well-directed sally of his horsemen, pursued the assailants into the Turkish encampment, where the fugitives threw a portion of the army into the greatest confusion. The Seljouk generals soon re-established order, and a superior force was drawn out against the Greeks, who then retreated within their walls. The leaders of both parties in this engagement displayed great personal valour, several men of rank fell on both sides, and Gaṭaseddin, a cousin of Melik, and Hayton, the reis of Sinope, were among the slain.

The next attempt to storm Trebizond was made from the south. Melik occupied the narrow platform between the two great ravines before the wall of the upper citadel with a division of his army. His own head-quarters were in the monastery of St. Eugenios, the church itself serving as the residence of his harem. It was resolved to surprise the upper citadel by a night attack; but the darkness which was to aid the success of the operation proved the ruin of the Turkish army. The three divisions of the besiegers, occupying the eastern suburb, the hill of St. Eugenios, and the platform above the citadel, were separated from one another by deep ravines, yet they were destined to act in concert. As the troops were moving forward to support the storming party, a dreadful tempest, accompanied by a hail-storm and a deluge of rain, suddenly swelled the torrents in the ravines. The troops from St. Eugenios and the eastern suburb were unable to mount the rocky ascent to the platform, and some were carried away by the flood as they were crossing the ravine. The feint attack from the north was repulsed, and the whole assault failed. The defeated troops were everywhere driven back on those destined to support them. The cavalry, horse and man, was forced over the precipices; the infantry was driven back into the torrents which poured down from the mountains, and the confusion was soon inextricable. When the fury of the storm abated, and it became possible to render the local knowledge of the garrison of some avail, a sortie was

directed against the head-quarters of Melik from the northern gates. The whole Seljouk army then fled in confusion, abandoning its camp and leaving everything to the enemy. Melik himself joined the fugitives, and was made prisoner at Kouration by a party of mountaineers from Matzouka. The glory of the victory was attributed to St. Eugenios, whose history it enriched with many a legend.

Andronikos used his victory with prudence. He treated Melik with great attention, dismissed him without a ransom, and sent him with a becoming escort to Iconium. Negotiations were opened with the sultan Alaeddin, and a new treaty of peace was concluded, by which the empire of Trebizond was declared free from all tribute, from the obligation of furnishing a military contingent, and from the homage which Alexios and Andronikos had been hitherto bound to pay to the grand sultan of Roum¹.

The independence of the empire of Trebizond was not of long duration. The sovereignty of western Asia was disputed by the great Khoarasmian shah Gelaeddin and the grand sultan Alaeddin. Andronikos saw that, in such a conflict, it would be impossible for him to retain his dominions unless he secured the alliance of one of these powerful princes. The ambitious shah was the more dangerous neighbour; and to purchase his friendship the emperor of Trebizond acknowledged himself Gelaeddin's vassal, and furnished a contingent to the Khoarasmian army. The army of Gelaeddin was completely defeated by Alaeddin at the bloody battle of Akhlat². One division of the Persian cavalry was driven over a range of precipices, and perished almost to a man in a vain attempt to escape; but another, by a rapid retreat, gained the passes of Armenia, and reached Trebizond in safety, where they served to strengthen the imperial army. Another defeat of Gelaeddin by the Mongols, in the year after the battle of Akhlat, placed Octai the grand khan of Tartary in direct rivalry with the sultan of Roum. Andronikos was again called upon to secure his political existence, and the duration of the empire of Trebizond, by the sacrifice

¹ Fallmerayer, *Original-Fragments*, Pt. i. 85.

² Hammer (*Histoire de l'Empire Othoman*, i. 39) places the battle of Akhlat in the year 1229. But Fallmerayer (*Geschichte*, 107), on the authority of Abulpharagius, places it in 1230, and d'Herbelot (*Bibliothèque Orientale*, s. v. Gelaeddin) agrees with this chronology.

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of his imperial pride. The activity of Alaeddin allowed him little time to choose; and as soon as the Seljouk sultan had completed the conquest of lesser Armenia, Andronikos hastened to renew his relations of vassalage with his old suzerain, and engaged to maintain a subsidiary force of two hundred lances constantly in the service of the sultan. This force may be considered as forming a body of one thousand men¹.

The sultan Alaeddin, with all his ambition and personal daring, was a politic and able prince, who did not overlook the commercial interests of his subjects. He perceived that the idle satisfaction of conquering a weak state like that of Trebizond, which only desired by its alliances to secure to itself a neutral position, would be ill compensated by the injury he would inflict on trade. He had discernment enough to understand that commerce was considered by the great majority of the merchants, whether Christians or Mussulmans—both in his own dominions and in the other states of western Asia—more secure while Trebizond and its territory remained an independent and neutral empire, than it would be were that city governed by one of his own turbulent emirs. The Seljouk empire was now at the height of its power, and had Alaeddin not thought and acted as a wise statesman, the Greek empire of Trebizond might have been destroyed at this early period of its existence, and its very name lost to European history. Though Trebizond survived this crisis, its extent suffered some contraction. Iberia, which had hitherto formed one of its most valuable provinces, and the possession of which was long recorded in the imperial title, seized the opportunity afforded by the weakness of Andronikos I. to assume complete independence. After the Mongols had driven the Georgian queen Roussadan from Tiflis, her son David was elected king by the Iberian and Lazian tribes, who had hitherto remained independent; and the Trapezuntine province threw off its allegiance, and united itself with the new Iberian kingdom. David was for some time the only Christian prince in these regions who lived in a state of

¹ Vincent de Beauvais, quoted by Fallmerayer, *Geschichte*, 70. A lance at this time, in the East, consisted of the leader in complete panoply with four armed followers—two on horseback and two on foot. Ducange, *Glossarium Med. et Inf. Lat. s.v. Lancea*: 'Centum lanceas more antiquo, quarum unaquaeque dicitur habere quinque milites vel homines.'

complete independence, owning no vassalage to the surrounding infidels. His capital was at Kutasion in Imerathia.

Andronikos reigned thirteen years. He was succeeded by his brother-in-law Joannes I., surnamed Axouchos, who occupied the throne only three years. The death of Joannes was caused by a fall from horseback while playing at the dangerous game called tzukanion—an amusement extremely fashionable among the Byzantine nobles¹. John I. left a son, named Joannikios, who was compelled to enter a monastery; and the crown was assumed by Manuel I., the second son of Alexios I.

SECT. II.—*Manuel I., the Great Captain.—Andronikos II.—George.*—A.D. 1238–1280.

Manuel I. was distinguished by the title of the Great Captain, but of the military exploits that gained him this name we know nothing. They were not, however, sufficiently brilliant to deliver Trebizond from its state of vassalage, for it is certain that he was compelled in the earlier part of his reign

¹ The emperor Manuel I. of Constantinople was nearly killed by the fall of his horse at this game. It was played with a leather ball, like a cricket ball, about as big as an apple or pomegranate. Two rival parties, mounted on horseback, with sticks having a conical bowl at the end, endeavoured to impel this ball beyond a certain barrier, or to prevent their adversaries from accomplishing the same feat before themselves, according to certain fixed rules of the game. Only the nobility appear to have engaged in the game, but it drew crowds of spectators and shared with the hippodrome in exciting Byzantine enthusiasm and passion. Every city of importance had its tzukanisterion, or place appropriated to this amusement. Cinnamus, 154; Ducange, *Histoire de St. Louis par Joinville*, diss. 8; *de l'Exercice de la Chicane et du Jeu de Paume à Cheval*. Quatremère, *Histoire des Sultans Mamlouks de l'Égypte*, i. 121, note; Ducange, *Glossarium Med. et Inf. Graecitatis*, s. v. Τζουανιστήριον.

In the modern Trebizond the Meidan is usually supposed to represent the ancient hippodrome, but it is perhaps too far beyond the line of the ancient fortifications. It is called by its present name Meidan in the Chronicle of Panaretos. See Fallmerayer, *Original-Fragmente*, Pt. ii. p. 89. The great open space on the road to St. Sophia's called Kapak-Meidan, i. e. 'Pumpkin Square,' seems to have a better claim to be the site of the hippodrome, and perhaps of the tzukanisterion. Fallmerayer (*Original-Fragmente*, Pt. ii. p. 74) thinks that the site of the tzukanisterion may be traced in the remains of a large enclosure on the space between the two ravines outside the walls of the upper citadel. On visiting it with Mr. Powers, the American missionary at Trebizond, a Turk of the neighbourhood informed us that the place was called Domouz Serai, and had served as a palace for the pigs of a giaour king of Trebizond. The enclosure may have contained an amphitheatre, but there hardly appears to be a level space large enough for a good game at tzukanion, and the name Kapak seems to refer to the ball, though a pumpkin is rather larger than an apple. See also Eugenici *Laus Trapezuntis*, c. 6, in Tafel's edition of Eustathii *Opuscula*.

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to pay homage to the Seljouks, and in the latter to the Mongols. We can only conjecture that his personal character was remarkable for daring, and that his military skill enabled him to command a degree of political influence incommensurate with the extent of his empire.

After the death of Alaeddin, in 1237, the Seljouk empire lost much of its power. His son Gaïaseddin Kaïkhouros II., who was said to have poisoned his noble father, was a weak and luxurious prince. During his reign the Mongols renewed their incursions into western Asia; and in the year 1244 he was entirely defeated in a great battle at Kousadac, near Arsing, by the army of the grand khan Otaï. The Seljouk force, composed of Turks, Arabs, Greeks, Georgians, Armenians, and Franks, though far superior in numbers to that of the Mongols, fled before them without offering any serious resistance. Manuel's contingent had fought in the routed army. Policy urged him to lose no time in conciliating the victor, and he was fortunate enough to be admitted to become a vassal of the Tartar empire, on nearly the same terms as had previously bound him to the Seljouk sultan. Trebizond was viewed by the Mongol court, as it had been by that of Iconium, rather as a mercantile station than as the capital of an empire; and the great captain escaped appearing as a suppliant sovereign before the grand Mongol at the court of Karakorum, because he was regarded as the chief of a trading factory, not as the emperor of a powerful state. His position and his power awakened neither the ambition nor the jealousy of the grand khan.

The political condition of Asia Minor during the reign of the emperor Manuel I. is described by the friar Rubruquis, who visited it in the year 1253, on his embassy from St. Louis to the court of Karakorum. He mentions that the Circassians, the Soanes, and the Iberians then lived in a state of independence; but Trebizond was governed by its own prince, named Komnenos, of the family of the emperors of Constantinople, who was in a state of vassalage to the Tartars. Sinope belonged to the sultan of the Turks, but at that time it was also reduced to a state of vassalage by the Tartars. The Greek empire of Nicaea, called by Rubruquis the land of Vatatzes, was ruled by Theodore II., called Lascaris, from his maternal grandfather; and this country,

was independent, and owed no vassalage to the Tartar empire¹.

The only notice of Manuel that is found in any western contemporary writer is contained in the life of St. Louis by Joinville. The stout seneschal mentions that, in the year 1253, while St. Louis was engaged fortifying Sidon, ambassadors visited the king from the signor of Trebizond, who called himself Grand-Komnenos. They brought with them rich presents, and asked the hand of a princess of France for their sovereign. No princess having accompanied the king on his pilgrimage, he recommended Manuel to form a matrimonial alliance with the family of Baldwin II., emperor of Constantinople, since the house of Courtenay was related to the royal family of France. This advice was doubtless not much relished by Manuel, who cared very little about the blood of Capet, and only sought an alliance with the French king on account of the great personal fame and influence of St. Louis; and because he hoped that a marriage with a princess of France might enable him to attract the expeditions of the crusading chivalry of the West to Trebizond.

Manuel died in the year 1263, after a long and prosperous reign of twenty-five years. He was the founder of the magnificent church and monastery of St. Sophia, situated in a delightful position on the sea-shore, about a mile and a half to the westward of the fortress of Trebizond, where the inhabitants of the city still crowd to enjoy every festival. His half-defaced portrait still exists on its walls².

¹ *Voyage de Rubruquis*, in the *Recueil de Voyages et de Mémoires*, publié par la Société de Géographie, Paris, 1839, tom. iv.

² The monastery has disappeared; but the church, with its external ornaments, its inlaid marble pavement, its mural decorations, and contiguous belfry and chapel, forms one of the most interesting monuments of Byzantine architecture, sculpture, and painting, that time has spared. The paintings are suffering hourly dilapidation, and in a very few years will probably be utterly destroyed. I was fortunate enough to find a full-length figure of the emperor Manuel, of which I had heard no previous mention, tolerably well preserved, to the right of the door used as the entry to the mosque. The emperor is without a crown, wearing only a band on his head ornamented with a double row of pearls; his robes are adorned on both sides, down the front, with two rows of single-headed eagles on circular medallions, about three inches in diameter. On his breast is a large medallion, about seven inches in diameter, bearing the figure of St. Eugenios on horseback, as he is represented on the later coins of Trebizond. The figure of the saint is painted on a blue ground. This painting would seem to be contemporary with Manuel, from the inscription, which styles him Emperor of the Romans. The single-headed eagle was a common type of the Byzantine empire, and by no means peculiar to the empire of Trebizond, before the conquest of Constantinople by the Crusaders. It may be seen on the inlaid floor, as it is

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Andronikos II., the eldest son of Manuel, occupied the throne for three years, and died without issue.

The reign of Georgios, who succeeded his brother Andronikos, lasted fourteen years; and as the power both of the Seljouks and the Mongols was now declining in Asia Minor, he gradually acquired a position of complete independence, and ventured to make war on the Turkoman tribes on the frontiers of his dominions. His endeavours to increase his own power rendered him unpopular among the nobles and military chiefs of Trebizond, whose assumption of individual authority, and whose attempts to arrogate to themselves the complete control over the financial and judicial affairs within their possessions, he determined to repress. In one of his military expeditions he was deserted by the nobles who accompanied him. Their object in deserting their sovereign was to turn the defeat of the imperial army to their own advantage, by weakening the central power; for they feared the increased authority of the emperor's administration, in matters of finance and justice, far more than they desired the extension of the limits of the empire. Their treacherous retreat left Georgios a prisoner in the hands of the Turkomans at the moment he expected to drive them from the range of Mount Tauresion, where they had begun to settle.

often represented, picking out the eyes of a hare. The inscription at the side of the picture is as follows:—

‘ΕΝ ΧΩ ΤΩ ΘΩ ΠΙΣΤΟΣ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΣ ΚΑΙ ΑΥΤΟΚΡΑΤΩΡ ΡΩΜΑΙΩΝ ΚΤΗΤΩΡ
ΤΗCΑΜΩΝ :: ΤΑΥΤΗ ΜΑΝΟΤΗΑ ΟΚΟΜΝΗΝΟΣ.’

It must be observed that the title used by Manuel is precisely that of the Byzantine emperors, as may be seen in the drawing of the emperor Basil II., from an old MS. of the ninth century, in Seroux d'Agincourt, *History of Art; Painting*, plate xlvii. 5, English edit.; so that, if the inscription had been discovered at Nicaea or Nicomedia, it would be attributed without hesitation to the Byzantine emperor, Manuel I. Comnenus. [I suppose the beginning of the latter part of the inscription should run—*κτίστωρ τῆς πόλεως ταύτης*. Ed.]

CHAPTER III.

TREBIZOND INDEPENDENT.—INTERNAL FACTIONS.

SECT. I.—*Reign of Joannes II.—Alliance with the Empire of Constantinople.*—A.D. 1280–1297.

JOANNES II., the third son of Manuel, ascended the throne in the year 1280, as soon as the news of the captivity of his brother Georgios reached the capital. The empire of Trebizond was now completely relieved from its vassalage to the Mongols, and its history assumes a new character. Hitherto, we have known little of its internal condition; henceforward the memorials of its intestine factions, the intrigues of the palace, and the vices of the emperors, form the prominent features in the records of the empire: but we hardly obtain a glimpse of the nature of the commerce or the social organization of the people, that furnished the wealth of the ruling classes, and enabled the nobles, the courtiers, and the sovereigns to amuse themselves with alternate feats of war and sensuality.

Joannes was a weak young man, and the state of society in the thirteenth century, not only at Trebizond, but over all the world, required that the sovereign should be a man of energy in order to preserve his authority. It was an age in which law and legislation exerted little control on the actions of men, and in which religion ceased to uphold the temporal power of princes. The talents and the will of a vigorous ruler could alone repress the tyrannical conduct of his own officers, the insolence of the aristocracy, and the anarchical propensities of the populace. Want of roads insulated each little district; experience was as difficult to acquire as a lettered education; wealth was concentrated in the hands of

a few landlords; public opinion had no existence; legal tribunals were powerless, and justice slept. The supreme authority in the state was consequently irresponsible; and for power of such a nature, emperors, nobles, and ministers of state fought and intrigued with an energy and at a risk which excites our surprise, when we couple this boldness with the worthless characters of the individual actors. Able and energetic sovereigns are, from the nature of man, not of frequent occurrence on despotic thrones, after power has been transmitted in the same family for some generations. The palace is rarely a good school for education. The family of Grand-Komnenos displayed at least an average deficiency in all great and good qualities, from the reign of Joannes II. to the extinction of the empire. Part of the difficulties, however, in which this emperor and his successors were placed arose as much from the state of society, as from their own incapacity and maladministration. Mankind was beginning to feel the operation of those social causes which replaced mediæval life by modern habits. Masses of the population were growing up beyond the ordinary movement of the old social routine. Slavery was disappearing, without creating any immediate opening for the employment of free labour. Popular anarchy, aristocratic oppression, royal rapacity, and military cruelty, were often the throes of a society in which men were driven to despair in their endeavour to obtain a subsistence or defend a hereditary right. The convulsions which destroyed the old system threatened for several generations to depopulate all western Asia and great part of Europe; nor has a large portion of the East yet attained a political organization suitable to social improvement. The history of the empire of Trebizond offers us a miniature sketch of this great social struggle, drawn in faint colours and with an indistinct outline.

The records of the reign of Joannes II. are extremely confused. Ducange and Gibbon supposed that he was the first sovereign of Trebizond who assumed the imperial title; but the discovery of the Chronicle of Panaretos enabled Fallmerayer to restore the title of emperor to the earlier princes¹. The critical sagacity of Ducange had almost

¹ Ducange (*Familie Auguste Byzantine*, p. 192) quotes at length the authorities from which he drew his inferences. Gibbon (chap. lxi. vol. vii. 327) follows

divined the true position of Joannes, even from the scanty materials at his disposal. There can be no doubt that the form of the coronation ceremony, and the title of the emperors of Trebizond, had remained, up to this period, precisely the same as that of Constantinople when it fell into the hands of the Crusaders. Joannes II. was crowned emperor of the Romans; and no especial political significance would probably have been given to the title, as constituting him a rival to the throne of the Byzantine emperor, Michael VIII., had it not been for the religious disputes that distracted the empire of Constantinople. Michael had rendered himself unpopular among the orthodox by forming a union with the papal church. The fealty of the Greeks was not considered to be due to an emperor of doubtful orthodoxy. Michael had been pardoned, by the lax morality of the Greek people and church, for dethroning and putting out the eyes of his young ward, the emperor John IV.; but he was condemned as an outlaw, by the ecclesiastical bigotry of Byzantine society, for seeking to unite the Greek and Roman, or orthodox and catholic, sections of the Christian church. A powerful party in his own dominions, and a large body of Greeks living beyond the bounds of his empire, were eager to dethrone him. Fortunately for Michael, the people of Europe and Asia were not agreed on the rival emperor they wished to place on the throne of Constantinople. The European Greeks looked to the despot of Epirus, or to John, prince of Thessalian Vallakia, both of whom called themselves Komnenos; but the Asiatics, and a considerable party at Constantinople, invited Joannes II. of Trebizond to place himself at the head of the orthodox Christians, as the undoubted heir of the imperial house of Komnenos, and as already crowned emperor of the Romans. Michael was

Ducange even in the error of mistaking the name of *Μέγας Κομνηνός*, or Grand-Komnenos, for Komnenos the Great. Fallmerayer (*Geschichte*, 135) has explained the true connection of the passages of Ogerius, the protonotary of Michael VIII., and of the Armenian historian Haithon, cited by Ducange, by means of the light thrown on this period by the Chronicle of Panaretos. Fallmerayer, however, thinks that Joannes II. made a great change in the title of the emperors of Trebizond by receiving the crown as emperor of the Romans; but the date of the embassy of Ogerius, and the words of Pachymeres (i. 353), who says that Michael sent several embassies to Trebizond on the subject of the imperial title, indicate that the preceding emperors bore the same designation. Joannes, indeed, could not otherwise, as we are informed he did, plead the impossibility of laying aside a title familiar to his subjects by *long usage*.

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regarded as a usurper, from the fact of his having ceased to be orthodox, and Joannes was considered as the lawful sovereign, because he had been already crowned the faithful emperor of an orthodox people.

Joannes was utterly destitute of the talents necessary to profit by the advantages of his position, nor had he any councillors around him capable of contending with a veteran diplomatist and experienced sovereign like Michael. No man estimated the exact danger of his situation better than Michael himself; and though his fears at times indicated a nervous sensibility, there can be no doubt that he had good reason to apprehend a general rebellion in support of any rival claim to the imperial title at this momentous crisis. About the time Joannes II. was crowned emperor of the Romans at Trebizond, Charles of Anjou, the papal vassal-king of Naples, threatened to invade the Byzantine empire, as the champion of the rights of Philip of Courtenay, the heir of the Latin empire of Romania, and thus deprived Michael of all hope of finding any support from the Latin Christians, with whose church he had endeavoured to unite. In this critical conjuncture, Michael, who feared domestic treason more than foreign invasion, was anxious to secure the alliance of the young emperor of Trebizond. Knowing his weak character, and the factious views of the nobility of Trebizond, he sought to neutralize all opposition from that quarter by a combination of cajolery, bribery, and intimidation, that would induce the government of Trebizond to dread an open rupture with the Byzantine empire.

The first embassy sent by Michael to sound the disposition of the young emperor of Trebizond was intrusted to the experience of the veteran statesman and valuable historian George Acropolita, in the year 1281¹. But the ambassador

¹ Smith's valuable *Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology* (s.v. Acropolita), and the improved German translation of Schoell's *History of Greek Literature* (vol. iii. 274), both state that the historian was sent, in the year 1282, on an embassy to John, king of Bulgaria. This is an error which has arisen from transcribing Hankius, *De Byzantinarum Rerum Scriptoribus Graecis*, without referring to his authorities. The learned work of Hankius is generally a safe mine of Byzantine lore; but in this case he seems inadvertently to have written *Bulgarorum* instead of *Lazorum Principem*, for he quotes at length the passage of Pachymeres as his authority, which states distinctly that Acropolita was sent to the prince of the Lazs, as the vain Constantinopolitan writers called the emperor of Trebizond. The date given by Hankius also seems to require

could neither persuade John to lay aside his title of emperor of the Romans, nor inspire him with a wish to unite his fortunes with those of Michael, by forming a matrimonial alliance with the family of Palaeologos. Acropolita, however, whose duty it was to ascertain the party views and political designs of the aristocracy as well as of the court, seems to have discovered the means of preparing the mind of Joannes to admit the conviction, that it would be impossible for him to wage war with the Byzantine court, and that it would even be dangerous to neglect forming a close alliance with the emperor. Acropolita had hardly quitted Trebizond before a general insurrection, headed by a Greek named Papadopoulos, drove the ruling party from power. The rebels rendered themselves masters of the citadel, and kept Joannes II. for some time a prisoner in his palace. It is true that Joannes soon escaped and recovered his power, and that it is not possible to prove the complicity of the Byzantine agents in this business; but there cannot be a doubt that it caused a great change in the views of the emperor of Trebizond, and induced him to form a close alliance with the emperor of Constantinople, on the basis of a league for their mutual protection against the rebellious movements of their subjects. The veteran Acropolita was not the man to have overlooked this obvious condition of public affairs in his arguments with the court of Trebizond, nor to have neglected taking measures for making events confirm his reasoning.

After the failure of Papadopoulos's insurrection, a new embassy arrived at Trebizond, and the emperor Joannes expressed a wish to form a close political and family alliance with Michael; but while he expressed his eagerness to espouse Eudocia, the emperor's youngest daughter, he declared that it was impossible for him to lay aside the imperial title which had been borne by his ancestors. The title of Basileus, the purple boots, the robes embroidered with eagles, and the prostrations of the powerful chiefs of the aristocracy, were dear to the pride of the citizens of Trebizond, and attached them to the person of the emperors, of whose heart these vanities formed the inmost delight. Neither the per-

correction, since the unsuccessful embassy of Acropolita must have happened in the year preceding the marriage. Hankius, 562; Pachymeres, lib. vi. c. 34, tom. i. p. 354, edit. Kom.

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sonal honour of Joannes, nor his political position, nor the feelings of his people allowed him to think for a moment of abandoning the pageantry of an imperial court. Michael himself soon saw clearly that the change was impossible; and this very circumstance rendered it more important that the rival emperor should be included within the circle of his own family. But his notorious bad faith, and the just suspicions it awakened in the breast of Joannes, still created some difficulties. The young emperor of Trebizond feared to trust himself in the power of Michael, lest, instead of becoming the husband of Eudocia, he should meet the fate of the unfortunate John Lascaris. At last, however, he received such assurances of his personal safety, and such pledges of the sincerity of Michael, that he repaired to Constantinople, where his marriage was celebrated in the month of September 1282¹.

The reception of the emperor of Trebizond at the Byzantine court displays all the vanity and meanness of the Constantinopolitan Greeks in a striking manner. Michael VIII. was a perfect type of this class, and his agents were worthy of their master. When Joannes reached the capital, he found Michael absent at Lopadion, and every species of intrigue, persuasion, and intimidation was employed to induce the young emperor to lay aside his purple boots and imperial robes. Seeing himself surrounded by the unprincipled instruments of Byzantine tyranny, and retaining always a lively recollection of the fate of the blind Lascaris, he consented, at last, to present himself before his future father-in-law in black boots, and in the dress of a despot of the Byzantine court. He was even induced to carry his concession to Byzantine vanity so far, as not to resume the insignia of an emperor until the celebration of his marriage. It seems that the emperor of Trebizond then first adopted the style of Emperor of the East, instead of his earlier designation of Emperor of the Romans; and probably his robes, adorned with single-headed eagles, were viewed by the Constantinopolitan populace as marking a certain inferiority to the family of his wife, who appeared in a dress covered with double-headed eagles, to

¹ Ducange (*Fam. Aug. Byz.* 234) makes Eudocia the second daughter of Michael VIII. instead of Anna. But Pachymeres (i. 354) says distinctly she was the third.

mark her rank as an imperial princess of the East and the West, born in the purple chamber¹. Both Joannes II. and his successors found it advisable to cultivate the alliance of the Byzantine court after this period. Policy, therefore, prompted them to lay aside the use of their ancient title of Emperor of the Romans, which was reserved exclusively for the sovereigns of Constantinople, while those of Trebizond confined themselves to that of Emperor of all the East, Iberia and Perateia².

The emperor Joannes returned home shortly after his marriage. His dominions had suffered severely during his absence, in consequence of David, king of Iberia, availing himself of the conjuncture to attempt the conquest of the capital. The Iberian army ravaged the country up to the walls of the citadel of Trebizond, which David besieged for some time; but with so little success, that he was compelled to effect his retreat without being able to carry off any booty. The reign of Joannes was not without its troubles after his return. Georgios, his brother and predecessor, was released by the Turkomans, and found a faction of discontented nobles to aid him in his endeavours to recover the throne. His attempts were unsuccessful. His followers were defeated; and the dethroned emperor, after wandering in the mountains in a condition between a knight-errant and a brigand, was at last taken prisoner and brought to Trebizond. In order to insure family concord as well as public tranquillity, Joannes allowed his brother to retain the title of Emperor, without, however, admitting him to take any part in the administration of public affairs.

A new revolution suddenly drove Joannes again from his throne. His sister Theodora, the eldest child of Manuel I.

¹ I observed full-length portraits of the emperor Joannes II., and of the empress Eudocia, in their imperial robes, though sadly defaced, on the walls of the porch of the church of St. Gregory of Nyssa, which was used as the metropolitan church of Trebizond. The robes of the emperor were adorned with single-headed eagles, those of the empress with double-headed. There were three figures on each side of the porch; that of the empress Eudocia was the one nearest the door of the church on the right hand. The crowns and robes of all the figures were curious, but the inscriptions were illegible. This church has been destroyed. *Bulletin mensuel de l'Académie des Inscriptions : Revue Archéologique*, Août, 1863, p. 264.

² The title of Emperor of the East, Iberia and Perateia, ought really only to have been used by Alexios I. and Andronikos I., since the province of Iberia was lost in the reign of the latter. But sovereigns are in the habit of assuming and retaining titles to which they have no right. See the golden bulls of the emperor Alexios III. Fallmerayer, *Orig.-Frag.* Pt. i. pp. 87, 92.

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by his first marriage with Roussadan, an Iberian princess, availed herself of the party intrigues of the nobles and the popular dissensions in the capital—perhaps also of the civil war between her two brothers—to assemble an army and mount the throne. Her reign occurred in the year 1285; but its duration is unknown, though the existence of coins, bearing her name and effigy, attest that her power was not destitute of political stability, and that she was fully and permanently recognized as sovereign of the empire¹. No clue affords us the means of explaining how Theodora obtained the empire with such facility, or how she as suddenly lost it, but Joannes very soon recovered possession of his throne and capital. He died at the fortress of Limnia in the year 1297, after a reign of eighteen years, and his body was transported to Trebizond, where it was entombed in the cathedral of Panaghia Chrysokephalos. He left two sons, Alexios II. and Michael.

The effects of the incessant domestic revolutions and civil wars in the empire of Trebizond can be more clearly traced than their causes. One of their immediate consequences, in the reign of Joannes, was the loss of the extensive and valuable province of Chalybia, with its strange metallic soil, from which, since the days of the Argonauts, the inhabitants have scraped out small nodules of iron in sufficient quantity to form a regular branch of industry². The Turkomans, availing themselves of the disorders at the capital, laid waste the province, and drove out the greater part of the ancient population, in order to convert the whole country into a land of pasture suitable for the settlement of their nomadic tribes.

Joannes II. enjoyed a reputation among the nations of western Europe totally incommensurate with his real power. The magnificent title of Emperor of Trebizond threw a veil over his weakness, and distance concealed the small extent of his dominions behind the long line of coast that acknowledged his sway. He was invited by pope Nicholas IV. to take part in the crusade for the recovery of Ptolemais, in which his Holiness flattered himself that the emperor of

¹ Pfaffenhoffen, *Essai sur les Aspres Comnénats*, p. 88.

² See an interesting account of the modern Chalybes in Hamilton's *Researches in Asia Minor, Pontus, and Armenia*, vol. i. p. 274.

Trebizond would be joined by Argoun, the Mongol khan of Tauris, and all the Christian princes of the East, from Georgia to Armenian Cilicia. The invitation proved of course ineffectual. Joannes was too constantly employed at home watching the movements of domestic faction, and guarding against the inroads of the Turkomans of the great horde of the Black Sheep, to think of aiding the Latin adventurers in Palestine, even had he felt any disposition to listen to papal exhortations¹.

SECT. II.—*Reign of Alexios II.—Increased commercial importance of Trebizond.—Trade of Genoese.*—A.D. 1297–1330.

Alexios II., the eldest son of Joannes II., succeeded his father at the early age of fifteen. He was naturally for some time a mere nominal sovereign, acting under the guidance of the ministers of state who held office at the time of his father's death. His father's will placed him under the guardianship of his maternal uncle, the Byzantine emperor Andronicus II.; but the courtiers and nobles of Trebizond easily persuaded the young sovereign to assume complete independence, and emancipate himself from all control. Andronicus, on the other hand, was eager to direct his conduct even in his most trifling actions. His first attempt to enforce his authority was ridiculous and irritating, like many of the acts of that most orthodox and most injudicious sovereign. He ordered the young emperor of Trebizond, an independent foreign prince, to marry the daughter of a Byzantine subject, Choumnos, his own favourite minister². The idea of this marriage was offensive both to Alexios and

¹ Wadding, *Annales Ordinis Minorum*, tom. v. p. 254, ad ann. 1291; Fallmerayer, *Geschichte*, 157.

² Nikephorus Choumnos was praelect of the kanikleion, or keeper of the purple ink with which the imperial signature was written—something between a lord-chancellor and a privy-seal. He was the author of several works that still exist in MS. in the libraries of Europe. Some of his writings have been published by Boissonade in the *Anecdota Graeca*, vols. i. and ii. One consists of consolations to his daughter Irene, who, after being rejected by Alexios of Trebizond, was married to the despot John, the third son of Andronicus. The despot died in 1304, and Irene, left a widow at an early age, took the veil under the name of Eulogia. There is also a discourse of Choumnos on the death of the despot John, addressed to his father the emperor Andronicus II.

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the people of Trebizond; so that, when the young emperor married the daughter of an Iberian prince, in contempt of his guardian's commands, the act gained him great popularity in his own dominions.

Andronicus, who was fond of exaggerating his claims to authority from his intense orthodoxy, conceived that he could always make the Greek church a subservient instrument of his political enterprises. In order to carry into execution his plans concerning the marriage of the daughter of his favourite, he put the whole Eastern church in a state of movement, and treated the question as if it was of equal importance with papal supremacy or the doctrine of the Azymites. He assembled a synod at Constantinople, and demanded that the marriage of his ward, the emperor of Trebizond—or the prince of the Lazæ, as the Byzantines in the excess of their pride had the insolence to term the young Alexios—should be declared null by the Greek church, because it had been contracted by a minor without the sanction of his guardian, the orthodox emperor. The patriarch and clergy, alarmed at the ridiculous position in which they were likely to be placed, took advantage of the interesting condition of the bride, to refuse gratifying the spleen of Andronicus. At this time Eudocia, the mother of Alexios, was at Constantinople. She had rejected her brother's proposal to form a second marriage with the kral of Servia, and was anxious to return to her son's dominions. By persuading Andronicus that her influence was far more likely to make her son agree to a divorce than the sentence of an ecclesiastical tribunal whose authority he was able to decline, she obtained her brother's permission to return to Trebizond. On arriving at her son's court she found him living happily with his young wife; and, on considering the case in her new position, she approved of his conduct, and confirmed him in his determination to resist the tyrannical pretensions of his uncle¹. Eudocia showed herself as much superior to her brother Andronicus in character, judgment, and virtue, as most of the women of the house of Palæologos were to the men. The difference between the males and females of this imperial family is so marked, that it would form a curious

¹ Pachymeres, tom. ii. 184, 198, edit. Rom.

subject of inquiry to ascertain how the system of education in the Greek empire, at this period, produced an effect so singular and uniform. The ecclesiastical culture of the Greek clergy may possibly have tended to strengthen the female mind, while it weakened and dogmatized that of the men.

Alexios II. displayed both firmness and energy in his internal administration. He defeated an invasion of the Turkomans in the year 1302. Their army, which had advanced to the neighbourhood of Kerasunt, was routed with great slaughter, and their general Koustaga taken prisoner.

The danger to which the empire was exposed by the insolent pretensions of the Genoese, in their endeavours to secure a monopoly of the commerce of the Black Sea, was as great as that which threatened it from the Turkomans and Mongols. This bold and enterprising people had already gained possession of the most important part of the commerce carried on between western Europe and the countries within the Bosphorus, both on the Black Sea and the Sea of Azof. These commercial relations had been greatly extended after the expulsion of the Latins from Syria, Palestine, and Constantinople; and the Genoese colonies at Galata and Caffa, joined to the turbulence and activity of the people, rendered them dangerous enemies to a maritime state like Trebizond, which was dependent on foreign trade for a considerable portion of its revenues.

At this time the ruin of the commercial cities of Syria, by the invasions of Khoarasmians and Mongols, the insecurity of the caravan roads throughout the dominions of the Mamlouk sultans, the bull of the Pope, forbidding the Christians to hold any commercial intercourse with the Mohammedans under pain of excommunication, and the impossibility of European merchants passing through Syria and Egypt to purchase Indian commodities, all conspired to drive the trade of eastern Asia through the wide-extended dominions of the grand khan of the Mongols, where security for the passage of caravans could be guaranteed from the frontiers of China and Hindostan to the shores of the Caspian and Black Seas. The grand khans, Mangou and Kublai, cherished the useful arts; and during their reigns the vigorous administration of Houlakou in Persia, Armenia, and Asia Minor, allowed merchants to wander in safety with their

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bales from Caffa, Tana, and Trebizond, to Samarcand, Bokhara, and other entrepôts of Indian and Chinese productions. The importance which this trade acquired, and the amount of wealth it kept in circulation, may be estimated from the effects of the Mongol invasions on the commerce of lands that might be supposed to have lain far beyond the sphere of their direct influence. Gibbon mentions, that the fear of the Tartars prevented the inhabitants of Sweden and Friesland from sending their ships to the fisheries on the British coast, and thus lowered the price of one article of food in England¹.

Akaba, the son and successor of Houlakou, on the vassal throne of the Mongols at Tauris, was a friend of the Christians, and an ally of both the Greek emperors, Michael VIII. of Constantinople, and Joannes II. of Trebizond. On ascending the throne he married Maria, the natural daughter of Michael, though she had been destined to become his father's bride². The political interests of the Mongols of Tauris induced them to become the protectors of the commercial intercourse between the Christians of Europe and the idolaters of India. The desperate valour of the Mussulmans of western Asia made even the dreaded Tartars seek every means of diminishing the wealth and financial resources of the restless warriors who ruled at Iconium, Damascus, and Cairo. The approval of this policy by the grand khans created an active intercourse with the Tartar empire, and suggested to the Christians hopes of converting the Mongol sovereigns to the papal church. Frequent embassies of friars were sent to the court of Karakorum, whose narratives supply us with much interesting information concerning the state of central Asia in the thirteenth century³. The commerce of the farthest East had at this period returned to a route it had followed during the wars of the Romans with the Parthians, and of the Byzantine emperors with the Sassanides and the early caliphs⁴.

¹ *Decline and Fall*, chap. lxiv. vol. viii. 15, note 28: 'It is whimsical enough that the orders of a Mogul Khan who reigned on the borders of China should have lowered the price of herrings in the English market.'

² Pachymeres tom. i. 116, edit. Rom.

³ *Recueil de Voyages et de Mémoires*, publié par la Société de Géographie, Paris, 1839, 4to. ably edited by M. d'Avezac.

⁴ The importance of the commercial relations of the Romans by this route is

The treaty of alliance which the Genoese concluded with the emperor Michael VIII., before the recovery of Constantinople from the Latins, conceded to them great commercial privileges. Subsequent grants placed them in possession of Galata, and rendered them masters of a large part of the port of Constantinople. Their own activity and daring enabled them to convert this factory into a fortress under the eyes of the Byzantine emperor, and within a few hundred yards of the palace of Bukoleon. New factories on the northern shores of the Black Sea soon became even more important for their commerce than the colony of Galata; and the trade they carried on from Caffa and Tana was of such value, that Caffa became the greatest commercial factory, and the most valuable foreign colony, of the republic. The advantages the Genoese derived from these establishments enabled them to extend their commerce, until it far exceeded that of any other power¹. Their long chain of factories, from Chios and Phokaia to Caffa and Tana, gave them the power of supplying every market both of Asia, Europe, and Africa, more speedily, and at a cheaper rate, than their Pisan, Catalan, and Venetian rivals. When they feared that the mercantile competition of rival traders was becoming too keen, their turbulent disposition led them to plunge into open hostilities with the party whose commercial activity alarmed them. Their insolence increased with their prosperity, and at last they aspired at a monopoly of the Black Sea trade. To carry their project into execution, it was necessary to obtain from the emperor of Trebizond all the privileges which they enjoyed in the empire of Constantinople. They had already formed an establishment at Daphnus, the anchorage of Trebizond, where the eastern suburb overhangs the beach; and they were desirous of fortifying this position, as its possession would have made them as completely independent of the government at Trebizond, as their fortress of Galata made them of the government

attested by several passages of Strabo, lib. xi. c. 2 and 3. For later times, compare Menander, 398, edit. Bonn; Jornandes, *De Rebus Geticis*, c. ii.

¹ Pachymeres, ii. 310. Every commercial people was eager to participate in this trade, and Nicephorus Gregoras (p. 60) informs us that the sultan of Egypt obtained from the emperor of Constantinople the right of sending annually two ships into the Black Sea. One of the principal objects of commerce for the sultan was male and female slaves; and this was an article of export the Genoese did not neglect.

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at Constantinople. In the year 1306 the emperor Alexios II. concluded a treaty with the republic of Venice, by which he conceded to Venetian merchants all the privileges hitherto enjoyed by the Genoese alone. He put the Venetians in possession of a quarter near the anchorage; and a Venetian bailo was established at Trebizond, with an interpreter and a colonial court of justice framed on the model of that at Constantinople¹. This concession excited the greatest dissatisfaction among the Genoese, who displayed their ill humour with their usual arrogance. They disputed with the imperial officers, and resisted their just demands. They denied the right of the revenue officers to open their merchandise in order to levy the transit-duties, they made the amount of these duties a constant subject of contestation, and they expected in this way to force the emperor to commute the transit-duties into a fixed tribute, which they regarded as the first step to the formation of an independent colony. These disputes lasted several years.

A formal embassy was at last sent from Genoa to Alexios II., to demand the conclusion of a commercial treaty on the same terms as that which the republic had concluded with the emperor of Constantinople, whom the government of Genoa affected to regard as the suzerain of Trebizond. The ambassadors declared that unless the Genoese merchants were freed from the examination of their goods in levying the transit-duties, and allowed to farm the tax for a fixed sum, they would quit the dominions of Alexios and transfer their commercial establishments to the neighbouring states. The admission of this pretension would have greatly curtailed the revenues of the empire, and would have placed the Genoese in the possession of immense warehouses, into which the imperial authorities would have had no right to enter. These buildings, from their nature and extent, would have soon formed a fortified quarter. The Genoese would then have repaired the ruins of Leontokastron, which would have given them the command of the port².

¹ Passini *Codices MSS. Graeci Biblioth. Taurinensis*, p. 222; J. Müller, *Ueber einige byzantinische Urkunden*; in the *Sitzungsberichte der philosoph.-historischen Classe der K. Akademie von Wien*, 1851, vol. vii. p. 335.

² The site of Leontokastron is now occupied by the lazaretto, which was constructed on the ruins of the palace of a pasha, built out of the remains of

The proposals of the Genoese were peremptorily rejected by Alexios ; and, in refusing their demands, he added that they were at perfect liberty to depart with all their property as soon as they paid the duties on the merchandise then in his dominions. The emperor knew well that, if they withdrew from Trebizond, their place would be immediately occupied by the Venetians, Pisans, or Catalans. The Genoese, enraged at the prompt rejection of their terms, acted with violence and precipitation. They were always the most reckless and quarrelsome of merchants, and ever ready to balance their books with the sword. They collected twelve ships in the port, and began immediately to embark their property without offering to pay any duties. This was opposed by the imperial officers of the revenue, and a battle was the consequence. The Genoese, pressed by numbers, set fire to the houses of the Greeks towards the Meidan, expecting to distract the attention of their enemies and impede the arrival of troops from the citadel. Their infamous conduct was severely punished. The variable state of the wind drove the fire back in their faces, and, descending the hill to the port, it destroyed the greater part of the merchandise about which the battle had arisen, and laid their warehouses in ashes. This unfortunate result of their passion brought the traders to their senses. They felt that they had suffered a far greater loss than it was in their power, under any circumstances, to inflict on their enemy. The destruction of their goods served as a premium to other merchants, and quickened the eagerness of rival traders to supplant them. Very little hesitation on their part, therefore, was likely to place either the Venetians or the Pisans in possession of the profitable trade they were on the eve of losing, after having long enjoyed a monopoly of its advantages. In this critical conjuncture they forgot their passion and their pride, and hast-

Leontokastron, of which some foundations may be traced. The palace was destroyed by order of the Porte, in consequence of the strength of the position. It appears that an old castle occupied the site before the establishment of the Genoese at Trebizond, and that it had fallen to ruin. The Genoese acquired a title to the possession of at least some part of this site, which they resigned to the emperor when they concluded their treaty of peace, and Leontokastron was repaired and strengthened by Alexios, in consequence of these disputes with the republic ; but in the year 1349 it was surrendered to the Genoese by the emperor Michael, shortly before he was dethroned, and remained in their hands until the fall of the empire. Fallmerayer, *Original-Fragments*, Pt. ii. 84.

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ened to conclude peace with Alexios, on condition that they should be allowed to resume their usual trade on the previous terms. Alexios prudently consented to this demand; and a treaty was signed by which the Genoese were allowed to re-establish themselves at Trebizond. But they were compelled to quit the position occupied by the warehouses that had been burnt, and form their new quarter deeper in the bay at the Darsena. Their industry soon enabled them to repair their losses; and these indefatigable merchants grew richer and more powerful from year to year, while the Greeks, industrious only in intrigue, became as rapidly poorer, and saw their political influence hourly decline. The summit of the position previously occupied by the Genoese was fortified by Alexios II., who repaired the ruins of Leontokastron, as a check on the naval power of the republicans¹.

The Greeks in general had lost much of their taste for naval affairs, as well as that skill which had made them, in the early part of the middle ages, the rulers of the sea². The people of Trebizond had participated in the national decay. The city was filled with that inert population which congregates round an idle and luxurious court, when the sovereign expends immense revenues, extracted from the industry of an extensive realm, within the walls of a single city. In such a state of things men's minds are turned away from every useful occupation and enterprising course of life. Wealth and distinction are more easily gained by haunting the antechambers of the palace, or frequenting the offices of the ministers, than by any honest exertion. The merchant is generally despised as a sordid inferior, and exposed to insult, peculation, and injustice. Merit cannot make its way without favour, either in the military or naval service. A large body of the populace lives by performing menial service about the dwellings of the courtiers, or acting as military retainers and instruments of pomp to the nobles. The public taxes and private rents, levied from the agricultural classes

¹ Pachymeres (ii. 310) places these events in the year 1306; Panaretos, whose chronology is more to be depended on, in the year 1311. *Chron. Trapez.* p. 363, edit. Tafel. Fallmerayer (*Original-Fragmente*, Pt. ii. p. 15) informs us that a copy of the treaty which put an end to this contest exists in the archives of Turin. It is dated at Trebizond the 9th June 1315, and ratified by the republic of Genoa the 16th March 1316.

² Constant. Porphyry, *De Them.* p. 58, edit. Bonn.

in the provinces, supply a number of favoured individuals with the means of pursuing a life of worthlessness. Such was the state of Greek society in the city of Trebizond.

In the Mohammedan city of Sinope everything was different. There, valour and military skill were the surest road to riches and distinction. But as the continent offered no field of conquest to the small force at the disposal of the emir of Sinope, his attention, and that of his people, was directed to naval affairs. The Black Sea became the scene of their enterprises. Every merchant-ship was the object of their covetousness. The rich commerce of the Christians, joined to the skill and bravery of the Italian mariners, made the war against the trade of the western nations a profitable but dangerous occupation. This very danger, however, tended to make it an honourable employment in the eyes of the Mussulmans of Sinope. The merchant-ships of this age were compelled to sail on their trading voyages in small fleets, well armed and strongly manned. In the Archipelago they were exposed to the attacks of the Seljouk pirates of Asia Minor; in the Black Sea, to the corsairs of Sinope. Even the Genoese, Pisans, Venetians, and Catalans were ready to avail themselves of slight pretexts for plundering one another. Piracy was a vice of the Christians as well as the Mohammedans¹. The difference was, that on the part of the Christians it was a deviation from their ordinary pursuits, while it was the chief occupation of the ships of the Mussulman princes. The corsairs of Sinope were thus sure of meeting enemies worthy of their valour; nor had they any chance of success, unless they became experienced seamen as well as daring warriors. Their usual expeditions were directed against the flags of the Italian republics; but when it happened that they met with no booty at sea, they turned their arms to other sources of gain, and ravaged the coasts inhabited by the Christians. Every article of property on which they could lay their hands, even to the metal cooking-utensils of the poorest peasants, were carried away, and all the inhabitants they could seize were sold as slaves.

In the year 1314 a band of these pirates landed in the

¹ Pegolotti (*Practica della Mercatura*), who was engaged in commercial affairs in the East about this time, tells us that the freight paid for merchandise embarked in vessels not armed was only the half of what was paid for its embarkation in armed galleys.

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vicinity of Trebizond, and, after ravaging the surrounding country, plundered the suburbs of the city, and set fire to the buildings without the gates. The conflagration spread far and wide, and many splendid edifices were destroyed.

Alexios II., in order to protect the western suburb, and the space between the fortress and the sea, from all future attacks, constructed a new wall to the city. This addition to the fortress extended from the tower that protected the bridge over the western ravine, in a line running down to the shore. The style of the new fortification was modelled on the land wall of Constantinople; and it still exists in tolerable preservation, particularly where it covers the bridge over the romantic ravine that forms the noble moat to the citadel¹.

Pope John XXII. seems to have entertained some hope of inducing Alexios to acknowledge the supremacy of the see of Rome, though we are aware of no grounds that could lead him to adopt such an opinion. There exists a letter of his Holiness, addressed to the emperor, dated in 1329, inviting him to co-operate in bringing about the union of the Greek and Latin churches, and recommending some missionaries to his good offices². The emperor Alexios died in the year 1330, after a prosperous reign of thirty-three years. He left a brother named Michael, and four sons, besides two daughters—one of whom, Anna, occupied the throne of Trebizond for a short period.

SECT. III.—*Period of Anarchy and Civil Wars.—Reigns of Andronikos III., Manuel II., Basil, Irene, Anna, John III., and Michael.—1330-1349.*

Andronikos III., the eldest son of Alexios II., reigned little more than a year and a half. He is accused of having murdered his two younger brothers, Manuel and George. If the crime was committed from motives of political suspicion, we may conclude that his second brother Basilios, and his uncle Michael, only avoided the same fate

¹ An inscription on this wall, though much defaced, proves that it was terminated in 1324. Fallmerayer, *Orig.-Frag.* Pt. i. 133. There is another inscription of the reign of Alexios III. in the tower to the left of the gate. Ibid. Pt. ii. 103.

² Wadding, *Annal. Minor.* ann. 1329, n. 11; Raynaldi, *Annal. Eccles.* ann. 1329, n. 95; Fallmerayer, *Geschichte*, 165.

by being absent, or by effecting their escape to Constantinople.

Manuel II. was only eight years old when his father Andronikos III. died. The crimes of his parent had utterly depraved a society already deeply stained with vice. No measures were now too violent for those who hoped to obtain wealth or power by civil broils or private murders. The chiefs of the different factions incited the populace to tumult, and goaded them to rebellion, in order to gratify their own ambition. The city was a scene of disorder, and the interior of the palace became the theatre of many an act of bloodshed. As soon as Andronikos III. died, the ministers of state, the clergy, the nobility, the provincial governors, and the leaders of the troops commenced intriguing one against the other, in order to obtain the command of all the patronage of the court.

The moment seemed favourable for the Turkomans to invade the empire. But it not unfrequently happens that a country apparently on the verge of ruin from intestine troubles, is found peculiarly ready to encounter a foreign enemy, on account of the very preparations which have been made to perpetrate political crimes. All parties become eager to gain popularity, by evincing extraordinary patriotism in defence of their native land. Each leader sees that the best way to strengthen his party is to perform good service against the foreign enemy. This was experienced by the Turkomans, who invaded the empire of Trebizond in the year 1332. They advanced as far as Asomatos, where they were defeated with considerable loss, and compelled to retreat with such precipitation that they abandoned the greater part of their horses and baggage to save their lives. The disorder within the walls of the capital was however very little diminished by this victory, and the whole population became at length seriously alarmed for the fate of the empire. In order to put an end to this state of anarchy, Basilios, the second son of Alexios II., was invited from Constantinople to govern the empire.

Basilios arrived at Trebizond in the month of September 1332, and was immediately proclaimed emperor. Manuel II. was deposed, after his name had been used for eight months to authorize every kind of violence and disorder. The young

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prince was kept in a state of seclusion, with the view, doubtless, of compelling him, when he grew older, to become a monk; but in the course of a few months the intrigues of a eunuch, who held the office of grand-duke, caused an insurrection during which Manuel was stabbed. Basilios, on mounting the throne, had allowed his partizans to commit the most shocking enormities. The grand-duke Leka, and his son Tzamba, the grand-domestikos, were slain; while the grand-duchess, a member of the family of Syrikania, one of the most illustrious houses in the empire, was stoned to death¹. The reign of Basilios lasted seven years and six months. It was disturbed by the exorbitant power and independent position which the great officers had acquired during the preceding anarchy. The principal nobles of the provinces assumed the rank of petty sovereigns, and their wealth and influence enabled them to form parties in the capital. The Scholarioi, or privileged militia, in the fortress, possessed a constitution and a degree of power not unlike that of the Janissaries of the Othoman empire in the century preceding their destruction². The emperor, unable to trust the Scholarioi, found it necessary to surround his person with a body of Frank, Iberian, and Byzantine guards, to guard the citadel and the palace; and the insolence and rapacity of these foreign mercenaries increased the unpopularity of his government.

The personal conduct of Basilios was ill suited to extend his influence. He married Irene, the natural daughter of the Byzantine emperor, Andronicus III.; and, had he availed himself with prudence of this alliance, he might have rendered the defeat of the Turkomans, who again ventured to advance to the walls of his capital, extremely advantageous to the empire. His conduct, however, was such that it excited the popular indignation; and an eclipse of the sun being interpreted by the people as a proof of divine reprobation, he was pursued with insults, and driven with stones to seek refuge in the citadel. The empress Irene had no children. Basilios, not contented with living in open adultery

¹ Irene, the third wife of the emperor Manuel I., the great captain, and mother of the emperors Georgios and Joannes II., was a daughter of the same family.

² See what Agathias (159) says of the Scholarioi. He considered them only a burden to the state.

with a lady of Trebizond, also named Irene, by whom he was the father of two sons, determined to open the way for their succession to the throne, by celebrating a public marriage with this mistress. Whether he ever succeeded in obtaining any divorce from his first wife, except by his own decree, seems doubtful, and on what plea he could pretend that his marriage was invalid is not known; but he persuaded or forced the clergy of Trebizond to celebrate his second marriage in the month of July 1339. He died in the following year¹.

Irene Palaeologina, who was universally considered as the lawful wife of Basilios, was suspected of having had some share in causing his death. She was found prepared for the event, and had already organized the movements of a party which placed her on the throne. This promptitude in profiting by her husband's death certainly looked suspicious; while the readiness of mankind to repeat calumnious reports concerning their rulers, the known immorality of the society in the imperial palace, and the careless levity of Irene herself, all tended to give circulation and credibility to unfavourable rumours. The moderation with which the empress treated her rival raises a doubt concerning the probability of her having plotted the assassination of her husband. Instead of putting Irene of Trebizond to death or immuring her in a monastery, she only sent her with her two sons to Constantinople, to be detained as hostages for the tranquillity of Trebizond. A powerful party among the nobility, however, was both alarmed and offended by the success of her schemes, which deranged all the plans they had formed for acquiring wealth and power during the minority of the children of Basilios, through the favour of Irene of Trebizond, whom they had intended to name regent.

The empire of Trebizond became, for several years, a prey to civil wars and intestine disturbances. Two great parties were formed, called Amytzentarants and Scholarians². Civil

¹ Compare Panaretos, 363, with Niceph. Greg. 424. Fallmerayer (*Geschichte*, 176) has pointed out the errors of Ducange (*Fam. Aug. Byz.* 193) concerning Basilios and Irene, in his usual lucid manner. The consecration of bigamy by the clergy of Trebizond was sternly reproved by the patriarch of Constantinople, but he did not venture to command the metropolitan of Trebizond to excommunicate his sovereign even for bigamy. Fallmerayer, *Original-Fragmente*, Pt. ii. 77; Müller, *Ueber einige byzantinische Urkunden*, 331.

² Fragment of Lazaros the Skeuophylax, in Fallmerayer's *Original-Fragmente*, Pt. i. p. 85.

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war in itself, though more to be deprecated than any foreign hostilities, may nevertheless be as necessary and legitimate. Its instigator may be a true patriot, its duration may be a proof of social progress, and its successful termination in favour of those who were stigmatized as rebels at its commencement may be an indispensable step to the establishment of national prosperity. Where war is undertaken by the people for the purpose of establishing the empire of the law, it indicates a healthy condition of society, even though it be a civil war. It is when internal contests take place among those who have no object to obtain but power, and no feelings to gratify but party spirit, revenge, or avarice, that civil war marks a state of the body politic so demoralized as to serve as a sure herald of national degradation. In the fourteenth century, neither the governments of Trebizond nor Constantinople, nor the Greek people, felt any disposition to submit their power, their passions, their prejudices, or their factions to the dictates of law or justice; and nowhere did the violence of individuals represent the demoralized condition of Greek society more vividly than in the city of Trebizond.

The empress Irene was no sooner established on the throne than civil war broke out. Assisted by the Amytzentarants, by a powerful party among the nobles, and by the Italian and Byzantine mercenaries, she held possession of the fortress, with its citadel and small port. The rebels, who affected to consider themselves the patriotic champions of native rights, headed by the lord of Tzanich, who was the captain-general of the Scholarioi, and supported by the great families of the Doranites and Kabasites, and of Kamakh—joined to a detachment of the imperial guard which remained faithful to the memory of the emperor Basilios, and a body of the people, who hated Irene as a Constantinopolitan stranger—established themselves in possession of the great monastery of St. Eugenios. This monastery then rose like a fortress over the eastern ravine that enclosed the citadel; and though it is almost within rifle range of the imperial palace, the distance, when combined with the advantages of its situation, was at that time sufficient to render it impregnable on the side of the old city, while another ravine separated it from the populous suburb extending to the Meidan and the great port. A third party, under the command of the grand-duke, the

eunuch John, who had murdered the young emperor Manuel II., held possession of the fortress of Limnia, then the most important military station in the empire beyond the walls of the capital. It was situated little more than twenty miles to the westward of Trebizond¹. For two months the parties of the empress Irene and of the Scholarioi and great nobles remained in arms, watching one another, within hearing of their mutual cries, and engaging in daily skirmishes leading to no permanent result.

The circumstance of a grand-duke being an eunuch, and holding Limnia as if it was his private estate, indicates that the power of many of the factious leaders was official and administrative as well as territorial and hereditary. The oligarchs of Trebizond were representatives of a Roman, not a feudal aristocracy, and partook more of the ancient and Asiatic type than of the mediaeval characteristics of the nobility of western Europe. The eunuch at last declared in favour of the empress, and advanced with his troops to her assistance. The communications of the citadel with the country to the westward had always remained open, as they were completely protected against the nobles at St. Eugenios by the two deep ravines that surround the old city. As soon as the troops of the grand-duke had effected a junction with those in Trebizond, the party intrenched in St. Eugenios was vigorously attacked. The approaches were made from the south, battering-rams were planted against the walls, and fire-balls were hurled into the place, which was soon set on fire. The immense monastery, and the splendid church—the rich plate, images, and relics, and the old mural paintings, which would have been more valuable in modern times than the bones of martyrs—the pride and palladium of the empire of Trebizond, was on this occasion reduced to a shapeless heap of ruins by a foreign empress and a factious eunuch². The leaders of the aristocratic party and the Scholarioi were captured by the warlike eunuch, who sent them prisoners to Limnia, where they were put to death in the following year,

¹ Niceph. Greg. p. 425.

² Nature has adapted the position of St. Eugenios to form a petty rival to the citadel of Trebizond, when missiles of only short range are in use. Both the quarter of St. Eugenios and the palace at Leontokastron served as defensive positions during the civil broils between the Turkish artillerymen of the upper citadel and the Janissaries of the lower fortress, which occurred in the last century. Peyssonel, *Traité sur le Commerce de la Mer Noire*, ii. 73, 88.

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when the throne of Irene was threatened by Anna Anachoutlou, her deceased husband's sister.

Irene was of a gay, thoughtless, and daring disposition, like her father Andronicus III. She soon overlooked the danger of her position, though she fully understood that her tenure of power was exposed to hourly perils. It was evident that, without a husband who could wear the imperial crown, she could not hope to maintain her position long; and she urged her father to send her a husband, chosen from among the Byzantine nobles, who could direct the administration, command the armies of the empire, and aid her in repressing the factions that were constantly plotting against her authority. Her ambassadors found Andronicus occupied in preparing for his campaign against the despotat of Epirus, and he died before he found time to pay any serious attention to his daughter's request. Irene consoled herself for the delay by falling in love with the grand-domestikos of her own empire. The favour this passion led her to confer on a few individuals divided her own court into factions, and afforded her old enemies, who had escaped the catastrophe at St. Eugenios, an opportunity of again taking up arms, so that a new storm burst on the head of the thoughtless empress.

Another female now appeared to claim the throne, with a better title than Irene. Anna, called Anachoutlou, the eldest daughter of the emperor Alexios II., had taken the veil, and until this time had lived in seclusion. The opposition party persuaded her to quit her monastic dress and escape to Lazia, where she was proclaimed empress as being the nearest legitimate heir of her brother Basilios. The Lazes, the Tzans, and all the provincials preferred a native sovereign of the house of Grand-Komnenos to the domination of a Byzantine scion of Palaeologos, who seemed determined to marry a foreigner. Anna, strong in the popular opinion that it was a fundamental law of the empire that Trebizond could only be ruled by a member of the house of Grand-Komnenos, marched directly to the capital without encountering any opposition. The government of Irene was unpopular, both on account of her personal conduct and the losses which a recent Turkish expedition had inflicted on all classes of her subjects. Her Constantinopolitan mercenaries fled without

giving battle to the infidels, who advanced to the walls of the capital and burned the suburbs on both sides of the fortress, leaving the blackened ruins encumbered with such numbers of unburied bodies that a fearful pestilence was the consequence. At this conjuncture Anna arrived at Trebizond. She was immediately admitted within the citadel, and universally recognized as the lawful empress. Irene was dethroned after a reign of a year and four months.

On the 30th of July 1341, when Anna had only occupied the throne for about three weeks, Michael Grand-Komnenos, the second son of Joannes II., arrived at Trebizond. He had been selected by the regency at Constantinople as a suitable husband for Irene; but he had attained the mature age of fifty-six—a circumstance which may have rendered it a piece of good fortune for him that she was dethroned before his arrival¹. As he was the legitimate male heir of his house, and had a son Joannes already nineteen years old, there were certainly strong political reasons in favour of his election. Michael reached Trebizond accompanied by three Byzantine ships of war and a chosen body of troops. He landed without opposition, attended by Niketas the captain-general of the Scholarioi, and it appeared that his title to the throne would be readily acknowledged by all parties. But the circumstance that he came to marry Irene, surrounded by Byzantine mercenaries and supported by the faction of the Scholarioi, irritated without intimidating the native nobility, who had driven Irene from the throne, and who were not willing to lose the fruits of a successful revolution without a contest. But as they were doubtful of the support of the people, and not prepared for open resistance, they resolved to gain their ends by treachery. Michael was received by the archbishop Akakios with due ceremony. He received the oath of allegiance from the assembled nobles and officers of state, and retired to the palace to prepare for his coronation on the morrow. At daybreak the scene was changed. The people had been incited during the whole night to resist the invasion of a new swarm of Constantinopolitan adventurers, and they now rose in rebellion. The treacherous nobles and officers of state facilitated their enterprise. Michael was seized in

¹ Niceph. Greg. 424.

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the palace and sent prisoner to Oinaion (Unieh¹). The Lazes, after a severe engagement, captured the three Byzantine ships, and Irene was embarked in a European vessel, and sent off to Constantinople with the adventurers who had escaped from the people in the tumult. The nobles of the Lazian faction now became the sole possessors of political power, and an association of powerful chiefs governed the empire in the name of the empress Anna².

The Greek people were too deeply imbued with an administrative organization, and too firmly persuaded of the necessity of a powerful central authority, to remain long satisfied with this state of things. Niketas, the captain-general of the Scholarioi, and the Greek party, which looked to the Byzantine alliance as the surest guarantee of civil order, resolved to make another attempt to drive their rivals from power. It was evident they could expect no success, unless they placed at their head a member of the family of Grand-Komnenos. Michael was in a distant prison; his son Joannes, who resided at Constantinople, was now twenty years old, and to him the Scholarioi resolved to apply. Niketas and the chiefs of the party left Trebizond in a Venetian galley, to persuade the young man to embark in the project. The expedition was undertaken without any open support from the Byzantine government. Three Genoese galleys were hired, in addition to two fitted out by the chiefs of Trebizond; and a body of chosen troops was enrolled, for an attack on the government of the empress Anna. They reached Trebizond in the month of September 1342, and effected a landing at the port. The Scholarioi, the Midzomates, and the Doranites joined them; and after a fierce contest in the streets the invaders forced their way into the fortress, and proclaimed Joannes III. emperor. Anna was taken prisoner in the imperial palace, and, to guard against the possibility of any reaction in her favour, she was immediately strangled. She had occupied the throne rather more than a year³. Many nobles of the Lazic party, particularly the Amytzantarants, were murdered; and a lady of rank was strangled, as well as the empress Anna, during the tumults that accompanied this revolution.

¹ He was afterwards removed to Limnia; Panaretos, c. 11.

² Niceph. Greg. 425.

³ Panaretos, c. 12.

Joannes III. celebrated his coronation in the church of Chrysokephalos. So little concern did he give himself about his father's fate, that he allowed the eunuch John to retain him a prisoner at Limnia. But before a year elapsed the grand-duke was murdered; and soon after this event, the party who had placed Joannes III. on the throne became disgusted with his conduct. The young emperor had never possessed much power beyond the walls of the capital, nor did he pay much attention to the duties of a sovereign. He found money enough in the public treasury to enable him to indulge in every species of luxury and idle amusement, and he trusted to his foreign guards for repressing any dangerous effects of popular discontent. At the same time, the preference he gave the young nobility of the native party, who, to gain his good-will and recover power, flattered his follies and his vices, alienated the attachment of those statesmen and soldiers who had placed him on the throne. The captain-general Niketas, who had taken the lead in so many revolutions, again commenced his factious movements. It is true there is no mode of reforming an absolute sovereign. He must be dethroned, as the first step to a better state of things. Niketas and his party marched to Limnia, and, releasing the imprisoned Michael, conducted him to Trebizond and proclaimed him emperor, in May 1344. Joannes III. was dethroned, after a reign of a year and eight months, and confined by his father in the monastery of St. Sabas¹.

The emperor Michael seems to have made some attempt to improve the condition of the government, but his talents were unequal to the task. The two great parties of the Lazian nobles and Greek leaders of the citizens maintained themselves in a condition to control the imperial administration, by personal combinations and political arrangements, arising out of temporary and local causes. Michael resolved to break the power of both parties. Immediately after his accession, he condemned to death the most eminent of the nobles of the Lazian party—a measure in which he was supported by the Greek party, to whom a distribution was made

¹ There are some slight remains of this monastery before a cavern in the rocky face of Bous-tepé, which overlooks the harbour. Panaretos, c. 13; Niceph. Greg. 426.

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of all the great offices of state. Niketas was made grand-duke¹.

All parties now felt the evils to which they were exposed by the continual vicissitudes in their civil contests, and became seriously alarmed at the bloody massacres which followed every change. Those who had recently secured power attempted on this occasion to give their authority a greater degree of permanence, by establishing an organic law for regulating the administration of the empire. In short, the confederacy of Scholarioi attempted to give Trebizond an oligarchical constitution. The emperor Michael was compelled to sign an act, ratified by a solemn oath, promising to leave the whole of the legislative power, and the direction of the public administration, in the hands of the great officers of state and members of the senate; and to remain satisfied with the imperial dignity, a liberal civil list, and the rule over his own palace². Neither party violence nor imperial ambition could be long restrained by such a convention; while the knowledge that the nobles had circumscribed the power of the emperor excited indignation among the people, who looked to the sovereign as their protector against the aristocracy, and as the only pure fountain of law and justice.

The emperor Michael seized the earliest opportunity that presented itself to rid himself of the tutelage in which he was held. The people of the capital and the Lazés flew to arms, and declared that they were determined to live under the government of their lawful emperors, and not under the arbitrary rule of a band of nobles. The enthusiasm of the people for a mere shadow of the laws of Rome enabled Michael to resume absolute power, and declare the concessions he had made to the ministers and the senate null. The grand-duke Niketas and several of the great officers of his party were arrested; but on this occasion no blood appears to have been shed. The emperor, to guard against further troubles, sent his son Joannes to be kept in ward at

¹ Gregorios Meizomates was created general-in-chief; Leo Kabasites, grand-domestikos; Constantine Doranites, vestiarios or treasurer; his son, high-steward; John Kabasites, grand-chancellor of the finances; the son of Gregorios Meizomates, chamberlain; Michael Meizomates, amirtzaoutzes—that is, emir tchaous, or marshal of the empire; and Stephanos Tzanichites, grand-constable. Panaretos, c. 13.

² Niceph. Greg. 426.

Adrianople, where he could find few opportunities of communicating with the factious at Trebizond¹.

The absolute sway of the emperor Michael brought no more prosperity to the city and empire than had been obtained by the government of the nobles. The great plague that about this time devastated every country in Asia and Europe visited Trebizond in the year 1347, where it swept off numbers of the population, and increased the social disorder, by dissolving all family ties². The Turkomans, who occupied the country from Arsinga and Erzeroum to the castle of Baibert, invaded the empire, and ravaged the valley of the Pyxites up to the walls of the capital³.

A more serious war than any which had yet occurred broke out about this time with the Genoese, who availed themselves of the enfeebled condition of the empire to seize on some of the most important positions in the imperial territories. In the year 1348 they captured the city of Kerasunt, after burning great part of the buildings. Two expeditions from Kaffa were successively directed against the capital. The first consisted of only two large Genoese men-of-war. The imperial officers considered that the force ready for action in the port was sufficient to capture these enemies. The Trapezuntine squadron, consisting of one large ship, a galley, and several smaller vessels, left the harbour of Daphnous to attack the republicans; but the Greeks were no match for the Genoese. The large imperial ship was burned; the grand-duke John Kabasites, Michael Tzanichites, and many more who bravely engaged in the fight, were slain. The Greeks now revenged themselves by attacking all the Franks settled at Trebizond; their houses and warehouses were plundered, and those were imprisoned who escaped death from the popular fury. The Genoese returned from Kaffa in a few weeks with a stronger force, determined to exact signal satisfaction for the treatment of the Europeans. Affairs at Trebizond were in a state of anarchy. Michael was stretched

¹ In the year 1362, during the reign of Alexios III., the dethroned Joannes III. escaped from Adrianople, but he was arrested at Sinope by the Turks, and died there. He left a son, who escaped to Kaffa and Galata. Panaretos, c. 14, 31.

² This was the great plague known in Europe by the name of the Black Death, of which Boccaccio has left us the well-known description. Panaretos, c. 14; Fallmerayer, *Kaiserthum von Trapezunt*, 189.

³ The modern name of the Pyxites is Deyirmenderisi, or mill-stream.

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on a sick-bed, incapable of action. An internal revolution was on the eve of explosion. With much difficulty peace was negotiated with the Genoese; but it was only obtained by ceding to them the fortress of Leontokastron, which Alexios II. had constructed to restrain their insolent pretensions (1349). Kerasunt, however, was restored to the Trapezuntine government. From this period the Genoese acquired the complete command of the harbour of Daphnous, and the importance of the empire of Trebizond began to decline.

Against all these misfortunes, an old man like Michael, worn out with sickness, and naturally destitute of talent, either as a soldier or a statesman, was ill suited to contend. Party spirit revived, conspiracies were formed, and popular tumults broke out, until at last Michael was dethroned, on Sunday the 13th December, 1349, after a reign of five years and seven months. He was compelled by the partizans of his successor, Alexios III., to enter the monastery of St. Sabas; but after a short time, the imperial monk was sent to Constantinople for greater security¹.

¹ Panaretos, c. 15.

CHAPTER IV.

RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE IMPERIAL SUPREMACY IN THE ILLEGITIMATE BRANCH OF THE HOUSE OF GRAND- KOMNENOS.

SECT. I.—*Reign of Alexios III.—Progress of the Turkomans.—
Revenge of Lercari.—Magnificent Ecclesiastical Endowments.*
—A.D. 1349–1390.

ALEXIOS III., son of Basilios by Irene of Trebizond, had been brought from Constantinople by the party of the Scholarioi to occupy the throne. He was declared emperor by the senate and the people, and solemnly crowned in the church of St. Eugenios, though he had not yet completed his twelfth year. His real name was John, but he adopted that of Alexios, which was the name of his deceased brother, on account of the auspicious influence it was supposed to exert over the family of Grand-Komnenos. The youth of the prince secured the aristocracy from all immediate attempts to diminish their power, and they hoped to profit by their tenure of administration, in such a way as to consolidate their authority, without openly restricting the exercise of the imperial prerogative, to which the people had given so many proofs of devotion.

The young emperor had received his education at Constantinople, and the usurper John Cantacuzenos assisted in placing him on the throne in order to exclude the legitimate branch of the family of Grand-Komnenos, represented by the emperors Michael and Joannes III., on account of its alliance with the house of Palaeologos, the lawful emperors

of Constantinople. That the union might be drawn as close as possible between the two dynasties of intruders, the young Alexios, when only fourteen years old, was married to Theodora, the daughter of Nicephorus Cantacuzenos¹. The marriage ceremony of the imperial children was celebrated in the church of St. Eugenios, whom the young Alexios selected as the patron saint of his dynasty, in addition to the saint's previous duties as guardian of the empire of Trebizond. The church and monastery, which had been ruined by the conflagration during the reign of Irene Palaeologina (1340), were both rebuilt, and enriched with great external splendour; but the appearance of the existing church proves that the arts had already declined at Trebizond, and the restoration of the shrine of his patron saint by the magnificent Alexios will bear no comparison, either in solidity or purity of architectural decoration, with the earlier church of St. Sophia—and it is doubtless far inferior in these qualities to the preceding building whose place it occupied².

The rebellions of the aristocracy and the seditions of the people continued with unabated violence during the early part of this reign. Each noble and senator strove, by intrigue or force, to secure for himself some private advantage, before the system of partitioning the resources of the state should be brought to a conclusion. No concessions of the ministers of state could satisfy even the pretensions of a single faction, so that plot was succeeded by plot. Nor were the people always inclined to submit tamely to see their interests sacrificed to the rapacity of the aristocracy, or stand idle spectators while the officers of state squandered the heavy taxes, that were employed to maintain armed followers, who did little else than plunder the country they ought to have been guarding against the inroads of the Turkomans. On one

¹ Panaretos (16) says that Nicephorus was the cousin of the emperor. Cantacuzenos mentions that he had a brother, to whom he intrusted the government of Adrianople, named Nicephorus. *Cant. Hist.* pp. 841, 879.

² The church is converted into a mosque, called Yeni Djuma djami, or New Friday mosque. Some very defaced paintings of emperors, with one-headed eagles embroidered on their robes, and fragments of inscriptions, may still be traced on the external wall to the west, where the portico stood, which has now disappeared. Of the monastery, which so often served as a fortress in the civil wars of Trebizond, no remains exist, unless they are concealed in the Turkish houses near the church.

occasion the family of Doranites, mastering the whole administration, of which they had for some time held the principal offices, forced the young emperor to retire to Tripolis; but they were soon after overpowered by the people, who often changed sides in their vain endeavours to find individual leaders willing to establish order and conduct the government according to law.

The fortresses of Limnia, Tzanicha, Kerasunt, and Kenchrina were for a time in the hands of various parties of rebel nobles. Limnia was recovered from the Doranites by an expedition led by the emperor's mother, with Panaretos, the author of the dull *Chronicle* which has preserved a place for the revolutions of Trebizond in the world's history, as one of her council. It would hardly tend to give us a clearer insight into the state of society at this period, if we were to repeat the meagre enumeration Panaretos has left us of the various revolutions that followed one another for some years in quick succession. A few prominent facts will paint with greater accuracy the universal disorder. The grand-duke Niketas, who was the leader of the *Scholarioi*, had been invested with the direction of the public administration at the popular rising which drove the Doranites from power; but in the course of about two years, the young emperor having recovered possession of the fortresses of Limnia, Tzanicha, and Kenchrina, and displaying both the power and the will to take upon himself the direction of the administration, the grand-duke and his partizans retired to Kerasunt. Counting on their influence over the factious native militia, and their popularity with the citizens, they made an attempt to recover their power by force. The rebels presented themselves before the capital in the spring of 1355, with a fleet of one large ship and eleven smaller vessels. Their arrival caused great disorders; but they found the young emperor's authority firmly established, and they were compelled to return to Kerasunt without having gained their object. This retreat marks the period at which the power of the emperor was again re-established in its full supremacy; but an altered state of society, and a general feeling that individuals, whether high or low, must trust to their individual position, and not to the law or the central administration, for justice, gave the authority of the emperors

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of Trebizond, henceforth, rather the characteristics of feudal suzerainty blended with Oriental despotism, than of the old Byzantine ascendancy of supreme legislator and incorruptible and all-powerful judge. Force, to the exclusion of justice, acquired the same influence over public opinion among the Greek race, that it had long held both in western Europe and among the Mohammedan nations; and as the social organization of the Greek people was now essentially unwarlike, their appeal to force, from their want of discipline and courage only rendered them despicable.

The defeat of the grand-duke before Trebizond was followed up by Alexios with some vigour. He sailed to attack the rebels in Kerasunt with two ships and a small fleet of transports, and after a single engagement the place capitulated. The grand-duke assembled his troops at Kenchrina, of which he had gained possession, and the emperor marched to besiege him; but the place was so strong that Alexios was compelled for a time to rest satisfied with a simple acknowledgment of his authority, and the apparent submission of the rebels who retained possession of the fortress. In spite of this check, the emperor gradually consolidated the central authority. During his expedition against Kenchrina John Kabasites, the duke of Chaldia, recovered the forts of Cheriana and Sorogaina from the Turkomans, and restored the imperial power in those districts. The dethroned emperor Michael was also defeated in an attempt to profit by the rebellion of his old ally, Niketas the grand-duke. The partizans of the Byzantine emperor John V. (Palaeologos) favoured his escape from Constantinople, and assisted him in his enterprise, in order to weaken the party of Cantacuzenos by the fall of the young Alexios. Michael, however, was too well known at Trebizond to find any support, and he was obliged to return to Constantinople without having it in his power even to create a revolt. Before the end of the year, the grand-domestikos, Meizomates, and the grand-general, Michael Sampson, took Kenchrina and put an end to the civil war. The grand-duke Niketas, whose administrative talents were very great, was soon received into favour; and when he died in the year 1361, the emperor Alexios, to mark his grief for the loss of so able a man, led the funeral procession clad in white robes—the mourning garb of the

emperor. The authority of Alexios III. was now re-established along the whole line of coast, from Oinaion to Batoun; but very little order existed in the interior of the country, at a distance from the sea-ports. Even the possessions of the great monastery of the Virgin at Sumelas, not thirty miles from the capital, were exposed to constant attacks on the part of the neighbouring Mohammedans. Many of the great landed proprietors continued to be almost independent, and their conduct kept several districts in a state bordering on anarchy. Domestic raids and foreign inroads of plundering tribes were events of frequent occurrence during the whole reign of Alexios¹. On one occasion the emperor himself had very nearly fallen into the hands of a party of his subjects, who attempted to carry him off to the mountains, from under the walls of his palace in the citadel of Trebizond. Alexios had formed a party of pleasure in the ravine of St. Gregorios, and while he was enjoying the fresh air on the picturesque banks of this deep ravine, a band of nobles belonging to the party of the Kabasites attempted to seize him, and it was with difficulty that he effected his escape into the citadel by the southern sally-port. This daring outrage occurred in the month of October 1363.

The emperor Alexios III. was less fortunate in his wars with the Turkomans than in the civil broils with his own subjects. The fall of Kenchrina encouraged him to make an expedition against the tribes established in the district of Cheriana. The chronicler Panaretos says, that the idea of the expedition must have been inspired by the machinations of the devil. The imperial troops marched forward without any plan of operations, ravaging the country, plundering, and making prisoners. In the midst of their career they were suddenly assailed by a small body of the enemy's cavalry. Emperor, generals, and troops, were all seized with a panic, and fled without offering any resistance. Four hundred were left dead on the field. John Kabasites, the duke of Chaldia, who a few months before had reconquered

¹ The golden bull of Alexios to the monastery of Sumelas, dated in 1365, gives a dark picture of the violence and oppression of the imperial officers, as well as of the neighbouring nobles, in levying exactions from the monks and their serfs, or *παρόικοι*. The emperor says, *Εισήλθον ὡς περ τινὲς θήρες ἀγριοί*. Fallmerayer, *Original-Fragments*, Pt. i. p. 97.

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the forts of Cheriana and Sorogaina, perished. Not only was all the plunder lost, but the whole of the baggage of the troops, the military chest of the army, and the personal equipage and tents of the emperor, fell into the hands of the Turkomans. Alexios fled among the foremost, and Panaretos followed close after his master. The historian declares, that if the Lord had not been with him, and strengthened his horse, so that he galloped for three days, posterity would have lost the imperial notary, and the history of Trebizond would have been at this hour a blank¹. The fugitives never stopped a moment to rally the troops, nor did they hold their own persons to be perfectly secure until they entered the walls of Trebizond, to which they brought the news of their disgraceful overthrow.

The Turkish hordes which attacked the long slip of territory that composed the empire of Trebizond belonged to different independent tribes. They were united by no political tie, and generally acted without concert. Indeed, they were frequently so hostile as to be more inclined to contract alliances with the Christians than with one another. The great impulse that carried them onward in their career of conquest and colonization was the necessity of securing new lands for their augmenting population and their increasing flocks and herds. Why the nomadic population should have increased in an augmented ratio at this period of history, is one of the social problems that lies beyond the sphere of Greek history; or, at least, it would involve a deeper investigation into the state of society among the Oriental nations, during the middle ages, than could be satisfactorily treated without indulging in conjectures which place the subject beyond the bounds of history. A few prominent facts alone require to be noticed. The Turkish nomades were compelled yearly to occupy a greater extent of land with their migratory encampments. Necessity obliged them either to exterminate other nomades, or to push before them the civilized cultivators of the soil, just as the civilized cultivators of the soil in our day, acting under the impulse of similar motives, are now driving before them the nomadic tribes of North America, Southern Africa, and Australia.

¹ Panaretos, c. 20.

The Turkomans on the frontiers of the empire of Trebizond, when they met with a numerous population, or a strong castle capable of resisting their progress, usually began their attacks by ruining the resources of the natives, not by risking a battle with them in the field. A successful foray in autumn enabled them to burn the standing grain, even when they were not strong enough to carry away plunder. The farm-houses, the cattle, and the fruit-trees were thus gradually destroyed; until at last the population was so reduced in numbers, and so impoverished, as either to emigrate or to become incapable of defending their paternal possessions. In this way the Mussulman nomades in Asia, and the Slavonian and Bulgarian herdsmen and shepherds in Europe, occupied many extensive provinces, and exterminated millions of the Greek race. Their progress, it is true, was aided by the rapacity of the central governments at Constantinople and Trebizond, which neglected the defence of the country, and, by the very nature of their administrative agency, fomented a spirit of local dissension and selfishness that took away from the people all power of acting in common, paralyzed their courage, and reduced them to a state of social degradation in which they hailed slavery as a welcome repose.

The process of depopulation was likewise at times effected by internal changes in the profits of industry. A dense population of cultivators of the soil often, in the declining period of the empire, gave way to a few graziers. This change was brought about by the fiscal severity of the government, which taxed gardens, vineyards, olive-groves, and orchards, while it neglected to repair the aqueducts, the roads, and the bridges, which could alone secure to the cultivator the power of converting his surplus produce into money at a profitable price. The peasantry made the discovery that the government could not so easily absorb the gains of a pastoral population as they could tax the fruits of the soil, and consequently it became the interest both of the great landed proprietors and of the peasantry to produce cattle, wool, and hides, rather than corn, wine, and oil. Every person who has paid attention to the condition of society in the interior of the Othoman empire must have frequently observed traces of the practical results of similar causes.

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In the decline of all absolute governments, the expenses of the sovereign absorb so large a portion of the public revenues that every department of the executive power is weakened to increase the splendour of the court. Distant lines of communications are allowed to become useless for transport. Military positions and strong fortresses are neglected, when the immediate district they cover cannot pay the expense of their maintenance. Princes often prefer dismantling fortresses to reducing the number of their chamberlains or of their court pageants. Of this spirit of economy the Turkomans frequently reaped the fruits. Every successive generation saw them gain possession of some frontier fortress, or encroach far into some province, that the emperors regarded as hardly worth defending¹. It must not, however, be supposed that they were always allowed to advance in an uninterrupted career of conquest. The army of Trebizond inherited some portion of the military discipline and science which enabled the Byzantine sovereigns not only to repulse the Saracens from the walls of Constantinople, but to drive them back beyond Mount Taurus. On the field of battle, if properly commanded, it was still superior to the nomade cavalry of the Turkomans. Even the reign of a sovereign so destitute of military talents as Alexios III. was distinguished by several successful military enterprises. The emir of Baibert was defeated and slain; and the emir of Arsinga, who had laid siege to Golacha, was repulsed with loss. On the other hand, however, the forts of old Matzouka and Golacha were ultimately captured by the Mussulmans. Limnia was either conquered by Tadjeddin, who married Eudocia, the daughter of Alexios, or it was ceded to him by the emperor as the dowry of the princess, to prevent its conquest². Alexios made a second attempt to reconquer Cheriana; but his military incapacity and the severity of the

¹ The emperor Alexios III., in his golden bull to the monastery of Sumelas, affords a strong illustration of this. The emperor says expressly that the possessions of the monastery were endangered by the frequent inroads of the Mussulmans; yet, to guard this important pass into the valley of the Pyxites, he only recommends the abbots to select their most trustworthy serfs (*πάροικον*), that good watch may be kept in the little fort near the monastery. Fallmerayer, *Original-Fragmente*, Pt. i. p. 99.

² The Limnia ceded to Tadjeddin can hardly have been the fortress mentioned by Nicephorus Gregoras as only two hundred stades distant from Trebizond. It appears to have been the name of a district between Kerasunt and Oinaion.

weather destroyed his army, which suffered greater loss from hunger and cold than from the sword of the enemy. Fortunately for the empire, the chiefs of the Turkomans directed their forces against one another, instead of uniting to conquer the Christians. Tadjeddin, the emir of Limnia, attacked Suleimanbeg, the son of Hadji-Omer, emir of Chalybia¹, at the head of an army of twelve thousand men. A great battle was fought between these princes, who were both sons-in-law of the emperor of Trebizond. Tadjeddin was defeated, and perished on the field of battle with six thousand of his army.

The character of the emperor Alexios III. was stained with far deeper disgrace by a quarrel in which he was involved with a Genoese merchant, than by all the defeats he suffered from the Turkomans. The disgraceful circumstances connected with this affair rendered the empire of Trebizond a byword of contempt throughout all the commercial cities of the East. A Genoese merchant noble, named Megollo Lercari, was settled at the colony of Caffa². He was in the habit of residing a good deal at Trebizond, partly on account of the facilities it afforded him for conducting some part of his business, and partly to enjoy the agreeable climate and gay society. As a man of rank and wealth he frequented the court of Alexios, where his knowledge of the world and intelligent conversation gained him a degree of intimacy with the emperor that excited the jealousy of the Greek courtiers. It happened one day, while playing at chess, that he became

¹ Hadji-Omer was married to a sister of the emperor.

² A doge of Genoa of this family, J. B. Lercari, was celebrated for the injustice with which he was treated by his countrymen on quitting office, and for the patriotic dignity with which he bore his persecutions, and refused to seek revenge, A.D. 1465. The doge whom Louis XIV., in the height of his insolence, compelled to visit Versailles in 1685, after the unjust bombardment of Genoa, was also a Lercari. His sarcastic reply to the vain Frenchmen, who, to make a boast of the magnificence of Versailles, asked him what he thought most wonderful in the palace, is well known—'To see me here.' The high rank held by the Genoese in the East at this period is testified by the chronicler Panaretos, who recounts that, when he was sent with several great officers of Trebizond on an embassy to Constantinople in 1363, they paid visits of ceremony not only to the emperor John V., and his father-in-law, the monk Joasaph, as the dethroned Cantacuzenos was called, but also to the podesta of the Genoese, whose name he disfigures, Leonardo de Montaldo, a distinguished lawyer memorable for his intrigues, was then captain-general of the Genoese possessions in the Levant—an office to which he had been named by the doge Boccanegra, in order to remove him from Genoa. Leonardo de Montaldo was raised to the rank of doge by his talents and his intrigues, in 1383.

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involved in a dispute with a page whom Alexios was reported to treat with unseemly favour. The young Greek, knowing that Lercari was regarded with jealousy by all who were present, carried his insolence so far as to strike the Genoese. The surrounding courtiers prevented Lercari from revenging himself on the spot: and when he demanded satisfaction from the emperor, Alexios treated the affair as a trifle and neglected his complaint.

Lercari was so indignant that he quitted Trebizond, declaring that he would hold the emperor accountable for his favourite's insolence. In order to prepare the means of gratifying his revenge he returned to Genoa, where, with the assistance of his friends and relations, he fitted out a piratical expedition, consisting of two war galleys, to cruise in the Black Sea.

He soon made his appearance off Trebizond, where he captured the imperial ships, ruined the commerce of the Greeks, ravaged the coasts, and took many prisoners, whom he treated with horrid cruelty—cutting off the ears and noses of all those who were in any way connected with the imperial service. Alexios sent out a squadron of four war galleys of superior size, manned with his best mariners and favoured by a leading wind, in the fullest confidence that the Genoese would be easily overtaken and conquered by the superior swiftness and size of these ships. But, even at this great disadvantage, the naval skill and undaunted courage of the unruly republicans gave them a complete victory over the Greeks. By a feigned flight, the Genoese succeeded in separating the four galleys from one another, and then by a combined attack they captured them all in succession. The prisoners were mutilated as usual, and sent on shore in the boats.

On this occasion an old man was taken prisoner with his two sons. When the sons were brought up to be mutilated, the old man entreated Lercari to take his life and spare his children. They had only obeyed their father's orders in taking arms against the Genoese. Lercari was moved by the noble earnestness of the father's entreaties, and for the first time a sentiment of compassion touched his heart for the innocent victims of a worthless monarch's pride, and he perhaps felt ashamed of his own brutal revenge. The old man and his sons were released and sent on shore; but they

were charged to deliver to the emperor a barrel full of the salted ears and noses of his subjects, and a letter declaring that the only means of delivering the empire from the exaction of this species of tribute was to send the author of the insult to Lercari, as a prisoner. Alexios, seeing his best galleys captured and his subjects exposed to the fury of the Genoese, submitted. The insolent page was delivered over to the vengeance of Lercari.

As soon as the young Greek beheld Lercari, he threw himself on his knees, and begged with many tears to be put to death without torture. Lercari, whose revenge was gratified by having humbled an emperor, felt nothing but contempt for the despicable page. He saw that his honour would gain more by sparing the weeping courtier, than by treating the blow he had received as a thing which of itself merited a moment's consideration. He only pushed the kneeling suppliant from him with his foot, adding with a significant sneer, 'Brave men do not revenge themselves by beating women.'

The expedition of Lercari appears to have been connected with some diplomatic transactions between the empire of Trebizond and the Genoese colonies in the Black Sea, for, at the peace which followed this transaction, the emperor Alexios engaged to put the Genoese merchants at Trebizond in possession of an edifice to serve as a warehouse. This must have been one of those great buildings like the caravan-series of the East—storehouses for goods, lodgings for merchants, and castles for defence, which, in the same way as the monasteries of the period, formed fortresses in the midst of every city, and of whose walls remains may yet be traced even in the fire-devastated city of Constantinople. The emperor also published a golden bull, confirming all the privileges enjoyed by the Genoese traders throughout his dominions.

The facts relating to the vengeance of Lercari have not been noticed by any Greek writer, and they are evidently strongly coloured by the pride and passion of the Genoese chronicles. Yet the whole history of the enterprise is so characteristic of the violence and daring of the citizens of Genoa *la superba*, that, even had it rested on a slenderer basis of fact than probably supported it, still it would have

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merited notice as a correct portraiture both of the people and the age¹.

The emperor Alexios III., though neither a successful warrior nor an able statesman, walked through life with some show of dignity as a sovereign. He received the empire, in boyhood, in a state of anarchy; he gradually restored it to order, and reconstructed the central administration. In completing this great work, he did everything in his power to secure the aid of the clergy. Policy required him to gain their good-will, in order to render their influence over the people of some practical use in re-establishing the imperial supremacy over the rival factions of the Amytzan-tarants and Scholarians. He may also have felt that something was necessary to calm his own conscience. Whether from policy, the memory of his vices, or the expression of heartfelt piety, certain is it that the ecclesiastical endowments of Alexios were singularly magnificent. He restored the church of St. Eugenios to something resembling its ancient splendour. He discovered that the 24th of June was the saint's birthday, and celebrated it annually with great pomp at the expense of the imperial treasury. He rebuilt other churches, and founded and repaired several monasteries and almshouses. The convent of nuns of Panaghia Theoske-pastos, which occupies a fine position before a cavern in the rocky face of Mount Mithrios, with a romantic view over the city of Trebizond, was enlarged, decorated, and enriched by his care and liberality². He built a church and founded

¹ This episode is recounted by most of the historians of Genoa; Agostino Giustiniano, *Ann. de Genova*, lib. iv.; Petri Bizari *Senatus Populique Genuensis rerum gestarum Hist.* p. 145, edit. Anv.; U. Foliettae *Hist. Genuensium*, lib. viii. p. 483; Paolo Interiano, *Ristretto delle Historie Genovesi*, lib. iv. The insolence of the Genoese was as great on the coasts of France as of Colchis. They complained to the seneschal of Beaucaire and to the consuls of Nîmes, that the inhabitants carried on maritime commerce, from which they pretended that the native citizens were excluded by an exclusive privilege conceded to the Genoese by the counts of Toulouse. Vincens, *Histoire de la République de Gènes*, vol. i. p. 391.

² Inscriptions commemorating the generosity of Alexios and various members of the imperial family to this monastery are given by Tournefort, *Relation d'un Voyage du Levant*, tom. iii. p. 81, 8vo edit.; by Fallmerayer, *Original-Fragmente*, Pt. i. p. 101; and Pfaffenhoffen, *Essai sur les Aspres Comménats*, pl. xiv. The paintings of Alexios, his mother, the lady Irene of Trebizond, and the empress Theodora, the size of life and clad in their imperial robes, which were seen in the vestibule of the church by Tournefort and Fallmerayer, were effaced in 1843. The church was then repaired and the vestibule replastered by the liberality of an ignorant abbess, when some hideous figures, true types of modern Greek art, were daubed over the ancient paintings. [The original figures are given in Texier's

a monastery of St. Phokas at Kordyle¹. The great monastery of Sumelas, covering the front of an immense cavern amidst the sublime rocks and magnificent forests which overhang the roaring torrents of the Melas, was enriched by his imperial bounty, and still possesses the golden bull he signed as the charter of its privileges².

But the most splendid existing monument of the liberality of Alexios is the monastery of St. Dionysius, situated in an enchanting site, overlooking the sea, on the south-western coast of Mount Athos or the Holy Mountain. It was the last constructed of the two-and-twenty great monasteries which consecrate the mountain in the eyes of the Eastern church³. The golden bull of Alexios, the charter of its foundation, is still preserved in its archives, and forms one of the most valuable monuments of the pictorial and caligraphic art of the Greeks in the middle ages. This imperial charter consists of a roll of paper, a foot and a half broad and fifteen feet long, surrounded by a rich border of arabesques. The imperial titles are set forth in capitals about three inches high, emblazoned in gold and ultramarine; and the word Majesty, wherever it occurs in the document, is always written, like the emperor's signature, with the imperial red ink. This curious document acquires its greatest value from containing at its head, under a half-length figure of our Saviour with hands extended to bless the imperial figures, two full-length portraits of the emperor Alexios and the empress Theodora, about sixteen inches high, in which their features, their imperial crowns, their rich robes and splendid jewels, are represented in colour, with all

Asie Mineure, plate 64, and in Texier and Pullan's splendid work on Byzantine Architecture, plate 66. The faces are evidently portraits, having nothing of the conventionality of the ordinary Byzantine type. The monastery is generally known as that of the Panaghia Theotocos. Ed.]

¹ The site of Kordyle is now occupied by the Turkish fort of Ak-kala.

² The romantic district in which the monastery of Sumelas is situated, amidst primeval forests, often impenetrable from the thick underwood of azaleas and rhododendrons, was called Matzouka. The distance from Trebizond is reckoned at twelve hours, but is not more than thirty miles. The golden bull of Alexios is not so magnificent as that of the monastery of St. Dionysius on Mount Athos. The imperial portraits are only about six inches high, and the seals are wanting. It is dated in December 1365.

³ [The number of monasteries on Athos is twenty. St. Dionysius, though one of the later ones, having been founded along with Simopetra, Constamonitu, Russico, and St. Paul's in the latter half of the fourteenth century, was not the last, for Stavronicea was established in 1545. Ed.]

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the care and minuteness of the ablest Byzantine artists. Immediately under the imperial titles, below the portraits, are the two golden *bullae* or seals, each of the size of a crown piece, bearing the respective effigies and titles of the two sovereigns. The seals are attached to the bull by clasps of gold¹.

Alexios III. died in the year 1390, after a reign of forty-one years. The period in which he lived was one of almost universal war, civil broils, and anarchy; and few countries in Europe enjoyed as much internal tranquillity, or so great security for private property, as the empire of Trebizond. By his diplomatic arrangements he succeeded in preserving a degree of political influence which his military reverses frequently endangered, and the transit trade which was carried on through his territories gave him financial resources vastly exceeding the apparent wealth of his small empire. The most powerful princes in his vicinity were eager to maintain friendly relations with his court, for their subjects profited by the trade carried on in the city of Trebizond. Alexios availed himself of this disposition to form matrimonial alliances between the princesses of his family and several neighbouring sovereigns, both Mohammedan and Christian. His sister Maria was married to Koutloubeg, the chief of the great Turkoman horde of the White Sheep; his sister Theodora to the emir of Chalybia, Hadji-Omer. His daughter Eudocia was first married to the emir Tadjeddin², who gained possession of Limnia; and after Tadjeddin was slain by the emir of Chalybia, she became the wife of the Byzantine emperor, John V. That prince had selected her as the bride of his son, the emperor Manuel II. (Palaeologos); but when she arrived at Constantinople, her beauty made such an impression on the decrepit old debauchee that he married the young widow himself. Anna, another daughter of Alexios, was married to Bagrat VI., king of Georgia³; and a third

¹ The account of this interesting document is given by Fallmerayer, who has published the text both of it and of the golden bull of Sumelas in the *Transactions of the Academy of Munich*, 1843; *Original-Fragments*. Pt. i. Montfaucon's *Palaeographia Graeca* (p. 476) notices this monastery in the description of Mount Athos by John Comnenus.

² Tadjeddin is called Dschiatines, Zetines, and Tatziatin. He occupied the coast of Pontus between the cities of Kerasunt and Oinaion.

³ Bagrat VI. reigned at Teflis from 1360 to 1396.

daughter was bestowed on Taharten, emir of Arsinga or Erdzendjan¹.

Constantinople was now tributary to the Othoman Turks; and its vassal emperor was glad to find an ally in the wealthy and still independent emperor of Trebizond.

The countenance and whole personal appearance of Alexios were extremely noble. He was florid, fair, and regular-featured, with an aquiline nose, which, his flatterers often reminded him, was considered by Plato to be a royal feature. In person he was stout and well formed; in disposition he was gay and liberal; but his enemies reproached him with rashness, violence, and brutal passions.

SECT. II.—*Reign of Manuel III.—Relations with the Empire of Timor.*—1390–1417.

Manuel III. received the title of emperor from his father in 1376, when only twelve years of age. As a sovereign, he was more prudent than his father, and possessed all his diplomatic talent. He lived in critical times, and was favoured by fortune in circumstances when his own resources could have availed him very little. The great Tartar irruption under Timor, that desolated Asia Minor during his reign, left his little empire unscathed. Though he was compelled to acknowledge himself a vassal of that mighty conqueror, and pay tribute to the Mongol empire for a few years, still his government was disturbed by no internal vicissitudes of importance. The only interest we feel in his reign of twenty-seven years' duration, is derived from its transitory connection with the exploits of Timor.

Alexios III. left the empire of Trebizond reduced to a narrow strip of coast, extending in an uninterrupted line from Batoun to Kerasunt, and including also the territory of Oinaion, separated from the rest of the empire by the possessions of Arsamir, the son of Tadjeddin, emir of Limnia. Its breadth rarely exceeded forty miles, its frontier running along the high range of mountains that overlook the sea. Within these limits several Christian nobles owned a doubtful

¹ Clavijo, p. 92; cited by Fallmerayer, 209.

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allegiance to the imperial authority. The city of Oinaion, with its territory, extending westward to the Thermodon, was governed by a Greek named Melissenos. As his possessions were separated from the imperial garrison at Kerasunt by the possessions of the emir of Limnia, he was almost virtually independent. Arsamir, the emir of Limnia, was, however, fortunately closely allied with Manuel, both by relationship and political interest. He was the son of Manuel's sister, the beautiful Eudocia.

Leo Kabasites, the head of a distinguished family, which had long possessed great influence in the empire, ruled an extensive territory in the mountains, and held several fortified castles, that gave him the command of the caravan route leading southward from the capital¹. The possession of these castles, which after the Othoman conquests became the residence of Deré-Begs, enabled him to levy tribute on all travellers who passed along the great road leading to Persia and Armenia.

The Spanish traveller Gonsalez de Clavijo, who was sent by Henry III., king of Castile, as ambassador to Timor, has left us a curious account of the power of Leo Kabasites, as duke of Chaldia, and of the manner in which he exercised it on those who came within his jurisdiction². The picture he gives of the insubordination and rapacity of the great nobles in the empire of Trebizond shows how generally the frame of society was convulsed by aristocratic anarchy, which was a feature of the social movement of the human race, not merely of a change in the feudal system of Europe. Clavijo confirms the expressions used by Alexios III. in his golden bull to the monastery of Sumelas, which he wished to protect against the exactions of his nobles. The Spanish traveller accompanied an envoy sent to Henry by Timor, on his way back to Samarcand. After quitting Trebizond, they were stopped by Leo Kabasites, as they entered his territory, and required to pay toll or make a present. In

¹ John Kabasites, who was killed in the shameful flight at Cheriana, was duke of Chaldia, or that portion of the mountains to the south-east of Trebizond inhabited by the Lazæ, who still resisted the advances of the Turkoman power.

² The *Itinerary* of Clavijo and the *Historia del Gran Tamerlan* were published by Gongalo Argote de Molino fol. Sevilla, 1582. Also in vol. iii. of the *Cronicas de los Reyes de Castilla*, 4to. Madrid, 1782.

vain the Mongol envoy protested that an ambassador of the great Timor was not bound to pay toll like the agent of a merchant, and insisted that he was entitled to a free passage through a land which was tributary to the Great Mongol—for Leo, as a vassal of the emperor of Trebizond, had no pretext for exacting toll from the representative of the suzerain of his prince. To all this Leo replied, that his duty was to keep the road open, which was done solely by his care, and that he was consequently entitled to receive toll from every traveller who passed. He lived in a desert district, where it was necessary to maintain a larger body of guards than the inhabitants could furnish, otherwise the mountain passes would be left open to the incursions of the nomad Turkomans, and would soon become impassable. Nay, he added significantly, at times he found it necessary to make incursions himself into the more fertile districts of the empire, to carry off provisions by force when travellers were rare. Clavijo was compelled to give the chieftain a piece of scarlet cloth and a silver dish; and the Mongol ambassador offered him at first a piece of fine linen and a dress of scarlet; but Leo was not satisfied with this present, and would not allow the two ambassadors to proceed on their journey until they had purchased a bale of camlet from a merchant in their caravan and added it to their previous presents. Leo Kabasites then treated them as his guests, and supplied them with an escort through the Christian territories, but at the same time he made as much profit as he could of their passage, by letting them pack-horses for the transport of their baggage as far as Arsinga¹.

The other Christian chiefs who acknowledged the suzerainty of the emperor of Trebizond were the signors of Tzanich, Dora, Larachne, Chasdenik, and the prince of Gouriél.

Timor was now the lord of Asia. Gibbon thought that this great conqueror had overlooked the little empire of Trebizond, amidst those mighty projects of ambition which led him to plan the conquest of China while encamped before the walls of Smyrna. Speaking of the flight of Mohammed, the son of Bayezid, from the disastrous defeat

¹ Clavijo, quoted by Fallmerayer, *Geschichte*, 240.

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of Angora, the historian observes, 'In his rapid career, Timor appears to have overlooked this obscure and contumacious angle of Anatolia¹.' But it was not so. Timor neither overlooked Trebizond nor forgot Mohammed; but neither the Greek empire nor the Othoman prince possessed a degree of importance that called for his personal presence. It reflects no discredit on the measures of Timor, either as a general or a statesman, that the empire of Trebizond outlived the Tartar power in Asia Minor, or that Mohammed I. became the second founder of the Othoman empire. Timor did not advance to the decisive battle with Bayezid until he had secured his right flank from every danger, and taken due precautions that no serious attempt could be made to interrupt his communications with the countries in his rear, by a diversion from the shores of the Black Sea.

All the princes who ruled in the countries between the gulf of Alexandretta and the sea of Trebizond, whether Christian or Mohammedan, were compelled to contribute their contingents to swell the numbers, and to form magazines to supply the wants, of the Tartar army. The king of Georgia was forced to abjure the Christian religion, and to deliver up to Timor the coat of mail which was believed by all the votaries of the Koran to have been forged by king David the psalmist, with his own hands². Taharten the emir of Arsinga, and Kara Yolouk, the chief of the Turkomans of the White Horde, became the voluntary vassals of the Mongol empire. Kara Yousouf, the redoubted leader of the Black Horde, was driven from the vast possessions over which he had wandered with his nomad army, and was a fugitive under the protection of the Othoman court.

Bayezid had pushed forward the frontiers of the Othoman empire to the banks of the Thermodon, and his territories were contiguous with the empire of Trebizond. Amasia, Tokat, and Sivas were in the possession of the sultan, who was also master of a fleet which would enable him to attack

¹ *Decline and Fall*, chap. lxy. vol. viii. 68, edit. Smith.

² Sale's *Koran*, chap. 21—'And we taught him [David] the art of making coats of mail for you, that they may defend you in your wars' This passage proves that little reliance can be placed on the pictures of society drawn by the romantic historian, translated by Ockley, who represents the Saracens, when they conquered Syria from the veteran troops of Heraclius, as mere naked warriors.

Trebizond by sea. In this state of things it became impossible for Timor to overlook the position of Manuel, nor could he without great imprudence have allowed the emperor of Trebizond to enjoy even a nominal independence. The precise period at which Timor reduced Trebizond to the rank of a tributary state cannot be exactly determined, but it seems to have taken place after the Georgian campaign in the spring of 1400. Timor detached a division of the northern army, then under his own immediate orders, to attack the empire; and Manuel made an attempt to arrest the progress of the Tartars by occupying the mountain passes. But the troops who had stormed the inaccessible cliffs and plunged into the precipitous ravines and dark caverns of the Georgian mountains, defended by the bravest mountaineers and hardest warriors of Asia, made light of the obstacles which the mercenary forces of Manuel could oppose to them. The prudence and diplomatic talents of Manuel served him better than his military skill or the courage of his army. By some negotiations of which we are ignorant, he succeeded in arresting the march of a Tartar army on Trebizond, by acknowledging himself a tributary of the Mongol empire, and placing his whole land and sea forces at the orders of Timor.

When the grand army of the Tartars marched against Bayezid, Timor ordered the emperor of Trebizond to appear in person at the head of his contingent. By some means or other, and most probably for the purpose of hastening the preparation of the naval force which Timor had ordered to be prepared to cover his flank, Manuel obtained the relaxation of this order, for there is no doubt that he was not present at the battle of Angora. His dignity and fame as a Christian emperor, and the deep detestation felt by all Christians against Bayezid, who had so often defeated the chivalry of the west, would have embalmed the name of Manuel in glory as a champion of a holy war, had he taken any part in the victory of Angora. We have too many accounts of that great battle, both by contemporary Christians and Mohammedans, to leave any doubt on the subject. At the same time, the close political alliance that existed between Taharten, the emir of Arsinga, who was highly distinguished at the court of Timor, and his brother-in-law

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Manuel, would alone be sufficient to establish the impossibility of the wary Mongol having overlooked the importance of the empire of Trebizond. Indeed, so minute was Timor's attention to every circumstance that could contribute to aid his cause in the severe struggle he anticipated with the Othoman forces, that he resolved to distract the attention of Bayezid, and deprive him of succours from his European dominions, by attacking the flank and rear of the Turkish army. For this purpose he ordered a fleet to be assembled at Trebizond; and there exists proof of this in a letter of Timor, addressed to John Palaeologos, the nephew of Manuel II., emperor of Constantinople, who governed the Byzantine empire while his uncle was begging assistance against the Turks in western Europe. This communication shows the importance attached by Timor to a naval diversion, in case of a prolonged campaign in the interior of Asia Minor. The letter is dated about two months before the battle of Angora. The Tartar monarch orders John Palaeologos to prepare immediately twenty galleys, to unite with a fleet of the same number which the emperor of Trebizond was fitting out, and to hold them ready for further orders¹. It is true that no use was made of these fleets, and that Timor did not cross the Bosphorus and lay waste the Serai of Adrianople, nor enter the walls of Constantinople; but this must be attributed to the utter destruction of the Othoman forces at Angora, and to the disappearance of every trace of further resistance in the Othoman empire; not, as Gibbon supposes, because 'an insuperable though narrow sea rolled between the two continents of Europe and Asia, and the lord of so many tomons or myriads of horse was not master of a single galley².' The reason was different.

¹ This letter is given by Fallmerayer with his usual judicious observations; *Geschichte*, 224. See also Muratori, *Rerum Italicarum Scriptores*, tom. xxii. p. 806; Marini Sanuti, *Vite de' Duchi di Venezia*. Ascala, the principal minister of Timor, was well acquainted with the naval affairs of the Black Sea. He is said to have been born at Caffa, of Genoese origin. Silvestre de Sacy (*Mémoires de l'Acad. des Inscriptions*, tom. vi. 410) has published the correspondence of Timor with Charles VI. of France in 1403. He had previously written to the republics of Venice and Genoa, to incite them to attack Bayezid.

² The army of Timor is usually represented by historians as so numerous, that common-sense tells us no such numbers could find food in the countries through which he marched. Its admirable discipline and the excellence of its equipments, the real causes of its success, are passed unnoticed. It was one of the first armies in which the various bodies of men were distinguished by the colours of their

The same political views which made Timor disdain to visit Trebizond and Brusa led him to despise Adrianople and Constantinople.

Timor ruled the world as the general of an army, not as the sovereign of a state. He was a nomad of surpassing genius, but he gloried in remaining a nomad. His camp was his residence, hunting was his favourite amusement, and, as long as he lived, he resolved that no city should relax the discipline of his invincible cuirassiers. In his eyes, wisdom and virtue existed only in tents; vice and folly were the constant denizens of walled cities and fixed dwellings. Before the battle of Angora, Timor had wisely prepared for a long war by calculating that all the resources of the immense empire of Bayezid would have been ably employed to resist the Tartars. But after the irreparable defeat of the sultan, and the total dissolution of the Turkish army, he overlooked the vitality of the administrative institutions on which the Othoman power reposed; and, in consequence of the contempt he felt for the Turks as a nation, he erroneously believed that the Othoman empire was based on the military strength of a tribe that appeared to be almost exterminated. Timor saw no Othoman army in the field, while he beheld the Seljouk princes of Asia Minor resuming all the power of which they had been deprived by Bayezid. Many tribes of Turks and Turkomans were now only vassals of the Mongol empire, and among them the Othomans appeared by no means the most powerful.

When the grand army of Timor quitted Asia Minor, a division of the troops visited Kerasunt. But the steep mountains, the winding and precipitous paths, and the want of forage for the cavalry and beasts of burden along the coast, between Kerasunt and Trebizond, saved the capital from their unwelcome presence¹. Manuel, we may rest assured, did everything in his power to collect abundant supplies of provisions and furnish ample means of transport on the shorter lines of road, in order to preserve the caravan routes

uniforms. Hammer says that Timor had the first regiment of cuirassiers mentioned in the annals of warfare. *Histoire de l'Empire Othoman*, ii. 83.

¹ Schiltberger's *Reisen*, edit. Penzel, München, 1813, p. 89, quoted by Fallmerayer, *Geschichte*, 231.

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in the immediate vicinity of Trebizond free from interruption. Fortunately none of these routes conducted to the westward. The revenues of the empire were now in a great measure dependent on the commercial importance of the capital. On quitting western Asia, Timor established his nephew, Mirza Halil, as immediate sovereign over the tributary states of Trebizond, Georgia, and Armenia, as well as over the chieftains of the Turkoman hordes¹. The troubles that ensued in the Mongol empire after Timor's death, and the departure of Mirza Halil to occupy the throne of Samarcand, enabled Manuel to throw off all dependence on the Tartars and deliver the empire from tribute.

Manuel III. died in the year 1417. He was twice married; first to Eudocia of Georgia, in the year 1377, by whom he had a son, Alexios IV., and after her death to Anna Philanthropena of Constantinople, by whom he left no children. Alexios was suspected of having hastened his father's death.

SECT. III.—*Reign of Alexios IV.—Relations with the Turkoman hordes.—Family crimes in the house of Grand-Kommenos.—1417-1446.*

After the retreat of the grand army of the Mongols, the empire of Trebizond was exposed, almost without defence, to the attacks of the two great Turkoman hordes of the Black and White Sheep, who wandered over the vast provinces that extend from the suburbs of Sinope to the walls of Bussora. Kara Yousouf, the chief of the horde of the Black Sheep, appeared for a time to be on the point of founding a great empire between the Mongols and the Turks. His conquests extended from the Euxine to the Persian Gulf. The career of Kara Yousouf was marked by the strangest vicissitudes, and a history of his empire would be nothing more than a record of his own singular adventures. Born the hereditary chieftain of a tribe that mustered thirty thousand cavalry, he was more than once forced to gain the necessaries of life as a common robber, while at other times he swept

¹ *Histoire de Timur-Bec, écrite en Persan par Cherefeddin Ali, traduite par Petis de la Croix, tom. iv. p. 120.*

through Mesopotamia at the head of sixty thousand of the finest troops in Asia. As early as the year 1387, he had tried his fortune in battle with Timor; but he was no match for the military skill of the wary Tartar. Undaunted by his first misfortune, he renewed the war in 1393; and though defeated a second time, he again raised his standard against the Tartars in 1400. In this last war, his army was so completely routed, and he was himself so hotly pursued, that, unable to conceal his movements either in the mountains of Assyria or the deserts of Mesopotamia, he fled to the court of Bayezid. The refusal of the Turkish sultan to deliver him up to Timor, who claimed him as a rebellious vassal, was the immediate cause of the invasion of the Othoman empire by the Mongols.

When Bayezid became the prisoner of Timor, Kara Yousouf fled to Cairo, where the Mamlouk king, Furreg the son of Berkouk, gave him an asylum until Timor's death. He then hastened back to the banks of the Euphrates and once more collected the Turkomans round his standard. The genius of Timor no longer directed the movements of the Tartar armies, and success attended the enterprises of Kara Yousouf. Tauris itself was captured, and became the capital of his empire. Kara Yousouf then occupied Arsinga, driving out the family of Taharten. He also defeated Oulough, who commanded the troops of the White Horde of the Turkomans for his brother Hamsa, their chieftain.

Alexios IV. was a helpless spectator of these sudden revolutions in his vicinity. He trusted, when he heard rumours of the impetuous career of Kara Yousouf, that the emir of Arsinga and the chieftain of the White Horde, who were both allied to his family, would serve as a barrier to protect his empire¹. The defeat of these allies compelled the emperor to throw himself on the mercy of the conqueror, and to declare his readiness to submit to any conditions of peace. Kara Yousouf ordered the suppliant monarch to send his daughter, the most beautiful princess of the house of Grand-Komnenos, which had long been celebrated in Asia for the beauty of its daughters, to be the wife of his son Djihanshah, and to pay the same amount of tribute to the Black

¹ Kara Youlouk, or the Black Leech, the father of Hamsa and Oulough, or Alibeg, was the son-in-law of Alexios III. Ducas, p. 69.

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Turkomans that his father, Manuel III., had paid to the Mongols¹.

Kara Yousouf died, in the year 1420, in as strange a manner as he had lived. A fit of apoplexy smote him in his tent as he was speculating on the consequences of an approaching conflict with the Tartars, in which he felt confident of victory. The next day was to have witnessed a great battle with Shah Roukh, the youngest son of Timor; and had victory continued faithful to the standard of Kara Yousouf, the empire of Asia would have passed from the Tartars to the Black Turkomans. The death of their leader, however, served as a signal for the dispersion of the Turkoman army. Each captain, the moment he heard the news, hastened from the camp to gain possession of some province rich enough to supply the means of keeping his troops together, until he could find an opportunity of selling his services to a new sovereign.

Kara Yousouf had never connected his personal authority with a systematic administration extending over all his dominions. The effect of his neglect or ignorance of political organization deserves to be contrasted with the fate of the Othoman administration after the catastrophe of Angora. While the Othoman empire revived with undiminished vigour even after the annihilation of its armies, the empire of the Black Turkomans melted away, on the death of its ruler, before any disaster had shaken its fabric. Kara Yousouf's corpse lay in his tent, surrounded by a chosen body of hardy veterans, while tribe after tribe marched off from the camp; but at length these guards, on beholding the troops in their immediate vicinity striking their tents, suddenly began to inquire what was to be done. They could not wait until Shah Roukh fell upon them. All their hopes had been concentrated in the dead prince, who had ridden proudly through their ranks the day before, promising them victory. To him they had looked for rewards and wealth, and he could serve them no longer. In this crisis, every man felt that his future fortune depended on himself, and that there was no time to lose. With one accord, as if seized by a common spirit of demoniacal impulse, the whole regiment of guards

¹ Chalcocondylas, p. 245.

rushed in silence within the royal enclosure, hitherto held sacred from intrusion, and guarded by the black eunuchs. They plundered the treasury; and, loading all the wealth in the royal tents on the first baggage horses on which they could lay hands, they departed from the camp, leaving the body of the mighty Kara Yousouf in a royal enclosure of empty canvas, surrounded by weeping women, howling eunuchs, and helpless mutes. The Tartars were more compassionate than the Turkomans. When the body was taken up for interment, it was seen that the ears had been cut off. Some avaricious officer of the Turkoman guards, who knew the inestimable value of the diamond earrings of his sovereign, on approaching the body to mark his reverence for his deceased master, had taken this strange way of perpetrating and concealing a robbery, which put him in possession of an immense treasure and prevented any one from sharing the plunder.

After the death of Kara Yousouf, the White Horde recovered its independence; and the emperor of Trebizond, protected by its power, ceased to pay tribute to the Black Turkomans.

We must now record the existence of a state of moral corruption in the house of Komnenos, calculated to insure the ruin of a nation so degenerate as to submit to such a dynasty. Without attaching much importance to the details of those anecdotes concerning the vices of the court of Trebizond that are transmitted to us by the Latins, we still find enough in Greek writers to confirm the picture they give of the crimes habitually perpetrated in the palace of the later emperors.

Manuel III. associated his son Alexios IV. with him in the imperial dignity, but he met neither with gratitude nor filial affection. Clavijo relates an anecdote which paints the state of society in the capital, as well as the relations between the two emperors. Manuel had taken into his favour a page of low birth, but of great personal advantages. This upstart obtained a degree of influence in public affairs that excited the jealousy of the nobility, accustomed to divide among themselves all the favours of the court. The discontented did everything in their power to increase the general dissatisfaction, and succeeded in awakening a popular outcry against the favourite. Alexios availed himself of the

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public indignation to form a conspiracy for seizing the reins of government and dethroning his father. He raised the standard of revolt, and, with the assistance of the people, demanded that the young page should be driven from the palace. Manuel was besieged in the upper citadel, and compelled to banish his favourite. The ambition of Alexios was now disappointed; for the people, having obtained their object, and having probably observed that he possessed worse vices than his father, ceased to support his rebellion. He succeeded, however, in making his peace with his father; and, perhaps as the price of his reconciliation, he retained the exiled page about his own person¹. His subsequent conduct led to the suspicion, already alluded to, that he caused his father's death.

Alexios IV. was a weaker and a worse man than Manuel III., and an avenger of his own filial ingratitude stepped forward in the person of an undutiful son. According to the usage of the empires of Trebizond and Constantinople, Alexios conferred on his eldest son Joannes the title of emperor. Alexios IV., like his grandfather, Alexios III., married a lady of the family of Cantacuzenos, who likewise bore the name of Theodora². The empress Theodora was impatient of her husband's conduct, and consoled herself for his neglect by too close an intimacy with the proto-vestiarios. Her son Joannes, indignant at his mother's disgrace, assassinated her lover in the palace with his own hand. But the young hypocrite contemplated the perpetration of crimes of a blacker dye than those he pretended to punish. Having made himself master of the upper citadel, he imprisoned both his father and mother in their apartments. The nobles, fearing that he was about to murder both his parents, and the people, persuaded that the young tyrant would prove a worse sovereign than the old debauchee, interfered, and delivered Alexios IV. from the hands of his son.

Joannes, who was called Kalojoannes, from his personal beauty, not from his mental accomplishments, fled to the court of Georgia, where he married a daughter of the king.

¹ See the interpretation of Fallmerayer from Clavijo; *Geschichte*, p. 216.

² Chalcocondylas, p. 246; but his text is confused. Panaretos (§ 55) mentions that the name of this empress was also Theodora.

Alexios IV. raised his second son, Alexander, to be his colleague in the imperial dignity, conferring on him all the rights of heir-apparent¹.

The greater part of the long reign of Alexios IV. was passed in luxury and idleness. The first rebellion of his son Kalojoannes occurred in the early part of his reign; about twenty years later, a second brought the emperor to a bloody grave². The death of Alexander seems to have prompted Kalojoannes to make a vigorous attempt to dethrone his father, as the only means of securing the succession to the empire. He opened communications with the powerful family of Kabasites, who stood in constant opposition to Alexios. Kalojoannes then repaired to the Genoese colony of Caffa, where he hired a large ship, which he fitted out as a man-of-war. Engaging a band of military adventurers in his service, he crossed the Euxine, invaded the empire, and seized the monastery of St. Phokas at Kordyle, where he fortified himself, and waited until some movement of his partizans should enable him to enter the capital. But Alexios felt so secure of the loyalty of the people, that he marched out to meet his son, and pitched his camp at Achantos. It seems however that a party of the emperor's attendants had been gained over to betray him, for two emissaries of Kalojoannes were allowed to penetrate into his tent at midnight. In the morning, Alexios IV. was found murdered in his bed. The parricide entered Trebizond without opposition. But it was necessary, even in the vicious state to which Greek society had then fallen, for the new emperor to repudiate the charge of having suborned his father's assassins. The obsequies of Alexios were celebrated with unusual pomp. His body, after remaining many days entombed in the monastery of Theoskepastos, was subsequently transported into the metropolitan church of Chrysokephalos. The murderers were then arraigned, for Kalojoannes declared that, though he had sent them to secure his father's person, he had charged them to pay the

¹ Chalcocondylas, p. 246. It appears that the Turkish language had already begun to corrupt the Greek dialect of Trebizond, for Chalcocondylas calls Alexander Skantarios.

² Theodora, the mother of Kalojoannes, died in 1426 according to the Chronicle, Panaretos, § 56. Her death, perhaps, followed close after the first rebellion of her son.

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strictest attention to his safety. Probably there was not a single individual in his empire who believed that he had ever supposed it possible to arrest the emperor in the midst of his army. The assassins were condemned but their lives were spared. One was punished with the loss of his hand; the other with that of his eyes¹.

The murder of Alexios IV. occurred about the year 1446, for he was alive in the year 1445; and in the year 1449 Joannes IV. was sole emperor, and had been for some time in the enjoyment of sovereign power².

¹ Chalcocondylas, 246.

² Compare a letter of Gregorios in Leo Allatius, *De Consensu Utriusque Ecclesiae*, p. 954, with Phrantzes, p. 206, edit. Bonn. In the text of Phrantzes, 6955 is erroneously given as the year. It ought to be 6958, as Phrantzes learned the death of Murad II., who died in February 6959 (1451), while he was still at Trebizond.

CHAPTER V.

END OF THE EMPIRE OF TREBIZOND.

SECT. I.—*Causes of the Rapid Rise and Vital Energy of the Othoman Empire.*

THE Othoman Turks first attacked the empire of Trebizond in the year 1442, during the reign of Alexios IV. Sultan Murad, who was an accomplished statesman as well as an able general, fitted out a fleet which he sent into the Black Sea to surprise Trebizond. In case the attempt on the city should fail, the admiral was instructed to lay waste the territories of the empire wherever they were open to attack, and to carry off as many slaves as possible. By this means the resources of the Christians would be diminished, and the ultimate conquest of the country accelerated. The attack on the city of Trebizond was repulsed, but the Turks landed at several places on the coast, plundered the country, destroyed the habitations, and carried off the young men and women to be sold in the slave-markets of Brusa and Adrianople. After ravaging the territories of the emperor of Trebizond, the fleet crossed the sea, and laid waste the Genoese possessions round Caffa. Before quitting the Black Sea, however, as the Othomans were returning to the Gulf of Moudania, which was then their naval station, this fleet was assailed by a furious tempest. Many of the largest ships were wrecked on the Asiatic coast near Heracleia, and those that escaped through the Bosphorus to Moudania and Ghiumlek brought back so little glory and plunder, that the sultan was not encouraged to try a second maritime expedition¹.

¹ Chalcocondylas, 138.

The Othoman empire is one of the most singular creations of human genius. It owed its rapid growth to institutions more than arms; and the institutions on which its greatness was founded were the work of an individual chief at the head of a small band of followers, not of the chosen lawgiver of a united nation. The name of Orkhan, or of his brother and vizier Alaeddin by whom he was guided, has not been ranked among the great legislators of mankind; yet he crushed all the feelings of humanity as sternly as Lycurgus, formed a well-disciplined army of religious enthusiasts, and called into existence a new nation¹. His contemporaries were unable to appreciate the profundity of his views, and historians have regarded the Othoman empire with feelings of religious and political prejudice, so strong as to have surveyed its ethnical anomalies with a species of mental blindness.

The grandfather of Orkhan entered the Seljouk empire, then in a state of decline, at the head of a tribe of only four hundred horsemen. Othman, his father, became the territorial chief of a small province, which he succeeded in appropriating to himself as an independent principality, at the dissolution of the Seljouk empire of Roum. His power increased; and his own little tribe of followers, whose original name is lost to history, became confounded in the various nomad hordes that recognized his authority and adopted his name. At length Orkhan conquered Nicaea, which had been for a time the capital of the Greek empire; he then gave systematic institutions to the people he ruled, and laid the foundations of a political society, destined to grow into a mighty nation. Let European pride contrast what Orkhan did with what Napoleon failed to do. Orkhan's own respect for religion, and the reverence paid by the tribe his grandfather had led into western Asia to their religious and moral duties, gave the Othomans a high rank among the Mussulmans. They were virtuous men in the corrupt mass of Seljouk society. The family education of this tribe may be more correctly estimated by its superiority for several generations over all its contemporaries, than by the declamations of historians against the vices of the seraglio.

¹ Hammer, *Histoire de l'Empire Othoman*, i, 116.

It was not chance that conferred on Orkhan and his successors a character so pre-eminent for firmness, that both Christians and Mohammedans sought to become their subjects, as a security for a stricter administration of justice, and a greater respect for personal rights, than was then to be found under any other government. This moral superiority, though it was mixed with many vices, must not be overlooked in searching for the causes of the rapid conquests of Orkhan and the earlier sultans: it is the key to the facility with which both the Seljouk Turks and the Byzantine Greeks submitted to a power originally so weak as that of the Othomans. It also illustrates the extent to which moral superiority will efface the impressions of religious truth; for we must attribute the numerous apostasies of the Greek renegades, who filled some of the highest commands in the Othoman armies, to a preference for valour and morality over policy and religion.

The most remarkable institution of Orkhan, and that which exercised the greatest influence in extending the power of his house, was the manner in which he organized a regular army into a permanent society. This army had no home but its barracks; the soldiers had no parents and no relations but their father the sultan. The choicest portion of this force was separated from the people by birth, as much as by habits and residence. It was composed of Christian children—neophytes, who became the adopted children of the sultan—and votaries especially consecrated to enlarging the domains of the prophet. Many of these children were orphans, whom the devastations of the Turkish armies would have left to perish, had Orkhan not converted them into instruments for the creation of the Othoman empire. But no permanent institution can trust to casual supplies. Orkhan, therefore, imposed a fixed tribute of children on every Christian village and town that he added to his territory. The habit was then so prevalent of selling Christians as slaves, that this inhuman tax was by no means so appalling to the conquered as we are inclined to suppose it must have proved to a Christian population. From these tribute children, Orkhan formed the celebrated corps of Janissaries, whose ranks were every year recruited and augmented by new votaries, drawn from successive conquests.

An army formed of purchased slaves had been created in the Byzantine empire by Tiberius II., towards the end of the sixth century¹. In different Mohammedan states, the same species of troops, under the name of Mamlouks, composed the principal military force. But the Janissaries differed from all preceding soldiers in the careful and systematic character of their education. The art with which their moral training was developed, and the success with which they were formed into enthusiasts, not less adroitly fitted for their peculiar mission than the Jesuits themselves, must place Orkhan, and the counsellors who aided him in establishing this strange college of destruction, among the greatest masters of political science. Perhaps they themselves did not perceive that they were among the worst corrupters of human society. Few institutions, formed to educate mankind for good purposes, have been so successful as this accursed college of infant proselytes of war, by means of which the Othoman sultans conquered Christianity in the East. In the time of Orkhan the Janissaries received an annual addition of two thousand tribute children. No accumulation of noble idlers encumbered their ranks with insufficient aristocratic or titled officers; nor could wealth or favour introduce military incapacity to a permanent command over such a band of well-disciplined enthusiasts. The institutions of the Janissaries at last declined; but the Greeks had lost their political existence long before the decline was perceptible.

Orkhan also gave the cavalry and infantry of his dominions a new organization, which rendered them the centre of a civil and financial administration. But enough has been said to indicate how the Othoman empire absorbed the better and more energetic portions of the Greek race, and converted the aspiring and ambitious among the Christian population of the East into agents of its power. That the steady progress of the Othoman conquests was not solely the result of brutal force or of individual talent, is sufficiently evident. No combinations, not based on permanent institutions and enduring causes, could have given a small tribe of nomads the power of invariably increasing in power at every change in the circumstances of those around them, and of surviving the greatest

¹ See vol. i., *Greece under the Romans*, 301.

misfortunes. The defeat of Angora would have annihilated any other Asiatic dynasty and empire.

It has been noticed that Timor believed the Othoman power dissolved by that battle; yet little more than ten years from the day that Mohammed I. fled, attended by only one faithful vizier, from the bloody field which seemed to have destroyed the power of his race, he reunited under his sway nearly the whole of the dominions of his father Bayezid. The Seljouk principalities of Aidin, Saroukhan, Mentshe, Kermian, and Karamania were restored by Timor to their ancient extent; so that each of these Turkish states had a better chance of subduing its neighbours than the Othoman sultan. The sagacious Tartar overlooked the power of Orkhan's institutions; he did not perceive that the tribute of Christian children levied in Europe rendered the foundations of the Othoman power at Adrianople every day more firm. The Christian population of the European provinces, which the Tartars never entered and wasted, furnished new sinews to the Othoman empire.

The civil administration of the Othoman government was as intimately connected with the tribute children as the military power. Orkhan, like the Greek philosophers of antiquity, was aware of the importance of commencing the education of the servants of the state at the earliest period of life. The tribute children were collected in colleges, at the age of eight and nine. In the earlier days of the empire they were all educated in the imperial palace. Those of superior mental capacity were trained as administrators and jurists; those who appeared to possess only bodily strength and activity became pages, guards, and Janissaries; while any happy combination of physical and mental advantages insured their possessors the rank of generals, pashas, and viziers. The Jesuits conducted their projects of domination over the human mind with less skill than Orkhan, for their system was not so closely interwoven with the physical principles of the aristocracy of nature. It is not, therefore, surprising that the Othoman administration was superior, both in the field and the cabinet, to all its contemporaries. Systematic education and true discipline existed, at that time, only in the papal church and the Othoman government; and they had far deeper roots in the hearts of the individuals composing the latter than the former, because the seeds were planted at an earlier age.

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SECT. II.—*Reign of Joannes IV. called Kalojoannes.*—

A.D. 1446-1458.

The Greeks of Trebizond had now lost all feeling of national independence: they thought only of pursuing their schemes of official intrigue or commercial gain without interruption. The example of their Georgian neighbours, who defended their liberty with determined courage, made no impression on the Greeks. The vices of the government nourished the worthlessness of the people. The dynasty of Grand-Komnenos began to be regarded by the Christian population of the country, Tzans or Lazes, as a race of foreign tyrants, and its alliances with the Turkoman plunderers of the frontiers increased the aversion. While profound hatred rankled in the hearts of the Colchian mountaineers, many bitter observations on the imperial diplomacy must have been frequently wrung from the native clergy. The state of moral degradation into which the Greek princes of this age had fallen, the mean spirit of the Greek archonts, and the avarice of the Greek dignified clergy, were so offensive, that the common people everywhere looked to their conquest by the Othomans as an event preferable to the continuance of their actual miseries¹.

Joannes IV. was hated by his subjects for his crimes; yet the force of social habits upheld the established order of things in his dominions, and the foreign attacks on his government were repulsed without creating any domestic disturbances. The decline of the empire of Trebizond was, however, so apparent to strangers, that one of the small independent Mussulman princes in the Armenian mountains made a bold attempt to render himself master of the city of Trebizond, a few years after the accession of Joannes. This assailant was Djouneid, the sheik of Ertebil, grandfather of Ismael the founder of the Persian dynasty of Sofis². His army was collected from the neighbouring tribes, and particularly from the population of the district of Samion³. With this force the

¹ Chalcocondylas, 245.

² Chalcocondylas, 247; Hammer, *Histoire de l'Empire Othoman*, iii. 78, iv. 89; *Historia politica Constantinopoleos*; Crusius, *Turcogracia*, 41.

³ The Samion of Chalcocondylas appears to be the Samtskhe of the Armenians

sheik of Ertebil marched to Meliars, and rendered himself master of the pass of Kapanion, near Cape Kereli. The emperor Joannes advanced to oppose the progress of the enemy, and encamped at the monastery of Kordyle, in the position he occupied when his father was assassinated. The duke of Mesochaldion, chief of the house of Kabasites, then held the rank of Pansebastos, and commanded the imperial forces under the eye of the emperor. It was resolved to make a joint attack on the army of sheik Ertebil by land and sea. The duke led the troops forward to storm the pass of Kapanion, while the fleet was ordered to harass the flank and rear of the enemy. But the violence of the wind raised such a swell at the moment of attack, that the ships were unable to approach the shore, and the Mussulmans, deriving every advantage from their position, routed the Christians without much difficulty. The pansebastos, his son, and thirty chosen men, who were leading the attack, were killed. On beholding the defeat of the advanced guard, terror seized the rest of the army at St. Phokas; and the troops, probably considering it a Divine judgment on an act of parricide, fled to the capital in confusion. The emperor escaped on board the fleet, and was among the first to reach Trebizond.

The sheik of Ertebil took many prisoners, most of whom he ordered to be immediately put to death. He then occupied the camp of the Greeks, and secured the plunder. In the mean time Trebizond was thrown into such a state of alarm, that he would probably have succeeded in capturing it, had he not wasted his time in murdering his prisoners and collecting the plunder of the camp in person. Rumour declared that he was already in possession of the monastery of St. Sophia, and all the inhabitants of the western suburb crowded into the citadel for safety. An Armenian woman, whose house was situated within the western wall built by Alexios II., felt so alarmed, that, for additional security, she fled into the city. Unfortunately she left some charcoal burning in her abandoned dwelling, and in the middle of the night flames burst from her house and quickly spread to the adjoining buildings. Frightful confusion ensued. The people believed that the

—one of the provinces of Iberia or Georgia. Saint-Martin, *Mémoires Hist. et Géog. sur l'Arménie*, ii. 357, 427.

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Mussulmans had stormed the outer fortifications, and the greatest terror prevailed lest, by seizing the western bridge, they should be able to enter the city. It was repeated from mouth to mouth that a conspiracy was formed to deliver up the citadel to the sheik of Ertebil, and this report increased the animosity which each section of the motley population of Trebizond entertained against the citizens of a different race, and prevented every man from placing confidence in his neighbour.

On this critical occasion the emperor Joannes showed both prudence and courage. The stake was his empire and his life. He ordered all the gates of the various fortifications to be immediately closed, and allowed no communications between the different parts of the capital, except to the troops acting under his own orders. The towers of the western enclosure and the monastery of St. Eugenios were garrisoned. The emperor, at the head of a guard of fifty men-at-arms, hastened in person to the fire, and then made the round of the western enclosure during the remainder of the night. In this manner he prepared the troops for offering an efficient resistance to the invaders, and succeeded in restoring some degree of order among the inhabitants of the quarter most exposed to attack. The alarm of the people was diminished when it was found that the fire was accidental, and that the fortifications were uninjured. But in the quarter towards the Meidan, which was unprotected by walls, confusion continued to prevail. The inhabitants sought safety at the port, endeavouring to embark on board the vessels in the harbour. The nobles, whose palaces were situated in this quarter, instead of repairing to the citadel to aid in defending their country, placed themselves in security, by a precipitate flight to Iberia in the first ships they could hire.

On the following day the sheik of Ertebil encamped on the hill above the quarter of Imaret Djamisi, extending his lines to the ground now occupied by that picturesque mosque and the tomb of the mother of sultan Selim I.¹ The towers of the

¹ The mosque of Imaret buried in trees, the tomb of the sultana, the medress or college cloisters, the public kitchen and bakehouse, and the stables for the steed of the lonely traveller, present a noble relic of the bright days of the Othoman power, when charity was as much an Osmanli virtue as ferocious valour. They are all now crumbling into ruins, partly from the effects of time, but more from neglect.

fortification of Alexios defended the approach to the western bridge, and the great western ravine separated the enemy by an impassable gulf from the upper citadel. Though the sheik arrived too late to take advantage of the confusion of the preceding night, he still hoped to profit by the general alarm. His army was too small to attempt forming the regular siege of a place so large as Trebizond, with its extensive suburbs; and the central citadel, protected by its two ravines, could only be assailed from the narrow isthmus to the south. The sheik of Ertebil, however, expected to terrify the Greeks into a surrender. He ordered his guards to bring out his most distinguished prisoner, Mavrokostas, an imperial equerry and postmaster of the empire, whom he had spared at the massacre of the other prisoners, but whom he now beheaded before the walls. This cruelty inflamed the garrison to seek revenge instead of disposing them to surrender, and the Mussulmans were repulsed in all their assaults on the western suburb. It was soon necessary to retreat from Trebizond; and the sheik encountered an additional repulse when he attacked the fort of Mesochaldion, in the hope that its capture would palliate his loss before the capital. But he revenged himself for his failures by carrying off an immense booty and a crowd of slaves from the open country¹.

The empire of Trebizond was on the brink of ruin; yet self-conceit blinded the emperor and his Greek subjects to the dangers that surrounded them. On no subject did their scholastic presumption so completely stultify the Byzantine Greeks in every age as on their foreign policy. They always underrated the intellectual powers of their opponents, more, even, than they overrated their own political talents and physical force. Under the influence of this habitual defect, the emperor Joannes rejoiced when he heard of the death of the politic Murad II., and immediately began to form projects for converting the young sultan, Mohammed II., into a serviceable ally, believing that an experienced Greek like himself would easily overreach an inexperienced Turkish youth in the paths of diplomacy. In this he mistook both his own capacity and the character of the young sultan. It must seem strange to those who do not appreciate the full extent of the imme-

¹ Chalcocondylas, 247.

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morial presumption of the Byzantine court, to find that all the Greek princes in this age shared the fancy, that they should be able to direct the career of Mohammed II. to their own ends. Their diplomatic agents at the court of Murad II. must have had their perceptions strangely obscured by vanity, when they were unable to give their masters any presentiment of the great talents and firm character of the fiery Mohammed. Constantine, the last emperor of Constantinople, allowed himself to be so far deluded by this national self-conceit, as, in his diplomatic communications with the Sublime Porte, to remind the sultan that it was in his power to raise a rebellion among the Turks, by releasing Orkhan, the great-grandson of sultan Bayezid, who was allowed to reside at Constantinople as a hostage, with a Turkish *pensión*. Such menaces are rarely forgotten even by the weakest sovereigns. The young Mohammed revenged himself for the insult by putting an end to the Byzantine empire.

With this example before him, the emperor Joannes IV. formed the plan of expelling the Othoman Turks from Asia Minor; a plan which he vainly believed he could find others to execute under his direction. His negotiations did not escape the watchful eye of the young sultan, who, as soon as he had taken Constantinople, determined to give the emperor of Trebizond some foretaste of the Othoman power. The first operations were intrusted to Chitir Bey, the governor of Amasia, who was ordered to make a vigorous attack on the empire by land and sea.

During the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the towns inhabited by the Greeks, both in Europe and Asia, were visited by fearful pestilential maladies in such rapid succession, that plague alone seemed to threaten the nation with extinction¹. This calamity was caused by the neglect of the people as much as by the indifference of the government. No attention was paid to the most necessary police and sanatory regulations, either by emperors, archonts, or municipal authorities. Each man in power was occupied in rendering his situation as profitable as possible to himself,

¹ In the Short Chronicle at the end of Ducas, nine great plagues are mentioned between the years 1348 and 1431, besides a partial pestilence in the Peloponnesus in 1422. Panaretos informs us that the state of Trebizond was no better.

his relations, and clients. Those measures which are absolutely requisite for the maintenance of health in crowded cities were disregarded, and the moral degradation of the Greeks was fitly represented by the filthy condition of the densely populated localities where they dwelt. No human prudence, it is true, can guarantee mankind from every visitation of pestilence, but the neglect of cleanliness invariably produces an augmentation of physical sufferings.

At the time Chitir Bey invaded the empire of Trebizond, the plague was carrying off the inhabitants of the capital with such fearful rapidity, that the emperor was unable to take any steps for defending his dominions. The Othomans plundered all the open country, and marched up to the walls of the capital, without meeting the slightest resistance. Chitir Bey descending from Boustépé, on which he had established his camp, attacked the eastern suburb, and made himself master of the Meidan and the neighbouring quarter. All the houses and magazines east of the fortified monastery of St. Eugenios were pillaged, and two thousand prisoners were secured; for the Turks, bold from their confidence in predestination, despised the danger of the plague. The emperor, unable to carry on war in the midst of a dying population, offered to submit to any terms Chitir Bey thought fit to impose. The Othoman leader, seeing that the force under his command was inadequate to besiege the citadel, and having performed the task of reconnoitring the military power and political resources of the empire, consented to retire, and even to release his prisoners, on Joannes acknowledging himself a vassal of the Othoman empire. The emperor sent an embassy to Constantinople, to receive the sultan's orders concerning the definitive treaty of peace, and his brother David was the ambassador who presented himself before Mohammed II. Peace was granted on very easy terms; the sultan fixing the annual tribute of the empire at the paltry sum of three thousand pieces of gold¹. But he seems to have had no intention of abstaining from hostilities longer than suited his interests. This treaty put an end to the political independence of the Greeks, if, indeed, we are authorized to consider the mongrel and semi-Asiatic inhabitants of Trebizond and its

¹ Chalcocondylas, 221, 248, edit. Paris.

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territory as at this time possessing a claim to be regarded as Greeks.

The emperor Joannes knew that his tenure of power would be of short duration, unless he could break the chain that bound him to the Sublime Porte, and the last years of his reign were occupied in preparing for revolt. As the military resources of his own empire were inadequate to sustain a contest with a single pasha, and as he knew that he could count on no patriotic feelings in the breasts of his Greek subjects, nor on the good-will of the hardy Lazian mountaineers, who were oppressed by the exactions of a host of imperial tax-gatherers and impoverished by the extortions of senators and nobles, he was compelled to look abroad for some powerful ally. The daring courage and prosperous fortunes of Ouzoun Hassan, the chieftain of the Turkomans of the White Horde, who was then advancing in a rapid career of conquest, made him a rival of Mohammed II. in the general estimation¹. On being invited to join in a league against the Othoman Turks, Hassan demanded, as the price of his assistance, the hand of the emperor's daughter Katherine, who was renowned over all Asia as the most beautiful virgin in the East. He required also to be invested with the sovereignty of Cappadocia as her dowry; for it seems the Christians of that province, who were still numerous, attached some importance to the vain concession. Joannes IV. was delighted to purchase his alliance on such easy terms. Yet, in order to save the honour of a Christian emperor with the Christian world, and, perhaps, as a balm to his own conscience, more tender about marrying his daughter to an infidel than murdering his father, he inserted in the treaty a clause by which the beautiful Katherine was insured the exercise of her own religion, and the privilege of keeping a certain number of Christian ladies as her attendants, and of Greek priests in her suite, to serve a private chapel in the harem. To the honour of Hassan, it may be observed that he strictly fulfilled his engagements, after the empire of Trebizond and the house of Grand-Komnenos had ceased to exist².

¹ Hassan, called Ouzoun Hassan, on account of his tall stature, was the grandson of Kara Youlouk (the Black Leech), the first celebrated chieftain of the horde of the White Sheep.

² Katherine was called by the people Despina Katon. Ramnusio, *Delle Navigat. et Viaggi*, tom. ii. 84; Fallmerayer, *Geschichte*, 261. The beauty of the princesses

Joannes also concluded alliances, offensive and defensive, with other princes, particularly with the Turkish emir of Sinope, who still maintained his independence, with the Seljouk sultan of Karamania, and with the Christian princes of Georgia and Cilician Armenia. All these allies engaged to make preparations for a vigorous attack on the Othoman dominions, and high expectations were entertained that the young Mohammed would be expelled from Asia Minor; but, as often happens among allies, each member of the alliance trusted that his neighbour would prove more active and energetic than himself.

At this critical conjuncture Joannes IV. died before witnessing the effects of the storm he had laboured to raise. He left a son named Alexios, only four years old, who was set aside to allow his uncle David to mount the imperial throne. No respect for the rights of their nearest relations seems ever to have influenced the minds of Greek princes or nobles, to whom any chance of ascending a throne presented itself. The ambition of wearing a crown annihilated every private virtue. From the days of the tyrants of Hellenic history to those of the emperors of Constantinople and Trebizond, the feelings of family affection and the ties of duty were habitually neglected or contemned. The depravity of the house of Grand-Komnenos may have led David to violate his duty; but the peculiar difficulties of the times would have served him as an apology for departing from the ordinary rules of succession, had it been possible by such a change to place an able administrator or an experienced warrior at the head of the government. In an ill-organized state a regency is often a greater evil than a usurpation. David, the new emperor, was a weak and cowardly man, and his conduct in usurping his nephew's place was the result of mere pride and vanity, not of noble or patriotic ambition. He had secured the support of the powerful family of the Kabasites, who were now independent lords of the province of Mesochaldion; and this alliance, joined to the indifference of the people, fortified him against all opposition¹. He could like-

of Trebizond was a theme of universal praise, and its fame was echoed in the romances of the West. The sad lot which the fair face of the beautiful widow Eudocia procured her at Constantinople has been mentioned.

¹ Chalcocondylas, 262.

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wise pretend that the rule of succession to the empire was not so clearly laid down as to exclude an uncle of full age, in preference to his nephew when a minor.

SECT. III.—*Reign of David.—Conquest of Trebizond by Sultan Mohammed II.—1458-1461.*

David was a fit agent for consummating the ruin of an empire. Proud, effeminate, and incapable, he blindly rushed forward in the course of policy his more energetic brother had traced out. All his attention was required to prepare for the coming war with the Othoman sultan; and he was fortunate enough to gain a respite of two years before the commencement of hostilities, in consequence of Mohammed considering that the affairs of the Greek despots in the Morea required to be finally adjusted before transferring the bulk of the Othoman armies into Asia. The haughty stupidity of David appears to have rendered him unable to appreciate the value of the strict discipline of the Janissaries and the admirable organization of the sultan's armies, though he had seen them in full activity as he stood a suppliant at the Sublime Porte soliciting the treaty for his brother. He was too little either of a soldier or a statesman to be sensible of the dangers of the contest into which he was hurrying. Yet he must have contemplated the possibility of his capital being besieged by Mohammed II., as it had often been by far weaker enemies. But even for this contingency he made no reasonable preparation. Nothing but the most complete ignorance of the changes which had recently taken place in the military art could induce any officer in Trebizond to fancy that the antiquated defences of the capital could offer any prolonged resistance to the new system of attack with heavy artillery, of which the fall of Constantinople was a recent and terrific example. The tower, crowning the highest point of the citadel, recently added to the fortifications by Joannes IV., could hardly, even in the opinion of David, have been considered capable of serving as a palladium against the Othoman power, any more than the bones of St. Eugenios. Yet the emperor acted as if such was his firm conviction.

The first step of David, as emperor, was to complete the matrimonial alliance of his family with Ouzoun Hassan ; for Joannes IV. died before the marriage of the beautiful Katherine had been celebrated. The princess was now sent to her bridegroom with suitable pomp. She soon acquired great influence over his mind, and in her conduct generally displayed more sense and talent than any other member of her house. New treaties of alliance were signed with Ismael of Sinope, and with the Christian princes of Georgia, Imerethia, Mingrelia, and Cilician Armenia.

David even made an attempt to revive the expiring spirit of crusading among the nations of western Europe ; but in his propositions for rendering the passions of the warlike Franks subservient to the selfishness of Greek policy, he miscalculated the political sagacity of the Latins, and the diplomatic astuteness of the papal court. In the letters addressed by David to Pope Pius II. (Aeneas Sylvius) and to Philip the Good, duke of Burgundy, to invite them to make a diversion in his favour on the side of Hungary, he indulged in such exaggeration and bombast, while enumerating the forces of his allies in Asia, that Pius II., though really disposed to do everything in his power against the Turks, could not trust the writer. After the capture of Trebizond, this Pope wrote a letter to Mohammed II., begging him to treat the Christians who had fallen under his sway with humanity ; but his intercession was probably of little service to the captives, for his Holiness availed himself of the opportunity to preach a sermon to the sultan on the advantages of embracing the Christian faith¹. Philip of Burgundy was as little pleased with the letter of the emperor as the Pope. David offered to reward his services by promising to acknowledge the duke as king of Jerusalem. This was treating Philip as a child ; for if the duke of Burgundy could conquer this distant kingdom, he certainly stood in no need of the acknowledgment of a suppliant who was begging aid to defend his own capital. To attack the Othoman sultan on the banks of the Danube, at the recommendation of the Greek sovereign of Trebizond, was, moreover, not the nearest way to conquer the kingdom

¹ The letter of Pius II. is printed in the collection of Reusner, *Epistolæ Turcicæ*, p. 239.

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of Jerusalem, which was then in the hands of the Mamlouk kings of Egypt.

The assistance the empire of Trebizond received from the Catholics was limited to the mission of a Minorite monk, who was sent by the Pope to preach war against the Othoman sultan among the Christians in Asia, and to promise support to their Mussulman allies. This emissary passed through Trebizond, on his way to Iberia, Georgia, Diarbekr, Cilicia, and Karamania. On his return, he brought back letters from the emperor of Trebizond and the princes of Iberia and Georgia, and he was accompanied by their envoys, as well as by ambassadors from Ouzoun Hassan to the duke of Burgundy¹. But Trebizond was taken by the Turks before Pope Pius II. could concert any steps for its defence. His zeal for a holy war was sincere ; and he died at Ancona in 1464, hastening forward preparations for an expedition against the Turks.

The only result of the coalition against the Othoman power was to point out to Mohammed II. the enemies against whom it was necessary to turn his arms and make use of his diplomatic arts. The only member of the alliance whose power and talents rendered him dangerous to the Othoman empire was Ouzoun Hassan, and, at first, the Turkoman chief showed no eagerness to engage in the contest. His whole attention was directed to establishing his supremacy over the rival horde of the Black Turkomans. But the persuasion of his beautiful wife at last determined him to embark in the war. In 1459 he sent an embassy to the Porte, to ask Mohammed to release David from the annual tribute of three thousand pieces of gold, and at the same time he reminded the sultan of a debt due by the Othoman Porte to the White Horde. Sultan Mohammed I. had agreed to purchase the friendship of Kara Youlouk, the grandfather of Ouzoun Hassan, by the payment of an annual tribute of one thousand prayer carpets and equipments for a thousand horsemen ; but this tribute had remained unpaid for nearly sixty years. The demand was justly considered

¹ Wadding, *Annal. Minor.* tom. xiii. The letters of David and Pius II. to the duke of Burgundy are given by Fallmerayer (*Geschichte*, 266) from the work of the Pope himself (Aeneas Sylvius). *Opera Geographica et Historica*, 4to. Helmstadii, 1699 ; Reusner, *Epist. Turcicas*, pp. 189, 191.

by the sultan as an insulting bravado. His reply was worthy of the haughty race of Othman. After hearing the Turkoman envoy patiently to the end, he replied calmly, 'Depart in peace; I will soon come to Mesopotamia, and discharge all my debts¹.'

As soon as Mohammed II. had completed the subjugation of the Greeks in the Morea, he resolved to conquer those in Asia. In order to secure his European dominions from all inquietude during his Asiatic campaigns, he concluded peace with his brave enemy, the Albanian prince Scanderbeg, in the month of June 1461². A large naval and military force was already prepared for action. A fleet of a hundred and fifty galleys had been fitted out in the port of Constantinople during the winter, and a powerful army collected at Brusa in the spring. About this time Mohammed wrested Amastris from the Genoese. That city was the principal Genoese fortress on the coast of Asia Minor, yet it surrendered the moment the sultan appeared in person before its walls; and the republic found itself too weak to declare war with the Othoman empire even after this attack. The Genoese were willing to make any territorial sacrifice in the East, in order to preserve their commerce in the Black Sea³.

The preparations of Mohammed had been immense, and their precise object was never communicated even to his own ministers. The inhabitants of Sinope, of Trebizond, and of Caffa were all equally filled with consternation; but their rulers felt so confident that the whole force of the storm would be directed against the Turkomans, that they neglected to take the necessary precautions for an immediate siege. Before the Othoman army moved, it is said that the *cadi* of Brusa ventured to ask the sultan against what enemy he intended to direct his forces. The young sultan turned

¹ Ducas, 192; Chalcocondylas, 261.

² The chronology of Mohammed's operations in Asia Minor is rather doubtful. Little reliance can be placed on the Turkish historians, according to Hammer. Chalcocondylas (258) says that the campaign against Sinope commenced in the year after the conquest of the Morea, as soon as it was spring. But Mohammed did not leave his capital before the end of June, as his letter, accepting the peace with Scanderbeg, is dated at Constantinople, 22d June 1461 (Barletius, 193; Lavardin, *Histoire de Georges Castriote, surnommé Scanderbeg*, 323); consequently the conquest of Trebizond must have taken place late in the year 1461.

³ Chalcocondylas (245) mentions the conquest of Amastris at an earlier period; but as he says that the sultan was present in person, which is confirmed by the Turkish historians, it seems that it must have taken place in 1461, before the conquest of Sinope.

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sharply to the inquisitive old judge, and replied, 'If a hair of my beard knew my secret, I would pluck it out and cast it into the fire.'

The power of Mohammed II. was great, the valour and discipline of the Othoman armies unrivalled, and their sovereign's confidence in his own military talents boundless. Yet he did not disdain to employ deception and falsehood for the furtherance of his ends. The Greeks had already persuaded their Turkish lords that these were the most effective weapons of political experience. Mohammed's eagerness to increase his territorial possessions, led him to confound deceit with wisdom, and ferocity with valour. No falsehood appeared to be dishonourable, if it tended to aid him in his conquests, or enabled him to spare the blood of his veteran troops; nor did any cruelty appear blamable that was exercised against the enemies of the house of Othman.

The sultan's first object was to detach Ismael, the emir of Sinope, from his alliance with the emperor of Trebizond. The fortress of Sinope was strong, and in a condition to make a long defence. Its port is the best on the southern shore of the Black Sea; so that its possession was necessary for the security of the left flank of the Othoman army. If it were besieged, the whole summer might be wasted, and the Turkomans, by making an irruption into the heart of Asia Minor, might find an opportunity of raising the siege. Mohammed, therefore, conceived that he could gain possession of the place more rapidly by deceit than by force of arms. An envoy was sent to Ismael, to assure him that the expedition of the Othoman army was destined to bestow the inestimable gift of the true faith on the infidels of Trebizond, and that he had nothing to fear. The emir of Sinope, willing, on the near approach of danger, to secure peace for himself, and fearing perhaps to appear as the ally of Christians, and the enemy of Mussulmans engaged in a holy war, allowed himself to be deceived by the sultan's assurances, and neglected to put his capital in a state of defence.

After Mohammed had made himself master of Amastris, and concluded his treaty with Scanderbeg, he hastened to the head-quarters of his army, which had advanced to Angora. The son of Ismael presented himself in the camp, bearing rich presents from his father. The position of the Othoman

army now cut off all hope from the emir of Sinope of receiving aid from the Turkomans. Amasia was occupied by a powerful body of troops, and the Othoman fleet was already in sight. The sultan, though still wearing the mask of friendship, changed his tone, and communicated his orders to Ismael in a hypocritical strain of advice. He counselled the emir to surrender Sinope, since the Othoman power alone was capable of defending a city whose possession was so important to the true faith, and he offered in exchange a territory in Europe of equal value. Ismael, who was a weak man and destitute of energy, felt so alarmed at this sudden display of hostile feeling on the part of his powerful neighbour, that he was glad to secure what we may call a large civil list: he resigned his dominions, and received the government of Philippopolis as an indemnity for the hereditary principality of Sinope.

The resources at the command of this feeble prince, and the strength of the situation of Sinope, were, in the opinion of Mohammed II., cheaply purchased by a little tergiversation. Ismael was one of the wealthiest sovereigns of his time. He possessed a well-filled treasury, besides an annual income of two hundred thousand gold ducats. The rich copper mines in his territory alone yielded about fifty thousand ducats annually to the sultan, after he entered on their possession. The ramparts of the isthmus which connects Sinope with the mainland, and the fortifications which overlooked its two ports, were crowned with four hundred pieces of artillery, large and small. The garrison consisted of two thousand musketeers, and ten thousand soldiers armed in the ordinary manner of the age, with spear, bow, sword, and iron mace. Many war-galleys and large ships were ready for sea in the ports; and one of these was of the burden of nine hundred pithoi, which we may perhaps call tons, as it was the largest vessel in the Eastern seas. The magazines were filled with provisions and military stores. But the cowardice of Ismael rendered all these advantages unavailing, and Mohammed II. became master of Sinope without opposition¹.

¹ Sinope still presents an interesting but rude miniature of Strabo's description. The land wall across the isthmus is in a neglected state, and several towers incline considerably from the perpendicular, so that it offers no traces of that strength which could have resisted the attacks of Mohammed. It contains hardly five thousand inhabitants; yet the natural advantages of its situation, and its valuable

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The sultan hastened eastward by the road of Amasia and Sivas. An army of Turkomans attempted to arrest his progress; but it was swept from his path by the charge of the Janissaries, and Arsinga and Koyounlou Hissar were occupied. Ouzoun Hassan, who had taken up a position in the passes leading to Kamakh, perceived that he had nothing to hope in a pitched battle with the Othoman army, which exceeded his own in numbers as much as in discipline. The country was ill adapted for the effective employment of cavalry, and it was only by availing himself of the excellence of his light horse that the Turkoman chieftain could expect victory. He saw the necessity of soliciting peace, and sent his mother as his ambassador to the sultan. Mohammed was fully aware of the impolicy of involving himself in a protracted war either amidst the mountains of Armenia or in the great plains beyond the Euphrates, into which it would be easy for the Turkomans to retire, and from whence they could renew their attacks as soon as the Othoman army was compelled to retire into winter-quarters. Under these circumstances, Mohammed listened with pleasure to the supplications of Hassan's mother, and a treaty of peace was concluded. Its principal condition was, that the Christians of Trebizond were abandoned to their fate by the chieftain of the White Turkomans. Thus ended the coalition with the Mussulmans, which the emperor Joannes IV. had regarded as a masterpiece of diplomatic skill, and on which he had counted for the ruin of the Othoman power and the aggrandizement of the Greek empire of Trebizond.

David was now left to encounter the whole force of his enemy without any ally. In the year 1459, when he expected an immediate attack, he had made arrangements for enrolling twenty thousand troops and fitting out thirty galleys. The mountaineers of Georgia were ready to furnish experienced warriors, and among the Frank and Italian adventurers in the Black Sea he could have found many brave and skilful mariners. The storm was delayed; David forgot his danger; and the autumn of 1461 found him utterly unprepared to sustain a prolonged siege in his capital.

port enlivened by the Greek quarter rising on the peninsula that overlooks it, with the houses shaded by trees, impress the mind of the traveller with wonder, that human institutions can so completely neutralize every advantage of nature as they now do in this celebrated spot.

When the sultan led his army against the Turkomans, his fleet quitted Sinope, and began to blockade Trebizond, in order to cut off its communications with Caffa and Georgia. The troops on board the fleet landed, burned the suburbs, and invested the fortress. For thirty-two days the place was closely blockaded, but little progress was made in pushing forward the siege. The news then reached the camp that the Turkomans had been defeated, and that Ouzoun Hassan had concluded a separate peace, and abandoned his Christian ally to his fate. The emperor David, on hearing the news, lost all hope of defending his empire, and thought only of preserving his treasures and his life. The example of Constantine, the last emperor of Constantinople, who, by falling gloriously in the breach, had raised an imperishable monument in the hearts of all the Greeks, awakened no sympathetic feeling in the breast of the last emperor of the degraded race of Grand-Komnenos.

Mohammed II. lost no time in leading his army over the lofty and inhospitable chain of mountains that serves as a barrier to the city of Trebizond. The advanced guard, under Mahmoud Pasha, took up its position at Skylolimne¹, and summoned David to surrender his capital. The cowardly prince declared that he was ready to enter into negotiations for a capitulation. Messengers were instantly despatched to inform the sultan of the humble sentiments of his enemy, and spare the advance of any more troops from the interior to the sea-coast. Mohammed II. dictated the terms on which he was willing to accept the submission of David. He required the instant surrender of the fortress and citadel of Trebizond, and offered, in exchange, to assign the emperor an appanage equal in value to that which he had conferred on Demetrius Palaeologos, the dethroned despot of Misithra. To hasten the decision of the timid emperor, Mohammed added a threat, that in case his offer was not immediately accepted, he would storm Trebizond, and put all the inhabitants to the sword. David had no thought of resisting; he only desired to secure the terms most advantageous to his own personal interests: of his subjects he took no heed, for he transferred them to the sultan without even one single request in their favour. He would

¹ Skylolimne, or *dog-lake*, is called by the Turks Gultchair, or *rose-meadow*. It is a small marsh about three miles from Trebizond.

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fain have bargained with the sultan for better conditions for himself; but when he found this to be hopeless, he embarked with his family and his treasures on board one of the Turkish galleys, to enjoy luxurious ease in his European appanage. Pope Pius II. endeavoured to do more for the Greeks than either the emperor of Trebizond or the despots of the Morea.

Kerasunt, which was occupied by a garrison of imperial troops, and Mesochaldion, the stronghold of the Kabasites, surrendered on the first summons. Even the inhabitants of the mountains submitted to the sultan's government without an attempt at resistance. The people generally found the Othoman administration less rapacious than that of the Greek emperors; and the tyranny of the nobles prevented the rural population from feeling any attachment to the semi-independent princes in the different parts of the empire. The population of the city of Trebizond, however, had cause to repent bitterly the cowardice of their emperor. Had their city been taken by storm, their condition could not have been worse.

There can hardly be a doubt that had Trebizond been defended by a man possessing a small portion of the courage and military skill of the Albanian prince Scanderbeg, Mohammed II. would have been compelled to abandon the siege and withdraw his army until the following spring; or, had he persisted in attacking the place so late in the year, he would have met with a repulse as disastrous as that which he suffered under the walls of Belgrade. In a few weeks the Othoman fleet must have quitted the open anchorage of Trebizond, and it would have been impossible to keep the army properly supplied with provisions and stores by sea during the storms of an Euxine winter. To attempt the collection of provisions for the army in the mountainous districts around would have been unavailing, while it would have involved the troops in a desultory warfare with a brave and hardy population, and exposed the sultan to have all his communications by land cut off, even during the intervals when the weather in this cold and rainy district left the road passable. Sultan Mohammed saw and appreciated these difficulties. His rapid advance from Sinope had prevented the army from bringing up the necessary tents and baggage for an autumnal encampment. No siege artillery had arrived

with the fleet, nor had preparations been commenced for casting battering-guns. In all probability, therefore, if the emperor of Trebizond had boldly refused to listen to any terms of surrender, and contented himself with offering an increase of tribute, and a sum of money to the sultan for the expenses of the war, prudence would have induced Mohammed to accept these terms, and withdraw his army without loss of time.

The force of these observations, and the natural propensity of mankind rather to accuse a subject of treachery than to believe a sovereign can be guilty of meanness and cowardice, led the Greeks to accuse George, the protovestiarios of the empire of Trebizond, of having caused the surrender of the capital by the treacherous communications he made to the sultan and the bad advice he gave to the emperor. George happened to be the cousin of Mahmoud Pasha, the commander of the first division of the Othoman army; he was, therefore, selected as the envoy sent to negotiate the surrender. This was sufficient to excite the imaginations of the Greeks, who held it less dishonourable to their nation to suppose that the last independent Greek state was conquered by the treachery of an individual, than by the cowardice of its sovereign and the degradation of its people. They had found a melancholy consolation in attributing the fall of Constantinople to the weakness of Giustiniani, yet they ought to have felt that if a few hundred Greeks had fought by the side of Constantine until the last day of the siege as bravely as Giustiniani, Mohammed II. might have been foiled in his attack. George, the protovestiarios, was perhaps accused with as much injustice as Giustiniani. After all, little persuasion must have sufficed to induce the timid David to surrender a fortress he had made no proper preparations to defend¹.

Sultan Mohammed passed the winter at Trebizond. The internal administration of this important conquest, forming an advanced post amidst people still hostile to the Othoman domination, required to be regulated with care, in order to prevent the Christians from finding an opportunity for rebel-

¹ Dorotheos, metrop. of Monemvasia, *Greek History*, p. 553, edit. 1631; Crusius, *Turco-Graecia*, 21.

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lion. No infliction of human suffering arrested the policy of Mohammed, so that the measures he adopted were of frightful efficacy. Only one-third of the Christian population, composed exclusively of the lower classes, was allowed to remain in the capital; and even this remnant was compelled to take up its residence in the distant suburb of St. Philip, beyond the Meidan, overlooking the dwellings of the fishermen. The wealthy Greeks, the independent nobles, the Kabasites, and other members of the territorial aristocracy, were ordered to emigrate to Constantinople. Their estates in the country, and their palaces in the capital, were conferred on Othoman officers, unless some individual in the family of the possessor became a renegade; in that case, he was usually put in possession of the family property. The remainder of the population, consisting of young persons of both sexes, were set apart as slaves for the sultan and the army. The boys of the noblest families, remarkable for strength and beauty, were placed in the imperial serai as pages, or in the schools of administration as pupils. Eight hundred youths were selected to be enrolled in the corps of Janissaries, and crowds were dispersed among the soldiers in the capacity of slaves.

The whole Christian population having been expelled from the ancient city, the houses were distributed among a Mussulman colony of Azabs; and for many years no Christian was allowed to pass the two narrow bridges over the magnificent ravines of Gouzgoun-déré and Issé-lepol, which form the gigantic moats to the table-rock of Trapezous. The citadel was garrisoned by a body of Janissaries, and the palace of the emperors became the residence of the pasha, who, from the tower recently constructed by Joannes IV., looked out over the city where Christian emperors had ruled for more than two centuries and a half.

The dethroned emperor David was not long permitted to enjoy the repose he had purchased at the price of so much infamy. For a few years he lived undisturbed at Mavronoros, near Serres, which he had received in exchange for his empire. At length he was suddenly arrested by order of the sultan, and sent with his whole family to Constantinople. Mohammed suspected him of carrying on secret communications with Ouzoun Hassan, and plotting to recover possession of Trebizond. The great Turkoman chieftain had prospered after

his defeat. He had completed the subjugation of the Black Horde, and conquered all Persia, so that Mohammed felt seriously alarmed lest he should join his forces to the army of the sultan of Karamania, who was preparing to attack the Othoman empire. At this crisis a letter from Despina Katon to her uncle David was intercepted by the Othoman emissaries. The fair Katherine requested David to send her brother, or one of her cousins, to be educated at the court of her husband. This letter afforded convincing proof to the suspicious sultan that David was plotting with Ouzoun Hassan, to recover possession of Trebizond and re-establish the empire.

Mohammed's suspicion was a sentence of death to the whole race of Grand-Komnenos. When David arrived at Constantinople he was ordered to embrace the Moslem faith, under pain of death. Adversity had improved the unfortunate prince. Though he had been formerly a contemptible emperor, he was now a good Christian. He rejected the condition proposed with firmness, and prepared to meet his end with a degree of courage and dignity very unlike his conduct in quitting the palace of his ancestors. His nephew Alexios, whom he had excluded from the throne, and his own seven sons, perished with him¹. Even George, the youngest, who had been separated from his family and compelled to become a Mussulman, was executed with the rest of his family, lest he should find an opportunity, at some future period, of joining the Turkomans and reviving his claims to the sovereignty of Trebizond. The bodies of the princes were thrown out unburied beyond the walls. No one ventured to approach them, and they would have been abandoned to the dogs, accustomed during the reign of Mohammed II. to feast on Christian flesh, had the empress Helena not repaired to the spot where they lay, clad in a humble garb, with a spade in her hand. She spent the day guarding the remains of her husband and children, and digging a ditch to inter their bodies. In the darkness of the night compassion, or a sense of duty, induced some of the friends and followers of her house to aid in committing the bodies to the dust. The

¹ Alexios, the son of Joannes IV., had been assigned a residence in Pera. The name Beyoglou, by which this suburb is known to the Turks, is said to have been given it when it became his residence. *Constantiniade, ou Description de Constantinople, le Ancienne et Moderne*, p. 162.

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widowed and childless empress then retired to pass the remainder of her life in mourning and prayer. Her surviving daughter was lost to her in a Turkish harem. Grief soon conducted her to a refuge in the grave¹.

The Greek population of Trebizond never recovered from the blow inflicted on it by Mohammed II. No Christian descendants of the families who inhabited the city in the times of the emperors now survive. Of the four hundred families who at present dwell in the suburbs, all have emigrated from the neighbouring provinces within the last two centuries². The only undoubted remains of the ancient race of inhabitants are to be found in a class of the population that has embraced Islam, or, to speak more correctly, that conforms to the external rites of the Moslem faith, while it retains a traditional respect for Christianity. A large portion of the mountaineers of Colchis embraced Islam; some became confounded with the rest of the Mussulmans in the Othoman empire; but the inhabitants of some districts retained a slight tincture of Christianity in the interior of their own families, and for four centuries they have preserved this attachment to the religion of their ancestors. Their conversion, which for many generations was simulated, became at last almost complete. They always, however, openly boasted of their descent from Christian ancestors, and they owed the toleration they obtained from the Osmanlis more to a conviction of the strength of their sinews than to any confidence in the purity of their faith³.

In concluding the history of this Greek state, we inquire in vain for any benefit that it conferred on the human race. It seems a mere eddy in the torrent of events that connects the past with the future. The tumultuous agitation of the stream did not purify a single drop of the waters of life. Yet

¹ Chalcocondylas (265), Phrantzes (414, edit. Bonn), Crusius (*Turco-Graecia*, 21), and Spandugnino, recount the facts relating to the fall of Trebizond. The execution of David took place in the interval between 1466 and 1472. Mohammed II. marched against Ishak, sultan of Karamania, in 1466, shortly after David was arrested. But his execution may have been delayed until Ouzoun Hassan became the chief object of the sultan's attention. In 1472 Mohammed II. defeated Ouzoun Hassan at Otloukbeli, in the mountains near Arsinga.

² Fallmerayer, *Fragmente aus dem Orient*, vol. i. p. 67.

³ The Greeks call them Krumlidhes, a name which seems connected with, or derived from, the same source as that of a distinguished family of Mussulman-Christians in Crete, of whom a good account will be found in Pashley's *Travels in Crete*, i. 105.

the population enjoyed great advantages over most of the contemporary nations. The native race of Lazes was one of the handsomest, strongest, and bravest in the East. The Greek colonists, who dwelt in the maritime cities until they were children of the soil, have always ranked high in intellectual endowments. The country is one of the most fertile, beautiful, and salubrious on the face of the earth. The empire enjoyed a regular civil administration, and an admirable system of law. The religion was Christianity, and the priests boasted of the purity of their orthodoxy. But the results of all these advantages were small indeed. The brave Lazes were little better than serfs of a proud aristocracy. The Greeks were slaves of a corrupt court. The splendid language and rich literature which were their best inheritance were neglected. The scientific fabric of Roman administration and law was converted into an instrument of oppression. The population was degraded, and despised alike by Italian merchants and Turkish warriors. Christianity itself was perverted into an ecclesiastical institution. The church, subject to that of Constantinople, had not even the merit of being national. Its mummary alone was popular. St. Eugenios, who seems to have been a creation of Colchian paganism as much as of Greek superstition, was the prominent figure in the Christianity of Trebizond.

The greatest social defect that pervaded the population was the intense selfishness which is evident in every page of its history. For nine generations no Greek was found who manifested a love of liberty or a spirit of patriotism. The condition of society which produced the vicious education so disgraceful in its effects, must have arisen from a total want of those parochial and local institutions that bind the different classes of men together by ties of duty and benevolence, as well as of interest. No practical acquaintance with the duties of the individual citizen, in his every-day relations to the public, can ever be gained, unless he be trained to practise them by constant discipline. It is, doubtless, far more difficult to educate good rulers than good subjects; but even the latter is not an easy task. No laws can alone produce the feeling of self-respect; and where the sense of shame is wanting, the very best laws are useless. The education that produces susceptibility of conscience is more valuable

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than the highest cultivation of legislative, legal, and political talents. The most important, and in general the most neglected, part of national education, in all countries, has been the primary relations of the individual to the commonwealth. The endless divisions and intense egoism that arose out of the Hellenic system of autonomy, where every village was a sovereign state, disgusted the higher classes with the firmest basis of liberty and social prosperity. Despotism was considered the only protection against anarchy, and perhaps in the existing state of society it alone afforded the means of securing some degree of impartiality in the administration of justice. But despotism has ever been the great devourer of the wealth of the people. The despotism of the Athenian democrats devoured the wealth of the free Greek cities and islands of the Aegean. The despots of the Roman empire annihilated the accumulated riches of all the countries from the Euphrates to the ocean. The empires of Byzantium and of Trebizond were mild modifications of Roman tyranny, on which weakness had imposed a respect for order and law that contended with the original instincts of the imperial government. But in the empire of Trebizond, from the earliest period of its existence, the power of the Roman administration and the Roman law was weak, and it became constantly weaker, until at last both the government and the people were in danger of falling into a state of anarchy.

APPENDIX.

I.

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF THE EMPERORS OF ROMANIA.

Baldwin I., count of Flanders and Hainault	1204 to 1205
Henry	1206 — 1216
Peter of Courtenay	1216 — 1219
Robert	1220 — 1228
Baldwin II.	1228
John de Brienne	1231 — 1237
Baldwin II.	1261

Titular Emperors.

Baldwin II. until his death	1273
Philip I. of Courtenay	1273 — 1286
Catherine I. of Courtenay, married to Charles of Valois	1286 — 1308
Catherine II. of Valois, married to Philip of Tarentum	1308 — 1346
Philip II. of Tarentum	1313 — 1332
Robert of Tarentum, prince of Achaia	1346 — 1364
Philip III. of Tarentum	1364 — 1373
James de Baux or Balza	1373 — 1383

The descendants of Baldwin II. became then extinct.

II.

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF THE KINGS OF SALONIKI.

Boniface, marquis of Montferrat	1204 to 1207
Demetrius	1207 — 1222

Titular Kings.

Demetrius	1222 — 1227
Boniface III., marquis of Montferrat (the Giant) .	1227 — 1254
William, marquis of Montferrat (the Great) .	1254 — 1284
William ceded the title to the Byzantine emperor, Andronicus II., who married his daughter Irene.	
William dalle Carceri, signor of Negrepont, married a daughter of King Demetrius, and assumed the title of king of Saloniki, which he bore in 1243 ¹ .	

The house of Burgundy received a grant of the kingdom of Saloniki from Baldwin II. in 1266, when he was only titular emperor of Romania.

Hugh IV. of Burgundy	1266 to 1272
Robert	1272 — 1305
Hugh V.	1305 — 1313
Louis, prince of Achaia	1313 — 1315
Eudes IV., duke of Burgundy, sold his royal title to Philip of Tarentum, by which it became reunited with the empire of Romania .	1315 — 1320

III.

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF THE DESPOTS OF EPIRUS, THE EMPERORS OF THESSALONICA, AND THE PRINCES OF THESSALIAN VLAKIA.

Despots of Epirus.

Michael I., Angelos Comnenos Ducas	1204 to 1214
Theodore, became emperor of Thessalonica .	1214

Emperors of Thessalonica.

Theodore	1222 to 1230
Manuel	1230 — 1232
John, son of Theodore	1232 — 1234
John governed Thessalonica as despot	1234 — 1244
Demetrius, his brother	1244 — 1246

¹ Rainaldi, *Annales Eccles.*, ann. 1243, tom. xxi. p. 298.

Despots of Epirus.

Michael II., natural son of Michael I.	1230 — 1267
Nicephorus I.	1267 — 1293
Thomas I.	1293 — 1318
Thomas II., count of Cephalonia	— — —
John, count of Cephalonia	— — 1337
Nicephorus II., count of Cephalonia	— — 1358

Princes of Thessalian Vlaskia.

John Dukas, natural son of Michael II.	1258 — 1290
Son of John Dukas	1290 — 1300
John Dukas II.	1300 — 1308
John Angelos	

Despot of Epirus of Servian origin.

Thomas Prelubos	1367 — 1385
Esau Buondelmonte married the widow of Prelubos		1386 — 1399

Despots of Epirus of the Family of Tocco.

Charles I., count palatine of Cephalonia, duke of Leucadia	1400 — 1429
Charles II.	1429 — 1452
Leonard	1452 — 1469

IV.

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF THE DUKES OF ATHENS.

House of De la Roche.

Otho	1205 to 1225
Guy I., de Ray	1225 — 1264
John, son of Guy	1264 — 1275
William, brother of John	1275 — 1290
Guy II., son of William	1290 — 1308

House of Brienne.

Walter de Brienne, cousin of Guy II.	1308 — 1311
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Catalan Grand Company.

Roger Deslau	1311 to 1326
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House of Aragon, Dukes of Athens and Neopatras.

Manfred, son of Frédéric II., king of Sicily	1326 to 1330
William, son of Frederic II.	1330 — 1338
John, regent of Sicily, son of Frederic II.	1338 — 1348
Frederic, marquis of Randazzo, son of John	1348 — 1355?
Frederic III., king of Sicily	1355 — 1377
Maria, daughter of Frederic III., married Martin, king of Aragon	1377 — 1386

House of Acciaiuoli.

Nerio I.	1386 — 1394
Antonio, his natural son	1394 — 1435
Nerio II., grand-nephew of Nerio I.	1435 — 1453
Infant son of Nerio II., with his mother as regent	1453 — 1455
Franco, nephew of Nerio II.	1455 — 1456

V.

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF THE PRINCES OF ACHAA AND MOREA.

William de Champlitte	1205 to 1210
Geffrey I. Villehardouin	1210 — 1218
Geffrey II.	1218 — 1246
William	1246 — 1277
Isabella, married thrice—	1277 — 1311
1. Philip, son of Charles of Anjou, king of Naples	1267 — 1278
2. Florenz of Hainault	1291 — 1297
3. Philip of Savoy	1301 — 1311
Maud of Hainault, married thrice—	1311 — 1317
1. Guy II., duke of Athens, who died	1308
2. Louis of Burgundy	1313 to 1315
3. Hugh de la Palisse	1316

Claimants of the Principality.

John, count of Gravina, pretended husband of Maud of Hainault	1317 — 1324
Eudes IV., duke of Burgundy, under his brother's will.	
Philip of Tarentum, as lord-paramount, in virtue of the forfeiture of Maud, and by purchase from Eudes IV.	1324 to 1332

Robert, titular emperor of Romania . . .	1332 — 1364
Mary de Bourbon, widow of Robert . . .	1364 — 1387
Louis, duke of Bourbon, her nephew, died in 1410.	

Suzerains or Lords-paramount of Achaia.

The Latin emperors of Romania, until Baldwin II. ceded his rights to Charles of Anjou, king of Naples, in	1267
Charles of Anjou	1267 — 1285
Charles II., king of Naples	1285 — 1294
Charles II. ceded his rights to his son Philip of Tarentum, who married Catherine of Valois, titular empress.	
Philip of Tarentum	1294 — 1332
Catherine of Valois, by grant from her husband	1332 — 1346
Robert, titular emperor and reigning prince of Achaia	1346 — 1364
Philip III., titular emperor	1364 — 1373
James de Baux	1373 — 1383

VI.

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF BYZANTINE DESPOTS IN THE MOREA.

From the time Misithra and the other fortresses were ceded to the emperor Michael VIII., until the year 1349, the Byzantine possessions in the Morea were ruled by a Strategos, whose term of command was generally short 1262 to 1349

Despots.

Manuel Cantacuzenos	1349 to 1380
Theodore Palaeologos I., son of the emperor John V.	1388 — 1407
Theodore Palaeologos II., son of Manuel II.	1407 — 1443
Constantine XI., the last emperor of Constantinople	1428 — 1450
Thomas, governor of Kalavryta in 1428, despot	1430 — 1460
Demetrius	1450 — 1460

VII.

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF DUKES OF THE ARCHIPELAGO AND NAXOS.

Family of Sanudo.—Dukes of the Archipelago.

1. Mark I.	1207 to 1220
2. Angelo	1220 — 1262

3. Mark II.	1262 — 1293
4. William I.	1293 — 1323
5. Nicholas I., son of William I.	1323 — 1341
6. John I., brother of Nicholas	1341 — 1362
7. Florence Sanudo, married to John dalle Carceri, 1359; to Nicholas Spezzabanda, 1363	1362 — 1371
8. Nicholas III., son of Florence Sanudo and John dalle Carceri	1371 — 1381

Family of Crispo.—Dukes of Naxos.

9. Francis I., signor of Melos	1381 — 1397
10. James I.	1397 — 1418
11. John II., brother of James I.	1418 — 1437
12. James II., son of John II.	1437 — 1447
13. John James, son of James II.	1447 — 1453
14. William II., son of Francis I.	1453 — 1463
15. Francis II., son of Nicholas, signor of Santorin	1463 — 1463
16. James III.	1463 — 1480
17. John III., brother of James III. ¹	1480 — 1494
18. Francis III.	1500 — 1519
19. John V.	1519 — 1564
20. James IV.	1564 — 1566

VIII.

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF THE EMPERORS OF TREBIZOND.

1. Alexios I., Grand-Komnenos	1204 to 1222
2. Andronikos I., Ghidos	1222 — 1235
3. *Joannes I., Axouchos ²	1235 — 1238

¹ The republic of Venice held the duchy in sequestration from 1394 to 1500.

² The asterisk marks the sovereigns of whom coins are known to exist. These coins are silver aspers and half aspers. The larger appear to be the miliaresion, of which twelve were equal to a gold byzant. They weigh less than two penny-weights. There are some concave copper pieces, with St. Eugenios on the reverse, that seem to belong to Trebizond. Saulcy (*Suites Monétaires Byzantines*, 330) and Köhne (*Beiträge zur Geschichte und Archäologie von Chersonesos in Taurien*, 231) have persisted in attributing these coins to Cherson, though Baron Marchant had pointed out the reason for assigning them to Trebizond. The question no longer admits of doubt. Mr. Borrel of Smyrna possesses a silver asper of Manuel III.; reverse, a full length figure of St. Eugenios, with the legend ΘΕΥΓΕΝ—ΟΤΡΑΠΙΣΤΙΟ. The author observed a painting of the emperor Manuel I. in the mosque of St. Sophia, with a medallion of St. Eugenios on horseback, in the attitude in which he is represented on some of the coins, on the emperor's breast. For the coins, see Pfaffenhoffen, *Essai sur les Aspres Comnénats, ou blancs d'argent de Trebizonde*.

4. *Manuel I., the great captain	1238 to 1263
5. Andronikos II.	1263 — 1266
6. Georgios	1266 — 1280.
7. *Joannes II.	1280 — 1297
8. *Theodora	1285
9. *Alexios II.	1297 — 1330
10. Andronikos III.	1330 — 1332
11. Manuel II.	1332 — 1332
12. *Basilios	1332 — 1340
13. Irene	1340 — 1341
14. Anna Anachoutlou	1341 — 1342
15. *Joannes III.	1342 — 1344
16. *Michael	1344 — 1349
17. *Alexios III.	1349 — 1390
18. *Manuel III.	1390 — 1417
19. *Alexios IV.	1417 — 1446
20. *Joannes IV., Kalojoannes ¹	1446 — 1458
21. *David ²	1458 — 1461

IX.

GENEALOGICAL TABLE OF THE FAMILY OF GRAND-KOMNENOS.

Andronicus I., emperor of Constantinople, who reigned from 1182 to 1186, was the progenitor of this family. He was the son of Isaac, third son of the emperor Alexius I., and cousin to the emperor Manuel I. An elder brother of Andronicus, named John, abjured the Christian religion, and was called by the Turks Tchelebi, or the young lord. The Greeks afterwards pretended that he was the progenitor of the Othoman sultans, but this is a mere fable.

Manuel, the eldest son of the emperor Andronicus, was the father of two sons, Alexios and David.

I. ALEXIOS, first emperor of Trebizond, 1204–1222, assumed the name of Grand-Komnenos. He left three children, Joannes I., Manuel I., and a daughter.

¹ Fallmerayer (*Original-Fragmente*, Pt. i. p. 68) gives an inscription in the outer face of the great tower in the citadel, which indicates that the tower was finished in 1460; and he supposes the reign of John IV., who built it, ended in that year. Historians place his death earlier, and the inscription seems only to give the date of the completion of the work of John.

² For the coin of David, see *Revue Archæologique*, 15 Mai, 1849.

- II. **ANDRONIKOS I.**, Ghidos, married the daughter of Alexios I., and succeeded his father-in-law. He died in 1235 without issue.
- III. **JOANNES I.**, called *Axouchos*, 1235-1238. He left a son called Joannikios, who was excluded from the throne and became a monk.
- IV. **MANUEL I.**, the great captain (*ὁ στρατηγικώτατος*), 1238-1263, second son of Alexios I., was married three times. 1. To Roussadan, princess of Iberia, by whom he had a daughter, Theodora. 2. To Anna Xylaloe, by whom he had Andronikos II. 3. To Irene Syrikaina, by whom he had Georgios and Joannes II.
- V. **ANDRONIKOS II.**, 1263-1266, died without issue.
- VI. **GEORGIOS**, 1266-1280, son of Manuel I. and Irene, died without issue.
- VII. **JOANNES II.**, 1280-1297, second son of Manuel I. and Irene, married Eudocia, daughter of Michael VIII., Palaeologos, emperor of Constantinople, in the year 1282. He had two sons, Alexios II., his successor, and Michael, the sixteenth emperor of Trebizond. Eudocia died in 1302.
- VIII. **THEODORA**, the daughter of Manuel I., by his first marriage with the Iberian princess Roussadan, was the eighth sovereign of Trebizond. She drove her brother, Joannes II., from the throne in the year 1285, and governed the empire for a short time.
- IX. **ALEXIOS II.**, 1297-1330, was the ninth sovereign. He was born in the year 1283. He married a princess of Iberia, and had six children. 1. Andronikos III. 2. Basilios, the twelfth sovereign. 3. Michael Asachoutlou. 4. George Achpouganēs. 5. Anna Anachoutlou, the fourteenth sovereign of Trebizond. 6. Eudocia, despoina of Sinope, so called from having married the Turkish emir of that city.
- X. **ANDRONIKOS III.**, 1330-1332, had a son, Manuel II.
- XI. **MANUEL II.** reigned only a few months. He was put to death in 1333.
- XII. **BASILIOS**, 1332-1340, the second son of Alexios II. He married Irene Palaeologina, natural daughter of Andronicus III. of Constantinople. Basilios had no legitimate issue, but he had four children by a lady of Trebizond named Irene. 1. Alexios, who died young. 2. John,

who became the seventeenth sovereign of Trebizond, under the name of Alexios III., born 5th October, 1337. 3. Maria, married in 1352 to Koutloubeg, chieftain of the Turkomans of the horde of the White Sheep. 4. Theodora, married in 1358 to the emir of Chalybia, Hadji-Omer.

XIII. IRENE PALAEOLOGINA, 1340-1341, widow of Basilios, became the thirteenth sovereign of Trebizond.


XIV. ANNA, called Anachoutlou, 1341-1342, daughter of Alexios II., was the fourteenth sovereign of Trebizond.

XV. JOANNES III., 1342-1344, son of Michael the sixteenth sovereign, grandson of Joannes II., was the fifteenth sovereign. He died at Sinope, leaving a son, in 1361.

XVI. MICHAEL, 1344-1349, second son of Joannes II., was placed on the throne when his son was dethroned¹.

XVII. ALEXIOS III., 1349-1390, second son of Basilios by Irene of Trebizond, married in the year 1352, Theodora, daughter of Nicephorus Cantacuzenos, brother of John, emperor of Constantinople. They had seven children— 1. Basil, born in 1358; died before his father. 2. Manuel III., born 1364. 3. Anna, born 1356, married 1367 to Bagrat VI., king of Iberia. 4. Eudocia, married 1380 to Tadjeddin, emir of Limnia; after his death, to John V., emperor of Constantinople. 5. A daughter married to Tahartan, emir of Arsinga. 6. A daughter married to Suleiman Bey, son of Hadji-Omer, emir of Chalybia. 7. A daughter married to Kara Youlouk, chieftain of the White Turkomans (Ducas, p. 69). Alexios III. had also a natural son named Andronicus, born 1355, died 1376.

¹ The genealogy of the members of the family of Grand-Komnenos, and the order in which they occupied the throne, from the death of Joannes II. to the accession of Alexios III., is best represented in a tabular form. The number prefixed to each name indicates the order of his succession to the throne:—



XVIII. MANUEL III., 1390-1417, son of Alexios III., married first, Koulkan or Koulchanchat of Teflis, who took the name of Eudocia; and second, in 1396, Anna Philanthropena. He had one son, Alexios IV., christened Basilios (Panaretos, § 50), born 1382.

XIX. ALEXIOS IV., 1417-1446, married in 1396 Theodora Cantacuzena, and had six children—1. Joannes IV., his successor. 2. Alexander, who received the title of emperor, but died during his father's lifetime. Alexander married a daughter of Gattiluzi, prince of Lesbos, and had a son named Alexios. 3. David, the twenty-first and last emperor of Trebizond. 4. Maria, married to John VI., emperor of Constantinople. 5. A daughter married to George Brankovitz, despot of Servia. 6. A daughter married to Dijhan Shah, chieftain of the Black Horde of the Turkomans.

XX. JOANNES IV., 1446-1458, called Kalojoannes, married a daughter of Alexander, king of Iberia, and had three children—1. Katherine, married in 1458 to Ouzoun Hassan, chieftain of the White Turkomans. 2. A daughter married to Nicholas Crispo, signor of Santorin. 3. Alexios.

XXI. DAVID, 1458-1461, married, first, Maria, daughter of Kyr Alexios of Gothia in the Crimea; and second, Helena Cantacuzena, by whom he had seven sons and a daughter. All his sons were strangled with himself and Alexios, the son of Joannes IV., about the year 1470. The daughter of David, and Alexios the son of his brother Alexander, were compelled to embrace Islam.

X.

LIST OF THE CHIEFS OF THE TURKOMAN HORDE OF THE WHITE SHEEP, AK KOYOUNLOU¹.

- I. Thour Alibeg Al Turkmanni.
- II. Fakhreddin Koutloubeg, son of the preceding, married, in 1352, Maria, sister of Alexios III., emperor of Trebizond.

¹ D'Herbelot, *Bibliothèque Orientale*, art. Turkman, p. 893.

- III. Kara Youlouk Othman, son of Koutloubeg, received his name of Kara Youlouk (the Black Leech) on account of his sanguinary disposition. He married a daughter of Alexios III.; died 1406.
- IV. Hamzabeg, son of Kara Youlouk, died 1444.
- V. Gehanghir, son of Alibeg or Oulough, grandson of Kara Youlouk, succeeded his uncle Hamza. He was dethroned by his brother Ouzoun Hassan.
- VI. Ouzoun Hassan, married in 1458 the beautiful Katherine, daughter of Joannes IV. of Trebizond.



